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Abstract 
This thesis explores the justification for and realisation of the formal rule of law ideal in 
EU competition law. It argues that the form of market intervention for determining the 
legality of business conduct matters, although European enforcement has not always 
appreciated its significance. It defends aspirations towards the formal rule of law in the 
fundamentally economic endeavour of competition policy: determining lawfulness 
through the application of generalised, equally-applicable, and comprehensible norms, 
subject to robust judicial review. While this less-discriminating form of market 
intervention is necessarily imperfect when compared with conduct-specific evaluations 
of competitive consequences, thus inaccurately prohibiting the efficient and permitting 
the inefficient, more restrained and structured determinations of legality facilitate the 
realisation of other important values. 
Part I justifies efforts to approximate the formal rule of law ideal in competition policy. 
Both the Chicago School of antitrust and German Ordoliberalism indicate support for 
enforcement through the application of generalised norms that are administrable and 
comprehensible to businesses. Their perspectives on the legitimate form of market 
intervention are woven into broader works of jurisprudence, liberal constitutional 
theory, and institutional economics, thereby demonstrating the political and economic 
significance of the formal rule of law ideal for competition enforcement. Part II 
evaluates its mixed realisation in EU competition policy. On the one hand, the 
Commission has often prioritised the effective pursuit of its ends to make markets work 
“better”, seeking to maximise the scope for discretionary interventions as it deems 
necessary and perhaps facilitated by deferential judicial review. On the other hand, 
certain presumptions and multi-stage tests for determining legality in EU competition 
law incorporate efficiency considerations ex ante into generalised norms that afford 
normative certainty to firms. Albeit imperfect, these are interpreted as admirable 
attempts to optimally reconcile economically-accurate ends and a means approximating 
the formal rule of law. 
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Introduction 
Scholarly interest in EU competition policy derives from its location at the intersection 
between law and economics, which brings together a suite of contrasting concepts and 
methods to make markets work “better”. Most decisions of the European Commission 
or judgments of the EU Courts pursuant to Articles 101 and 102 TFEU1 can be 
interpreted as complex, sometimes tense, interdisciplinary syntheses. Exploring such 
frictions has been a perennial occupation of competition scholars.  
Since the inclusion of competition provisions within the Treaty of Rome, countless 
commentators have considered the substantive relationship between law and 
economics in the field. For example, how should the economic goal/s pursued by EU 
competition law be understood? Do particular decisions, cases, and legal doctrines 
cohere with economic learning? Does economics reveal “gaps” where anticompetitive 
conduct escapes legal prohibition? In these enquiries, law is an empty vessel. As it lacks 
an essential substantive content of its own,2 the question is the extent to which EU 
competition law has accurately absorbed contemporary economic thinking. 
Alternatively, scholars have also routinely addressed the appropriate form of market 
intervention: of how the economic goal/s of competition policy ought to be realised 
through the medium of law. Consider two reflections: 
“…competition policy cannot be based on economics alone. The rule of law is a pillar of 
the constitutional system: it makes the enforcement of competition policy predictable 
and allows economic actors to adapt their behaviour.”3      
“…traditional lawyers remain reluctant to use economic analysis since it may make the 
outcome of real-life cases less predictable and thus fly in the face of legal certainty… The 
lack of flexibility resulting from the use of traditional legal concepts makes it impossible 
to profit fully from important economic insights.”4 
                                                          
1 Article 101 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) (prohibiting agreements, concerted 
practices, and decisions of trade associations with the object or effect of restricting competition); Article 
102 TFEU (prohibiting the abuse of a dominant position). 
2 It could be argued that rights of defence and due process are necessary “legal” elements, but these 
procedural requirements are not in conflict with an economically-informed substance. 
3 Evans and Grave [2005] 136. 
4 Van den Bergh [2002] 34-35. 
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Albeit offering different analyses, both extracts point to a particular tension within 
competition policy. Although substantively empty, rival understandings of the 
appropriate form of competition law – on the “rule of law” and legal certainty versus 
flexibility – have an impact upon how economics is incorporated into enforcement, for 
better (Evans and Grave) or worse (Van den Bergh). In short, the legal form of market 
intervention matters.  
This disagreement on the appropriate form of competition law has animated European 
scholarship since its inception. René Joliet was an early critic of legalistic assumptions 
about the legitimate form of law restricting the effectiveness of realising the economic 
aims of market intervention. In 1967 he argued that the fledgling EU enforcement 
regime had already adopted a Germanic conceptualisation of law that prioritised the 
promulgation of generalised norms which clearly delineated the boundary between 
legality and illegality.5 But applying mechanistic, rigid presumptions, abstracted from the 
specific context to ensure legal certainty, was a mistake; effective enforcement required 
‘a thorough factual analysis, on a case-by-case basis, in the light of economic 
investigation.’ Although occasionally acknowledging the value of certainty,6 his overall 
conclusion was that limiting the legal form of competition enforcement to applying 
generalised, comprehensible norms was inappropriate in this specific field:  
“…some uncertainty appears to be a fair price to pay for an effective antitrust policy. It is 
inherent in the nature of such policy not to rely on abstract legal criteria, but to 
discriminate between significant and insubstantial restraints of trade.”7 
Although many scholars since have similarly suppressed the idea of an inherently 
legitimate legal form to thereby maximise the economic effectiveness of competition 
enforcement, the degree and nature of such criticism has varied. Like Van den Bergh and 
Joliet, some have directly challenged at a conceptual level the value of a form for 
determining lawfulness that approximates predictability.8 More common has been the 
promotion of deciding legality through ad hoc, subject-specific economic analysis of the 
competitive effect of particular business conduct, thereby implicitly undermining 
aspirations towards generalised and clear legal norms.9 This formal recommendation 
                                                          
5 Joliet [1967] 117. 
6 ibid 10, 63. 
7 ibid 190. 
8 Holley [1992] 693; Forrester [2000] 102-103 (cf [2004] 169). 
9 eg Schechter [1982] 13, 19; Jeanrenaud [1986] 36; Korah [1986a] 92-93; [1993] 148, 188-189; D 
Waelbroeck [1987] 56-57; Pathak [1989] 261; Holley [1992] 693; Hawk [1995] 974-976, 984-986; Bright 
[1996] 555; Lugard [1996] 167, 177; Siragusa [1997] 547-549; Bishop [2000] 58, 64; Forrester [2009]. 
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has been tied to the on-going process of rendering EU competition law “more 
economic”.10 Although making limited exceptions for presumptions of illegality against 
hardcore cartels under Article 101 TFEU,11 it is especially pronounced in scholarship 
critical of the law on abuses of dominant position pursuant to Article 102 TFEU.12 Other 
imperfect generalisations intended to foster normative certainty for businesses – block 
exemptions regulations conferring legality,13 guidelines indicative of decision-making 
factors –14 have also been dismissed as formalist, legalistic, “pigeon-holing”,15 ignoring 
the actual economic consequences of the agreement or conduct on the market in 
question.   
Despite its prevalence and longevity, the argument that effective, economically-literate 
competition enforcement necessitates marginalising the value of generalised and 
predictable legal norms is problematic for a number of reasons. To begin, it fails to 
explain why legal certainty is unimportant in competition policy. Although many cited 
above were arguing against excessive formalism by the Commission to thereby 
maximise its discretion,16 the logical – though perhaps unintended - consequence of 
their offensive is that any predictable generalisation undermines the economic pedigree 
of the law as it is unable to sift between individually “good” and “bad” in the specific 
market context. But isn’t the resultant normative uncertainty itself detrimental to the 
functioning of economic forces?17 Furthermore, what other risks and costs are 
introduced into competition law when legality is determined via a “flexible” form of 
market intervention? In addition, it is not obvious that the economically “ineffective” 
legal form of generalised, certain norms and case-by-case decision-making should be 
presented as a binary choice. Would intermediate forms be able to realise the best of 
both worlds?18 Are there other methods by which EU competition enforcement can 
become “more economic”? Many of the scholars cited above do not address these 
points. But such omissions are themselves important. They suggest that this decades-
                                                          
10 For a general overview of the rise and EU realisation of the “more economic” approach: Witt [2016]. 
11 eg Hawk [1995] 987-988; Bright [1996] 558-559; Siragusa [1997] 548. 
12 eg Ridyard [2002] 296-297, 302; Sher [2002] 482; Martinez Lage and Allendesalazar [2003] 344-346; 
Kallaugher and Sher [2004] 263, 271, 279; CLFA82RG [2005] 180-183; EAGCP [2005] 2-3, 5-6; D Waelbroeck 
[2005] 171; Bishop and Marsden [2006] 1-4; Akman [2009b] 76-7. 
13 eg Lugard [1996] 173; Siragusa [1997] 550; Bishop [2000] 56; Van den Bergh [2002] 37-38.  
14 eg Hawk [1995] 986; Akman [2009b] 78. 
15 A label often associated with: Hay [1984]. 
16 See Chapter V, Section II. 
17 See Chapter IV, Section IV. 
18 See Chapter VI. 
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long discussion of the appropriate legal form for competition policy has not been 
sufficiently theorised. 
In criticising the form of EU competition law, these scholars have avoided the customary 
label for their target: the formal rule of law, the aspiration towards determining legality 
through generalised, equally-applicable norms that are comprehensible to subjects, 
rather than ad hoc, subject-specific decision-making. Direct appeals to this legal 
aspiration have, until recently, been few and far between in EU competition scholarship, 
though occasional praise for certainty and administrability vis-à-vis unstructured effects-
based analysis can be interpreted as supportive.19 However the formal rule of law has 
become more visible in EU commentary since the mid-2000s for two reasons. First, 
numerous scholars have challenged the notion that realising generalised, predictable 
norms, and economically-sophisticated enforcement are mutually exclusive. Commonly 
labelled a “Neo”-Chicago approach, they advocate the incorporation of economic 
learning ex ante into the design of rules, presumptions, and structured tests, thereby 
aiming to optimally reconcile accurate economic outcomes with approximating the 
formal rule of law ideal.20 The second impetus has been the growth in competition 
enforcement by the Commission through commitment decisions, the settlement of 
investigations with often far-reaching remedial conditions.21 Many have lamented the 
loss of legal certainty owing to the Commission pursuing novel theories of harm via one-
to-one negotiations, thereby lessening the guidance afforded to businesses by the 
authoritative case law of the EU Courts on the interpretation of Articles 101 and 102.22 
The disproportionality of the remedies secured is also said to violate the formal ideal,23 
and the CJEU’s reluctance to incisively scrutinise such outcomes has been condemned as 
a dereliction of the judicial role to uphold the rule of law.24 
While seemingly differing in opinion on the appropriate form of enforcement, such 
direct and indirect support for the rule of law in EU competition policy suffers a similar 
                                                          
19 eg Alexander [1973]; Caspari [1987] 356; Whish and Sufrin [1987]; Jenny [1998]; Nicolaides [2000]; 
Schaub [2000].  
20 eg Evans and Grave [2005]; Evans and Padilla [2005]; Evans [2005]; Vickers [2005] F260; Röller [2005] 11, 
21; Maier-Rigaud [2006] 99-100; Bruzzone and Boccaccio [2009] 466-468. 
21 Council Regulation 1/2003 on the Implementation of the Rules on Competition laid down in Articles [101] 
and [102] of the Treaty [2003] Article 9. 
22 eg Cengiz [2011] 132-133; Wagner-Von Papp [2012] 931, 966; [2013]; Bottemann and Patsa [2013] 363; 
Gerard [2013] 22-24; Dunne [2014] 401, 415-416; Jenny [2015]. 
23 eg Moullet [2013] 86. 
24 eg Schweitzer [2008] 576-577; Cengiz [2011] 128-129, 150-151; Wagner-Von Papp [2012] 930-931; Jenny 
[2015]. 
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defect to case-by-case champions: its theoretical roots are insufficiently substantiated 
and justified.25 Why is the predictable application of generalised, equally-applied norms 
a valuable aspiration in a field concerned with markets and the promotion of economic 
goods? If the ends of enforcement are most effectively pursued through ad hoc 
determinations of legality – whether unstructured effects-based analysis or 
administrative discretion – what is lost? How do concerns for remedial proportionality 
and thorough judicial oversight relate to formal considerations of normative abstraction 
and comprehensibility? It cannot simply be assumed in this field that the formal rule of 
law is a universally accepted aspiration as competition enforcement is unavoidably an 
economic, market-focused endeavour. In failing to articulate its value within this specific 
setting, there is a real risk that legitimate concerns about the appropriate form of 
intervention can be easily dismissed as stereotypical legal qualms by opposing 
commentators and ends-driven authorities alike. Perhaps more than any other legal 
field, references to the formal rule of law, certainty, generalised norms, judicial scrutiny, 
etc., require close, careful, and context-specific justification. 
Both perspectives on the appropriate form of EU competition law within the literature 
are deficient in their failure to meaningfully engage with foundational questions of legal, 
political, and economic theory. On the one hand, those who stress the effectiveness and 
economic accuracy of determining legality through case-by-case, conduct-specific 
analysis do not adequately address the negative consequences of eschewing normative 
certainty and generality. Nor do they consider intermediate positions between the 
(prima facie) absolutes of realising perfect economic ends and approximating the means 
of the formal rule of law. On the other hand, those who apparently champion this ideal 
vis-à-vis administrative discretion and unstructured effects-based analysis struggle to 
persuasively advance beyond instinctive, unsubstantiated legalism. The importance of 
aspiring to the formal rule of law is assumed, without clearly articulating the value of its 
constituent parts, how they fit together, and, most damaging of all, without situating the 
ideal within the particular context of competition enforcement, the societal pursuit of 
economic goods.   
                                                          
25 One notable exception is Christiansen and Kerber [2006], though this analysis is still relatively concise 
(219-220, 229-235). 
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This thesis addresses and remedies such deficiencies in routine debates within EU 
competition law scholarship on the appropriate form of market intervention. It has two 
research questions.  
The first is theoretical: to which form for determining the legality of business conduct 
should the fundamentally economic endeavour of competition policy aspire? After briefly 
recounting the indeterminacy of competition microeconomics on this issue (Chapter I), 
the response advanced in Part I is that there is considerable merit in aiming to realise 
the formal rule of law in this field: market intervention in the form of applying 
generalised, comprehensible norms, subject to close judicial oversight. Instead of going 
directly to theory, Part I first proceeds inductively by examining underappreciated 
responses offered by two – supposedly - “rival” bodies of thought on competition policy: 
the Chicago School of antitrust (Chapter II) and German Ordoliberalism (Chapter III). 
Although reached by differing routes and varying intellectual lineages, they provide very 
similar conceptualisations of and justifications for determining legality in a manner 
which aspires to realise the formal rule of law ideal. These claims are then woven into a 
systematic justification for the political and economic desirability of approximating the 
formal rule of law in competition policy (Chapter IV). Determining legality through ad 
hoc, subject-, context-, and market-specific evaluations may allow for enforcement of 
utmost efficacy, freed from the administrative restraint and rigidity of applying 
generalised legal norms. But attempting to realise the formal rule of law is to accept 
more modest means for the centralised pursuit of societal ends, to thereby attain other 
significant values. 
This theoretical justification leads to the second, practical research question: do the 
substantive norms, enforcement practices, and institutions of EU competition law realise 
the formal rule of law? Although far from comprehensive, it will be shown that the 
record and contemporary nature of EU competition law is mixed on this formal front. At 
times, the realisation of ends – however conceptualised – with maximum effectiveness 
has been through means simply antithetical to the formal rule of law (Chapter V). Albeit 
with sincere intentions of making markets work “better”, the Commission has 
occasionally sought to expand its discretion by avoiding the restraint and rigidity of 
applying generalised, comprehensible norms. The EU Courts may have contributed to 
such significant deviations from the formal rule of law ideal, through operating an 
unpredictable standard of review, and sometimes failing to prospectively formulate 
15 
 
structured, comprehensible tests for determining legality. Nevertheless, many other 
aspects of EU competition law can be interpreted as respectable attempts to optimally 
(and, necessarily, imperfectly) realise both economically-sophisticated ends and the 
virtues of endeavouring towards the application of generalised, comprehensible norms 
(Chapter VI). These examples can be understood as falling along a sliding-scale between 
“more” and “less” generalised/certain forms for determining legality and, inversely, 
forms “less” and “more” discerning of the economic effects of the specific conduct in 
question. Returning to the divide in the literature introduced above, this is just as the 
“Neo”-Chicagoans recommend. In adopting a form which attempts to offer abstracted 
and clear norms where possible (presumptions, structured tests), it also explains the 
distaste of those who, since Joliet, have stressed that economically-sophisticated 
enforcement necessitates case-by-case, subject-specific determinations of legality. But 
in light of the response to the first research question, having explored the political and 
economic importance of approximating the formal rule of law ideal, both the 
undesirable consequences of such a form of market intervention and the appeal of 
optimally reconciling ends and means can be better understood. 
The focus of this thesis will be far-reaching, both in terms of its disciplinary scope and 
level of abstraction, ranging from theoretical discussions of law, politics, and economics, 
to the minutiae of contemporary enforcement at the coalface. Its distinct intellectual 
contribution will be to synthesise divergent concepts, approaches, and foci into a 
systematic exploration of whether the legality of business conduct in the unavoidably 
economic endeavour of competition policy should be determined by a means aspiring to 
the formal rule of law ideal, and whether EU competition enforcement has realised this 
form of market intervention in practice. Regardless of the actual answers offered, the 
broader significance of this thesis is to reiterate a theme already discernible from the 
scholarly literature above: the form of competition law matters.                   
                                                          
36 Council Regulation 139/2004 on the Control of Concentrations between Undertakings [2004] L24/1. 
37 Article 107 TFEU. 
38 Article 263 TFEU. 
39 Article 267 TFEU.  
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Chapter I: Competition Policy: Economic Orthodoxy and Formal Indeterminacy 
I. Introduction 
There is a tension at the core of economic policy. On the one hand, many countries have 
recognised that the spontaneous operation of free markets, unencumbered by excessive 
governmental intervention, may better serve and benefit society than state direction of 
the economy.1 On the other hand, it is recognised by all but the most absolutist 
libertarians that a policy of total economic laissez-faire would not guarantee the 
beneficial operation of the spontaneous market order; even in the absence of state 
hindrance - price-setting, production quotas, restricted entry - the optimal performance 
of markets through decentralised coordination by businesses can be stalled by those 
wishing to secure a potentially quieter, more profitable life. The friction at the heart of 
economic policy is therefore that although markets are considered more efficient than 
centralised direction, intervention is still necessary against endogenous disturbances 
that are similarly detrimental. Essentially, the void occasioned by the retreat of public 
bulwarks to the benefits of free markets should not be filled with private distortions that 
also harm consumers.  
Understanding the rationale behind this specific category of market interventions - 
competition policy - is the purpose of this short chapter. Given its focus upon the free 
economy and market conduct, conceptualising competition policy is fundamentally and 
necessarily a question for economics.3 As a discipline, economics is a broad church of 
divergent methods and policies. As the prevailing contemporary account of the concepts 
and value of competition policy, Section II will outline the basics of neo-classical 
microeconomic theory (or “price theory”). Although furnishing a justification for market 
intervention and indicating a few business practices that may be problematic, Section III 
                                                          
1 eg OECD [2017] (on Mexican telecommunications liberalisation reducing mobile broadband prices up to 75 
per cent, permitting 50 million more users).  
3 Posner [2001] 1; Peeperkorn and Verouden [2014] 3; Niels, Jenkins, and Kavanagh [2016] 2.   
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will explore the limits of microeconomic theory as a basis for enforcement. In particular, 
it will situate price theory within the wider body of contemporary competition 
microeconomics, which stresses that context is key for determining whether specific 
practices are likely to have a positive or negative market impact. 
But the most important point of this overview of the economics underpinning 
competition policy concerns what is not seen. Although providing a range of theoretical 
concepts and practical tools for anchoring the substance of market intervention, 
ordinary competition economics is either silent on or makes unsubstantiated 
suggestions about the desirable form for determining the legality of potentially 
problematic commercial conduct. This is a question of shifting from the domain of 
substantive competition policy towards its actual pursuit via the medium of competition 
law. Section IV therefore reiterates the research question to be explored throughout 
Part I: to which form for determining the legality of business conduct should the 
fundamentally economic endeavour of competition policy aspire?  
II. Basic Microeconomic Price Theory and the Need for Market Intervention4 
Despite several intuitive meanings in common use,5 the definition of “competition” is 
not self-evident. One could suggest that competition policy aims to maintain business 
rivalry. A suspicious eye might be cast over concentrated markets with few actors or 
horizontal mergers between competitors, thus advocating substantial industrial 
fragmentation. But how much rivalry is enough rivalry, and how is this to be measured? 
Would antagonism towards concentration hold even when larger firms with fewer rivals 
could bring the same product to market at a lower cost and price for consumers? And 
without cooperation between businesses operating at different levels of the market, 
would many products reach consumers at all? Another intuitive definition might view 
competition policy as guaranteeing the opportunity to freely enter and operate in 
markets. Yet if such freedom is defined as a guaranteed commercial existence, should 
exclusion from the market owing to consumer dissatisfaction and better rival products 
                                                          
4 This section is based upon several similar accounts: Mankiw [2012]; Peeperkorn and Verouden [2014] 10-
24; Jones and Sufrin [2016] 3-10; Niels, Jenkins, and Kavanagh [2016] 7-14; Whish and Bailey [2018] 4-8. 
5 Bishop and Walker [2010] 17-19. 
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be illegal? Is the sale of goods by one firm to a customer classed as an illegal 
impediment to a second firm’s ability to sell to the same customer? 
As ultimately futile efforts to capture the essence of “competition”, both definitions are 
defective as they fail to enlighten the purported value of rivalry or the guaranteed 
opportunity to trade. Only by articulating the envisaged “good” of a programme for 
market intervention is it possible to delineate the boundary of state action in the 
economy, and to benefit from a metric for consistently evaluating potentially 
undesirable business practices.6 The tendency of competition treatises to swiftly 
introduce neo-classical microeconomics7 reflects the consensus that basic price theory 
provides the most useful expository framework for introducing key concepts and 
understanding the value of competition policy.8  
Microeconomics traces its roots back to Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations, notable 
for its focus upon how systemic forces alone may coordinate decentralised market 
action.9 Its core tenet was that the self-interest of individuals in the marketplace sees 
them behave as if ‘led by an invisible hand’, unwittingly producing an economically-
superior outcome than could be achieved through governmental direction.10 Smith 
nevertheless recognised that this beneficial interplay between supply and demand was 
not guaranteed. His rudimentary concerns for monopoly pricing11 and cartels12 indicated 
a basic need for the state to police malfunctioning markets brought about by 
endogenous conduct, thus furnishing an early justification for competition policy. Neo-
classical price theory built upon Smith’s approach by highlighting how costs influence a 
firm’s decision to produce at a certain quantity of output, subsequently impacting the 
final price paid by consumers. With the advent of economic marginalism towards the 
end of the nineteenth century in the writings of William Jevons and Alfred Marshall,13 
neo-classical scholars focused upon how the cost of, or revenue derived from, producing 
one additional unit of output affected rational pricing decisions. 
                                                          
6 Bishop and Walker [2010] 20-21; Fuchs [2012] 54. 
7 eg Posner [2001]; Hovenkamp [2008]; Jones and Sufrin [2016]; Niels, Jenkins, and Kavanagh [2016]; Whish 
and Bailey [2018]. 
8 But far from perfect. See Section III. 
9 Viner [1927] 198-199; Stigler [1976].  
10 Smith [1776b] 32. See also: [1776a] 119 (‘It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the 
baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest.’). 
11 Smith [1776a] 164. 
12 ibid 232. 
13 Hovenkamp [2008] 15-16; Peeperkorn and Verouden [2014] 5.  
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Modern microeconomic theory is the study of how economic units (consumers, firms) 
make decisions and interact with each other on the market.14 Through a duo of stylised 
models, neo-classical price theory introduces a toolkit of concepts - efficiency, supply 
and demand, marginalism - for understanding the societal value of competition, for 
justifying a programme of centralised market interventions, and for abstractly 
comprehending the basic logic of rational business behaviour.15 The two models are the 
“good” of perfect competition and the “bad” of monopoly power.16 Together they 
illustrate the common argument that efficiency is the desirable consequence of free 
markets and a value to be protected through a programme of competition policy.17 
The value of perfect competition derives from the theory that it produces the greatest 
possible distribution of societal welfare; no alternative configuration could better realise 
the combined welfare (or “surplus”) of producers and consumers. 
the lower the product output, the higher the demand
In this way
It assumes a market 
with an infinite number of producers of homogenous goods that act with complete 
rationality, possess perfect information, have no transaction costs, and can enter or exit 
markets without loss or delay. The demand for and supply of products have an inverse 
relationship: . As Smith himself 
recognised,20 the valuable dynamic of perfect competition is logical and intuitive. If 
supply is scarce, higher prices result in profits for producers and unmet consumer 
demand. In response to this, rational producers will enter the market, thereby 
increasing supply to reduce demand and, ultimately, prices. But if there is oversupply, 
where demand is so low that products can only be sold at a price below costs, producers 
will rationally respond by exiting the market, decreasing output and thus raising the 
market price. Through repeated entry and exit, a perfectly competitive market will 
eventually reach equilibrium, optimising allocative efficiency.  This means that society’s 
scare resources have been used to meet the demand of consumers to the greatest 
extent possible with the least detriment to producers, and vice versa.25 The equilibrium 
of perfect competition also displays the highest level of productive efficiency, with fierce 
rivalry influencing firms to fetch goods to market at the lowest possible cost and thus 
resultant price for consumers. , microeconomic theory suggests that a 
                                                          
14 Gellhorn and Kovacic [1994] 44; Mankiw [2012] 29. 
15 Gellhorn and Kovacic [1994] 57-58; Niels, Jenkins, and Kavanagh [2016] 2-3. 
16 Niels, Jenkins, and Kavanagh [2016] 2. 
17 This is a highly contentious claim: Chapter II, Section II.B.ii, and especially the criticisms cited in fn 59. 
20 Smith [1776a] 159-160. 
25 Ibid 161 (the market ‘naturally aims at bringing always the precise quantity thither which may be 
sufficient to supply, and no more than supply, the demand.’). 
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perfectly competitive market optimises total efficiency through the spontaneous, 
decentralised reaction of firms to the information signalled by prices to increase or 
decrease output.27 
If the model of perfect competition illustrates the valuable efficiency of free markets, 
the microeconomic model of monopoly indicates the negative consequences of 
substantial market power. When the assumption of infinite producers is replaced with a 
single firm, the monopolist itself chooses the quantity produced and resultant market 
price. Their quandary is that every additional unit of output reduces demand and thus 
lowers the price charged for all units.
This constitutes
28 The rational profit-maximising response to 
diminishing marginal returns is to produce at a lower output than under perfect 
competition, and therefore at a relatively higher price.  a transfer of 
wealth from consumers that is commonly the lay aversion to monopolies and was 
criticised by Adam Smith as an ‘absurd tax’.32 Monopoly is the most extreme 
manifestation of market power - the ability to influence prices and derive supra-
competitive profits without challenge - which is often posited as the main target of 
competition policy.33 But from an economist’s perspective, the question of whose 
pocket the Euros line is not the most critical consequence of substantial market power.34 
Instead, the concern is for the monopoly profit and higher consumer price being the 
result of allocative inefficiency when compared to the outcome under perfect 
competition.35 This is the “deadweight loss” to consumer welfare for those who despite 
being willing to pay the above-or-at-cost competitive price, do not have their demand 
met in a monopolistic market owing to higher prices. Monopoly may also be a source of 
productive inefficiency.36 Freed from the pressure of a competitive climate where 
businesses are forced to operate at lowest cost and price or lose all custom, there may 
be a significant degree of managerial slack and a failure to pursue cost-improving 
methods.37 Substantial resources may also be expended by businesses vying for a 
monopolistic position that only the successful firm may be able to recoup.38 The waste 
occasioned by such rent-seeking is especially visible where a position of market power is 
                                                          
27 Lyons [2009] 2.  
28 In the absence of perfect price discrimination: Mankiw [2012] 314-317. 
32 Smith [1776a] 164. 
33 Motta [2004] 40-41; Peeperkorn and Verouden [2014] 9. 
34 Posner [2001] 13. 
35 Hovenkamp [2008] 13-14. 
36 cf Posner [2001] 18-19 (a rational, profit-maximising monopolist will be productively efficient). 
37 That the scale of such inefficiency may dwarf the allocative inefficiency of monopoly: Leibenstein [1966].  
38 See generally: Posner [1975b]. 
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politically bestowed.39 When these further forms of possible inefficiency are combined 
with the allocative deadweight loss, the detrimental economic impact of monopoly vis-
à-vis perfect competition could be potentially substantial.  
In this way, basic microeconomics provides a justification for adopting competition 
policy. The invisible hand is a valuable mechanism for efficient economic coordination 
but is not invulnerable. An absolute laissez-faire stance towards the economy leaves 
market forces susceptible to hindrance by firms with substantial market power, whether 
unilaterally or in combination. The role of the state is to intervene to ensure the 
continuing operation of free markets through a programme of competition policy. Its 
function has been likened to that of a sports referee, ensuring no ‘foul play’ on the 
market and letting the best competitors win customers, by appraising ‘tackles so that 
the competition is robust and exciting without breaking down into lethargy, match fixing 
or kicking the other side off the field.’42  
Through simple extrapolation from the basic concepts introduced by microeconomics, it 
is clear that market power could be acquired, defended, and deployed to the detriment 
of efficiency in a variety of possible ways. If anything, such disturbances ought to be 
expected: as Adam Smith recognised, the common interest in the benefits of 
competitive pressure commonly clashes with the allure of supra-competitive profits 
derived from market power.43 Even absent legally-guaranteed monopolies, firms may 
enjoy a position of power through the creation of substantial barriers to new entry (eg 
through long-term contracts) or via conduct that excludes actual and dissuades potential 
rivals (eg aggressively pricing below production costs). Competitors may merge to create 
a more powerful entity or even a monopolist. Supra-competitive profits through 
limitations of market output could also be achieved via less permanent forms of 
coordination between businesses, especially but not necessarily limited to cartel 
agreements.44 The general scope of competition policy is therefore often divided into 
three forms of potentially anticompetitive market practices: i) unilateral conduct to 
exercise or acquire substantial market power; ii) coordination between independent 
businesses; and iii) mergers and acquisitions.  
                                                          
39 Rent-seeking is discussed in Chapter IV, Section IV.B.ii. 
42 Lyons [2009] 10. 
43 Smith [1776a] 358. 
44 ibid 232 (‘People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the 
conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices.’). 
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Thus microeconomic theory provides foundations for understanding the value of 
competition policy and gives some indication as to the possible focus of enforcement 
attention.  
III. The Limits of Neo-Classical Price Theory and Contemporary Competition Microeconomics: Context is Key 
The models of neo-classical price theory are important for understanding the purported 
benefits of free markets and for justifying centralised interventions to ensure their 
continuing operation. But microeconomic theory alone is not a concrete blueprint for 
the practical, day-to-day enforcement of competition policy. This is for several reasons. 
A) Necessarily Unrealistic Assumptions 
The explanatory power of microeconomic theory derives from a methodological reliance 
upon assumptions (eg rationality, perfect information, costless entry/exit).45 Models are 
used to analyse the causal relationship between a few variables with all other factors 
assumed to be fixed.46 Rather than a foundational defect, assumptions are a necessary 
ingredient for microeconomics to introduce concepts that are valuable tools for 
orientating competition policy.47 Albeit derived from stylised models, they constitute an 
invaluable common language for lawyers, economists, and enforcers that avoids the 
need to repeatedly address foundational justifications (“why is competition valuable?”) 
with every proposed market intervention.48  
But while acknowledging the utility of these assumption-laden models, it is still obvious 
that perfect competition is an ideal that has perhaps never been approximated in 
reality. Nor is the absolute market power of the theoretical monopolist a common 
phenomenon. The vast majority of industries are somewhere between the two.49 All 
companies have some effect on price and thus meet the microeconomic definition of 
                                                          
45 Peeperkorn and Verouden [2014] 4. For a staunch defence of general assumptions if they reasonably 
predict behaviour: Friedman [1953].  
46 Singer [1981] 2. 
47 Posner [1977b] 12-13 (a theory necessarily lacks realism or it would be a complex empirical description); 
Jones and Sufrin [2016] 10.  
48 Stigler [1957] 14. 
49 Bishop and Walker [2010] 16; Geradin, Layne-Farrar, and Petit [2012] 69; Jones and Sufrin [2016] 10; 
Whish and Bailey [2018] 9. 
23 
 
market power; the question becomes one of the degree that competition policy is 
willing to tolerate before taking action.50  
B) Important Considerations Excluded 
Even if the microeconomic model of perfect competition were a realistic and deliverable 
blueprint for the enforcement of competition policy, there are still strong justifications 
for questioning it.  
For example, as a static model focusing upon prices, it says nothing of dynamic efficiency 
and the societal benefits resulting from competition on innovation.51 Whether more or 
less concentrated markets better stimulate innovation has been the subject of 
considerable economic debate.52 Furthermore, although one ingredient of perfect 
competition’s efficiency derives from the homogeneity of goods, everyday experience 
suggests that consumers appreciate product differentiation, avoiding the dullness of 
everybody wearing the same clothes and driving the same car.53 
Perhaps the strongest reason to doubt the simplicity of neo-classical price theory as an 
illustrative guide for competition policy enforcement is the allocative/productive 
efficiency trade-off.54 The assumption of an infinite number of competitors all 
optimising both allocative and productive efficiency in the model of perfect competition 
obscures a complex possible relationship between the two. Although the market 
structure of many sellers may promote allocative efficiency, fewer firms with substantial 
market shares may be necessary to realise productive efficiencies (eg economies of 
scale)55 or be a result of such efficiencies in the face of strong competitive pressure (the 
best product, superior technology, effective management).56 And if the economic 
justification for free markets and competition policy is societal efficiency, it may be the 
case that productive efficiencies outweigh the resultant loss of allocative efficiency from 
other firms exiting the market. Replicating the structural conditions of perfect 
competition does not necessarily optimise efficiency; deploying competition policy as a 
tool for industrial deconcentration could deny consumers lower prices resulting from 
                                                          
50 Motta [2004] 41.  
51 Kerber [2008] 98-100; Hovenkamp [2008] 95-96; Whish and Bailey [2018] 10.  
52 Peeperkorn and Verouden [2014] 37-40. 
53 Singer [1981] 3-8; Niels, Jenkins, and Kavanagh [2016] 14. 
54 For the seminal economics paper on this trade-off: Williamson [1968]. 
55 Peeperkorn and Verouden [2014] 15-17; Niels, Jenkins, and Kavanagh [2016] 10-11. 
56 The Chicagoan approach to productive efficiency, avoiding attempts to calculate the maximum number of 
firms on a market: Posner [1976] 89-90; Bork [1978] 105-106. 
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cost savings occasioned by economies of scale or punish dominant companies that 
achieve their position from successfully and efficiently giving customers what they 
want.57  
C) Contemporary Competition Microeconomics: Context is Key 
More generally, the limit to basic price theory alone providing a concrete guide to 
competition policy is that its illuminating foundational generalisations and concepts are 
‘possible only if its subject-matter is made abstract to the point of telling us little or 
nothing about actual behaviour’.58 Neo-classical price theory is one necessary but 
insufficient element of the broader church of contemporary competition 
microeconomics.59 In particular, industrial organisation economics (“IO”) has sought to 
understand ‘actual behaviour’ and its competitive impact for the purposes of enforcing 
competition policy.60 Although their respective domination of competition 
microeconomics has waxed and waned throughout the twentieth century, the two 
complementary methodological strands exist in a dialectic tension between abstract 
simplification and practical complexity: neo-classical price theory retains its pre-
eminence as the foundational theoretical justification and conceptual toolbox for 
understanding business behaviour in the abstract; and IO provides the means for 
practically quantifying, contextualising, and ultimately complicating competition policy’s 
engagement with and understanding of real-life markets. Essentially, they represent the 
division between theory and application within microeconomics. Since the late 1980s 
the latter strand has rapidly expanded in its endeavour to comprehend the real 
efficiency consequences of business practices.61 In particular, the “new” IO economics 
has incorporated insights regarding strategic behaviour and oligopolistic coordination 
from game theory,62 plus the sophisticated empirical methods of econometrics that 
attempt to quantify actual or potential economic effects of specific market practices.63 
                                                          
57 See Chapter II, Section II.B.ii. 
58 Knight [1922] 475. 
59 There is no strand called “competition economics”, but it is a combination of various branches: Niels, 
Jenkins, and Kavanagh [2016] 4.  
60 Peeperkorn and Verouden [2014] 4 (describing it as ‘applied microeconomics’ which investigates ‘real-
world markets and company behaviour.’); Niels, Jenkins, and Kavanagh [2016] 4. 
61 C Shapiro [1989] 127; Sullivan [1994] 669-670; Geradin, Layne-Farrar, and Petit [2012] 76 (introducing ‘the 
complexity of the economic realities into competition analysis’); Peeperkorn and Verouden [2014] 8. This is 
often referred to as the “Post-Chicago” School: see Chapter II, text accompanying fn 158-161. For the 
related development of New Institutional Economics: Chapter IV, Section IV.   
62 Geradin, Layne-Farrar, and Petit [2012] 75-76; Peeperkorn and Verouden [2014] 8, 26-28; Samuelson 
[2016]; Jones and Sufrin [2016] 22, 652-654. 
63 Peeperkorn and Verouden [2014] 8, referring to Einav and Levin [2010]; Niels, Jenkins, and Kavanagh 
[2016] 5-6.    
25 
 
The perceived need for competition microeconomics to address behavioural economics’ 
critique of the foundational assumption of rationality is also growing.64 IO economics 
has thus been something of a sponge for approaches and methods that in various ways 
blur the simple elegance of neo-classical price theory.65   
Situating the theory within this wider, multifaceted body of methods and techniques of 
application highlights a central tenet of contemporary competition microeconomics: in 
determining whether actual business behaviour has a positive or negative impact on 
market efficiency, context is crucial.66 For example, exclusive dealing agreements may 
have anticompetitive effects in one particular market where they constitute a dense 
network of relations hindering new entry, but not in a different scenario.67 Rebates 
might be a method of fierce competition and the result of productive efficiency when 
adopted by a small company, but a damaging means to exclude competitors when 
introduced by a firm with substantial market power.68 A merger between the same two 
businesses would have differing effects on competition if two or twenty rivals remained. 
In other words, it is nigh-on impossible to claim that a particular form of market practice 
is inherently pro- or anticompetitive, always efficient or inefficient. This is perhaps also 
an inevitable consequence of the disciplinary focus of economics upon markets and 
business practices; as evidenced, for instance, by recent research on how pricing for 
online sales differs from sales in person,69 competition economics will always be forced 
to reconsider received wisdom in light of commercial and technological innovations in 
the marketplace. Of course, basic predictions or common preconditions can be 
formulated as to the likelihood that conduct will have negative efficiency 
consequences.70 But in contemporary competition economics it is suspect to claim that 
every manifestation of a certain action regardless of its specific context is irrefutably 
in/efficient or will inevitably have a detrimental/beneficial impact.  
                                                          
64 Peeperkorn and Verouden [2014] 8; Thaler [2016]; Walker [2017].  
65 This is not to suggest that IO does not employ theory and models, as are particularly prevalent in game 
theory, though the assumptions employed tend to be more context-specific. 
66 Geradin, Layne-Farrar, and Petit [2012] 76 (‘individualistic evaluations, entirely dependent upon the 
circumstances at hand in a particular case’); Peeperkorn and Verouden [2014] 4 (‘In individual cases, it will 
be necessary first to find the concepts and model that best fit the actual market conditions of the case and 
then proceed with the analysis of the actual or possible competition consequences.’), 8 (anticompetitive 
effect ‘typically depends on the precise circumstances of the case’); Whish and Bailey [2018] 2 (‘Competition 
law is about the economic analysis of markets… each case will depend on its circumstances’). 
67 See: Chapter V, Section II.B.ii. 
68 See: Chapter V, Section III. 
69 Gorodnichenko and Talavera [2017]. 
70 Peeperkorn and Verouden [2014] 4. Chapters II and VI will consider Chicagoan and “Neo”-Chicagoan 
advocacy of this method. 
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Despite furnishing authorities with a justification for intervention and tools for 
understanding the practical consequences of business conduct, competition 
microeconomics does not, therefore, provide a clear roadmap for the practical 
enforcement of competition policy.    
IV. The Unanswered Question: What Form of Market Intervention? 
Every competition law treatise recognises the key role played by microeconomics in 
articulating the justification for systematic interventions to improve the spontaneous 
operation of market forces and prevent endogenous distortions. In other words, 
competition policy is positively framed as a thoroughly economic endeavour. So too do 
they acknowledge the limits of neoclassical price theory, and situate its conceptual 
devices within the broader toolbox of competition economics that seeks to understand 
the actual impact of business behaviour on specific markets. The preceding discussion 
represents an uncontroversial recounting of the prevailing economic theory which 
underpins competition policy. 
This thesis, however, is inspired by an important foundational question that is absent 
from contemporary competition microeconomics or its periodic restatement by 
academic authorities of competition law: to which form for determining the legality of 
business conduct should competition policy aspire? The economics justifying and 
informing market intervention clearly makes formal claims. In particular, the 
prominence of IO methods since the 1980s and a focus upon context have frequently led 
to claims that modern competition economics rightly prioritises ‘assessment of the facts 
of the case (case-by-case approach)’.72 But just as with the examples of EU competition 
scholarship considered in the Introduction which see a “more economic” approach as 
necessarily requiring ad hoc, subject-specific determinations of legality, the implications 
of these claims about the legitimate form of market intervention are not explored in 
detail.  Yet this is a fundamental discussion that goes to the heart of competition policy’s 
liminal existence at the intersection between economics and law, at the juncture 
between decentralised market order and centralised normative order. This theoretical 
enquiry cannot simply be dismissed as an esoteric venture. On the contrary, exploring 
the appropriate form of market intervention addresses thoroughly practical questions 
                                                          
72 Peeperkorn and Verouden [2014] 8. See fn 60-66. 
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of, for example, the construction of particular legal tests, the role of judges in reviewing 
decisions based on economic expertise, or procedural choices for investigating and 
closing cases where economic analysis is on the side of the competition authority, but 
precedent is not. 
The purpose of the next two chapters is to closely analyse two important schools of 
competition thought to understand their preferred means for market intervention. 
Although often cast as rival economic approaches to competition policy, the Chicago 
School of antitrust and German Ordoliberalism both signal a surprisingly harmonious 
appreciation for a certain conceptualisation of the legitimate form for determining the 
legality of business conduct in pursuit of the goal/s of competition policy. Together they 
begin to reveal political and economic justifications for aspiring to realise the formal rule 
of law ideal in competition enforcement. 
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Chapter II: The Chicago School of Antitrust: An Economic ‘Subordination’ of Law? 
I. Introduction 
Every competition lawyer is familiar with the Chicago School of antitrust. Whether 
considered a ‘much needed corrective’1 or a bunch of ‘neoconservative Darwinists’,2 
their influence upon US antitrust law and scholarship is undeniable.3 Even in historical 
accounts of EU competition law’s theoretical evolution, the Chicago School is often 
afforded a central, almost messianic, role. Legal folklore suggests that after decades of 
being led astray by Ordoliberal economic illiteracy,4 Chicagoan emphases upon the goal 
of efficiency and resilient market self-correction made European inroads during the 
1990s, ushering-in a period of “modernisation” towards a “more economic” approach to 
EU competition law.5  
To suggest that the Chicago School has been, and continues to be, divisive in 
competition law scholarship is an understatement. A recent portrayal depicts them as so 
obsessed with ensuring that antitrust law maximised market efficiency that their 
approach can ‘hardly be seen as proper interdisciplinarity’.6 Instead, the author 
characterises Chicagoan antitrust as the economic ‘subordination of the law’.7 This is not 
only a judgement as to their preference for the substance of antitrust law being guided 
by faithful deduction from the assumptions of neo-classical price theory. It also goes to 
the idealised form of Chicagoan market intervention: their determination to ensure 
                                                          
1 Hovenkamp [2008] 2. Similarly: [2001] 258 (‘the most coherent and elegant ideology that antitrust has 
ever experienced.’). 
2 Adams and Brock [1987] 1117. 
3 Duxbury [1995] 349. 
4 This common portrayal of Ordoliberalism is disputed in Chapter III, Section III. 
5 eg Weitbrecht [2008] 82-85. 
6 Andriychuk [2017] 65. 
7 ibid. 
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efficient business practices are not prohibited by overbroad application of per se rules 
supposedly rendered lawyerly qualms about legal certainty ‘overruled’.8  
The Chicago-inspired revolution in US antitrust from the late 1970s undoubtedly 
involved both: on the basis of substantive economic arguments about the efficiency of 
business conduct, the US Supreme Court shifted the form for determining the legality of 
specific practices one-by-one from rule-based prohibitions per se, to a conduct-specific 
analysis of their particular competitive impact on the market (the “rule of reason” 
standard).9 As a result, it has been routinely suggested that the Chicago School of 
antitrust advocated market intervention ideally conceptualised as ‘assessing a suspect 
agreement’s anti- and pro-competitive effects in every individual case, instead of 
inferring its nature from its form.’10 
That was indeed a consequence of judges absorbing Chicagoan arguments on the 
overbroad substantive reach of US law, but the resultant form of market intervention 
was not a core tenet of their approach. On the contrary, ad hoc, subject-specific, 
determinations of legality were the exact opposite of the Chicago School’s 
conceptualisation of the ideal form that enforcement should take. Despite a reputation 
for dogmatic adherence to neo-classical microeconomic theory and efficiency-driven 
enforcement, this chapter argues that the Chicago School of antitrust nevertheless had a 
clear concern for the desirable form of market intervention.11 Rather than the economic 
‘subordination’ of law, the Chicago School’s proposed method for antitrust represents 
an attempt to reconcile an economically-informed normative substance with formal 
desiderata often associated with the rule of law ideal - general and equally-applicable 
norms that delineate the boundary between legality and illegality in a manner 
comprehensible to legal subjects.12 
Section II provides a brief overview of the history, approach, and substantive 
implications of the Chicago School for US antitrust law. The subsequent two sections 
systematically analyse their writings to develop a clearer picture of the envisaged form 
                                                          
8 ibid 62. 
9 Discussed in Section III.A.  
10 Witt [2016] 67. See also: 65, 68 (it ‘convinced the US Supreme Court to move away from presumptions of 
illegality and to assess most business conduct as to its actual effects’); Niels, Jenkins, and Kavanagh [2016] 4. 
This was more implicit in older accounts: see fn 105. 
11 For rare recognition: Lande [1988] 436-438; Wright [2009] 7, 12; [2012] 247-249. 
12 Chapter IV deductively conceptualises the rule of law in greater detail; this chapter and the next proceeds 
inductively to tease-out elements suggestive of this conceptualisation.  
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that market intervention ought ideally to take. Section III considers the Chicago School’s 
negative response to various calls for determining antitrust legality through subject-
specific decision-making (effects-based analysis or the rule of reason standard). Instead, 
it will be argued that they preferred a conceptualisation of market intervention where 
sophisticated economic wisdom was incorporated ex ante into the design of generalised 
norms - rules, presumptions, structured tests - that were administrable and 
comprehensible to businesses. Section IV explores whether this may be attributable to a 
deeper faith in the formal rule of law. Indications of such in later Chicagoan writing can 
be substantiated either by tracing the ideal back to the more metaphysical writing of 
earlier Chicago School economists, or via Posner’s economic analysis of the rule of law 
as the optimal form for incentive calibration. A brief conclusion sketches the limits of the 
Chicago School for justifying a particular formal conceptualisation of market 
interventions, thus signalling the way to German Ordoliberalism. 
II. The History, Approach, and Implications of the Chicago School of Antitrust 
There are pitfalls aplenty in attempting to trace the contours of schools of thought.13 
Frequently they invite ‘slovenly stereotype[s]’ that disregard heterogeneity.14 Such 
reservations are justified in the instance at hand: accurately and faithfully portraying the 
Chicago School of antitrust is far from straightforward. It of course pivots upon the 
output of scholars directly affiliated with the University of Chicago Law School, 
particularly Robert Bork, Richard Posner, and Frank Easterbrook, especially from the 
1950s to the 1980s. But it also has roots in the related Chicago School of Economics 
stretching back to the 1920s, implicating many figures less familiar to competition 
scholars. The geographic pull of Illinois for Chicagoan ideas was also rather weak: many 
lawyers and economists based at other US universities contributed to its intellectual 
development.15 Furthermore, the concrete policy recommendations offered by Chicago 
School writers for US antitrust were far from homogenous.16 
                                                          
13 Crane [2009] 1915. 
14 Stigler [1962] 70. On abandoning labels altogether: Wright [2012]. 
15 Samuels [1976] 6; Crane [2009] 1915.  
16 Williamson [1983b] 211-213; Kovacic [2007] 10; Kobayashi and Muris [2012] 154, 171-172; Wright [2012] 
244. Posner disagreed with key Chicagoan arguments: [1974] 506 (their disbelief in exclusionary practices by 
a dominant firm was ‘overstated’); [1976] 171; [2001] 4; Kovacic [2007] 10-11; Crane [2009] 1917-1918; 
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Such caveats noted, this section A) provides a brief account of the historical 
development of the Chicago School, B) depicts the nature of their approach, and C) 
highlights the major substantive implications of their writing for competition law.  
A) A Brief History of the Chicago School17 
The Chicago School of antitrust was an offshoot from the body of interwar scholarship 
often referred to as the Chicago School of economics.18 From the 1920s Chicago 
developed a reputation as the ‘extreme vanguard’19 of the kind of neo-classical price 
theory that formed the basis of the previous chapter. This was largely the result of 
scholarship by Frank Knight,20 Jacob Viner,21 and Henry Simons.22 Knight and Simons 
were particularly prominent guardians of the price mechanism against the growing 
advocacy of central economic direction and eager intervention. Knight’s concretisation 
of a Chicagoan ‘style’ of neo-classical microeconomic analysis deeply influenced his 
Nobel laureate students Milton Friedman and George Stigler.23 The latter’s work on 
industrial concentration, oligopoly theory, and barriers to market entry provided 
especially important economic foundations to the later legal writing of the Chicagoan 
antitrust scholars. Simons’ importance for the subsequent Chicago School of antitrust – 
as well as “law & economics” generally - was more organisational. As the first economist 
at the Chicago Law School, he set an interdisciplinary precedent for years to come.24 He 
was also instrumental in the appointment of another economist, Aaron Director, to the 
Law School in 1946 through a recommendation to Friedrich Hayek who had secured 
funding for a new institute.25 
Aaron Director was arguably the most important protagonist in the development of the 
Chicago School of antitrust,26 acting as the intellectual bridge between the old Chicago 
School of economics and a series of influential publications that would fundamentally 
                                                                                                                                                               
Kobayashi and Muris [2012] 154, 167. Posner particularly disputed the permissive approach to predation, 
highlighting the importance of strategic consequences: [1974] 516-517; [1976] 185-186; [1979] 939-940.  
17 For historical accounts: Kitch [1983]; Coase [1993]; Duxbury [1995] chapter 5.    
18 For accounts of the Chicago School of economics: Miller [1962]; Samuels [1976].  
19 Samuels [1976] 3-4. 
20 eg Knight [1922]; [1923].  
21 eg Viner [1927]; [1931]. 
22 eg Simons [1936]; [1941]; [1945]. 
23 Duxbury [1995] 333-334. 
24 Katz [1946] 2-3; Coase [1993] 242-243; Duxbury [1995] 335. 
25 On Director’s involvement in the US publication of Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom and later appointment at 
Chicago: Coase [1993] 246; Duxbury [1995] 342. 
26 Posner [1979] 925 (It is Director to whom the ‘basic features of the Chicago School of antitrust analysis 
are attributable.’) 
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alter opinions of US law. Legend goes that Director used his invitation to the antitrust 
law course as an opportunity to demonstrate to students that overbroad legal 
prohibitions made little economic sense.27 Over many years he recruited a generation of 
young legal scholars to follow his clarion call that ‘the conclusions of economics do not 
justify the application of the antitrust laws in many situations in which the laws are now 
being applied.’28 Although publishing very little himself, Director provided the 
inspiration behind several seminal articles written by his students from the 1950s to the 
1970s,29 many in the Journal of Law & Economics that he founded in 1958. The disparate 
pieces on various economically-problematic facets of US antitrust policy were woven 
into comprehensive recommendations of a distinctive Chicago “School” with the 
publication of two monographs towards the end of the 1970s: Richard Posner’s Antitrust 
Law and Robert Bork’s The Antitrust Paradox.30 The latter has come to be regarded as 
the ‘most orthodox’ account of the Chicago School of antitrust,31 and is perhaps the 
most influential book in the history of competition law scholarship.32 
Despite initially appearing as ‘little better than a lunatic fringe’,33 these articles and 
monographs eventually had a tangible influence upon the law. Following the US 
Supreme Court’s watershed Sylvania [1977] ruling removing non-price vertical restraints 
from the ambit of per se illegality,34 decades-old precedents were sequentially re-
evaluated by judges who had clearly absorbed the scholarly output of Chicagoan 
authors.35 The 1981 appointment of William Baxter, a Chicago adherent, to head the 
Antitrust Division also saw reduced prosecutions by the Department of Justice for 
practices viewed benignly by the Chicago School.36 In the same year Bork brazenly 
declared that the ‘intellectual war has been won’, a ‘final and irreversible’ victory.37 This 
                                                          
27 Duxbury [1995] 344. For a first-hand account: Bork [1993a] xii. 
28 Director and Levi [1956] 282. 
29 Peltzman [2005]; Kobayashi and Muris [2012] 151. Director’s inspiration is often explicit in the 
acknowledgements: Bowman [1957] 19 (Director encouraged interest, provided the theory, and an 
application); McGee [1958] 138 (Director suggested a logic-based argument which McGee investigated with 
a specific case); Telser [1960] 86 (Director recommended the case study and provided assistance); [1965] 
488; Bork and Bowman [1965] 366;  Posner [1973a] xi; Bork [1978] xv (‘the seminal thinker in antitrust 
economics’).  
30 Posner [1976]; Bork [1978] (the main elements of this were settled in the late sixties, though delayed by 
personal matters and Bork’s appointment as Solicitor-General).  
31 Posner [1979] 926. 
32 eg Kovacic [1990] 1416-1417; Priest [2014] S1, S7. For a critical take: Baker [1989]. 
33 Posner [1979] 931. 
34 Continental Television v GTE Sylvania (1977) 433 US 36 (“Sylvania [1977]”). 
35 Crane [2009] 1911-1912; Priest [2014] S1 (on the Antitrust Paradox as the most influential work upon the 
US Supreme Court in any field of law). 
36 Crane [2009] 1912.  
37 Bork [1981] 181.  
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was a rather premature claim as with influence came resistance.38 Their most prominent 
bulwark was professor and judge Frank Easterbrook, who fiercely defended the Chicago 
School approach throughout the more hostile academic environment of the 1980s. 
Notwithstanding such opposition, since the 1990s it has become clear that ‘there exists 
very little in the way of contemporary antitrust theory which has not been inspired to 
some degree by Chicago economic analysis.’39 Whether this inspiration is more as friend 
or foil is an open question.40   
B) The Chicagoan Approach: Economic Method and Legal Motivation 
Reading The Antitrust Paradox, one would think that before the Chicago School US 
antitrust law and scholarship was devoid of economic underpinnings.41 This is, of course, 
far from correct.42 Rather than a novel “discovery” of economics, the influential change 
brought about by the Chicagoan approach consisted of: i) an economic method that put 
much greater emphasis upon the explanatory power of the theoretical assumptions of 
neo-classical price theory; and ii) an exclusive reliance upon total economic welfare (ie 
efficiency) as the motivation behind market intervention.    
i) Economic Method: Trust Assumptions 
The previous chapter highlighted the dialectic tension within competition 
microeconomics between abstract neo-classical price theory and practical industrial 
organisation economics (“IO”). Post-war the pendulum had very much swung towards 
an inductive and descriptive form of antitrust IO. This “Harvard School” style relied 
heavily upon empirical data to ‘take account of the richness of the real world’.43 In 
contrast, since the 1920s economics at Chicago under Knight and Viner maintained faith 
in orthodox neo-classical price theory,44 ie deductions based upon simple assumptions 
of rationality, profit maximisation, downward-sloping demand, and so on.45 This 
methodological commitment was continued by Aaron Director, deployed to deconstruct 
                                                          
38 See Section III.C. 
39 Duxbury [1995] 349. 
40 For a critical collection: Pitofsky [2009]. 
41 eg Bork [1978] 6-7 (the need to read antitrust ‘in light of the disciplines of law and economics’); [1993a] 
xvi (‘Chicagoans applied economic analysis more rigorously than was common’), xiii (‘Few economists ever 
looked seriously at antitrust’). 
42 Kaplow [1987] 184; Hovenkamp [1985] 217-223; [2002] 1-3. As recognised by: Director and Levi [1956] 
282 (‘the antitrust laws have been greatly influenced by economic doctrine’, albeit wrong). 
43 Peeperkorn and Verouden [2014] 5. For a Chicagoan take: Posner [1979] 928-929, 931 (a ‘microscopic 
examination of the idiosyncrasies of particular markets.’). 
44 Stigler [1974] 170; Samuels [1976] 3-4, 11.  
45 Posner [1979] 931. 
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and discredit numerous per se rules of antitrust prohibition throughout the 1950s and 
1960s.46 Bork’s Antitrust Paradox was explicit in its adoption of neo-classical price theory 
as he found it the only body of knowledge capable of separating anticompetitive 
business practices from those that are efficient;47 in this way, the ‘simple ideas’ of 
microeconomics were also the most ‘powerful’.48 
The Chicagoan embrace of neo-classical price theory as the primary method for 
understanding the nature and scope of competition policy is often legitimately 
highlighted as a core element of the School.49 But they arguably did themselves few 
favours by proclaiming such blanket statements, inviting facile criticism of themselves as 
theoretical daydreamers, idly drawing curves and ignoring business behaviour at the 
coalface.50 In reality, the Chicago School take on neo-classical price theory was intended 
to be empirically-substantiated and practically focused, addressing issues of 
organisation and market behaviour albeit from a prima facie abstract and deductive 
perspective.51 Chicagoan scholars regularly engaged in empirical research, whether to 
test the veracity of or inductively build their theoretical arguments.52 
The Chicago School method of invoking neo-classical price theory is perhaps best 
understood as a renewed faith in the explanatory power of these empirically-grounded 
economic assumptions: if businesses are rational profit maximisers, what reasons do 
they have to engage in conduct X?53 If rivals and potential entrants are also rational 
profit maximisers, and inelastic consumers respond to price increases by purchasing 
elsewhere, how safe is an inefficient monopolist, and will attempts to exclude more 
                                                          
46 ibid 928 (‘Director’s conclusions resulted simply from viewing antitrust policy through the lens of price 
theory.’); Bork [1993a] xii. 
47 Bork [1978] 117 (‘To abandon economic theory is to abandon the possibility of rational antitrust law’). 
Similarly: Posner [1979] 932 (‘the proper lens for viewing antitrust problems is price theory.’).  
48 Bork [1978] 90. 
49 Wright [2009] 10. 
50 eg Fox and Sullivan [1987] 936-937 (a ‘sweeping set of theoretical assumptions’ out of touch ‘with the 
changing business environment’).  
51 Friedman [1953] (defending assumptions if they are reasonable predictions of reality); Stigler [1959] 529-
530 (dismissing the ‘completely formal theorist’ and advocating the ‘empirical study of economic life’); 
Samuels [1976] 4, 8 (quoting Friedman on Chicagoan use of theory to analyse ‘‘‘concrete problems, rather 
than as an abstract mathematical structure of great beauty but little power”’). 
52 On empirically testing their theories: Samuels [1976] 8 (quoting Friedman: Chicago ‘“insists on the 
empirical testing of theoretical generalizations and [rejects] alike facts without theory and theory without 
facts.”’); Easterbrook [1984b] 151 (‘At Chicago no economic model is worth much without testing.’); [1986] 
1701; Wright [2009] 11; Kobayashi and Muris [2012] 152. 
53 Posner [1979] 928, 931; Peltzman [2005] 329. 
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efficient competitors be successful?54 Taking assumptions seriously generated a method 
of antitrust analysis profoundly sceptical of claims that certain types of behaviour ought 
to be necessarily deemed illegal, lacking in pro-competitive explanation or the potential 
for remedial market self-correction.55        
ii) Legal Motivation: Allocative and Productive Efficiency 
A second aspect of the Chicago School’s approach was a belief that antitrust policy 
should be animated solely by the goal of maximising overall efficiency.56 Although 
(deliberately?) obscured by the language adopted by Bork,57 this meant the total 
societal welfare of neo-classical price theory, ie the combination of allocative efficiency 
(resources optimally directed to outputs most desired by consumers) and productive 
efficiency (eg low production costs, consumer benefits). Advocacy of efficiency as the 
sole motivation for market intervention has been a long-standing aspect of the 
Chicagoan approach to competition policy.58 And despite continual resistance from 
certain scholars,59 achieving widespread support for this proposition is perhaps the 
Chicago School’s key legacy.60 
The case for efficiency-animated antirust was most forcefully advanced by Bork. 
Synthesising various aspects of an argument that he had been making since the mid-
1960s,61 in The Antitrust Paradox he strongly asserted that the ‘only legitimate goal of 
American antitrust law is the maximization of consumer welfare’,62 ie the total 
combination of allocative and productive efficiency.63 His main foils were various US 
court judgments deciding antitrust liability on the basis of the economic freedom of 
atomistic markets or supporting the welfare of small competitors:64 Justice Peckham’s 
‘small dealers and worthy men’ in Trans-Missouri [1897];65 Judge Hand’s protection of 
                                                          
54 Duxbury [1995] 344-345 (summarising Director); Hovenkamp [2002] 3. Also: Easterbrook [1986] 1701 
(‘Competition is hardier than you think. The desire to make a buck leads people to undermine monopolistic 
practices’). 
55 Easterbrook [1986] 1701; Peltzman [2005] 328-329. 
56 Bork [1993a] xi. 
57 On his questionable use of “consumer welfare”: Lande [1988] 434-435; Fox [1986b] 1715; Priest [2014].  
58 eg McGee [1971] 137; Posner [1971] 505-506; [1976] 4, 18-22; Easterbrook [1986] 1703-1704. 
59 Pitofsky [1979] 1051; Rowe [1984]; Fox [1986a]; [2002] 77; Fox and Sullivan [1987]; Adams and Brock 
[1987] 1116-1117.   
60 Hovenkamp [1985] 234; Kovacic [1990] 1450. For self-congratulation: Bork [1993a] xiv; Posner [2001] ix.  
61 Bork and Bowman [1965] 365; Bork [1965b] 831.  
62 Bork [1978] 50-51. See also: 89, 405.   
63 ibid 405. 
64 ibid 7. Against academics advancing the same: Bork [1965a] 413-415. 
65 US v Trans-Missouri Freight Association 166 US 290 (1897) (“Trans-Missouri [1897]”). 
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minor firms ‘for its own sake and in spite of possible cost’ in Alcoa [1945];66 or Justice 
Warren’s ‘protection of viable, small, locally-owned businesses’ in Brown Shoe [1962].67 
For Bork, these were political judgments, ‘an ugly demand for class privilege’68 or 
‘uncritical sentimentality about the “little guy”’,69 entirely overlooking the total 
efficiency implications. While judicial protection of small businesses may promote 
allocative efficiency, they failed to give due weight to productive efficiency.70 Only by 
adopting total efficiency as the single ‘common denominator’ by which to evaluate 
business practices, jettisoning incommensurable romantic political ideals of artisan 
craftsmen, was it possible for market intervention to be coherent.71 Solely through 
affording equal weight exclusively to the combined trade-off between allocative and 
productive efficiency could the law avoid the paradoxical outcomes that gave Bork’s 
book its title. This aspect of the Chicagoan approach has been so persuasive that even a 
noted critic warned advocates of multiple enforcement goals ‘to proceed very careful if 
antitrust is not to become a meaningless hodge-podge of conflicting, inconsistent, and 
politicized mini-policies.’72 
C) Legal Implications of the Chicago School Approach 
The Chicago School’s approach of combining a method that took seriously the 
assumption of rational business profit maximisation from neo-classical price theory with 
an exclusive concern for market intervention to foster overall efficiency had substantial 
implications for the law: generally it was over-inclusive in adopting rule-based, per se 
prohibitions.73  
                                                          
66 US v Aluminum Co of America 148 F 2d 416 (2d Cir 1945). 
67 Brown Shoe Co Inc v US 370 US 294 (1962) (“Brown Shoe [1962]”). Similarly: Posner [1976] 104 (a ‘social 
objection’ to mergers). 
68 Bork and Bowman [1965] 370. For other allegations of “political” antitrust: Posner [1971] 505-506; [1976] 
18-22; Easterbrook [1986] 1703-1704. Questioning efficiency-focused antitrust as apolitical: Fox [1986a]; 
[1986b]; Fox and Sullivan [1987] 957.  
69 Bork [1978] 54. 
70 ibid 7-8, 135 (‘Considering only one vector in a two-vector situation’), 405 (‘probably the major reason for 
the deformation of antitrust’s doctrines.).  
71 Ibid 79, 405. See also: Bork [1965b] 832; Posner [1971] 506; Easterbrook [1986] 1703. 
72 Hovenkamp [1985] 234.  
73 Hovenkamp [2002] 3 (Chicagoans ‘pointing out the economic nonsense’). 
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i) Market Structure  
On the structure of markets, Chicagoans argued that the frequent prohibition of 
horizontal mergers74 and proposals for industrial deconcentration75 overlooked the 
possible connection between size and efficiency.76  
Suspicion of large firms throughout the 1950s and 1960s was based upon empirical 
studies in the tradition of the Harvard School’s IO microeconomics, finding that 
oligopolistic markets persistently secured supra-competitive profits, perhaps through 
the parallel limitation of output.77 This approach to the nefarious effect of market 
concentration reflects the “structure-conduct-performance” paradigm: because a 
concentrated market structure determined the conduct of actors, and their conduct 
determined the competitiveness of the market, a highly concentrated market structure 
therefore logically also determined market performance; the actual conduct of 
businesses thus falls away from the concern of competition policy as a mere inevitability 
of concentration.78 
Application of Chicago School thinking sought to make Harvard’s fascination with 
deconcentration ‘intellectually bankrupt’.79 Methodological critique and rival empirical 
research by the wider Chicago School of economics - especially Yale Brozen, Harold 
Demsetz, and George Stigler - challenged the common distrust of market 
concentration.80 Rather than presuming anticompetitive conduct, large profits and 
market share expansion to even very high levels could be the result of efficiency, 
whether substantial economies of scale to operate at lowest production costs, 
managerial talent, technological superiority, or simply giving consumers the best 
                                                          
74 eg Brown Shoe [1962]. See: Posner [1976] 100-105; Bork [1978] chapter 9 (probably the ‘worst antitrust 
essay every written’).  
75 In 1968 a Task Force on Antitrust Policy recommended new legislation for divestiture where fewer than 
four firms together held market shares of over 70 per cent: Brozen [1970]; McGee [1971].   
76 This trade-off was noted in Chapter I, Section III.B. The Chicagoan economists of the 1920s to 1940s had a 
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77 Brozen [1969a] 124-125; [1970] 279; Duxbury [1995] 352-354; Hovenkamp [2008] 35-37; Peeperkorn and 
Verouden [2014] 5. 
78 Hovenkamp [2008] 36-37; Peeperkorn and Verouden [2014] 7. 
79 Bork [1977a] 874. Director and Levi had defended the efficiency of monopoly in the absence of barriers to 
entry: Director and Levi [1956] 285. 
80 Peeperkorn and Verouden [2014] 6-7. For empirical refutation of Harvard: Brozen [1970]; [1974]. 
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product.81 To legally condemn this success was to suggest that ‘firms should compete 
but should not win’.82 Chicagoans argued that it was natural for firms incapable of 
rivalling these efficiencies to be excluded from the market.83 And as barriers to potential 
entry by new firms had been overstated by Harvard economists,84 if market share and 
profits were not based on efficiency they would invite new entrants. In other words, the 
problem would be self-corrected by market forces.85  
Translated into concrete competition policy, the Chicago School of antitrust suggested a 
hands-off approach to horizontal mergers lest productive efficiencies occasioned by size 
and success be threatened through over-eager fragmentation.86 In essence, ‘whenever 
monopoly would increase efficiency it should be tolerated, indeed encouraged’.87 
Vertical mergers were also considered overwhelmingly pro-competitive phenomena 
that ought to be subject to little oversight as fears of competitor foreclosure or more 
difficult entry were overstated.88 This relaxed stance towards integration between 
different levels of the market was largely derived from Coase’s theory that the 
boundaries of firms were determined by whether it was more efficient to contract under 
the price mechanism or internalise processes to avoid higher market transaction cost.89 
ii) Business Conduct 
In terms of policing collusive or unilateral business conduct, the Chicago School 
dismissed antitrust’s lazy legal stance of prima facie ‘inhospitality’ towards any 
behaviour that might injure or exclude competitors.90 Greater recourse to the 
assumption of rational profit maximisation, the robustness of market forces (consumers, 
                                                          
81 Brozen [1969a] 125-131; [1969b] 6; [1974] 390-391; Demsetz [1968]; [1973] 1-5; [1974]; [1976] 372-375; 
McGee [1971]; Posner [1973a] 129-130; [1976] 22; Peltzman [1977]; Bork [1977a] 878. 
82 Brozen [1969b] 7. See also: Demsetz [1973] 3 (on the importance of the incentive for short-term 
monopoly profit for driving competition); [1974] 179; [1976] 383; McGee [1974] 95. 
83 Brozen [1969b] 6; Bork and Bowman [1965] 375; Bork [1978] 49, 136-137. 
84 Posner [1979] 946. This was largely based on the regulatory theory of: Stigler [1971]. Chicagoans 
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86 Demsetz [1973] 4-5; [1974] 179; [1976] 375; Posner [1973a] 129-130; [1976] 89-91; Peltzman [1977] 262-
263; Bork [1978] 56 (‘a tax upon consumers for the benefit of some producers’), 179 (‘If dissolution would 
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87 Posner [1976] 22. 
88 Bork [1954]; [1978] 226-227; Posner [1976] 196-201. 
89 Coase [1937]. Developed by: Williamson [1968] 32-33; [1977]. 
90 Easterbrook [1984a] 4-7. 
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rivals, potential entrants), and the prevalence of productive efficiencies again led the 
Chicago School to instead advocate a lesser scope for per se prohibition.  
Perhaps their most influential claims related to vertical restraints in contracts between, 
for instance, a manufacturer and independent retailers relating to price, location, store 
display, and so on. The Chicago scholars argued that these terms should be generally 
outside legal condemnation.91 Restrictions on sellers are prima facie counterintuitive for 
many manufacturers as self-imposed limitations hinder the sale of more products, which 
might suggest malevolent intent. But building upon Director’s method of taking the 
assumption of rational profit maximisation seriously, vertical restraints were 
reconceptualised by Chicagoans as positive means to ensure additional sales services 
that customers valued by avoiding non-compliant dealers free-riding on the efforts of 
others.92 Restraints on intra-brand competition between distributors were argued to 
enhance inter-brand competition through facilitating greater non-price product 
differentiation.93 And as all forms of vertical restraints were substitutes, this Chicagoan 
claim was to apply across-the-board,94 including to resale price maintenance.95      
Similar scepticism was cast upon supposed attempts by large firms to exclude rivals and 
cement their market position. In their 1956 article, Director and Levi laid the 
foundations for the Chicagoan approach to exclusionary conduct by arguing that the 
hardiness of market forces made them unlikely to succeed.96 Indeed, many condemned 
practices could actually be considered legitimate competitive practices for all firms, 
large or small, that excluded simply inefficient rivals whilst offering consumer benefits.97 
For instance, rather than an anticompetitive attempt to leverage power from one 
market to another, tying was a potentially efficient means to reduce the cost of 
providing complementary products, to ensure compatibility, and a consumer 
                                                          
91 Bork [1966]; [1978] 288-289; Easterbrook [1984b] 135; Demsetz [1992] 215-216. Posner agreed but 
highlighted their possible facilitation of cartels: Posner [1976] 147-166. 
92 This argument was initially developed for resale price maintenance (Bowman [1955]; Telser [1960] 91-92) 
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93 Bowman [1955].  
94 Bork [1966] 404-405. 
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Demsetz [1992] 216. cf Peeperkorn [2008] 205. 
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automatically exclusionary practices is entirely without merit.’); Easterbrook [1986] 1701. 
97 Bork and Bowman [1965] 366; Telser [1965] 504; Bork [1978] 134-135 (‘the infliction of injury upon rivals’ 
is also a ‘means by which productive efficiency is created’).  
41 
 
convenience.98 Even without pro-competitive efficiency explanations, it was unlikely to 
succeed.99 Predatory pricing was also deemed improbable owing to the instigator 
sustaining much heavier losses than the prey that were unlikely to be recouped in the 
future, thus conflicting with the assumption of profit maximisation that would render 
direct acquisition a more rational course of action.100 To be sure, the Chicagoan views of 
supposedly exclusionary practices were not impossibility theorems; sometimes firms 
would act irrationality.101 But exclusionary conduct was improbable and unlikely to 
succeed, leaving market intervention perhaps not worth the effort.102  
*** 
In summary, the Chicagoan message was that antitrust condemned concentrations and 
conduct unlikely to have anticompetitive consequences owing to robust market forces 
and rational profit maximisation, whilst also chilling potential efficiencies beneficial to 
consumers. As a result, the scope of antitrust liability through per se rules ought to be 
substantially narrowed, and predominantly directed towards cartels and horizontal 
mergers to monopoly.103 
III. The Chicagoan Rejection of ad hoc, Subject-Specific Determinations of Legality 
The foci of Chicagoan scorn were the numerous market practices subject to blanket, per 
se prohibition by antitrust law. As seen in the previous section, deductions from 
microeconomic theory suggested to the Chicago School that they were efficient at best, 
at worst subject to market self-correction. It is therefore understandable why the US 
Courts would absorb this substantive critique of the overbroad reach of legal prohibition 
and thus adopt a form of market intervention that facilitated closer scrutiny of their 
actual impact on the market for determining legality: ad hoc, subject-specific analysis of 
whether, on balance, the practice in question would reduce overall market efficiency. 
                                                          
98 Bowman [1957]; Telser [1965] 490; Posner [1976] 171-184; Bork [1978] 380-381. 
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Despite the ease of the mistake, this judicial response to their writing was simply not an 
accurate representation of the Chicagoan understanding of the relationship between 
law and economics in antitrust. On the basis of underappreciated views as to the 
legitimate form that antitrust law ought to take, A) Posner, B) Bork, and C) Easterbrook 
all explicitly rejected this means for determining legality as unworkable for decision-
makers and unpredictable for businesses. What they proposed instead was ex ante 
incorporation of economic learning into general norms which, despite imperfectly 
distinguishing between efficient and inefficient conduct in every instance, overall 
reconciled efficiency-driven antitrust with the desiderata of legal certainty and 
administrability.     
A) Posner’s Response to Sylvania 
The US Supreme Court’s Sylvania [1977]104 decision is often thought to be one of the 
Chicago School’s most important victories.105 Nevertheless, to understand their 
approach to competition policy it is crucial to note that this was a partial triumph: as the 
response of Posner clearly demonstrates, the Chicagoans agreed that they had (almost) 
won the battle on the substantive economic approach to vertical restraints, but not on 
the resultant form of market intervention. 
Sylvania represented the US Supreme Court fundamentally altering the law’s treatment 
of vertical restraints that had been resolutely negative only a decade previously in 
Schwinn [1967].106 Citing Bork and Posner, it accepted the Chicago argument that 
vertical restraints were generally beneficial, stimulating inter-brand product 
differentiation through guaranteeing extra sales services by preventing free-riding.107 As 
a result, the rule-based per se prohibition of non-price vertical restraints - in this 
instance, location clauses - was inappropriate and was thus overruled. There was some 
disappointment that resale price maintenance continued to be prohibited per se,108 and 
a degree of initial hesitancy that US antitrust would really shake the overly broad 
application of automatic illegality.109 Still, Bork and Posner were delighted with the 
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economics underpinning the substance of the ruling and how it indicated a radical 
redirection towards efficiency-focused antitrust.110 
Nevertheless, what has often been overlooked when considering Sylvania as a 
Chicagoan triumph is that Posner fundamentally disagreed with the proposed form of 
market intervention for determining legality. The Supreme Court removed non-price 
vertical restraints from the frying pan of per se condemnation and placed them into the 
fire of the “rule of reason” standard, as articulated by Judge Brandeis in Chicago Board 
of Trade [1918]:111 
‘The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and 
perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even 
destroy competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the 
facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and 
after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or 
probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting 
the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.’ 
The Supreme Court in Sylvania gave little indication as to how this standard was to be 
applied,112 save for stating that ‘the factfinder weighs all of the circumstances of a case 
in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an 
unreasonable restraint on competition.’113 In essence, legality depended upon an ad 
hoc, conduct-specific evaluation of the effects of the particular restraint in question.  
Posner’s immediate response to this form of market intervention was overwhelmingly 
negative: it was ‘formless’, a ‘poor guide to the decision of restricted distribution cases’, 
and did not provide ‘usable criteria of illegality’.114 Rather than case-specific analysis of 
pro- and anticompetitive consequences, he proposed a more administrable and 
predictable test comprising three consecutive rules.115 Yet returning to this issue in 1981 
he found even this test difficult to apply and therefore, as anticompetitive consequences 
were thought highly unlikely, he recommended a rule of per se legality to ‘lighten the 
burden on the courts and to lift a cloud of debilitating doubt’ for businesses unsure of 
                                                          
110 Posner [1977a] 5 (‘good economics’), 12-13; Bork [1977b] 172; [1978] 287 (exhibiting a ‘far higher degree 
of economic sophistication’). 
111 Chicago Board of Trade v US 246 US 231 (1918). 
112 Posner [1977a] 13-14. 
113 Sylvania [1977] 432. 
114 Posner [1977a] 15-16.  
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their normative obligations.116 The intervening years had also amplified his 
condemnation of determining legality via ‘broad-ranging assessment of all competitive, 
and perhaps all economic benefits and costs of the challenged practice.’117 This 
‘particularized case-by-case approach’ to lawfulness had fostered ‘considerable legal 
uncertainty’, thereby deterring efficient and pro-competitive use of vertical restraints.118 
Posner thus deemed the substantive economics underpinning the Sylvania decision to 
be sound, but its form of market intervention to determine legality highly problematic. 
It is important to note how Posner’s two proposed alternatives incorporated 
presumptions from economic research on vertical restraints - the low likelihood of 
anticompetitive effects, the difficult and error-prone nature of sifting “good” from “bad” 
- into designing legal norms that were more comprehensible than the rule of reason. 
Indeed, in the first edition of Antitrust Law he suggested that his purpose was to see 
efficient business practices as outside per se prohibition but ‘without having to compare 
directly the gains and losses from a challenged practice.’119 This can also be gleaned 
from his recommendations for merger control in the mid-1970s: strong presumptive 
legality for horizontal mergers below high combined market shares as they are ‘precise’, 
‘workable’ and avoid ‘intractable subjects for litigation’;120 abandoning legal prohibition 
of acquisition of potential competitors owing to the ‘impossibility of developing 
workable rules’;121 and rejecting an efficiencies defence for mergers.122 Similarly, Posner 
struggled with the appropriate legal test for predatory pricing owing to administrability 
issues.123 His negative response to the form of market intervention introduced by the 
Supreme Court in Sylvania should therefore not have come as a shock. Indeed, two 
years earlier he claimed that satisfactory legal rules must be ‘reasonably precise’ to 
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thereby limit the ‘discretion’ of decision-makers124 and, pre-empting his critique of 
Sylvania, condemned the Supreme Court for:125 
“insensitivity to the practical limitations of the judicial process, which require rules to 
guide decisions rather than invitations to roam at large through masses of factual 
materials thrown up by the defense bar.”  
In this way Posner, the figurehead of the “law & economics” movement, refused to 
determine the application of antitrust law through conduct-specific analysis of economic 
effects. He was not alone amongst the Chicago scholars in condemning such a form of 
market intervention.   
B) Bork versus Williamson and his Peculiar Conceptualisation of the Rule of Reason 
Bork’s especial contribution to the Chicago School was to stress that the sole motivation 
for antitrust law, thus delimiting the scope of liability, was the maximisation of total 
welfare, the overall combination of allocative and productive efficiency. The overbroad 
application of per se rules of illegality did not take into account the latter efficiency of 
condemned practices, and therefore ought to be scaled back to primarily naked 
restraints that had few possible efficiencies.126 For non-naked (‘ancillary’) restraints, the 
rule of reason was the appropriate form of antitrust inquiry. But what has not been 
adequately recognised is that Bork’s conceptualisation of the rule of reason was rather 
unusual: it certainly did not amount to appraising the legality of individual business 
practices through consideration of their specific pro- and anticompetitive effects. 
Despite his notoriety as the doyen of efficiency-informed antitrust scholars, Bork’s 
aversion to ad hoc, conduct-specific determinations of legality should have been obvious 
from his early dispute with Oliver Williamson.127 Williamson’s influential 1968 paper, 
‘Economies as an Antitrust Defence’, gave graphical representation to the welfare trade-
off in horizontal mergers, whereby the loss of allocative efficiency may be outweighed 
by the productive efficiency of realising economies of scale.128 He thus proposed the 
adoption of a productive efficiencies defence for merging parties to show the particular 
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positive effects of the concentration counterbalancing any resulting loss of rivalry,129 
alongside a list of other factors for consideration.130 
In The Antitrust Paradox, Bork borrowed Williamson’s trade-off graph to explain the 
consumer welfare approach and to demonstrate how many antitrust problems lead to a 
reduction in allocative but an increase in productive efficiency.131 Nevertheless, he was 
adamant that purely effects-based legal analysis was not the appropriate form that 
‘efficiencies are to be given weight by law’.132 To determine legality on the basis of the 
efficiency consequences of a specific practice would be to demand the impossible of 
both antitrust decision-makers and subjects; Bork argued that thoroughly unpredictable 
and unworkable market intervention would be the result as it was impossible to reliably 
quantify efficiencies, even by defendant firms themselves.133 Williamson refused to 
favour administrability over accurate sifting between pro- and anti-competitive conduct 
in each instance, accused Bork of overstating the volatility of directly addressing the 
inevitable efficiency trade-off, and rather baldly claimed that over time the courts would 
somehow work it all out.134 
For Bork, the alternative to consideration of conduct-specific efficiency consequences 
for determining legality was to incorporate economic analysis ex ante into generalised 
norms – rules, presumptions, cumulative filters – that were therefore also administrable 
and comprehensible: the aim of The Antitrust Paradox was to ‘show that rules can be 
devised which reflect and resolve the tension between productive and allocative 
inefficiency accurately enough for the law to confer a net benefit’, to thus ‘balance the 
tradeoff considerations through general legal rules.’135 Bork’s writing offers numerous 
examples. Predatory pricing was unlikely to be rational or effective, and therefore 
introducing potentially erroneous and ‘unworkable’ cost tests were not worth the 
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hassle.136 It was impossible to rigorously prove that never, under any circumstances, 
would resale price maintenance have an anticompetitive effect, but the most rational 
explanation for its use on balance was to provide additional sales services, thus justifying 
an overall lack of legal concern.137  
The most prominent example of such logic was the per se rule of illegality for naked 
price-fixing agreements. This Bork and Bowman considered a ‘model’ law, reconciling 
the economic consensus on cartels with delivery through a ‘relatively clear, workable 
rule’.138 That price-fixing or output-limiting agreements could generate productive 
efficiencies or might be doomed to failure through instability or a lack of market power 
was entirely irrelevant;139 economics suggested that allocative inefficiency would result 
in the overwhelming majority of instances so there was no point, on balance, wasting 
resources abandoning the simple per se rule of prohibition.140 The inevitably inaccurate 
overreach of responding via rule-based market intervention was therefore justified ‘not 
only on economic grounds but also because of the rule’s clarity and ease of 
enforcement.’141 
But if Bork strongly argued against conceptualising the appropriate form of antitrust 
intervention as ad hoc, subject-specific decision-making, what is to be made of his clear 
support for the (purely economic)142 rule of reason standard, where legality is 
dependent upon ‘the effect [business] behaviour was likely to have, considering the 
market context’?143  
It is crucial to note that Bork’s advocacy of this means for determining legality was 
conditional upon his unorthodox understanding of what the rule of reason entailed. 
Rather than the formulation of Judge Brandeis from Chicago Board of Trade [1918] as 
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applied in Sylvania [1977],144 he preferred Chief Justice White’s earlier statement of the 
rule of reason as prohibiting business practices ‘either because of their inherent nature 
or effect or because of the evident purpose of those acts.’145 Bork thus considered the 
rule of reason a three-stage analysis of i) per se rules prohibiting naked agreements, ii) 
intent, and iii) effect upon the market.146 Nevertheless, the latter part in Bork’s reading 
is not as it seems; by placing emphasis upon the word ‘inherent’ to modify both ‘nature’ 
and ‘effect’ in White’s formulation,147 Bork argued that the effects-based analysis was 
not to involve ‘the futile direct study of actual effects’148 but ‘applying rules of thumb 
constructed with the aid of economic analysis’,149 primarily market-share thresholds.150 
The avoidance of ‘lengthy industry studies of actual performance’151 and of having 
courts ‘sift through endless data’ at the effects-based stage rendered Bork’s rule of 
reason administrable for courts and afforded ‘predictability that businessmen and their 
counsel desire.’152  
To summarise, Bork refused to countenance ad hoc efficiencies analysis to determine 
the legality of business conduct. Instead, he advocated generalised norms - per se rules, 
presumptions - to structure a very peculiar conceptualisation of the rule of reason that 
restrained decision-making and therefore gave greater normative certainty to 
businesses. Undoubtedly, the adoption of generalised norms meant that the absolute 
accuracy of prohibiting inefficient and permitting efficient practices was sacrificed. But 
to settle for the alternative and ‘demand perfection’, Bork claimed, was ‘to demand the 
abolition of the law’.153 This conclusion reveals the latent conceptualisation of “law” as 
the medium for market intervention in the Chicago School’s approach to antitrust. It can 
again be glimpsed when critics began to demand economic perfection in antitrust law 
throughout the 1980s.        
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C) Post-Chicago Complexity and Easterbrook’s ‘Workable Antitrust’ School  
Whilst the 1970s represented the waxing of the Chicago School approach to antitrust, 
throughout the 1980s it waned in academic circles as its critics condemned how market 
intervention had been ‘minimalized and trivialized’.154 The coalition of counter-
Chicagoan voices was broadly constituted: some were continuing adherents of older 
Harvard School scepticism of industrial concentration;155 others rejected the exclusive 
focus upon efficiency as an impoverished foundation for antitrust.156 
Yet the most interesting critics of the Chicago School were scholars that largely accepted 
their pure efficiency focus,157 but challenged the veracity of their strong assumptions of 
rational profit maximisation and robust market self-correction. As alluded to in the 
previous chapter, the main contribution of this “Post-Chicago” or “new” industrial 
organisation approach was to incorporate the strategic considerations of game theory 
into dynamic models, thus arguing that business practices often had more complex 
effects than the simple Chicagoan assumptions suggested.158 Strategic barriers to entry 
may be rife;159 for example, fostering a reputation for predatory pricing might deter 
market entry much more effectively than engaging in such irrational conduct itself.160 
The vertical restraints between producers and distributors deemed harmless by 
Chicagoans may actually be problematic owing to their ability to raise rivals’ costs.161 In 
essence, the Chicago School was accused of being far too sanguine in its reliance upon 
the simple assumptions of neo-classical price theory which could not account for every 
possible anticompetitive eventuality, instead resulting in under-inclusive legal 
prohibition.162 Shifting the methodological pendulum in competition microeconomics 
back from abstract and deductive price theory towards complex and inductive IO, the 
Post-Chicagoans advocated context-specific studies into the consequences of particular 
practices on the market in question to determine legality; only such ‘[i]ntense fact-
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specificity anchors the law to reality’.163 As summarised by Sullivan, the scope of Chicago 
School antitrust was premised upon ‘generalizations’, whilst ‘the post-Chicagoan must 
determine purpose and effect by empirical inquiry and analysis.’164 As argued in Chapter 
I, a central tenet of contemporary competition microeconomics is that context is key in 
evaluating whether conduct actually has, or will likely have, a negative or positive 
impact on specific markets. 
It would have been possible for Chicagoan scholars to fight economic fire with economic 
fire, arguing that their recommendations actually did incorporate strategic 
considerations,165 or that the Post-Chicagoan approach was defective in substance.166 
But instead, Frank Easterbrook combatted the Post-Chicagoan charge on the grounds of 
administrability and normative predictability. Although similar concerns have been 
glimpsed in Chicagoan scholarship throughout this section, Easterbrook’s distinctive 
contribution was to explicitly place institutional limitations and the comprehensibility of 
legal obligations for businesses at the centre of his analysis of the appropriate form of 
market intervention.167 
His direct response to growing criticism that Chicago recommendations were too 
simple,168 that they did not always prohibit the anticompetitive and permit the efficient 
in every instance, was that ‘pursuit of the perfect is the enemy of the good.’169 It was to 
fall foul of the ‘nirvana fallacy’ to believe that every possible imperfection in the reach of 
the law was actually worth the cost of remedying it.170 This idealism was being spurred 
by the Post-Chicagoan creation of ‘“existence theorems”’, complex models showing that 
generally pro-competitive conduct might lead to contrary outcomes in very specific 
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circumstances.171 To ensure that antitrust did more good than harm to overall efficiency, 
Easterbrook stressed that the formulation of legal norms had to incorporate economic 
research into the costs of likely errors (over- or under-inclusivity) and of their 
enforcement.172  
Therefore, he argued that the virtue of per se rules was their simple inaccuracy: 
generality was appropriate for prohibiting practices that would be anticompetitive in the 
overwhelming majority of instances as administrative savings from ease of application 
and normative clarity for businesses counterbalanced rare condemnation of pro-
competitive efficiencies.173 The same logic of per se legality applied conversely for 
practices where the potential for negative consequences was thought to be minuscule 
and the costs of searching for a few bad apples substantial.174 
Despite its potential for perfect legal accuracy in sifting anticompetitive from efficient, 
Easterbrook was a staunch critic of the ad hoc, subject-specific legal analysis conducted 
under the unstructured rule of reason standard, stressing its sizeable error and 
administrative costs. It was naïve to assume that legality could be determined via the 
rule of reason without error,175 and the vagueness of its formulation failed to help 
businesses planning their conduct, thus inviting further wasteful litigation.176 The pursuit 
of absolute antitrust accuracy had mistakenly fostered over-ready recourse to the rule 
of reason in decisions such as Sylvania.177 Even for practices where the consequences 
were more complex, Easterbrook stressed that it was not a black or white choice 
between the form of per se rules or particularistic determinations of legality: the task of 
economic research was to assist antitrust to ‘use the economists’ way out’ by devising 
cumulative presumptive filters to structure analysis.178 This would be of considerable 
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benefit not just for decision-makers but also for businesses to comprehend their 
obligations under antitrust.179  
What renders Easterbrook’s articulation of the various costs of antitrust enforcement 
distinctly Chicagoan is how he resolved the inevitable imperfections of generalised per 
se rules and presumptive filters. In the choice between substantive over-inclusion (false 
positives) and under-inclusion (false negatives), Easterbrook employed the Chicago 
School’s foundational commitment to the robustness of market self-correction: 
imperfect rules and filters should err on the side of cautious acceptance of possibly 
detrimental practices as market forces themselves would probably act as a secondary 
disciplinary influence beyond legal condemnation. The alternative of erroneously 
prohibiting beneficial practices would have a greater chilling effect that extended 
beyond the instant conduct, causing wider societal inefficiency. Such legal false positives 
were thought much slower to self-correct, as demonstrated by the existence of ancient 
problematic precedents.180 
*** 
Easterbrook’s countering of Post-Chicagoan calls for context-specificity and complexity 
in determining legality with administrability and normative comprehensibility was 
relatively successful.181 But he also did not believe that his error-cost approach 
constituted much of a gloss upon the orthodox Chicagoan approach; so endemic was its 
concern for applicability and certainty in conceptualising the appropriate form of market 
intervention that Easterbrook thought it may as well have been rebranded the 
‘Workable Antitrust Policy School’.182 The discussion of Posner and Bork’s approach in 
this section provides substantial evidence for his proposal, as could other Chicagoan 
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protagonists.183 Their ideal vision of the relationship between law and economics in 
antitrust was for sophisticated insights from the latter to be ex ante incorporated into 
generalised norms (rules, presumptions, structured tests) to thereby formally foster 
legal certainty and administrability. 
But despite the clarity of their rejection of ad hoc determinations of legality – purely 
effects-based analysis, the unstructured rule of reason standard - their suggested 
conceptualisation of the most appropriate form of market intervention invites deeper 
enquiry. Beyond austere calculations of administrative cost-savings, why did the 
Chicagoans, the high priests of neo-classical price theory in competition law, believe 
there to be great virtue in determining legality through the form of generalised rules or 
presumptions? 
IV. The Chicago School and the Rule of Law 
The tell-tale sign of adherence to some conception of the rule of law is scholarship that 
refers to intra vires normative actions - statutory interpretation, precedential 
development, use of conferred powers - as still being “not really law”. They amount to 
suggestions that legal validity is necessary but not sufficient; to recognition that there 
are “legitimate” and “illegitimate”, “more legal” and “less legal” exercises of authority 
that are nonetheless constitutionally valid.184  
It will be demonstrated A) that such signals of aspirations towards realising the formal 
rule of law ideal are common to the later scholarship of the Chicago School of antitrust. 
Bork and Easterbrook particularly indicate that legality should be determined through 
the enforcement of generalised norms of lawfulness and unlawfulness that afford legal 
certainty to businesses. To better understand the appeal of this means, two direct and 
more substantial engagements with the desirability of this form of market intervention 
will also be considered: B) the more metaphysical discussion of the older Chicagoan 
economists, who connected the formal rule of law to political liberty; and C) Posner’s 
economic analysis of the ideal as optimally recalibrating subject incentives to effectively 
deliver the goal animating market intervention, ie maximising efficiency  
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A) Bork and Easterbrook: On “Good” and “Bad” Law 
The Antitrust Paradox is not just one of the most important books on the economics 
underpinning competition policy. It is arguably also a fundamental work on the 
conceptualisation of antitrust in accordance with the formal ideal of the rule of law.  
Bork’s intention was not simply to reorient US competition law according to the 
Chicagoan approach to economics, but also through considering ‘the virtues appropriate 
to law as law’.185 Of course US antitrust was legal as a matter of constitutional validity; a 
number of statutes have been passed prohibiting various types of anticompetitive 
conduct and the US Supreme Court has the authority to interpret their meaning, thereby 
determining the normative obligations incumbent upon legal subjects. But as is clear 
from the earliest pages of The Antitrust Paradox, Bork believed that even valid law can 
take the form of “bad” law:186 
“[Although] the very idea of the rule of law … is not, and cannot be, nearly so highly 
developed as that of economics, law does have requirements that are distinctively its 
own. When these are ignored, as they increasingly have been in antitrust adjudication, 
law that is bad as law, quite apart from its substantive content, necessarily results.”     
Bork stressed that antitrust was ‘not respectable as law’.187 Throughout his writing, he 
suggested that realising competition policy through the medium of law comes with its 
own requirements, an ‘intellectual discipline of its own’.188 The above reference to 
undesirability for reasons ‘quite apart from its substantive content’ emphasises that his 
concern was not with a substantive conceptualisation of the rule of law (eg rights of due 
process, access to justice)189 but the form of market intervention for determining the 
legality of conduct, regardless of its economic merit. This is confirmed by reference to 
‘attributes of rationality, efficacy, tolerable certainty’ as ‘characteristics of good law’.190 
Sometimes the formal rule of law ideal was couched by Bork in terms of responsible 
adjudication, which required antitrust decision-making:191    
                                                          
185 Bork [1978] 7 (emphasis in original).  
186 ibid 8. (emphasis added). 
187 ibid 418 (emphasis added). 
188 Bork [1985] 24 (Nobody listens to his claim that the case for consumer welfare rests on legal arguments 
too because they do not believe that ‘law has any intellectual discipline of its own.’). See also: [1965b] 780 
(‘antitrust is law as well as economics, and law has its own claims, its own tradition and discipline.’); [1978] 8 
(‘We are too little accustomed, however, to thinking of law as a science’).   
189 Though this boundary is somewhat blurred when he shifts into arguments based upon the constitutional 
separation of powers: [1966] 876; [1985] 24. 
190 Bork [1966] 876. 
191 Bork [1967b] 244. On the formal rule of law in terms of judicial responsibility: [1978] 72. 
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“upon criteria which are judicially administrable, give fair warning to those required to 
obey the law, permit sufficient predictability so that desirable conduct is not needlessly 
inhibited, and permit rational explanation…” 
Furthermore, these requirements of “good” law could take precedence over even 
substantively sound economic theory.192 And while more frequently expressed purely in 
terms of normative comprehensibility for businesses, at times Bork suggested that the 
form of generalised, ‘simple rules of substantive law’ is critical to realising this benefit.193 
The clearest demonstration of Bork’s foundational faith in the virtues of the formal rule 
of law was actually his advocacy of efficiency as the sole goal animating antitrust. 
Chicagoan scholars unfailingly stressed the economic need to incorporate considerations 
both of allocative and productive efficiencies, excluding political preference for small 
businesses and atomised markets. But Bork also emphasised ‘only that goal permits 
courts to behave responsibly and to achieve the virtues appropriate to law’.194 Indeed, 
this argument from the rule of law may have been his most important.195 Bork’s 
proposition was that permitting the judiciary discretion to draw upon any political goal 
they wished to decide antitrust liability in an ad hoc, subject-specific fashion fostered 
hopelessly unpredictable decision-making, denying fair warning as to one’s normative 
obligations that hindered individual planning:196 
“No businessman can know what the law is if the “law” depends upon the sympathies 
and prejudices of any one of the hundreds of federal judges before whom he may find 
himself arraigned at some certain date in the future.”   
The use of quotation marks emphasises Bork’s belief that without efficiency as the 
singular goal of antitrust, the resultant form of market intervention is a degenerate 
normative order that ‘hardly deserves the name of law’.197    
                                                          
192 Bork [1965b] 781. 
193 Bork [1978] 81 (emphasis added). See also: [1965b] 780 (the rule of law requires one to ‘determine what 
rules can be properly laid down for the future’ with its ‘additional limits’ of ‘warning’); text accompanying fn 
135-141 on per se rules.  
194 ibid 89. See also: [1966] 876; [1967b] 244 (‘Consumer welfare is the only legitimate goal of antitrust, not 
just because antitrust is economics, but because it is law.’). 
195 Bork [1967b] 246. For recognition of this underappreciated aspect: Lande [1988] 436-438; Kovacic [1990] 
1462; Heyer [2014] S22. 
196 Bork [1978] 81. See also: Bork and Bowman [1965] 370 (‘prediction of the courts’ behaviour would 
become little more than a guessing game’); Bork [1965b] 832 (consumer welfare meets ‘the virtues 
appropriate to good law by becoming capable of giving fair warning to those who must obey, susceptible for 
principled administration by the courts that apply it’); [1978] 405 (‘Departures from that standard destroy 
the consistency and predictability of the law.’). 
197 Bork and Bowman [1965] 370. See also: Bork [1993b] 427 (judicial discretion as to the goals of antitrust 
made ‘anything resembling a rule of law impossible.’). 
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Easterbrook agreed with Bork’s justification for consumer welfare based on legal 
certainty (and was also a fan of derisory quotation marks): for legal prohibition to be 
unforeseeably determined on the basis of any number of unknowable, incompatible 
goals in the particular discretionary decision at hand was ‘not a power to enforce “law” 
at all’.198 He too suggested that there are legitimate and illegitimate forms of market 
intervention, and was often much clearer than Bork in linking normative certainty with 
the decisional restraint of generalised, rule-based norms. This was particularly visible in 
his later writing. Developing his preference for cumulative presumptions in antitrust 
over the rule of reason, Easterbrook argued more generally that ‘laundry lists’ of factors 
constituting legal balancing tests199 or ‘plastic standards’ defied regular application as 
they permitted decision-makers to ‘go any which way.’200 In such circumstances, where 
there are no norms of general scope, ‘no rules of law’, but only judicial discretion to 
impose particular outcomes, uncertainty not only fosters needless litigation,201 but also 
fails to guarantee equality before the law. Normative orders reliant upon ad hoc 
determinations of legality under vague standards, facilitating differential outcomes from 
case-to-case and decision-maker-to-decision-maker, permitted personal idiosyncrasies 
and views of the worthiness of the individual subject to unpredictably influence 
results.202 In contrast, Easterbrook argued that a commitment to law as generalised 
norms of equal application - formulated to be prospectively applied in the future, and 
applied in the present to guarantee continuity with the past - ensure restrained and 
regularised enforcement so that such decisions ‘may be called law rather than will, rules 
rather than results.’203 It is for these reasons that Easterbrook considered ‘decision by 
rule […] an objective of law’ and ‘a benefit that cannot be doubted’.204 
It is therefore clear that Bork and Easterbrook subscribe to some formal understanding 
of the rule of law as a desirable ideal; that legitimate market intervention is 
conceptualised as generalised norms, which in their rigidity and restraint delineate the 
                                                          
198 Easterbrook [1986] 1703. See also: [1984a] 716 (‘multi-goal antitrust policy is unpredictable and 
unprincipled… judges can reconcile any decision, in any case’). 
199 Easterbrook [1990] 780. 
200 Easterbrook [1992] 349. Similarly: Posner [1975a] 282. 
201 Easterbrook [1990] 780-781. 
202 ibid 781 (with standards, judges focus on ‘the facts before them and not on how rules affect future 
conduct. When there are no “rules” the tug of fair treatment is especially strong. Judges who have personal 
idiosyncrasies or ideologies may indulge them freely.’); [1992] 350 (‘the more discretion, the less "law" 
remains in the system.’ Unstructured standards ‘liberate courts from rules, license ex post appreciations and 
"fair" divisions of the stakes; concrete rules establish restrain discretion later on.’). 
203 Easterbrook [1988] 422. 
204 Easterbrook [1992] 350. 
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boundaries between legal and illegal in a manner comprehensible to businesses 
(prospective, clear, public). The virtues justifying this aspirational form for determining 
legality seem to be the interconnected phenomena of administrative restraint and 
normative clarity. Still, this is rather vague. Bork and Easterbrook were not legal 
philosophers. Nevertheless, they were part of a movement that had amongst its ranks 
scholars – counter-intuitively, economists - who did engage with jurisprudential issues 
and regarded the formal rule of law to be a necessary component of political liberalism.          
B) The Chicago School of Economics and Liberal Political Theory205 
The historical account in Section I mentioned that the University of Chicago established 
a reputation in the inter-war period as a continuing devotee of liberal economic policy in 
an increasingly unreceptive climate favouring central direction. The scholars providing 
the microeconomic foundations to the subsequent Chicago School of antitrust were 
similarly animated by a belief in the efficiency of free markets.206 But in contrast to later 
Chicagoans, they were also much more explicit in their being motivated by metaphysical 
considerations of individual freedom that further recommended a free market society. 
That ‘freedom itself is of transcendent importance as a condition of moral life’ was 
especially visible in the writings of Frank Knight207 and Henry Simons,208 though even 
Stigler, the later figurehead of empirical Chicago economics, also made unusually 
philosophical claims concerning freedom and the dignity of man.209  
Economic freedom on the open market and the enjoyment of political freedom were 
often considered by Chicago economists to be two sides of the same coin.210 The 
common potential threat to both was the overbearing state, whether as central planner 
of economic production or despotic tyrant of the polity.211 Yet just as neo-liberal 
                                                          
205 The connection between political liberalism and the formal rule of law is analysed in Chapter IV, Section 
III. 
206 Notwithstanding the need for competition policy and disagreement as to what this entailed: fn 76. 
207 Knight [1944] 340. See also: [1951] 13. For discussion of Knight’s economic methodology unapologetically 
incorporating political values of liberty: Hirsh and Hirsh [1976] 61-62. 
208 Simons [1936] 68 (‘The preservation of freedom is, I submit, the most important end of policy’); 
Davenport [1946] 6 (Simons’ views ‘rested on the dignity and worth of the individual’; ‘individual liberty 
cannot be disassociated from the preservation of the free competitive market.’). 
209 Stigler [1958b] 172. 
210 eg Knight [1941] 201 (politics and economics ‘are so closely interrelated that they are ultimately little 
more than aspects of the same organisation’); [1960] 28; Simons [1945] 231 (the ‘implied political 
philosophy’ of freedom within classical economics.); Friedman [1962] (‘intimate connection between 
economics and politics’); Friedman and Friedman [1980] 1-3. 
211 eg Knight [1944] 340 (‘very “strong” government is more likely in the long run to be bad than good’); 
[1960] 14 (quoting Acton on absolute power); Friedman and Friedman [1980] 4 (Smith and Jefferson ‘had 
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economic policy both warns against and requires market intervention,212 liberal political 
philosophy shares the tension that government is a necessary evil to guarantee 
individual freedom.213 Whether its task is to prevent violence between citizens, enforce 
contracts, guarantee property rights, authoritatively adjudicate disputes, or prohibit 
cartels, there is a friction at the heart of liberalism, including the brand represented by 
the Chicago School:  ‘[h]ow can we keep the government we create from becoming a 
Frankenstein that will destroy the very freedom we establish it to protect?’214 Somewhat 
surprisingly for a group of economists, the two solutions were both legal.     
The primary means to maintain individual political freedom vis-à-vis the state’s 
monopoly of coercion was through substantive constitutionalism: restraining centralised 
power by only conferring a limited range of competences and powers to act with 
constitutional validity.215 Naïve expectations that government could solve all ills and be 
trusted with greater constitutional competence ignored ‘its evils and dangers.’216 
However, many of the early Chicagoan economists also subscribed to the formal rule of 
law as an additional restraint; essentially a belt-and-braces limitation upon interference 
with individual freedom by state action that was nevertheless constitutionally valid. As 
precursors to the suggestions of Bork and Easterbrook above, prior Chicagoan 
scholarship is awash with conceptualisations of law as a generally-applicable framework 
of norms structuring individual conduct and restraining state power.217 Indeed, a 
number of older Chicagoan scholars found the jurisprudential concept of the formal rule 
of law to be a concomitant ideal contained within broader political and economic visions 
                                                                                                                                                               
seen concentrated government power as a great danger to the ordinary man; they saw the protection of the 
citizen against the tyranny of government as a perpetual need.’). 
212 See Chapter I, Section I. Rather than the common contemporary pejorative, ‘neo-liberalism’ is used here 
in the historical sense to denote free-market advocates who rejected laissez-faire, supporting interventions 
to guarantee the operation of market forces.  
213 Knight [1941] 204 (government has to ‘provide and enforce a framework of rules for securing freedom’); 
[1951] 13 (‘governments have to set some limits to individual freedom’); [1960] 14 (‘Liberals hold that men 
are not to be trusted, beyond necessity, with arbitrary power.’); Davenport [1946] 6 (quoting Simons that 
the state should: ‘“…maintain the kind of legal and institutional framework within which competition can 
function effectively…”’); Director [1953] 2 (‘economic liberalism has always assumed a well-established 
system of law and order designed to harness self-interest to serve the welfare of all.’); Friedman [1962] 
(‘The existence of a free market does not of course eliminate the need for government’). 
214 Friedman [1962] 2.  
215 Knight [1944] 340, 369 (‘a fairly narrow limitation of the functions of government’); Friedman and 
Friedman [1980] 4. 
216 Knight [1944] 340, 369 (‘Such grants of power tend to become irrevocable and the power itself tends to 
grow beyond assignable bounds.’) Similarly: Director [1953] 2, 9; Friedman and Friedman [1980] 4-5. 
217 eg Knight [1941] 204 (the role of government is to ‘provide and enforce a framework of rules.’); Director 
[1953] 2-3; Director and Levi [1956] 282; Friedman [1962] (‘government is essential both as a forum for 
determining “rules of the game” and as an umpire to interpret and enforce the rules decided on.’). 
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of the liberal state.218 Requiring governmental intervention via generalised, equally-
applicable norms was a formal restraint upon the discretion of the state to impose its 
own will in particular instances against individuals.219 As a corollary of the increased 
certainty of eliminating an unknown quantity in the application of norms, such a formal 
conceptualisation of law was also respectful of individual rationality and freedom of 
action, thus facilitating planning as to how one wishes to live their life (or run their 
business). The ‘ethical character and import’220 of the formal rule of law ideal in 
comparison to subject-specific, unpredictable imposition of the state’s will can be seen 
in Knight’s suggestion that:221 
“there is a vast difference in principle between general laws, of the nature of traffic 
regulations or rules of the game, and concrete prescription of where, when, and how to 
travel or what game to play.”      
Henry Simons most explicitly linked the formal rule of law ideal to antitrust in a review 
of Thurman Arnold’s The Bottlenecks of Business.222 In much the same manner as 
Posner, Bork, and Easterbrook above, Simons poured considerable cold water on 
determining the legality of business conduct on the basis of subject- and context-specific 
decisions pursuant to vague standards, whether the US courts’ unstructured rule of 
reason or Arnold’s recommendation that the antitrust statutes be replaced with a 
simple prohibition of ‘unreasonable behaviour’.223 For Simons this was ‘no law at all’. 
Instead, it amounted to a ‘perpetual witchhunt’, where decision-makers had the 
discretion to unexpectedly pick and choose which businesses to pursue, before finding 
‘particular conduct lies outside or inside the moral pale as defined by emotive 
slogans’.224 Simons feared this would transform the Antitrust Division into a ‘super-
public-utility commission’ that would harass businesses into charging lower prices ex 
                                                          
218 eg Simons [1945] 231 (the classical economist sought ‘solutions which are within the rule of law’); Knight 
[1939] 62-63 (‘The liberal state is essentially “The Law.”’); Viner [1960] 48-49 (the rule of law as ‘an essential 
safeguard of economic and other freedoms’). More recently: Posner [1995] 20 (‘Along with a market 
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124, 164.  
219 Friedman and Friedman [1980] 299 (on law as equally-applicable ‘package deals’ preventing 
discrimination); Posner [2007] 266 (‘Generality increases the cost of persecution’ of individuals). 
220 Knight [1939] 62. 
221 Knight [1944] 364.  
222 Arnold [1940]. 
223 Simons [1941] 208-210 (‘I do not like the rule of reason (either Mr Arnold’s or the Court’s)’). cf [1936] 71 
(in antitrust ‘one finds here a reason for proposing the generally objectionable expedient of an 
administrative authority with some discretionary power’). 
224 ibid. Unusually, he thought the flexibility of the rule of reason allowed businesses to get away with 
anticompetitive behaviour owing to its ‘timorous squeamishness’. 
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post rather than prospectively stating what would be considered illegal.225 Therefore, in 
keeping with his advocacy of rules-based monetary policy,226 Simons stressed that the 
aspirational form for antitrust ought to be ‘unambiguous rules of law’.227 In a later 
dismantling of the Beveridge Report, he emphasised that advocacy of the formal rule of 
law ideal over ‘discretionary authorities’ was a bulwark against state tyranny that 
separated the economic liberals from the planners.228 And the deontological nature of 
Simons’ reason for faith in law conceptualised as general, restrained norms - freedom - 
was indicated by his argument that, even if ‘omniscient and benevolent’ state actors 
could better improve societal efficiency, it would not make any difference: ‘some of us 
dislike government by authorities, partly because we think they would not be wise and 
good and partly because we would still dislike them if they were.’229          
This is not to suggest guilt by association or scholarly osmosis: that because Knight, 
Simons et al explicitly advanced the political virtue of conceptualising market 
intervention in accordance with the formal rule of law ideal (ie general norms that are 
comprehensible to subjects) due to the imperative of freedom and enhanced state 
restraint, that Bork and Easterbrook agreed. Rather, at the very least, the ideas of the 
early Chicago School are recounted to demonstrate that when economic liberalism does 
address philosophical questions of the value of market-based society beyond efficiency, 
it may meet the formal rule of law ideal. It can be used to fill justificatory gaps in later, 
less conceptual work that signal an appreciation for a particular conceptualisation of the 
form that antitrust should take. But if scepticism vis-à-vis the Chicago School of 
economics results from its metaphysical arguments, jarring somewhat with the later 
emphasis upon neo-classical assumptions and societal efficiency, an alternative 
justification can be found: Posner’s economic analysis of the rule of law.     
C) Posner: The Rule of Law as Incentive Calibration and Effective Intervention 
Although it has been seen that Posner’s antitrust writing rejected the form of 
particularistic market interventions and suggested a preference for generalised norms 
for determining legality that were comprehensible to businesses, linking this to a latent 
belief in the formal ideal of the rule of law in antitrust is slightly more complex. This is 
                                                          
225 ibid 211.  
226 Simons [1936] 69; [1945] 214; Davenport [1945] 8. 
227 Simons [1941] 210 (though admitting that this was an aspiration, as the rule of reason could not be 
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229 ibid 231. 
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not simply owing to the lack of tell-tale signals, akin to Bork or Easterbrook, that there 
are “good” and “bad” ways of “doing law”. It results instead from his explicit self-
distancing from ‘rule-of-law conservatives’.230 Outside the confines of antitrust, Posner 
has developed a pragmatist theory of adjudication231 which takes as its starting-point 
that the concept of “law” has almost no autonomous virtue or epistemic logic.232 
Furthermore, the entire notion of law as ‘rules of the game’ is misplaced.233 Instead, law 
is merely a prediction of what judges will decide,234 largely based on an unscientific 
mixture of standard legal sources with pragmatic appeals to various values and 
policies.235 Indeed, Posner suggests that incorporation of neo-classical price theory into 
US antitrust represents the nature of such anti-formalist pragmatic jurisprudence par 
excellence.236 
The problem for Posner is that after thoroughly articulating pragmatism as profoundly 
sceptical of law being anything other than external policy or political sophistry, lacking 
method or desirable form, he finds himself painted into a corner with the legal realists 
and critical legal scholars to whom he also objects. With little sense of this, he proceeds 
to condemn them for downplaying the importance of distinctly legal constructs: the 
realists for eliding law with indeterminate judicial politics;237 and the CLS authors for 
failing to recognise that the rule of law is a ‘genuine, indeed an invaluable, public 
good.’238 Especially in his later articulations of pragmatism, Posner is careful to stress 
that judges ought not completely disregard ‘the social interest in certainty of legal 
obligation’239 or act as an ‘unprincipled, ad hoc decision maker’.240 Even where 
pragmatism strongly recommended normative change - including, for example, bringing 
antitrust closer to the learning of competition economics -241 Posner accepts that it may 
                                                          
230 Posner [1990] 434. 
231 For a summary: Posner [1990] 26, 459-460. 
232 Posner [1990] 37-39, 226 (‘law has no nature, no essence’), 434-435 (rejecting ‘neo-traditionalist’ claims 
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236 Posner [2000] 228-229. 
237 Posner [1990] 39. 
238 ibid 467. Similarly: [1995] 20 (‘The rule of law, in the sense of a system of social control operated in 
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240 ibid 262.  
241 Posner [1995] 21. 
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still be necessary to maintain normative foreseeability242 and, essentially, for the judge 
to act as a formalist.243 
Unfortunately for the coherence of his theory of pragmatic adjudication, Posner has 
clearly done too much economic analysis of the formal rule of law ideal. No matter how 
much he attempts to resist, Posner remains an admirer of market intervention through 
generalised, comprehensible norms within the Chicago School of antitrust. Rather than 
based on lofty liberal philosophical concerns for freedom, individual planning, and the 
tyrannical state,244 he reaches the same conclusion via a different route: the economic 
conceptualisation of effective law as accurate incentive-recalibration to realise 
consequentialist goods for society. 
According to Posner, the basic function of law from an economic perspective is to ‘alter 
incentives’ to pursue societal goods.245 In the second edition of Economic Analysis of 
Law he argues that it is a mistake to define any command backed by coercive power as 
law. To optimally achieve its animating purpose - deterring cartels, permitting pro-
competitive conduct - it ought to satisfy various ‘formal characteristics of law itself 
[deduced] from economic theory’:246 it cannot command the impossible; it must be of 
general and equal application, treating like cases alike; there must be a mechanism to 
ensure that normative obligations are predictably enforced in practice;247 and it must be 
prospective, public, and intelligible or there will be ‘no effect on the conduct of the 
parties subject to it’.248 Posner’s economic perspective therefore suggests that effective 
market intervention, actually altering business incentives to avoid anticompetitive and 
continue pro-competitive conduct, will take the form of the rule of law ideal.  
Although purporting to neutral articulation of respective benefits and costs, this is also 
implied by two general pieces considering the distinction between conceptualising law 
in the form of rules (eg the per se rule against price fixing) or standards (eg the rule of 
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reason).249 Unlike the flexibility of a standard that provides the potential for a perfect 
categorisation of each instance before the decision-maker as “legal” or ‘illegal’ ex post, 
generalisations that ex ante remove individual factors from consideration are necessarily 
imperfect.250 Such imperfections may be exacerbated over time with societal and 
technological progress that necessitates their reformulation, unlike a dynamic open 
standard.251 
Nevertheless, Posner suggests that aspiring towards the formal rule of law ideal - 
generalised and comprehensible (clear, predictable, prospective) norms - improves the 
efficacy of intervention by better influencing the incentives of legal subjects to cease 
detrimental conduct, thereby optimally realising the societal good animating 
intervention.252 Such normative clarity also minimises the ‘“chilling” of socially valuable 
behaviour by an uncertain law’, preventing positive conduct from being consumed by 
the ‘penumbra of a vague standard.’253 And much like Easterbrook’s focus upon the 
wider cost of antitrust norms, this manner of enforcement is argued to reduce the risk 
of erroneous application and administrative expenditure in numerous ways.254 
Therefore, despite Posner’s extended critique of formalism, his work can also be utilised 
to advance a separate justification for the advocacy of the formal rule of law ideal in 
Chicagoan writing: conceptualising market intervention as generalised, equally-
applicable norms, that restrain and structure determinations of legality, thereby 
effectively realises the motivation behind such norms (eg efficiency) through better 
influencing the incentives of legal subjects. The particular language and author may give 
the impression that this is an approach to the rule of law peculiar to those of a “law & 
economics” persuasion. On the contrary, fellow Chicagoan Easterbrook, who did not 
engage in positive economic analysis of law, made comparable claims.255 But more 
                                                          
249 Posner [1973b] (discussing strict liability rules or the negligence standard in accident liability); Ehrlich and 
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generally, this instrumentalist take on the formal rule of law has close connections with 
a classic debate in legal philosophy.256 
*** 
This section has directly challenged the perception of the Chicago School of antitrust as 
advocating the ‘subordination’ of law or leaving concerns for normative 
comprehensibility ‘overruled’ through an insincere and unbalanced commitment to 
“interdisciplinary” scholarship.257 On the contrary, it has been demonstrated that 
generations of Chicagoans frequently considered the appropriate form for determining 
legality. These basic justificatory arguments signifying the desirability of aspirations 
towards the formal rule of law can be situated within centuries of political and economic 
thought. Although revolutionaries in the field of US antitrust law, the Chicago School’s 
appreciation for market intervention in accordance with the rule of law ideal 
simultaneously casts them as quiet followers of well-known authorities on the 
rationality and restraint of liberal legalism.258 
V. Conclusion: The Chicagoan Form of Market Intervention and its Limits 
This chapter has argued that the reputation of the Chicago School has distorted the 
reality of their scholarship for decades: while a substantive commitment to norms 
informed by rigorous deduction from the assumptions of neo-classical price theory is 
undeniable, their acute concern for the appropriate form of market intervention has 
often been overlooked. Far from advocating the determination of legality via ad hoc, 
subject-specific analysis of the particular efficiency consequences of instant conduct, the 
Chicagoans preferred to incorporate economic wisdom into the ex ante design of 
generalised norms - rules, presumptions, structured tests - to thereby rigidify decision-
making and thus afford normative comprehensibility to legal subjects. As will be 
considered later, this conceptualisation of the relationship between law and economics 
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in antitrust renders the “neo” prefix meaningless when applied to an indistinguishable 
brand of thought in contemporary competition scholarship.259 
In this way, the Chicago School provides a number of fledgling arguments that can be 
substantiated to answer the question motivating the first half of this thesis: given the 
justificatory “gap” of modern competition microeconomics, what form of market 
intervention for determining the legality of business conduct should competition policy 
ideally adopt? 
Nevertheless, there are limits to the Chicago School alone furnishing a justification for a 
particular form of market intervention. Theirs is an approach highly sceptical of the 
competitive good that can be achieved by antitrust: would a school of thought more 
comfortable with the state policing marketplace behaviour be so ready to restrain 
decision-makers and grant normative clarity to businesses, especially if often occasioned 
through imperfect rules of per se legality? Furthermore, to what extent is the Chicagoan 
critique of particularistic determinations of lawfulness grounded in the idiosyncratic 
institutional framework of US antitrust, where decisions are largely brought before 
generalist judges?260 To address these limits, it is necessary to consider the form of 
market intervention advocated by another influential brand of competition thought: 
German Ordoliberalism.  
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Chapter III: Ordoliberalism: Ambiguous Economics and the 
Rechtsstaat Tradition 
I. Introduction 
Ordoliberalism is one of the most contentious and least understood subjects within 
contemporary competition scholarship. Since its popular introduction to English-
speaking commentators in the 1990s,1 interest in this assemblage of liberals hitherto 
little known outside of Germany has increased exponentially. Many lawyers are now 
familiar with its orthodox historical narrative:2 an economist, Walter Eucken, and two 
lawyers, Franz Böhm and Hans Grossmann-Doerth, met at the University of Freiburg in 
the early 1930s, soon discovered that they had similar analyses of crucial issues - the 
economic crises of the 1920s, the rise of National Socialism - and thus combined 
economic and legal thinking in pioneering interdisciplinary work that laid the 
foundations for Ordoliberalism. Aspects of this movement are often said to have 
influenced the reconstruction of West Germany under Economic Minister Ludwig 
Erhard, frequently credited with the post-war economic ‘miracle’.3 
Despite decades of antitrust enforcement across the Atlantic, the Ordoliberals were 
relatively unusual in mid-twentieth century Europe due to their shared commitment to 
the virtues of competition policy. They advocated not just classical liberal negative 
restraints to protect the operation of the price mechanism - no closed markets, 
privileges, price controls - but also a positive programme of market intervention against 
anticompetitive conduct. The inclusion of competition provisions within the Treaty of 
Rome has been attributed to their scholarship.4 More controversially, so too has the 
frequently condemned substance and subsequent development of EU competition law.5 
                                                          
1 Gerber [1994]; [1998]. For criticism: Mestmäcker [2011]; Behrens [2015]. 
2 An historical account will be provided in Section II. 
3 On Erhard’s Ordoliberalism-inspired abolition of almost all rationing and price controls in 1948: Willgerodt 
and Peacock [1989] 3; Callison [2017] 53. 
4 Gerber [1994] 69-72. cf Akman [2009a]; Wigger [2017]. 
5 ibid. Followed by, eg: Ahlborn and Grave [2006] 206; Weitbrecht [2008] 82-85; Mongouachon [2011] 70; 
Witt [2016] 83-86. cf Akman [2014]; Wigger [2017]. 
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Perceptions of Ordoliberalism have been almost completely tainted by their humanistic 
concern for economic freedom, often conflated with the pre-Chicagoan obsession with 
industrial deconcentration in the US, sacrificing productive efficiencies for the sake of 
everybody’s absolute right to compete freely on atomistic markets. If the role typically 
afforded to the Chicago School by EU competition law is somewhat messianic,6 
Ordoliberalism often represents its original sin. Whenever the law is condemned as too 
interventionist, overly-burdensome, stifling of business efficiency, the pejorative label of 
“Ordoliberal” is commonly found. 
Sections II and III will challenge this frequent depiction within EU competition 
scholarship by separating the few elements that bind Ordoliberalism together as a 
singular movement from those upon which their writing demonstrates considerable 
heterogeneity. Although the Ordoliberals shared a set of conceptual tenets - a 
methodology, a broad societal vision, mechanisms for delivery - at the practical level of 
how competition policy ought to be substantively conceptualised, the extent of 
incoherence, disagreement, and development over time casts doubt on their simplistic 
contemporary depiction. 
These important discussions are, however, secondary to the question of the legitimate 
form of market intervention envisaged by Ordoliberalism for determining legality. As 
suggested in concluding the last chapter, it is necessary to shift focus to the Ordoliberals 
for three reasons that set them apart from the Chicago School: first, although disputed 
in Section II, Ordoliberalism is popularly perceived to be a radically different, peculiarly 
European brand of market intervention; second, owing to their alleged influence upon 
EU competition policy, the subject matter of Part II of this thesis; and third, due to their 
advocacy of enforcement by an administrative monopoly office pursuing the goals of 
competition policy. If impartial experts of law and economics (eg the European 
Commission) are entrusted with market intervention, does that render subject-specific 
determinations of legality owing to resultant effects a more palatable form for enforcing 
competition policy? Is the virtuous restraint and comprehensibility of norms envisaged 
by the formal rule of law ideal an idiosyncratic requirement of US antitrust, determined 
by generalist judges rather than the technocratic enforcement of the Ordoliberal 
administrative agency? 
                                                          
6 See Chapter II, Section I. 
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Section IV will argue that, despite advocating administrative enforcement and rarely 
considering the rule of law explicitly, Ordoliberalism must be situated within the history 
of Germanic faith in the formal Rechtsstaat ideal traceable back to Immanuel Kant. Once 
this often latent expectation for the realisation of their societal vision is highlighted, it is 
possible to decipher numerous arguments from which it can be extrapolated that 
Ordoliberal competition enforcement would aspire to the form of generalised norms 
delineating illegality in a manner comprehensible to legal subjects. If, however, both the 
Chicagoans and Ordoliberals share an appreciation for this ideal means of enforcement, 
and if questions can be raised as to whether the latter really advocated freedom over 
efficiency, this might indicate that these supposedly rival competition schools perhaps 
have more in common than is often acknowledged.   
II. Ordoliberalism as a Family of Shared Concepts 
As with the Chicago School, understanding and defining ‘Ordoliberalism’ is not 
straightforward. This section will A) briefly provide an historical overview of the main 
strands and protagonists of the Ordoliberal movement. The primary focus, however, will 
be upon B) articulating the shared concepts that appear to bind Ordoliberalism together 
as a coherent body of scholarship, despite divergent methodologies, times of writing, 
emphases, policy recommendations, and so on.   
A) Historical Account7 
Ordoliberalism can be divided into at least three related bodies of scholarly sub-groups:8 
the ‘Freiburg School’, the ‘Sociological Neoliberals’,9 and the ‘Social Market Economists’. 
The Freiburg School was the intellectual catalyst for the overall Ordoliberal movement. 
The most prominent protagonists were: Walter Eucken (1891-1950), Professor of 
Economics at Freiburg from 1927; Franz Böhm (1895-1977) who taught law at Freiburg 
from 1933 and was later Professor of Civil and Economic Law at the University of 
Frankfurt; and Hans Grossmann-Doerth (1894-1944) who took a chair in law at Freiburg 
in 1933 after publishing a study into standard contractual terms in industrial 
                                                          
7 For more detailed overviews: Rieter and Schmolz [1993] 96-103; Gerber [1994]; Nicholls [1994]. 
8 This division is similar to: Feld, Köhler, and Nientiedt [2015] 2 (distinguishing between the Freiburg School, 
the conservative Ordoliberals, and the social Ordoliberals). 
9 A label borrowed from: Sally [1996] 234. 
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agreements.10 Together at Freiburg they commenced interdisciplinary work on law and 
economics and in 1936 provided a foundational mission statement for the wider 
movement (the “Ordo Manifesto”),11 later establishing the journal ORDO as a platform 
for the group’s work on economic and legal order in 1948. Two of their immediate 
disciples have been of particular interest for competition lawyers:12 Leonard Miksch 
(1901-1950), a student of Eucken credited for the controversial “as-if” standard for 
supervising monopolies;13 and Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker (b. 1926), Böhm’s post-war 
student who elaborated upon the Freiburg understanding of competition, and who was 
particularly influential in the formative development of EU competition law.14 
The Sociological Neoliberals, a second strand of the wider Ordoliberal movement, 
consisted of close friends Wilhelm Röpke (1899-1966) and Alexander Rüstow (1885-
1963) who both fled Germany in 1933 for the University of Istanbul. Rüstow returned to 
Germany with a chair at the University of Heidelberg from 1949, publishing his three-
part magnum opus Freedom and Domination throughout the 1950s.15 After Istanbul, 
Röpke spent the rest of his academic career at the Graduate Institute of International 
and Development Studies in Geneva. He was an internationally-renowned journalist and 
produced around 900 publications.16 From affiliation with Eucken as part of the ‘German 
Ricardoans’ in 1926,17 Rüstow and Röpke remained closely connected to the Freiburg 
scholars, frequently exchanging correspondence and cross-references in their work.18 
The methodology of this duo was, however, to view society in a more metaphysical 
light,19 stretching ‘from legal-economic constitutionalism to the philosophy of history, 
historical sociology and a piercing cultural critique.’20 
The Social Market Economists represent the branch thought closest to the programme 
of reform implemented in post-war West Germany and least typically “Ordoliberal”. The 
chief theorist was Alfred Müller-Armack (1901-1978), Professor of Economics at the 
                                                          
10 For an overview of his work on contractual terms as a vehicle for private economic might: Mongouachon 
[2011] 71. 
11 Böhm, Eucken, and Grossmann-Doerth [1936]. 
12 They could be classed as a fourth category of the Ordoliberal movement. For a generational 
categorisation: Behrens [2015]. 
13 Goldschmidt and Berndt [2005] 978. 
14 For an overview of his role in EU competition policy throughout the 1960s and 1970s: Behrens [2015].  
15 Rüstow [1950]; [1952]; [1957]. 
16 Sally [1996] 244. 
17 Callison [2017] 52 (Led by Rüstow, challenging the German Historical School).  
18 Barry [1989] 107; Gerber [1994] 32; Sally [1996] 247. 
19 Barry [1989] 107; Gerber [1994] 32. 
20 Sally [1996] 244. 
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Universities of Münster and Cologne, who also served under Ludwig Erhard (1897-1977) 
in the Ministry of Economics from 1952-1963. The core tenets of the Social Market 
Economy explicitly built upon the Freiburg School’s groundwork, though Müller-Armack 
placed greater emphasis upon the ‘social’ element of the label.21 He envisaged a greater 
need for market interventions to pursue a policy of more equitably redistributing the 
benefits of a competitive economy.22 For other Ordoliberals, the acceptance of, for 
example, small business subsidies, co-determination, and full employment,23 was 
incompatible with delivering an exchange-based economy; a ‘Trojan horse’ for 
interventionism, fiscal deficits, and public debt.24 However for pragmatic politician 
Erhard this represented a more politically-palatable compromise.25 
B) Conceptual Account 
The problem with a purely historical account is that it obscures the core tenets that held 
Ordoliberalism together, making it possible to classify all three branches as part of a 
single, multifaceted movement. Ordoliberalism might better be understood as a ‘family 
of ideas’26 united by a common conceptual core, despite exhibiting otherwise 
substantial heterogeneity. This conceptual account can be divided into three shared 
tenets: i) a methodology, ii) a societal vision, and iii) twin means to guarantee the 
coherent realisation of a free market economy.      
i) Order-Based Method: Metaphysical and Interdisciplinary 
The most important aspect of Ordoliberalism is arguably its methodology of thinking in 
terms of pure economic orders. The initial trio of Freiburg scholars were perturbed by 
the German public’s support in the 1930s for ever-increasing concentration and 
cartelisation of industry, uncritically accepted as part and parcel of a necessary 
trajectory of technological progress.27 For many, economic liberalism and market 
competition amounted to little more than an ‘ethereal ‘professors’ programme’, a 
                                                          
21 For partial admission of this legacy: Müller-Armack [1965] 258. 
22 Grossekettler [1989] 42; Gerber [1994] 60; Nicholls [1994] 140; Sally [1996] 248-249; Joerges and Rödl 
[2004] 12-14; Vanberg [2004] 2. 
23 Sally [1996] 249. 
24 Dyson [2017] 96. 
25 Berghahn [1984] 179.  
26 Marquis [2007] xxxi. See also: Dyson [2017] 91-92 (on Ordoliberalism as a family resemblance).  
27 Böhm, Eucken, and Grossmann-Doerth [1936] 19; Eucken [1942] 94; Böhm [1947] 122; [1954] 149; 
Rüstow [1957] 405 (blaming ‘Marxian dogma’ for the popular ‘blind faith in technical progress’ as meaning 
cartelisation and concentration). 
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Canute-like resistance to the economically inevitable.28 Walter Eucken blamed German 
economists for this perception. He argued that a dualism of economic approaches had 
been taken to extremes - the ‘Great Antinomy’29 - thus preventing either from 
meaningful analysis and public engagement.30 The German Historical School could not 
see the wood for the trees: their hyper-realistic studies depicting every minutia 
overlooked how individual elements came ‘together as a whole’, and thus how 
individual phenomena – eg cartels – were of systemic detriment.31 Yet German disciples 
of the Austrian Theoretical School of Carl Menger could not see the trees for the wood: 
their preoccupation with constructing overly-abstract models or purportedly rational 
deduction from woolly concepts (“capitalism”, “socialism”)32 missed the importance of 
‘actual historical phenomena and of individual facts’ for the lived experience of an 
economic system.33 
Eucken’s proposed solution was to engage in order-based economic thinking to 
synthesise the best qualities of both the inductive and deductive methods;34 combining 
the ‘facts now around us’35 with how the economy ‘hangs together as a whole.’36 Just as 
the finite letters of the alphabet produce an infinite number of words,37 in Foundations 
of Economics he argued that every economic system could be understood as a 
combination of two pure forms:38 the centrally-directed or the exchange-based 
economic orders.39 In the final chapters, Eucken proposed various mixtures of the two 
into three principle varieties of centrally-directed order40 and one hundred possible 
combinations of supply and demand into differing markets,41 thereby accounting for 
‘the economic system in every period and of every people’.42  
                                                          
28 According to Böhm, with hindsight: [1954] 154-155. 
29 Eucken [1950] 42. 
30 ibid 57. 
31 ibid 61-63. See also: Böhm, Eucken, and Grossmann-Doerth [1936] 21. 
32 Eucken [1948b] 192-193. 
33 Eucken [1950] 42. See also: Röpke [1935] 85 (theoretical economists neglect their professional duty if in 
the face of fascism ‘they should persist, like Archimedes, in drawing their curves while the enemy threatens 
to invade the city’). For the argument that Menger did have concerns for institutional phenomena: Chapter 
IV, text accompanying fn 181. 
34 Meijer [2007] 172.  
35 Eucken [1950] 34. 
36 ibid 23 (emphasis in original). 
37 ibid 109. 
38 ibid 10. 
39 ibid 118. 
40 ibid 120-128. 
41 ibid 156. 
42 ibid 222. 
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This methodology is of crucial importance for understanding Ordoliberalism as it laid the 
foundations for their metaphysically-focused and interdisciplinary body of scholarship. 
Even in its purely economic research, Ordoliberalism was not simply concerned with 
efficiency but also metaphysical considerations of individual freedom.43 The most 
important economic question for Eucken was ‘[h]ow can modern industrialized economy 
and society be organized in a humane and efficient manner?’44 Röpke similarly implored 
economists to fight ‘for freedom, personal integrity, the constitutional State and 
morality which can only subsist in freedom.’45 In many ways this metaphysical element 
to their work is comparable to the early Chicago economists,46 but acquired a new 
urgency given the context: many Ordoliberals were writing during fascism, whether 
inside Nazi Germany or in exile; alternatively, their post-war work was mindful both of 
this recent history and the proximity of communist-socialism in East Germany. By 
reformulating Thomas Aquinas’ philosophy of a singular, true order between God and 
humanity, the Ordoliberals sought to depict the perfect economic ‘Ordo’ between state 
and citizens for the twentieth century that would avoid the oppression of both lived 
realities.47   
Ordoliberalism’s methodological commitment to order-based thinking also explains their 
interdisciplinary perspective. Depicting the ideal economic order was impossible without 
considering its interdependence with law, governance, and society.48 From his 
habilitation thesis in 1933 that endeavoured to translate neo-classical economics ‘into 
the language of jurisprudence’,49 to work in the 1960s on the rule of law in a free market 
economy,50 Böhm’s writing particularly explored the interface between law and 
economics. The 1936 Ordo Manifesto to which he contributed chastised lawyers for only 
considering legal changes internally and doctrinally, thereby overlooking potentially 
                                                          
43 Willgerodt and Peacock [1989] 5; Schweitzer [2012a] 36. 
44 Eucken [1951] 27 (emphasis added). Similarly: Eucken and Böhm’s foreword to the first ORDO in 1948 in 
Zweig [1980] 18 (‘“What kind of order is required for a human and economically successful life?’”); Eucken 
[1949] 219 (‘How can a functioning and humane order be given to the modern, industrialized economy?’). 
45 Röpke [1955] 368. 
46 See Chapter II, text accompanying fn 207-209. 
47 Zweig [1980] 18-19. 
48 Eucken [1942] 93 (‘contradictions and failures will arise’ when the ‘interdependence of all economic 
measures is not taken into account.’); [1949] 231-232 (‘all economic circumstances are related… every single 
economic policy intervention affects the economic process as a whole... and must therefore be coordinated 
with each other.’) 
49 Böhm quoted in: Lenel [1996] 301. 
50 Böhm [1966]. See Section IV. 
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substantial implications for the economic order.51 For example, the 1897 ruling of the 
German Reich Court that cartel agreements were legally enforceable may have raised 
few lawyers’ eyebrows, but ought to have been recognised as of profound economic 
significance.52 Rather than a passive spectator of the market, the law as shaped by 
legislators and judges directly influenced patterns of economic behaviour conducted 
within its normative framework. Lawyers had to consider the economic implications of 
legal norms, whilst economists also had to acknowledge the impact of the law upon 
their subject of study.53 
Ordoliberalism was thus founded upon an order-based methodology that investigated 
economic efficiency and individual freedom in an interdisciplinary manner. 
ii) Normative Vision - between Laissez-faire and Leviathan 
Despite Eucken’s ‘cautious neutrality’ in presenting the two pure forms of order,54 the 
Ordoliberals were in the same liberal economic policy camp as the Chicago School, 
unequivocally preferring the exchange-based order. Decentralised coordination through 
prices optimised allocative efficiency,55  militating against governmental distortions via 
privileges, legal monopolies, and price-setting.56 It was futile for state technicians in a 
centrally-directed economy to even attempt to emulate such efficiency.57 But the virtue 
of free markets for Ordoliberals was not just their ‘economic effect’ but also the 
‘profound meaning for freedom.’58 Central direction was said to leave individuals with 
‘no sphere of freedom or independence,’59 instead treating them as a ‘tiny part in the 
anonymous, state-run economic machine’.60 Alternatively, the exchange-based market 
order embodied freedom. It was an emancipating societal leveller as everybody was 
subjected to the same impersonal direction of the price mechanism,61 and individual 
                                                          
51 Böhm, Eucken, and Grossmann-Doerth [1936] 18. 
52 Nicholls [1994] 18. 
53 This institutional approach to economics is considered in Chapter IV, Section IV. 
54 Johnson [1989] 49. 
55 Eucken [1948b] 189; [1948c] 27-28. 
56 Eucken [1952] 116, 119. 
57 Eucken [1932] 71; [1942] 83-84; [1948a] 94-96; Röpke [1936a] 320; Böhm [1947] 126; Rüstow [1957] 669 
(‘so obvious’ that ‘little more need to be said on the subject.’). 
58 Böhm [1954] 159. See also: Rüstow [1957] 669 (what a ‘rare good fortune for humanity’ that the only 
order compatible with freedom is also the most efficient); Schweitzer [2012a] 36 (Ordoliberalism continued 
the classical liberal tradition of seeing markets as necessarily for prosperity and freedom). 
59 Eucken [1950] 128. 
60 Eucken [1948c] 35. For an amusingly dramatic critique: Röpke [1948] 2 (considering the lack of liberty so 
overbearingly despotic that 3000 years of civilisation would be lost and ‘every vestige of intrinsic worth and 
dignity would perish from the earth.’). 
61 Grossekettler [1989] 41-42. 
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economic success was depoliticised, dependent upon flattering consumers rather than 
bureaucrats.62 As ‘a force without masters or knaves’,63 coordination by the prevailing 
price was the ‘nearly ideal social substructure for a democratic political order.’64 
But the Ordoliberal predilection for free markets was not absolute. In rejecting 
nineteenth century ‘paleo-liberal’ absenteeism,65 they sought to chart a new path 
somewhere ‘between laissez-faire and Leviathan’.66 The desiderata of freedom and 
efficiency were not simply a ‘battle-cry to use against the State’ but necessitated a 
‘positive substance’ of intervention.67 Laissez-faire liberalism was argued to suffer from 
two fundamental defects.  
The first was the facilitation of social inequity, with all three strands of Ordoliberalism 
acknowledging the need for some form of corrective social policy (‘Vitalpolitik’)68 to 
address abject disparities resulting from the exchange-based order. As Röpke pithily 
stated, it was ‘economism to forget that people do not live by cheaper vacuum cleaners 
alone’.69 Despite common contemporary portrayals as the fetishisation of austerity and 
budgetary responsibility, amounting to little more than trickle-down economics,70 the 
question of how inequality was to be addressed was the most contentious issue within 
Ordoliberalism.71 Although Eucken considered effective realisation of the exchange-
based order to be the main engine for mitigating social ills,72 he also accepted some 
form of redistribution ‘to fill gaps and soften hardship’.73 Röpke advocated a radical 
policy of societal deconcentration to forestall the poor living conditions occasioned by 
industrialisation and urbanisation.74 The Social Market Economy strand took the most 
expansive view, with Müller-Armack recommending a ‘multiform and complete system 
                                                          
62 Böhm [1947] 125-126 (‘Every individual is dependent upon an equally-impacting, impersonal and 
anonymous common will’); Röpke [1950a] 106. 
63 Böhm [1947] 128 (‘a form of power that does not violate the political, social or legal autonomy of those it 
acts upon.’) 
64 Böhm quoted in: Friedrich [1955] 511. 
65 Rüstow [1957] 670. 
66 Willgerodt and Peacock [1989] 4. Though not a middle way: Barry [1989] 108. 
67 Miksch [1937] 148. See also: Eucken [1949] 223-224 (‘the creation of the economic orders cannot be left 
to its own devices.’); [1950] 314 (‘economic system has to be consciously shaped’); [1952] 116; Foucault 
[1979] 121 (‘Government must accompany the market economy from start to finish’). 
68 Rüstow [1957] 670 (‘a policy for enhancing the quality of life’). 
69 Röpke [1960] 107. 
70 eg Bonefeld [2012]. cf the more nuanced account of: Berghahn and Young [2013]. 
71 Kasper and Streit [1993] 19; Vanberg [1988] 20. 
72 Streit [1992] 697; Kasper and Streit [1993] 19. 
73 Eucken quoted in Streit [1992] 697. For discussion: Lenel [1989] 27-28. 
74 Röpke [1944] 190; [1948] 178; [1950b] 46; Dyson [2017] 97. 
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of social protection’.75 Their comfort with subsidies for small business, vocational 
training, co-determination, and the pursuit of full-employment76 to deliver the ‘goals of 
social justice’77 was divisive. It did however render Erhard’s post-war programme of 
economic reform more appealing to the German public.78 
The second defect of laissez-faire was, of course, its failure to protect market forces 
from endogenous distortions, ie the lack of competition policy: ‘deliverance from the 
predominant power of the State’, claimed Eucken, should not leave society at the ‘mercy 
of private centres of power’.79 Like Smith, he recognised the ‘omnipresent, strong and 
irrepressible urge to eliminate competition and to acquire a monopolistic position.’80 It 
was not ‘sinning against the spirit of liberalism’81 for state intervention to limit absolute 
business freedom. The blind faith of laissez-faire in spontaneous, inherent harmony was 
mistaken,82 overlooking the need for an ‘armed night-watchman’ to ensure the ‘life 
blood’ of the competitive order83 and thus defend ‘“capitalism” against the 
“capitalists”’.84 The uncertainty of what this entailed in practice will be discussed in 
Section III. Still, the recognition of requiring intervention to guarantee the beneficial 
operation of free market forces makes Ordoliberalism an unusual brand of inter-war 
European liberalism. 
To summarise, in wholeheartedly supporting an exchange-based economy but fully 
aware of the deficiencies of laissez-faire, this second shared aspect of the Ordoliberal 
movement is neatly reflected in Eucken’s maxim: ‘policy to shape the economic system 
– yes; steering of the market process – no.’85  
                                                          
75 Müller-Armack quoted in: Lenel [1989] 27 (emphasis in original).  
76 Sally [1996] 249. 
77 Müller-Armack [1965] 258. 
78 Zweig [1980] 8. 
79 Eucken [1948d] 270. See also: [1942] 87. 
80 Eucken [1949] 222 (‘Everyone espies possibilities of becoming a monopolist.’); Böhm [1947] 124. 
81 Röpke quoted in: Nicholls [1994] 93. 
82 Miksch [1937] 148 (advocating ‘corrective adjustments’). Similarly: Eucken [1949] 223-224; Rüstow [1957] 
455, 459 (a ‘pathological degeneration’ of capitalism.) 
83 Böhm [1966] 51. cf the Sociological Neo-Liberals who thought such a phrase too weak: Megay [1970] 425 
(Röpke on ‘“government leading a shadow existence”’); Rüstow [1957] 421. 
84 Röpke [1963] 237-237. 
85 Quoted in: Kloten [1989] 70. Similarly: Eucken [1942] (state intervention by ‘indirect means, seeking to 
create and maintain a workable order.’). 
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iii) Coherent Realisation - the Economic Constitution and Institutional Independence 
The Ordoliberals were realists rather than theoretical daydreamers.86 A possible 
practical problem with their normative vision for society was that absolute standards – 
no state intervention under laissez-faire or complete state control under collectivism – 
are much easier to guarantee and consistently deliver. Given their sophisticated 
understanding of the interrelation between economics and law, the Ordoliberals were 
acutely aware of the potential for incoherent realisation of the exchange-based order 
over time. 87 
The novel solution was the logical device of an economic constitution. Rather than a free 
market equivalent to a political constitution,88 an economic constitution was merely the 
‘general political decision’ between an exchange-based or centrally-directed economy.89 
Its importance derived from how this choice was used by Ordoliberalism as a focal point; 
every norm, every institution, every market intervention, was to be checked for 
coherence with this quasi-Kantian categorical imperative of the exchange-based 
economic constitution.90 The intention was to thereby achieve a consistent critical mass 
of market-supporting norms and interventions to optimally deliver the efficiency and 
freedom of a competitive order.91 
The actual fleshing-out of the exchange-based economic constitution to deduce 
concrete guiding principles was a rather amorphous aspect of Ordoliberal writing. At the 
very least, it is possible to note two separate manifestations of the economic 
constitution in action to guarantee coherent implementation. The first concerned 
consistency between the free market order and the normative framework provided by 
law. Every legal norm – particularly in problematic fields such as intellectual property, 
corporate, tax, or bankruptcy law -92 had to be individually audited for compliance with 
                                                          
86 Möschel [1989] 155. 
87 Eucken [1948c] 39 (the market as a purpose built machine rather than an arbitrary assemblage of parts); 
[1948d] 275 (likening the inconsistent mixture of free-exchange with central direction to expecting 
simultaneous playing by rival orchestras to harmonise); Müller-Armack [1978] 328 (‘unsystematic mingling’). 
88 Mestmäcker [2011] 41-42. The language of ‘constitutionalizing the economy’ (Gerber [1994]) may 
mislead. 
89 Böhm, Eucken, and Grossmann-Doerth [1936] 24. See also: Böhm [1937] 115-117 (a community decision 
on the economic and political system); Eucken [1950] 83 (the ‘decision as to the general ordering of the 
economic life of a community’). 
90 Grossekettler [1989] 51. See also: Böhm [1937] 115, 117 (‘a single governing ideal, which guarantees its 
unity and utility.’); Foucault [1979] 121 (‘general index in which one must place the rule for defining all 
governmental action.’). 
91 Gerber [1994] 42. 
92 Böhm [1961] 39; Röpke [1950a] 117; Eucken [1942] 92-93; [1949] 232, 236-237. 
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the economic constitution.93 Prospectively this Ordoliberal ‘economic legislative theory’ 
was to ensure coherence with the free-market order whenever normative changes were 
considered.94 Eucken was one of the only Ordoliberals to develop this,95 concretising the 
auditing process by deducing a number of consequential, more tangible, ‘constitutive’ 
principles.96 The second manifestation of the economic constitution as a device for 
coherence was in constraining the positive programme of state intervention (eg 
competition or social policy).97 The logic was the same: is a particular act a ‘conformable 
intervention’ when checked against the economic constitution of a free market order?98 
Rüstow had similarly articulated ‘liberal interventionism’ as the appropriate market-
based response to industrial decline: rather than doing nothing (ie laissez-faire), or 
disturbing the price mechanism (eg subsidies, import bans), the market-conforming 
solution was the provision of industrial retraining.99 This evaluation of compatible and 
incompatible interventions afforded considerable scope for disagreement, as was 
especially the case with their divergent social policy recommendations.100 
Guaranteeing the Ordoliberal vision was not, however, simply about ensuring that the 
state was wary of the unintended consequences of incoherent laws or interventions. 
Maintaining the exchange-based constitution required resilience vis-à-vis the 
‘persistently dangerous influences exerted by interested parties’,101 endeavouring 
inevitably to influence decision-makers and thus inhibit realisation of the efficient and 
free market economy.102 These concerns justified a commitment to limited conferral of 
                                                          
93 Eucken [1949] 232 (to make ‘the establishment of a functioning price system of complete competition the 
essential criterion of every economic measure. This is the basic principle of the economic constitution.’) 
94 Grossekettler [1994] 15. 
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discrete powers for the state to act rather than ‘blank cheques and power to the 
bureaucracy’, thus mitigating the risk of private steering.103  
But a foundational aspect of Ordoliberalism was that the state had to intervene in 
markets in pursuit of competition policy. It was an especially vulnerable prey as exactly 
the kind of governmental conduct that powerful economic entities would wish to derail, 
rendering thorough enforcement perhaps the Achilles heel of successfully implementing 
the exchange-based economic constitution.104 As a result, corrective market 
interventions by the state had to be ‘strong’, ‘impartial’, ‘powerful’, ‘standing above the 
melee of economic interests’ and, Röpke argued, committed to defending ‘”capitalism” 
against the “capitalists”’.105 The Ordoliberal solution was for politically independent 
enforcement by an administrative monopoly office.106 As the ‘guardian of the 
competitive order’,107 it would have sole responsibility to pursue a policy that ensured 
‘the bearers of economic power behave as if complete competition prevailed.’108 The 
details of this recommendation were rather sparse,109 though Eucken stressed the need 
for distance from the government to avoid ‘the pressure of interested parties.’110 Of 
course, championing a decision-maker’s ‘inflexible will to exercise its authority’111 
excludes both powerful industrial lobbying and popular contestation. Ordoliberal faith in 
independent agencies has recently led to its condemnation as anti-democratic or even 
authoritarian.112 As will be argued, such simplistic accusations overlook the additional 
restraint imposed by the often latent ideal of the formal Rechtsstaat in Ordoliberal 
writing.113 
*** 
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Order-based thinking, advocacy of liberalism with more intervention than laissez-faire, 
and coherent realisation via the economic constitution and institutional independence, 
are three conceptual elements binding Ordoliberalism together as a single movement, 
despite divergent protagonists, decades, methodologies, and disciplinary emphases. In 
comparison to the tighter, more focused portrayal of the Chicago School in the previous 
chapter, Ordoliberalism may appear rather vague; heavy on abstract concepts, lighter on 
concrete policies. As will be demonstrated by analysing the substance of Ordoliberal 
competition policy in Section III, once one bores-down through this general agreement 
to the practical coalface there are unmistakable cracks.114 Beyond foundational tenets, 
Ordoliberalism was far from a coherent body of policy recommendations. 
III. The Ambiguous Substance of Ordoliberal Competition Policy 
It is not the main purpose of this chapter to delve into the substance of Ordoliberal 
competition policy. Yet given its common simplification in contemporary EU competition 
scholarship and the ability to draw parallels with the supposedly “rival” Chicago School, 
the substantive controversy and complexity of Ordo competition policy will be briefly 
addressed.  
Ordoliberal competition law prohibited “preventive” or “impediment” actions by 
businesses,115 conduct that excluded competitors and facilitated the accumulation of 
market power via means other than on the merits of their performance.116 Beyond this 
fuzzy theoretical distinction, Ordoliberal scholarship revealed very little about whether 
specific types of potentially anticompetitive conduct should be placed on one side of the 
divide or the other.117 Of course cartels would be banned outright, not accepted as 
valuable agreements to stabilise markets vis-à-vis ruinous competition,118 nor subjected 
to light-touch policing of their “abuse”.119 Absolute freedom of contract had in reality 
amounted to the ‘freedom to choose how to define the rules of the game or the forms 
which the economic process takes’.120 But beyond cartels, there was little indication as 
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115 Eucken [1949] 235, 242; [1952] 119.  
116 Gerber [1994] 53; Ahlborn and Grave [2006] 214-216; Mongouachon [2011] 76. 
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to the legal fate of other types of restrictive agreement, besides a few critical references 
by Eucken to exclusive dealing and resale price maintenance.121 It is also clear that 
Ordoliberalism lacked a fully-theorised concept of unilateral abuse by dominant firms,122 
save for, again, Eucken’s categorisation of predatory pricing, loyalty rebates, price 
discrimination, and excessive pricing as illegal ‘preventive’ competition.123 
The substantive controversy of Ordoliberal competition policy instead appertains to its 
purported goal for market intervention and the resultant consequences for industrial 
concentration. Ordoliberalism has often been depicted as upholding economic freedom 
- rivalry for rivalry’s sake - rather than maximising efficiency.124 As discussed 
previously,125 such an orientation invites a more critical approach to large market 
shares, merger control, and the exclusion of even inefficient rivals by bigger firms.126 
Whilst some champion Ordoliberalism as an anti-Chicagoan, peculiarly European 
approach specifically because it is argued to eschew efficiency,127 others dismiss Ordo 
competition policy as anachronistic economic illiteracy.128  
Both supporters and detractors can point to Eucken’s advocacy of ‘complete’ 
competition129 as a market context where industrial ‘power disappears completely’,130 
justifying a policy of intervention not simply to tame abuses by large firms, but targeted 
‘against their very existence’.131 In the face of natural monopoly, Eucken followed 
Miksch’s suggestion for governmental regulation to force firms to act “as-if” subjected 
to the constraints of complete competition,132 including both equilibrium prices and the 
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pressure to be productively efficient.133 Such “as-if” regulation has frequently been 
derided as ‘pie-in-the-sky’ thinking.134 In a 1947 piece titled ‘Decartelisation and De-
Concentration’, Böhm also connected the powerlessness of fragmented industry in 
complete competition to all market participants being ‘reckoned as a free man’.135 Like 
Eucken, it was not the misuse but the ‘very emergence’ of large firms that threatened 
freedom, thus recommending a policy of ‘pitiless de-concentration of the private 
economy.’136 The same policy prescription is discernible from his later argument that an 
exchange-based economy obliged intervention ‘to place any conceivable obstacle in the 
way of the establishment of economic power’; competition law was enacted not owing 
to concerns for efficiency, but rather the ‘serious dangers to freedom and justice’ posed 
by industrial concentration.137 Röpke also disparaged ‘monopolism, concentration and 
capitalist gigantism’ which could not be considered a ‘genuine free market and system 
of competition’,138 encouraging ‘radical’ interventions to abolish monopolies139 and 
deconcentration by a ‘very painful process, to more reasonable proportions’,140 thus 
guaranteeing market access for small- and medium-sized businesses.141 Even if this 
resulted in the ‘sacrifice’ of societal efficiency,142 it was a price worth paying.143 
Industrial concentration was simply ‘incompatible with ideals of freedom and justice’.144    
Nevertheless, in the face of considerable heterogeneity within the movement, such 
passages of evidence alone cannot sustain the overall depiction of substantive 
‘Ordoliberal competition law’ as purely about economic freedom, complete competition, 
and industrial deconcentration. As an increasing number of accounts have suggested, 
Ordoliberalism was far from coherent in its treatment of whether competition policy 
ought to be animated by economic freedom or efficiency.145 Two dimensions of 
ambiguity on the substance of Ordoliberal competition policy are discernible. 
                                                          
133 Eucken [1949] 243. 
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137 Böhm [1961] 33. 
138 Röpke [1944] 188-190. 
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The first is internal: Eucken and Böhm were inconsistent. In Foundations Eucken stressed 
that market concentration and profits should not be conflated with economic power, 
revealing nothing as to whether there existed sufficient competitive constraint.146 His 
categorisation of ‘unavoidable’ monopolies necessitating “as-if” supervision but not 
subject to deconcentration was also ambiguous,147 including common microeconomic 
examples (eg gas pipelines, railway infrastructure) but also ‘a factory producing 
precision scales or medicinal equipment’ that may only partially dominate the market 
‘on the basis of genuine cost advantages’, ie productive efficiency.148 This coheres with 
Eucken’s suggestion that a dominant firm with smaller rivals ought to be supervised by 
the competition authority,149 and later implication that it was possible and legitimate to 
come under its scrutiny through ‘becom[ing] a monopolist by using competitive 
means’.150 These comments are difficult to square with the stark claims above. The same 
is true for Böhm.151 Despite the strong support given to deconcentration in 1947, other 
aspects of this work were more equivocal, setting a relatively high threshold for finding a 
business dominant,152 or stressing that complete competition was a mere theoretical 
concept: [t]he practical needs of daily economic life are generally satisfied where 
competitive conditions are only partially present’.153 And although later depicting a 
struggle between democratic freedom and economic power, Böhm acknowledged 
efficiencies occasioned by greater size, refuting the need to emulate perfect 
competition.154 Having earlier recognised that the optimum size of firms ought to be 
determined through the free market mechanism rather than administrative gut-
feeling,155 Böhm also accepted the efficiency of vertical integration156 and the 
robustness of market self-correction in the absence of barriers to entry,157 especially 
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against excessive pricing.158 So, despite his radical calls for deconcentration, in the end 
Böhm’s conceptualisation of competition policy was relatively modest:159 
“any competition whose effects will be felt by the holders of economic power, will suffice. 
And even if the struggle between the partial monopolist and any outsiders or between 
duopolists or oligopolists does not in any way have the regulating and controlling power 
characteristic for competition on really competitive markets, it nevertheless has the 
effect of weakening existing dominant positions and preventing their reinforcement.”   
Perhaps the internal inconsistency of Böhm’s later writing is explicable by reference to 
the second dimension of Ordoliberalism’s ambiguity on the substance of competition 
law: temporal development. As Marquis warns, the controversial notions of replicating 
complete competition and “as-if” regulation were, at most, two early and ‘unsuccessful 
“experiments”’ that cannot be considered definitive elements of Ordoliberal 
competition policy through the decades.160 Complete competition was little more than a 
stylised model, comparable to the role of perfect competition in modern microeconomic 
theory.161 Secondary literature has also noted that as regards the controversial “as-if” 
standard of monopoly regulation, Miksch himself was aware of its limitations162 and, 
despite frequent emphasis in contemporary commentary,163 it was rapidly rejected.164 
More generally, any perceived opposition to economic concentration particularly 
softened throughout the 1950s and 1960s.165 Rather than a failure to deliver Ordoliberal 
theory,166 this temporal reformulation explains why the German delegation to the 
drafting of the Treaty of Rome – including Müller-Armack – pushed for abuse control 
rather than the French preference for per se prohibition of dominance.167 It also casts 
light upon why Mestmäcker - disciple of Böhm and a modern Ordoliberal voice - 
defended acquisitions of efficiency-based dominance through internal expansion168 and 
mergers169 throughout the 1970s, like Bork170 rejecting freedom-based competition law 
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as ‘mere protection for the middle classes’.171 Furthermore, and as Böhm’s later 
equivocation suggests, the clearest indication of a change in the Ordoliberal approach to 
the freedom/efficiency debate in competition law is how those writing over a number of 
decades adapted their economic perspectives. Compare Röpke of the 1930s, 1940s, and 
early 1950s on the need for painful deconcentration,172 with his position in Economics of 
the Free Society from the 1960s.173 In this he directly rejected replicating the structural 
model of perfect competition as it overlooked the ‘dynamic reality of economic life’, 
which required the ‘incentives provided by the temporary advantages of market 
dominance’ to galvanise ‘the continuous striving of the producers for the favour of the 
consumers.’174 Competition was only restricted where 'the “lead” becomes a permanent 
position of privilege and power’, and intervention was therefore not appropriate where 
dominance ‘is temporary and the leader is closely followed by competitors who are free 
to overtake him in turn.’175 This conceptualisation of the substantive role of competition 
law, espousing the virtues of market self-correction and effective incentives to win, is 
very different not just from other earlier passages of Röpke’s writing, but also the 
popular perception of ‘Ordoliberal competition law’ itself. 
Ordoliberal ambiguity on the substance of competition policy, particularly with regards 
to the goal of intervention and the treatment of industrial concentration, really ought to 
come as little surprise. Their conceptualisation of legitimate market intervention was 
intended to be entirely dependent upon economic wisdom. The foundational Ordo 
Manifesto of 1936 called for lawyers to avail themselves of the ‘findings of economic 
research’ in deciding upon whether certain business practices ought to be illegal, 
therefore necessitating greater ‘collaboration of the two sciences’.176 If competition 
policy is underpinned by economic research rather than metaphysical dogmatism, such 
accumulated wisdom has never been unequivocal and is necessarily subject to 
substantial disagreement and development over time,177 dynamically adjusted ‘to 
practical experience and theoretical progress triggered by new economic insights’.178 
Exactly the same contestation and evolution of the common position was alluded to in 
the previous chapter: Henry Simons and Frank Knight of the older Chicago School 
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profoundly disagreed with each other on the inevitability and desirability of economic 
concentration,179 though the allocative/productive efficiencies trade-off became more 
widely accepted throughout the late 1950s and 1960s, thus affecting the nature of 
Chicagoan competition policy recommendations.180 The economic consensus changed at 
Chicago. That Ordoliberalism remains trapped as a fossil from the 1930s and 1940s in 
contemporary scholarship without acknowledgement of its ambiguity, manifest 
internally even then, is simplistic and arbitrary.181 Were Eucken exposed to the 
Chicagoan claims on, for instance, predatory pricing,182 he may today remove it from the 
illegality category of ‘impediment’ competition; post-Chicagoan counter-claims based on 
strategic considerations may have reaffirmed his views.183 More generally, it might be 
the case that if writing today, the early Ordoliberals would have few qualms with an 
exclusively efficiency-focused approach to competition policy.184 
Essentially, condemnation of a singular Ordoliberal approach to competition law is 
questionable; attachment to the goal of economic freedom and industrial 
deconcentration rather than societal efficiency was never unambiguous and underwent 
considerable evolution from the 1950s onwards. Rather than ‘economic freedom’, the 
substantive orientation of “Ordoliberal competition law” should instead be generally 
understood as intervention underpinned by current economic wisdom, acknowledging 
that such learning necessarily represents a moving target. 
IV. The Form of Ordoliberal Competition Policy: Contextualisation and Extrapolation 
As with accounts of the substance of Ordoliberal competition policy, their alleged 
conceptualisation of the form of market intervention has been neatly portrayed for 
decades, both by neutral chroniclers185 and contemporary critics186 alike: Ordoliberalism 
is routinely said to aspire for competition enforcement through comprehensible (clear, 
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public, prospective) and generalised norms determining legality and illegality, militating 
against ad hoc decision-making that analyses the actual effects of specific conduct. The 
most commonly cited authority for this proposition is Möschel’s 1989 ‘Competition from 
an Ordo Point of View’, where Ordoliberalism is said to advocate a ‘shaping of 
competition policy into a rule of law rather than a mechanism of discretionary 
decisions.’187 This was motivated by notions of administrative restraint and normative 
certainty.188 Although imperfect in sifting pro-competitive from anticompetitive 
conduct, the virtue of ‘necessarily rough rules of thumb’ lay in their administrability, 
abstracting workable factors as determinative of legality, but also in restricting the 
competition authority to the enforcement of foreseeable norms.189 
Unlike the common depiction of the substance of Ordoliberal competition policy, the 
problem here is not that it is misleadingly simplistic. Instead, the issue is with how this 
happy consensus on their conceptualisation of the form of market intervention has been 
reached. For the critics of Ordoliberalism, it is perhaps flawed logic based on dubious 
premises: that i) as their competition policy was animated by economic freedom rather 
than efficiency, then ii) they must necessarily have advocated market intervention via 
overbroad, generalised norms of illegality. It has already been demonstrated that i) is 
partial190 and previous discussion of Chicagoan antitrust shows that ii) does not 
necessarily follow i).191 But even the more impartial or generous depictions of 
Ordoliberal competition policy as abstracted and equally-applicable obligations 
comprehensible to legal subjects, may struggle to locate firm foundations for their 
portrayal.192 The Ordoliberals rarely considered jurisprudential matters of the rule of law 
or an ideal conceptualisation of legal norms in any great detail;193 direct and extended 
theorising on the form of competition enforcement even less so.194 
To reach these legitimate conclusions found in contemporary accounts of Ordoliberalism 
it is necessary to contextualise their scholarship and extrapolate from influential writing 
that preceded it. To fully understand the form of market intervention envisaged by the 
Ordoliberals, their thoughts must be situated within a tradition theorising the virtues of 
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the formal Rechtsstaat traceable to Immanuel Kant. Numerous commentators have 
highlighted that Ordoliberalism simply assumed delivery of its societal vision in 
accordance with this idealised relationship between the state and citizens.195 
Nevertheless, they omit A) an extended discussion of the meaning and origins of the 
Rechtsstaat, as well as B) a consideration of how it can be connected to and fill gaps 
within later Ordoliberal scholarship. This section addresses both omissions, thereby 
explaining why Ordoliberalism ought to be considered another school of competition 
policy aspiring towards determining the legality of market conduct in accordance with 
the formal rule of law ideal - generalised and equally-applicable norms comprehensibly 
delineating the boundary between lawful and unlawful.  
A) Kant and the Rechtsstaat in German Constitutional Theory 
The concept of the “Rechtsstaat” has had multiple conceptualisations throughout more 
than two-hundred years of Germanic theorising, waxing and waning in its popular 
desirability.196 But rather than an empty slogan,197 the common thread running 
throughout is the reconciliation of state power and individual freedom via generalised 
and clear legal obligations.198 The classic definition of the Rechtsstaat is attributable to 
Friedrich Stahl from the middle of the 19th century:199 
“It shall precisely determine and unswervingly secure the paths and limits of its activity 
as well as the free spheres of its citizens in the manner of law, and it shall not, directly 
through the state, implement (enforce) moral ideals further than befits the legal sphere - 
that is to say, no further than the most essential fencing-round. That is the concept of the 
Rechtsstaat - not, for example, that the state simply runs the legal system without 
administrative objectives or fully protects only the rights of individuals. It certainly does 
not signify the object and substance of the state but only the manner of realising the 
same.”     
Although he did not use the term, the concept of the Rechtsstaat owes much to 
Immanuel Kant’s writings throughout the 1790s, especially his articulation of the 
Doctrine of Right in the Metaphysics of Morals.200 These later works of political theory 
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essentially concerned the innate right to ‘[f]reedom (independence from being 
constrained by another’s choice)’ and how it could ‘coexist with the freedom of every 
other’.201 Kant’s proposed solution for delineating the boundaries of everyone’s 
freedom was through appeal to practical reason, especially by reference the Universal 
Principle of Right.202 A norm was ‘right if it can coexist with everyone’s freedom in 
accordance with a universal law’.203 Generalisability was thus the key determinant of 
rightfulness and legitimated coercion against contrary actions to thus guarantee 
freedom for all.204 Although interpersonal relations of private right (contract, property, 
status) were conceivable without the state, centralised mechanisms were necessary to 
authoritatively promulgate universal laws reciprocally binding on all, to guarantee their 
enforcement, and to adjudicate disputes, thus recommending transition from the state 
of nature (a ‘state of externally lawless freedom’) for the civil condition of public right.205 
In this way, submission to the laws posited by the legislature in the rightful condition 
secured individual liberty; all that had been sacrificed was ‘wild, lawless freedom in 
order to find his freedom as such undiminished, in a dependence upon laws’.206 And as 
the norms produced ought to meet the Universal Principle of Right - ie were capable of 
universalisation - the result was ‘a constitution in which law itself rules and depends on 
no particular person’.207  
At the start of the 19th century, theorists of the Rechtsstaat articulated a “thick” 
conceptualisation, blending Kantian reasoning with inviolable liberties and notions of 
self-fulfilment through law.208 In the latter half of the century the Rechtsstaat ideal 
largely shed these substantive requirements, revealing a more formalistic character of 
rule through law;209 simply that the state ‘may not interfere in the realm of individual 
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liberty either against a law (contra legem) or without a legal foundation (praeter, ultra 
legem)’.210 This is visible in Stahl’s above claim that adherence to the Rechtsstaat says 
nothing as to the ‘object and substance of the state but only the manner of realising the 
same.’211 With this positivistic shift, it came to be seen not as a beneficial reconciliation 
of individual liberty with state power but as a toothless restraint legitimating old 
omnipotent authority, repackaged for a revolutionary age.212 As a consequence, post-
war German conceptualisations of the Rechtsstaat have sought to introduce hard, 
substantive limitations upon state interference with liberty through constitutionally-
entrenched basic rights derived from human dignity.213  
Contemporary efforts to substantively “thicken” the Rechtsstaat ideal may be 
reconnecting with the pre-positivist conceptualisation from the early 19th century, but 
they do not re-establish contact with its Kantian origins: Kant made it very clear that the 
rightful exercise of state coercion ‘concerns the form of what is laid down’ rather than 
its substance,214 a more austere stance that may have been somewhat obscured by his 
ethereal discussions of reason, innate right, freedom, and so on.215  
Nevertheless, placing Kant within the same camp as the later, more positivistic 
conceptualisation of the Rechtsstaat without substantive limitation should not be hastily 
dismissed as meaningless constraint and authoritarian legitimation. On the contrary, 
shorn of far-reaching questions on substantive limits to state authority and the scope of 
individual rights, it is possible to see that even the “thin”, formalistic understanding of 
the Rechtsstaat is an ideal of considerable virtue.216 As a prominent German judge has 
argued, the formal guarantees of the Rechtsstaat:217 
‘show themselves to be institutions of liberty, having little to do with formalism and even 
less with positivism. The dismantling of liberty under totalitarian regimes begins not with 
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the exploitation of formal guarantees and procedures but always with contempt of them 
in the name of a higher, material, pre-positive law’. 
The first aspect of the formal Rechtsstaat is the virtue of generalised norms rather than 
ad hoc determinations of legality. Universalisation was the core concept of Kant’s 
political theory, giving the law generated by the sovereign legislator its “publicness”.218 
Such abstraction produced end-independent norms to structure relations between 
individuals and with the state, otherwise affording freedom to do as one wished.219 The 
Rechtsstaat aspiration towards norms universal in their scope is linked to formal 
equality in their application and enforcement, a common motif throughout the 
evolution of the ideal.220 Ripstein has thus interpreted Kant as cautioning against the 
conferral of open-ended powers to determine the rights and obligations of citizens in a 
subject-specific manner.221 Elements of this can be seen in his dismissal of equitable 
claims in legal proceedings as unstructured, subjective, discretionary appeals to the 
‘court of conscience’.222 The denial of privileges or discrimination through ‘status-based’ 
laws was a potent idea in Enlightenment Europe.223 Formally preventing the state from 
singling-out individuals or groups through norms generalised in scope and equally-
applied in the Rechtsstaat has therefore been defended as a crucial restraint on state 
coercion.224 
The second element is the aspiration towards normative comprehensibility and clarity 
for legal subjects. Although this is less prevalent in Kant’s articulation of the rightful 
condition,225 a number of commentators have extrapolated that this would improve the 
utility of the mutual “fences” between zones of private autonomy,226 as well as 
optimising deterrence against prohibited conduct that Kant considered to be a rejection 
of the rightful condition.227 Normative clarity was a more pronounced desideratum of 
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later Rechtsstaat scholars, as with Stahl envisaging laws restraining the state through 
‘precisely’ determining the ‘free spheres of its citizens’ and ‘limits of its activity’.228 Von 
Humboldt similarly rejected the popular notion of unclear criminal laws overcoming, 
essentially, the moral hazard of beneficial violations, advocating instead norms ‘fully and 
clearly made known to citizens without distinction’.229 This formal requirement would 
prevent ‘the arbitrary trespass of all limits’ through the enforcement of ill-defined laws 
and discretionary interventions.230 The extension of this ideal to the burgeoning 
administrative apparatus of the 19th century state was one of the underappreciated 
successes of the later Rechtsstaat theorists,231 advocating a comprehensible normative 
framework to thereby facilitate ‘greater control over one’s interest in a complex social 
setting’ by formally restricting unforeseeable state acts (ie unclear, retrospective, secret, 
impossible normative acts) and the exercise of discretion. 232 
Therefore, despite lacking substantive bulwarks to state action thus guaranteeing 
freedom, even the most austere formal conceptualisation of the Rechtsstaat has 
particular virtues that ought not to be overlooked. It is possible to extrapolate from its 
advocacy in the 19th century to the Ordoliberals in the 20th century, who arguably shared 
this conclusion on the considerable virtue of the Rechtsstaat ideal, supporting general, 
equally-applicable, and comprehensible normative obligations. 
But before situating the form of Ordoliberal competition law within the Rechtsstaat 
tradition, a brief word on Hans Kelsen, arguably one of the most influential legal 
philosophers of the twentieth century. The first version of Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law, 
published in 1934, was a product of the same political and economic upheavals afflicting 
Central Europe that contemporaneously inspired the early work of the Freiburg 
School.233 His theory of a legal system may also be taken to exemplify the more 
formalistic, minimalist conceptualisations of the Rechtsstaat, noted above for their 
falling out of favour in the post-war period for supposedly legitimating, rather than 
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limiting, the exercise of centralised power through law.234 To achieve ‘true legal 
science’,235 Kelsen thought it necessary to separate legal normativity from inherently 
contestable notions of morality or justice (contra natural law),236 while also avoiding the 
reduction of law to mere facts that failed to appreciate their binding “oughtness” as 
norms (contra empirical legal positivism).237 The pure theory instead conceptualised 
legal systems as a chain of hierarchical norms, from individual judicial determinations, 
through statutes and various iterations of the constitution, to the basic norm, a 
presupposition (or, in later works, a fiction)238 upon which the validity and normativity of 
the entire system rests.239 Fruitful similarities could probably be drawn between Kelsen’s 
basic norm and the Ordoliberal logical device of the economic constitution, both 
attributable to a common indebtedness to Kantian transcendentalism.240 
Yet putting to one side temporal and geographic proximity, Kantian methods, and a 
connection to the Rechtsstaat tradition widely construed, Kelsen’s pure theory adds 
little to the questions explored in this chapter. This is for one simple reason: in 
consciously denying any distinction between the state and the law,241 his 
conceptualisation of the Rechtsstaat was so broad and inclusive as to exclude any 
consideration of the desirable formal qualities for determining legality considered here 
(normative comprehensibility, generality, equal application, etc).242 To be sure, there 
have been subsequent attempts to read into Kelsen’s austere articulation of the 
Rechtsstaat similar formal desiderata as are clearly recognisable above in Kant, Stahl, 
von Humboldt, and others.243 Nevertheless, Kelsen’s “scientific” method for pinpointing 
the precise nature of legal normativity prevents such qualitative reflections. Whether by 
reason of substantive or formal deficiencies, to muse on the nature of a ‘“true” legal 
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system… is a prejudice of natural law” which overlooks that, on Kelsen’s definition,244 
every state necessarily satisfies the conditions to be designated a Rechtsstaat.245 Thus, 
despite his jurisprudential statute, Hans Kelsen’s pure theory does not enlighten the 
envisaged form of Ordoliberal competition law, nor their links to a conceptualisation of 
the Rechtsstaat which does incorporate considerations of the appropriate legal form.                     
B) From the Formal Rechtsstaat to Freiburg  
The Ordoliberals rarely used the word “Rechtsstaat”. Their general intellectual 
indebtedness to Kant was more visible, particularly in Eucken’s conceptualisation of 
external freedom to act without coercion by others and the role of law in demarcating 
protected zones of individual liberty.246 Where Kant is not explicitly mentioned, his 
influence is nevertheless tangible within the language and conceptual analysis of 
Ordoliberalism: Rüstow’s discussion of formulating law as a process of rationalisation 
and the paramount importance of legal equality (‘isonomy’);247 Miksch’s comments on 
‘self-limiting freedom’ and ‘a just delimitation of the spheres of freedom’;248 or Röpke’s 
vision of the constitutional state containing ‘legal principles which offer security and 
protection to the individual not only in the face of the encroachments of other 
individuals, but also against the arbitrary interference of the state’.249 But still, direct 
links between Kant, the Rechtsstaat, and the appropriate conceptualisation of law by 
20th century Ordoliberalism may seem prima facie tenuous.    
Nevertheless, extrapolating from this Kantian-Rechtsstaat tradition, making relevant 
connections and filling problematic gaps, renders Ordoliberalism a richer, more cohesive 
brand of liberal thought. Perhaps this is why a number of commentators have suggested 
that the Ordoliberals simply presumed that their societal vision would be realised in 
accordance with this Germanic jurisprudential tradition.250 By situating the Ordoliberals 
within this intellectual context, it is possible to substantiate the common contemporary 
                                                          
244 Kelsen [1934] 105. 
245 This explains Hayek’s dismissal of Kelsen’s conceptualisation of the Rechtsstaat, shorn as it was of all 
substantive and formal requirements: [1960] 208-209; [1976] 214. 
246 eg Eucken [1952] 39 (citing Kant on freedom); Gerber [1994] 39-40 (quoting Eucken: “it is the 
responsibility of the state to find a form in which there is room for sociable coexistence…”’, where absolute 
freedom is legally constrained to protect the freedom of others) For comparisons: Streit and Wohlgemuth 
[1997] 5, 7; Wörsdörfer [2010] 25-30; [2014] 252; Klump and Wörsdörfer [2010] 32, 48; Biebricher [2013] 
340. Similarly: Mestmäcker [1979] 334-337 (citing Kant’s Doctrine of Right to justify ‘the resolution of social 
conflicts through rules’). 
247 Rüstow [1950] 110-111. 
248 Miksch quoted in: Goldschmidt and Berndt [2005] 982-984. 
249 Röpke [1950a] 95-96. See also: [1950b] 39 (‘the constitutional state based on the rule of law’). 
250 see fn 195. 
94 
 
submission that their competition policy would adopt the Rechtsstaat form of 
generalised, equally-applicable norms that were comprehensible to legal subjects. A 
connection can be made through three justifications for this conceptualisation of law: i) 
the extra bulwark afforded against state coercion; ii) the more effective realisation of 
the exchange-based constitution through forestalling misguided and privately-motivated 
interventions; and iii) complementarity with the free market economy.  
i) Justification I: Extra Bulwark against State Coercion 
The first reason for believing that Ordoliberal competition policy would aspire to realise 
the Rechtsstaat ideal results from their recognition of its formalised restraint, thus 
better guaranteeing individual freedom vis-à-vis organs of the state. 
The deployment of institutional independence as a technique of statecraft was seen to 
be a key element of Ordoliberalism, thus guaranteeing faithful implementation of the 
exchange-based constitution by shutting-out private interests.251 Although vague on the 
specifics of the independent monopoly office, it was clearly expected as an agent of the 
economic constitution to maintain the ‘inflexible will to exercise its authority’252 and to 
be staffed by a bureaucracy ‘enjoying life tenure, and answerable to itself’.253 Although 
sometimes equivocating on whether insulated decision-makers always pursued the 
public interest,254 it has been argued that Ordoliberalism lacked engagement with 
difficult questions of how administrative actors were to be restrained:255 of how to keep 
‘potential recalcitrants constantly in fear of the law’ whilst conferring ‘as little 
“arbitrary” power as is feasible’ to decision-makers.256 Ordoliberalism may thus be 
accused of responding to its scathing critique of regulatory capture with a rose-tinted 
view of benevolent dictatorship by independent agencies such as the monopoly 
office.257 
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This criticism would, however, overlook their appreciation for how conceptualising law 
as general, equally-applicable norms formally restrains authority, thereby echoing 
arguments supporting the Rechtsstaat ideal as an additional, politically-desirable 
bulwark against the necessary power of the state. In essence, general legal norms clearly 
delineating rights and obligations were preferable to ad hoc normative acts by the state 
owing to their protection of liberty.258 In one of the few direct references to the 
concept, Rüstow argued that the importance of the Rechtsstaat’s elements for 
individual freedom through state restraint - ‘even those of “merely formal” nature’ - 
should not be taken for granted.259 As opposed to subject-specific determinations of 
lawfulness, this ideal of generalised and equally-applicable norms was also for Röpke the 
greatest achievement of the 19th century: ‘the conquest of arbitrary might through 
right’.260 Adopting the familiar analogy of traffic control, he argued that conceptualising 
law in the form of general norms facilitated individual liberty as the driver could still 
choose their own destination.261 This notion of law as universalised, end-independent 
obligations is unmistakably Kantian.262 Indeed, it was the ‘inflexible’ quality of such 
norms that recommended them, formally forestalling particularistic and discretionary 
acts by the state.263 This also relates to Eucken’s brief discussion of predatory pricing, 
and how if it were to rest on ‘nebulous notions’ of ‘fairness’ or ‘unfairness’ there was ‘no 
firm basis here for a judgment to rest on.’264 Miksch’s writing can also be interpreted as 
evidence for the Ordoliberal appreciation of the inflexible restraint of state action in the 
formal Rechtsstaat,265 whilst its absence fostered what he called ‘bureaucratic 
despotism’.266 The solution to such a potential for tyranny for Miksch was therefore to 
‘replace the concrete power of man over man by the abstract power of law’.267 
This connection between the formal Rechtsstaat and Ordoliberal thought was further 
refined in a 1979 piece by Willgerodt. His aim was to consider whether their 
conceptualisation of the administration changed dependent upon the choice between a 
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centrally-directed or exchange-based constitution.268 This question is, of course, of great 
importance for understanding the role of the independent monopoly office in 
Ordoliberalism. Willgerodt argued that the unchanging Weberian depiction of 
administration (bureaucratic knowledge, auditing techniques, professionalism, 
incorruptibility) was not shared by Ordoliberals; the economic constitution did 
materially alter their view of how it could and should operate.269 A centrally-controlled 
economy was closely associated with the mercantilist administrations of the pre-
Enlightenment era, operating through ‘irregular and discretionary’ market interventions, 
with ill-defined powers that set no official limit on the reach of the state.270 In contrast, 
Willgerodt claimed that the administrative action envisaged under an exchange-based 
economic constitution in Ordoliberal thought was reminiscent of the idealised civil 
service developed during the nineteenth century as a result of Rechtsstaat theorising. 
Rather than governance through ‘pragmatism and extemporization’, the Ordo 
interpretation of this idealised form of administration had ‘clear limits and 
circumscribed powers’.271 Willgerodt thus found there to be considerable virtue to the 
‘permanent and unambiguous demarcation between the sphere of private autonomy 
and the options of governmental intervention’.272  
Essentially, the restraint of the formal Rechtsstaat ideal can be connected to 
Ordoliberalism as a further measure to realise individual freedom and rigidify the power 
of state organs.  
ii) Justification II: Preventing Misguided and Privately-Motivated Interventions 
The second argument for extrapolating from the formal Rechtsstaat ideal to Ordoliberal 
competition policy relates to its guaranteeing of the exchange-based economic 
constitution: aspiring to market intervention via generalised and equally-applicable 
norms formally prevents ad hoc interference in the economy, whether as a result of 
centralised error or external persuasion.   
With regard to the state’s necessary powers to mitigate the omissions of laissez-faire 
(competition policy, social policy), Rüstow’s advocacy of liberal interventionism and 
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Röpke on conformable actions were both briefly discussed above.273 In their cautious 
awareness of the possibility for the inconsistent realisation of the exchange-based 
economic constitution, they clearly envisaged the prevention of substantively 
incompatible interventions; the appropriate response to industrial decline, for example, 
was not subsidies and tariffs but workforce retraining.274 But it is also plain from 
Ordoliberal writing that ad hoc, subject-specific interventions, as opposed to the rigidity 
of general norms delineating prohibited conduct, were considered formally incompatible 
with the market order, regardless of what they sought to achieve. In other words, the 
Rechtsstaat ideal facilitated the coherent realisation of the Ordoliberal societal vision by 
formally binding the state’s hands, preventing particular means of interference that 
were deemed incompatible with a free market order. This is discernible from Röpke’s 
comparison of general traffic rules with the police determining each individual’s position 
on the road and directing every separate movement; the latter form of normative act 
‘would be an entirely incompatible intervention and thus akin to planned economy’.275 
To prevent arbitrary disturbances to the market order, the state should be restricted to 
the form of entirely ‘inflexible’ rules.276 In short:277 
‘it is advisable to base economic policy on definite rules and fixed principles and to 
restrict the sphere of arbitrary action as much as possible. The economic system must, so 
to speak, be an unbreakable toy – “fool-proof” is the telling English expression.’ 
The possibility for discretionary intervention on an as-necessary basis was simply an 
invitation for foolish interference with market forces. Böhm suggested the same risk was 
visible in competition policy; if the state remedied individual anticompetitive practices in 
a subject-specific and unsystematic manner after their commission, there was a risk that 
authorities would actually meddle in everything in an ‘amateurish and arbitrary 
manner’.278 To lessen such potentially counterproductive interventions, the Ordoliberal 
vision would be better delivered if the state were restricted to indirectly improving 
competitive conditions through recalibrating the generalised rules shaping economic 
processes.279 Indeed, it was this combination of free markets and the formal restraint of 
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the Rechtsstaat together to prevent particular means of market intervention that 
Foucault found so novel about Ordoliberal governmentality.280  
But the virtue of the formal Rechtsstaat for Ordoliberalism went beyond the prevention 
of misguided state interference with the economy; the inflexibility of generalised norms 
and their formulaic enforcement also forestalled the state’s vulnerability to influence by 
powerful external actors. The Ordoliberal anxiety that industrialists would set politicians 
against competition policy was discussed above.281 This led to their advocacy of an 
independent monopoly office isolated from direct political influence.282 But as mere 
insulation from democratic contestation does not prevent private lobbying, the formal 
restraint of market intervention through generalised norms provides an additional 
bulwark to protect delivery of the economic constitution and prevent discriminatory 
economic privileges.283 Essentially, this is an economic equivalent to the advocacy of the 
Rechtsstaat formally inhibiting discriminatory normative acts between citizens. This 
valuable consequence of the formal ideal was acknowledged by Böhm, who spent his 
entire career criticising the mere empowerment of officials to intervene against 
anticompetitive behaviour in a discretionary manner. From his early work on the 1923 
law policing cartel abuses,284 through his argument in the 1940s in favour of outright 
prohibition of cartel agreements rather than ‘bureaucratic restraints’,285 to the 
formulation of the first comprehensive German competition policy enacted in 1957,286 
Böhm was sceptical as to whether extensive administrative discretion to determine 
illegality would ever see enforcement taken seriously. Of the latter development, he 
argued that even ‘a very well-qualified office would, however, find it extremely difficult 
to administer a law which leaves to its own discretion the decision whether competition 
should be restrained in any particular case.’287 Therefore, for the Ordoliberal vision to be 
guaranteed against political or private influences, mandating intervention in the form of 
generalised and equally-applicable norms, thus leaving ‘no room for exceptions 
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favouring single industries or companies’,288 would provide an additional safeguard 
beyond institutional independence to deliver the exchange-based order.289 
iii) Justification III: Effective Operation of the Free Markets 
One of the most fascinating aspects of Ordoliberalism is its claim that there exists a 
degree of complementarity between concepts associated with the formal Rechtsstaat 
and the optimal operation of an exchange-based economic order.290 As a key normative 
frameworks shaping market transactions, this connection provides a third and final 
justification for characterising the form of Ordo competition policy as aspiring towards 
the Rechtsstaat ideal of determining legality through the equal application of 
generalised, comprehensible norms. 
This virtuous economic complementarity was initially implicit in the writing of Eucken on 
the need for steady market conditions to facilitate business expectations and decision-
making. One of his six constitutive principles deduced from the exchange-based 
economic constitution was the requirement of stable economic policy.291 Eucken 
hypothesised that a previous failure to guarantee reliable conditions had contributed to 
unnecessary mergers to counteract risk, providing an example of market conduct that 
might not have been the same in steadier economic circumstances.292  
That such stability was related to the form of state engagement with markets is revealed 
by considering Eucken’s conceptualisation of the opposite to economic stability, as 
summarised by Schmidtchen: ‘hectic, short-sighted, unpredictable fiddling with the 
levers of economic policy’ and ‘characterised by nervous restlessness’.293 The legal 
system could ‘give direction to the actions of the economic persons and set limits to 
them’,294 but would not in the form of ad hoc interventions.295 As competition policy is a 
fundamental element of wider economic policy, it is reasonable to infer that Eucken 
                                                          
288 Watrin [1998] 18. See also: Lyons [2009] 17 (‘In order not to be corruptible, ordo-liberals argued that 
policy should be implemented formulaically and without discretion’). 
289 Gerber [1994] 46 (‘legal principles that directed but also constrained government conduct’); Vanberg 
[2014] 217-218. 
290 Also noted by: Streit [1992] 684 (on universal rules stabilising expectations), 693 (law establishes and 
secures ‘the autonomy of the economic agents as a precondition of self-coordination’). Ordoliberalism is an 
important precursor to New Institutional Economics: Chapter IV, Section IV. See: Schmidtchen [1984] 67; 
Grossekettler [1989] 65; [1996] 313-314; Kasper and Streit [1993] 12; Sally [1996] 252. 
291 See fn 96. 
292 Eucken [1952] 130. 
293 Schmidtchen [1984] 72. 
294 Eucken quoted ibid 63. 
295 Similarly: Willgerodt [1979] 164 (intervention ‘in a haphazard fashion… accomplishes absolutely nothing 
apart from unsettling trade and industry.’). 
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would expect its enforcement ideally via restrained and comprehensible general norms 
rather than particularistic and unforeseeable determinations of legality.296 Röpke 
similarly stressed the importance of steady economic policy for fostering 
competitiveness and risk-taking,297 as well as the complementary role of the rule of law 
in guaranteeing a level of ‘continuity which permits of making reasonable plans and 
dispositions’ on the market.298 Business planning, especially of long-term investment 
choices, naturally meets considerable uncertainty, but the legal order ought not to 
exacerbate such risks by ignoring the need for comprehensible rights and wrongs, thus 
blurring the prospective boundaries of normative obligations.299 According to Rüstow, it 
was therefore desirable to base economic policy ‘on definite rules and fixed principles 
and to restrict the sphere of arbitrary action as much as possible.’300 
It was however Franz Böhm’s 1966 article, Private Law Society and the Market Economy, 
which contains the most sophisticated Ordoliberal analysis of the supposed 
interrelationship between the exchange-based market economy and a legal framework 
in accordance with the formal Rechtsstaat.301 Böhm drew from classical 
conceptualisations of this as norms ‘in a general, abstract and negative sense, telling 
individuals what not to do and otherwise leaving them free to pursue their own 
interests and discover new actions.’302 These formal characteristics were to be 
approximated whether norms were promulgated as statute or the product of judicial 
decision-making.303 This resultant ‘uniform order’ of stable and comprehensible norms 
was rechristened by Böhm as the ‘private law society’, the framework of rights and 
obligations which enshrouded and shaped all interactions between private actors.304 In a 
characteristically Ordoliberal fashion, he stressed that the virtue of this Rechtsstaat was 
not just desirable on its own terms, but owing to its necessity in an exchange-based 
economy: the optimal ‘functioning of the free market system presupposes the existence 
of the private law society’.305 This resulted from the administrative restraint of the 
formal Rechtsstaat ideal facilitating economic planning under conditions of optimal 
                                                          
296 As argued by: Kloten [1989] 72; Lenel [1989] 32. 
297 Röpke [1950a] 95.  
298 Röpke [1959] 72. 
299 Lenel [1989] 32. 
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301 Böhm [1966]. See: Vanberg [2009] 8.  
302 Sally [1996] 243 (summarising his conceptualisation). 
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normative clarity.306 The institutional context within which economic processes 
operated was critical. Just as the price mechanism of neo-classical microeconomics 
spontaneously influenced and coordinated action by market actors, Böhm argued that 
law was another ‘signalling’ system impacting upon individual economic decision-
making.307 To foster coherence and facilitate frictionless reactions to the price 
mechanism, the state was therefore tasked with ‘defining and maintaining the 
regulative framework’ via legislation and administrative measures that created 
‘favourable conditions for the emergence of effective competition.’308 As the ‘medium’ 
through which the state sent signals to individual market actors,309 the legal certainty of 
rights and obligations envisaged by the Rechtsstaat rendered law at its most ‘extremely 
effective’ as an ‘instrument of social control’,310 thereby influencing very ‘effectively, the 
selection of individual plans, their content and their accommodation to the plans of 
others’.311  
This institutional perspective on how the form of law affects market decision-making is 
essentially a more sophisticated version of Miksch’s earlier writing on law, prices, and 
general economic policy as complementary mechanisms impacting coordination on the 
market.312 A more recent manifestation of the same economic justification for the 
formal Rechtsstaat by a contemporary Ordoliberal is Mestmäcker’s dismantling of 
Posner’s pragmatic theory of adjudication.313 Böhm’s student rejects the premise that 
law and economics exist as autonomous conceptual phenomena: Posner allegedly 
overlooks that ‘[a]bstract legal rules’ are critical elements for decision-making in the 
economic system, ‘providing information that makes a rational division of labour and 
allocation of resources possible.’314 Posner’s theses on the separation of law from 
economics replicates the laissez-faire error of presuming that optimal resource 
allocation through exchange is guaranteed without state input, including the legal 
framework that it maintains.315 On the contrary, Mestmäcker claims that:316 
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‘[i]nstitutions [including legal rules] reduce the information we need to act rationally and 
stabilise expectations in complex societies […] They are the legal foundation of market 
economies. Like the price system they enable individuals to make use of more 
information than they individually have and to organise their own economic affairs 
through participation in markets.’ 
Furthermore, like Böhm before him, Mestmäcker stresses the formal desiderata that 
permit law to fulfil this economic good: the comprehensibility of norms to legal subjects 
is necessary for planning in the market economy as a key ‘by-product’ of the ‘rule of law 
is expectations that people can rely on’.317 He traces this affinity between the 
conceptualisation of the legal system and the free market order through the 
Ordoliberals to Adam Smith.318 This lineage of institutional economics and its more 
recent manifestation will be discussed in the next chapter.319 
To summarise, the third and final justification for considering Ordoliberal competition 
law as aspiring to the form of the Rechtsstaat is due to its supposed complementarity 
with the optimal operation of free markets. 
*** 
Despite the ease with which contemporary commentators attribute a particular form of 
market intervention to Ordoliberals for determining legality, it is actually rather difficult 
to find concrete evidence for this popular portrayal. Yet as has been argued, once placed 
within the context of Germanic theorising on the Rechtsstaat and their indebtedness to 
Kant is acknowledged, the envisaged form of Ordoliberal competition policy becomes 
more plausible. Their minimal engagement with questions of how to keep in check 
autonomous decision-making by independent agencies they advocate is also less 
problematic. The formal Rechtsstaat ideal is a foundational aspect that can be teased 
out of their scholarship, justified as a further bulwark against state coercion, as a means 
to prevent ill-considered or privately-motivated market interventions, and as a valuable 
complement to the efficient operation of free markets. As their proposed monopoly 
office is otherwise unconstrained, is still susceptible to lobbying, and acts as a key 
protagonist shaping the normative context within which the economy operates, it is 
reasonable to conclude that the Ordoliberals would have anticipated competition 
enforcement in accordance with the formal Rechtsstaat ideal. Notwithstanding their 
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status as progenitors of the EU’s administrative system of competition policy, market 
intervention from an Ordoliberal perspective would nevertheless still amount to the 
‘provision, correction and enforcement of adequate “rules of the game”’-320 generalised, 
equally-applied normative obligations that restrained and rigidified determinations of 
lawfulness to thus afford legal certainty to businesses.   
V. Conclusion: Rival Schools? 
Ordoliberal competition policy is characterised by a great deal of ambiguity, much more 
so than is admitted by their common depiction in contemporary scholarship, both in 
terms of its suggested substance and form.  
With regard to their substantive conceptualisation of the goal underpinning 
intervention, Section III highlighted the heterogeneity of Ordoliberal writing on 
competition policy. Although there were undoubtedly freedom-extolling accounts of 
widespread industrial deconcentration and “as-if” regulation to replicate complete 
competition, Ordoliberalism was subject to considerable inconsistency, disagreement, 
and development over time. Owing to this divergence on the question of whether 
competition policy should promote freedom or efficiency, it was suggested that the 
original message of the Ordo Manifesto be heeded: that the substance of Ordoliberal 
competition policy were to be deduced from prevailing economic wisdom.321 Rather 
than the anti-efficiency original sin of EU competition law, the Ordoliberal heritage may 
actually be more subtle and conceptual, manifest in ideas such as the ‘special 
responsibility’ of dominant firms, or a slightly more sceptical approach to market self-
correction.322  
The ambiguity in relation to the form of market intervention proposed by Ordoliberalism 
derived not from mixed messages, but rather a scarcity of deep engagement with such 
conceptual issues. It is difficult to trace any real consideration of the legitimate form of 
competition enforcement by the independent monopoly office. Nevertheless, the 
common contemporary perception of Ordoliberalism as aspiring towards generalised 
                                                          
320 Miksch quoted in: Vanberg [1988] 23. 
321 cf attempts to reconcile efficiency, economic freedom, and the rule of law ideal in Ordoliberalism, 
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and comprehensible norms was substantiated by contextualising their scholarship and 
extrapolating from the formal desiderata of the Kantian-Rechtsstaat tradition. 
Conceptualising law as ideally market intervention in this manner is justified by the need 
to further limit centralised coercion (especially by independent agencies), to prevent 
erroneous or exogenously-influenced distortions, and to optimise the operation of free 
market forces by providing normative certainty for businesses.   
By combining an economically-informed substance with a form akin to the Rechtsstaat, 
it has been suggested by some commentators that Ordoliberal competition policy might 
therefore advocate the incorporation of economic research on efficiency consequences 
into the ex ante design of generalised norms – rules, presumptions, multi-stage tests – 
to structure determinations of legality, and thereby afford normative clarity to legal 
subjects.323 But if that is the case, there is little separating Ordoliberalism as a school of 
competition policy from its often posited transatlantic rival, the Chicago School of 
antitrust. Despite the common conflation of the Chicagoan focus upon efficiency as the 
goal of market intervention with ad hoc, subject-specific determinations of illegality, 
Chapter II explored their overlooked appreciation for the formal rule of law ideal. The 
arguments extolling the desirability of generality and normative certainty in the Chicago 
School’s consideration of the appropriate form of market interventions share much in 
common with Ordoliberalism’s connection with the Rechtsstaat in this chapter. The next 
will weave these strands together alongside liberal political philosophy, jurisprudence, 
and institutional economics, to justify why market interventions realising the goal/s of 
competition policy ought to aspire towards the formal rule of law ideal. 
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Chapter IV: The Rule of Law Ideal: Rationality, Restraint, and Robust Review 
I. Introduction 
The purpose of Part I has been to develop a response to the question latent within 
contemporary European scholarship and left unanswered by modern competition 
microeconomics: towards which form of market intervention for determining the 
legality of business conduct ought the enforcement of competition policy aspire? 
Despite their common portrayal as rival schools, close analysis of Chicago School and 
Ordoliberal scholarship has demonstrated a substantial degree of commonality, not just 
in terms of the substantive orientation of enforcement, but also in answering this 
question as to the ideal form. Albeit by different means and with varying emphases, 
both can be interpreted as advocating intervention via generalised and equally-
applicable norms delineating the boundary between legality and illegality in a manner 
comprehensible to businesses (clear, prospective, public, etc). Furthermore, 
rudimentary justifications for this aspirational means have already been intimated 
through shared references to notions of, for instance, freedom, restraint, planning, 
market stability, independent decision-making, and so on.      
This chapter shifts focus from the historical contexts of the Chicagoans and Ordoliberals, 
as well as the specific subject-matter of competition policy, towards the wider plane of 
legal, political, and economic theory. Its purpose is to weave together the hitherto 
disparate strands of appreciation for a particular form of market intervention into a 
singular, coherent justification for the aspirational ideal of the rule of law. Section II 
offers a three-part conceptualisation of the rule of law: i) generalised and equally-
applicable norms; ii) that are comprehensible to legal subjects; and iii) that are subject 
to rigorous oversight by the courts. It also briefly justifies the use of this formal 
definition against thicker, more substantive accounts, and the critique offered by 
Marxist legal scholars. The following sections elaborate upon the many virtues of the 
formal rule of law, detailing justifications found in liberal political theory (Section III) and 
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New Institutional Economics (Section IV). Rather than an abstract ideal, this convergence 
of legal, political, and economic justifications ought to suggest that market interventions 
in pursuit of competition policy should take realisation of the formal rule of law 
seriously. 
II. A Tripartite Conceptualisation of the Formal Rule of Law Ideal and its Critique 
The rule of law has maintained its position as a key idea of Western legal philosophy for 
millennia owing to its malleability and imprecision.1 In recent decades it has been 
considered as at best an essentially contested concept,2 and at worst a meaningless 
slogan.3 But rather than rejecting the concept altogether, such warnings simply highlight 
the need to be very specific about the conceptualisation of the rule of law adopted from 
the extensive catalogue of formulations.4     
As a concept, the rule of law is an aspirational ideal that goes beyond the mere 
requirement of legal validity, advocating more than the technical, constitutional 
“legality” of normative acts. For instance, a legitimately-enacted law may confer the 
discretionary power upon a decision-maker to compel behaviour as it “sees fit”, or to 
create normative obligations upon citizens that are incomprehensible, impossible, or 
completely secret. Such norms may be legal, but they would not be in accordance with 
the rule of law ideal.5 It represents an additional, highly valuable “extra”, beyond bare 
legality.  
The rule of law ideal, as conceptualised and justified in this chapter, is the aspiration 
towards normative obligations incumbent upon legal subjects realising principles (i) and 
(ii) below, within an institutional framework providing principle (iii). Their respective 
antitheses (-) have also been briefly given to clarify their positive requirements and 
provide a singular conceptual taxonomy. Furthermore, it is important to stress their 
                                                          
1 Hutchinson and Monahan [1987] 99 (‘historical plasticity’, ‘the will-o’-the-wisp of constitutional history’); 
Waldron [2002] 140-141; Loughlin [2010] 312-313 (‘the ubiquity of the expression ‘the rule of law’ is 
matched only by the multiplicity of its meanings.). 
2 Waldron [2002] 159. 
3 Loughlin [2010] 312. 
4 For an overview of its historical development and varieties: Tamanaha [2004]. 
5 Hayek [1944] 85-86 (distinguishing legality ‘in the juridical sense’ from realising the rule of law); [1960] 180 
(‘complete legality… is not enough,’ the rule of law is ‘more than constitutionalism: it requires that all laws 
conform to certain principles.’). For similar by Bork and Easterbrook: Chapter II, Section IV.A. 
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aspirational quality, as (i) and (ii) are incapable of perfect implementation.6 Realising the 
formal rule as articulated in this thesis is therefore to progress along a sliding scale of 
legal forms – i.e. from “less” to “more” comprehensible and generalised - rather than a 
binary quality of norms. 
(i) Norms are Comprehensible, Capable of Internalisation by Legal Subjects: 
the first principle is that it is possible for legal subjects to comprehend 
the normative obligations upon them and to rationalise their actions in 
response.7 This capacity for “internalisation”, “cognisability”, or 
“comprehensibility” is a catch-all for the variety of more specific formal 
characteristics that are frequently posited: publicity, prospectivity, 
clarity, consistency, constancy, possibility, and so on; 
(-) Incomprehensible Norms: a norm that it is not possible for legal 
subjects to rationally internalise is described as incomprehensible. This 
may result, for instance, from it not being made publicly known, 
commanding the impossible, or from being thoroughly ambiguous in its 
requirements.      
(ii) Generalised Norms of Equal Application: the second principle 
encompasses two mutually-reinforcing ideals.8 First, generality or 
universality relates to their normative scope: ideally, laws are abstracted 
away from the particular individuals and situations that can be brought 
within their ambit. Second, equal application concerns the enforcement 
of norms: when a specific instance falls within its scope, the norm is to 
be applied equally to all, consistent with past and future enforcement; 
(-) Ad hoc, Subject-Specific Normative Determinations: the antithesis is 
to determine the legality of conduct on the basis of the specific 
individual and/or instance in question without a commitment to equal 
application. This is primarily achieved through the conferral of 
administrative discretion, whether specifically deciding the legality of 
acts or flexibility as enforcement activity. But there are other means to 
                                                          
6 See Section III.C.ii. 
7 Comparable to: Raz [1977] 214 (‘find out what [law] is and act on it.’). 
8 Radin [1989] 785. 
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the same end, especially determining lawfulness through considering 
the specific outcomes, consequences, or effects of the conduct in 
question.  
(iii) There is a Robust Mechanism for Independently Reviewing the Legality 
of Normative Acts: the third principle is that when an individual is 
subjected to a normative determination, there must be some 
independent mechanism for checking the legal validity of their power 
and, if entrusted with pursuing certain societal goals (eg promoting 
“competition”), for reviewing the substantive compliance of normative 
acts with this condition of power-conferral. This is a task usually 
entrusted to the courts; 
(-) Deference: A body with the power to make normative determinations 
that is not subject to close oversight regarding the legal source of its 
acts, reviewing its substantive compliance with the conferral and its 
individual exercise, enjoys deference, whether as to law, facts, or the 
legal characterisation of facts. 
This account of the rule of law derives from the somewhat differing conceptualisations 
offered by Friedrich Hayek,9 Lon Fuller,10 and Joseph Raz.11 Indeed, it also conforms to 
the version of the rule of law critiqued by Roberto Unger,12 as well as Phillipe Nonet and 
Phillip Selznick.13 Hayek’s understanding of the rule of law is particularly important and 
will be a frequent point of reference for two reasons: first, his close interaction and 
affiliation with both the Ordoliberals14 and the Chicago School,15 thus representing an 
                                                          
9 Hayek [1944] 75-76 (‘government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand – 
rules which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive powers in 
given circumstances, and to plan one’s individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge’, with discretion 
‘reduced as much as possible’); [1973] 116 (rules ‘applicable to an unknown number of future instances and 
containing prohibitions delimiting the boundary of the protected domain of each person’). 
10 Fuller [1969] 33-39. 
11 Raz [1977] 214-218. 
12 Unger [1977] 52-54, 176-177 (autonomy, neutrality, uniformity, predictability). 
13 Nonet and Selznick [1978] 53-54 (apolitical, rule-based, procedural, observed in practice).  
14 Hayek moved to the University of Freiburg in 1962. On his proximity to Ordoliberalism: Hayek [1960] 359-
360 (including Eucken and Röpke among his formative influences); Streit [1992] 676; Gerber [1994] 32, 58. 
15 Hayek joined the University of Chicago in 1950. See: Hayek [1960] 359-360 (referencing Simons and 
Knight among his influences), 383-384 (considering Knight ‘the American economist who has done most to 
advance our understanding of a free society’). 
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intellectual bridge;16 and second, his explicit synthesis of theorising on the rule of law 
with considerations of economic order.17 Both render Hayek especially relevant when 
evaluating the ideal form for market interventions in pursuit of the economic goals of 
competition policy. 
This conceptualisation of the rule of law is not substantive.18 It casts no judgement upon 
the content of legal norms and the ends they pursue; they could still be “good” or “bad”, 
“moral” or “immoral”, and, more pertinently, economically-informed or illiterate. In 
Ronald Dworkin’s terminology, it is a ‘“rule-book”’ rather than a ‘“rights”’-based 
approach, which would further aspire towards realising substantive justice.19 Its formal 
and judicial character also says nothing as to the nature of governance, in particular the 
democratic pedigree of legal norms. This contrasts with the discourse theoretic 
communicative constitutionalism of Jürgen Habermas, as most extensively developed in 
Between Facts and Norms.20 His objective was to reconcile the centuries-old clash 
between liberal rights and democratic republicanism - Kantianism versus Rousseauism -
21 through pinning the normative legitimacy of law upon civic participation in the 
process of norm formulation:22 legitimate legal obligations were those which could be 
agreed upon by all affected persons engaging in rational discourse in the public arena,23 
guaranteed by participatory rights.24 Mere aspirations towards normative generality, 
comprehensibility, and judicial review clearly fall short of this ideal, and are compatible 
with the most undemocratic and elitist means for legislating.25 It was the form of his 
decrees rather than their royal origin which prevented Fuller’s King Rex from realising 
the formal rule of law.26 
                                                          
16 On competition policy, the Road to Serfdom (Hayek [1944]) is close to early Ordoliberal thought, whilst his 
later works ([1960], [1973], [1976], [1979]) are more akin to the Chicago School.  
17 See Section IV. On the rule of law and economic freedom: Tamanaha [2004] 43-44. 
18 For discussion of substantive conceptualisations: Summers [1993] 135-138; Craig [1997] 477-487. 
19 Dworkin [1985] 11-13. 
20 Habermas [1996]. For a more accessible summary: Habermas [1995].  
21 ibid 99-103. 
22 ibid 83. 
23 ibid 3-5 (on communicative reason), 104 (‘… the legitimacy of law ultimately depends on a communicative 
arrangement: as participants in rational discourses, consociates under law must be able to examine whether 
a norm meets, or could meet with, the agreement of all those possibly affected), 107-108 (on the discourse 
principle and its communicative conditions).  
24 ibid 104, 123, 170-171. 
25 Habermas [1995] 12 (on the rule of law without democracy in practice, but how theory should not 
separate the two); [1996] 102-103 (generalised, abstracted norms guaranteeing legal equality are 
illegitimate if not resulting from rational discourse: legitimacy is ‘not secured simply through the 
grammatical form of general laws but only through the communicative form, discursive processes of opinion 
and will-formation.’), 134 (comparing his theory of discursive legitimacy to the formal Rechtsstaat).   
26 Fuller [1969] chapter 2. 
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Individual rights and participation in the law-making process are undoubtedly core, 
foundational values of Western liberal democracies.27 But rather than a failing, the 
deliberate minimalism of the understanding of the rule of law adopted in this thesis 
isolates the desirable consequences of the purely formal ((i),(ii)) and institutional ((iii)) 
principles themselves, without their being lost in broader visions of political theory and 
constitutional design.28 Advocates of a wider, more substantive conceptualisation of the 
rule of law still frequently accept the desirability of these formal characteristics,29 as will 
be evidenced by routine citations to Habermas below. If anything, his writing is a 
demonstration of how a genuine appreciation for the virtues of the formal rule of law, 
as is visible at countless junctures in his work,30 can all too easily be marginalised in 
more far-reaching theorising on constitutional ideals. In any event, on a more 
conceptual level the argument that the formal and institutional desiderata of the rule of 
law do have discernible positive consequences, justifying it as an aspiration for market 
intervention, collapses the wholly artificial distinction between form and substance 
itself.31 Articulating these valuable outcomes from approximating the rule of law ideal in 
practice is the purpose of this chapter. Section III develops its justifications found in 
liberal political theory, and Section IV argues that New Institutional Economics reaches 
very similar conclusions. 
More problematic are claims which go beyond merely supplementing the formal rule of 
law ideal with other important principles, to directly challenging its desirability. Such 
denunciation has come most prominently from Marxist legal scholars. Marx himself did 
not systematically analyse the concept in his major writings on capitalist production,32 
though negative reflections can be pieced together from his early Critique of Hegel’s 
Philosophy of Right and essay ‘“On the Jewish Question”’.33 In both works, Marx 
advanced the idea of a separation between the abstracted political sphere, where 
                                                          
27 As reflected in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union. 
28 Raz [1977] 211 (substantive conceptualisations include ‘a complete social philosophy’ where the form 
loses its independent value). 
29 eg Dworkin [1985] 13 (although ‘plainly not sufficient for justice’, ‘[s]ome high degree of compliance with 
the rule-book conception seems necessary for a just society.’). 
30 eg Habermas [1996] 82-83 (on the importance of universal, equal, and abstract legal liberties), 143-144 
(citing Fuller that legal norms should be comprehensible, prospective, public etc. to stabilise expectations); 
153-154 (on the general, abstracted form of legal norms), 168 (on normative coherence fostering legal 
certainty), 201 (dismissing realism for abandoning hope of legal certainty which ‘leads to the conclusion that 
the legal system must ultimately give up the idea of satisfying the very function of law, to stabilize 
expectations.’). For passages that could be taken as supportive of New Institutional Economics: [1996] 39-
40, 488. 
31 Similarly: Summers [1993] 139. 
32 Balbus [1977] 575; H Collins [1982] 10; Fine [1984] 96-97. 
33 Marx [1843]; [1844]. See: Balbus [1977] 575. 
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individuals seemingly held generalised legal rights to formal equality in common with all, 
and the reality of civil society, where everyday life was marked by inequality and 
division.34 The liberal notion of universal and equally-applicable legal norms was thus an 
illusion which masked and legitimated political, economic, and social discrimination in 
practice.35 Briefly revisiting this topic in a later piece, Marx honed in on formal legal 
equality as the institutionalisation of inequality, as necessarily unequal individuals can 
only be treated the same through their viewing ‘from a certain side only,… everything 
else being ignored.’36 This fledgling critique of normative generalisations and legal 
equality as legitimating real-life disparities was elaborated upon by a number of scholars 
throughout the twentieth century. Bolshevik jurist Evgeny Pashukanis attempted to 
more precisely connect formalism, universal norms, and abstracted legal subjects to the 
rise and legitimation of capitalism.37 Like Marx before, Pashukanis saw legal equality as a 
façade for inequality whereby, for instance, the law ‘qualifies all people as being equally 
‘eligible for property,’ but in no way makes property-owners of them.’38 The very notion 
of “law” ruling in the Rechtsstaat rather than “men” was instead a means of class 
subjugation behind the veneer of impartial norms equally-applicable to all.39 Such 
critical themes - the false equality of abstract laws, the legitimating relationship 
between liberal legalism and capitalist power dynamics - were motifs of Marxist 
condemnation of the formal rule of law throughout the 1970s and 1980s.40 Indeed, so 
successful was this offensive that such analysis found a new home in the broader Critical 
Legal Studies movement. In their respective characterisations of the formal rule of law 
noted above, both Nonet & Selznick and Unger detailed how aspirations toward 
“apolitical” legal equality, consistently applied and blind to material circumstance, 
                                                          
34 Marx [1843] 72-73, 77-78 (‘a separation of the political citizen, the citizen of the state, from civil society, 
i.e., from his own actual, empirical reality.), 116; [1844] 36 (man’s ‘double life’), 48; Fine [1984] 81. 
35 Marx [1843] 80-81 (‘…just as the Christians are equal in heaven yet unequal on earth, so the individual 
members of a people are equal in the heaven of their political world yet unequal in the earthly existence of 
society’ through money, education, and property), 137; [1844] 34-35 (‘the state can be a free state without 
the man being a free man’; also on how political freedom of religion, property, and work is an abstention 
from their continuing cleavages in civil society), 37-38, 43-46 (on individual rights not guaranteeing freedom 
in reality), 48.  
36 Marx [1875] 154. 
37 Pashukanis [1924] 68, 82-88, 93, 115 (on the separation between legal subject and reality, the ability to 
possess rights and to act), 120-121. See: Fine [1979] 34-35 (praising Pashukanis for focusing on legal form); 
[1984] 157-158 (a more mixed appraisal of his fidelity to Marx); H Collins [1982] 108-111. 
38 Pashukanis [1924] 127. Similarly: 147 (‘The free and equal owners of commodities who meet in the 
market are free and equal only in the abstract relation… In real life, they are bound by various ties of mutual 
dependence.’). 
39 Pashukanis [1924] chapter 5. cf 53-54 (claiming that his method avoids shallow reductions of law to class 
oppression). 
40 Balbus [1979] 575-577, 580; Horwitz [1979] 566; Picciotto [1979] 174; H Collins [1982] 136-140; Fine 
[1984] 111-112, 135-136, 144-146. 
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clashed with the post-war rise of bureaucratic decision-making by the social-democratic 
welfare state endeavouring towards substantive justice.41  
The criticisms levied by Marxist scholars against the formal rule of law as recounted and 
applied in this thesis are serious but not fatal. This is for two reasons.  
First, as has increasingly been acknowledged by authors in this tradition since the late 
1970s, it is all too easy to overdo the Marxist assault. It is one thing to criticise the 
formal rule of law for masking and perhaps facilitating vast societal disparities; it is 
another to denounce all aspirations towards generality, legal equality, or normative 
certainty as fundamentally insidious, and thus to instead champion subject-specific, 
discriminatory, and prospectively incomprehensible determinations of legality animated 
by achieving “justice”. Although few Marxists would go so far as to consider the formal 
rule of law an unqualified human good,42 a more nuanced middle-ground accepts the 
important consequences of struggles for basic legal equality by women and minority 
groups, albeit  still recognising the formal rule of law can only go so far.43 For this reason 
even Nonet & Selznick and Unger, who helped introduce the Marxist critique into the 
canon of Critical Legal Studies tenets, both had considerable reservations about 
dispensing with the formal ideal altogether in pursuit of subject-responsive, flexible, 
discretionary determinations of what would be the “just” outcome in the particular 
dispute at hand.44    
The second justification for acknowledging but marginalising the Marxist critique of the 
formal rule of law relates to the theoretical foundations of the subject-matter in 
question: competition policy is inextricably linked to the ideological assumptions of 
liberalism. As the previous three chapters have demonstrated, it is a field of law 
indebted to: Adam Smith; nineteenth century economists; inter-war liberalism then 
unpopular on both sides of the Atlantic; and scholarship since the 1950s which, albeit 
often disagreeing over the goal/s and methods of US antitrust, is nevertheless united by 
a commitment to the societal superiority of market forces over centralised economic 
                                                          
41 Unger [1977] 179, 192-199, 204-205; Nonet and Selznick [1978] 54, 57, 60-64. 
42 In the (in)famous words of Marxist historian E.P. Thompson. See: Horwitz [1977] 566; H Collins [1982] 
144-146.  
43 eg Fine [1979] 30-32; [1984] 1-2 (wishing to go between absolute adoration and denunciation of liberal 
legalism); Young [1979] 23-26. cf H Collins [1982] 146 (on the rule of law being ‘inconsistent’ with Marxism). 
For a general overview of this divide: Young [1979]. 
44 Unger [1977] 238-249 (‘the decline in the rule of law might endanger, or even destroy, individual 
freedom.’); Nonet and Selznick [1978] 82-83, 117 (‘a risk of regression from responsiveness to repression’). 
On Unger becoming less apprehensive in his later writing: Shklar [1987] 10. 
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direction. As will similarly be seen in Part II when the focus shifts to the European Union, 
despite scholarly wrangling over the merits of specific policies and decisions, EU 
competition enforcement has always been sincerely committed to making free market 
economic forces work “better”. Competition policy is a liberal endeavour, and the 
purpose of this chapter is therefore to explain in detail how aspiring to the formal rule of 
law in this field best facilitates the effective realisation of political and economic goals 
associated with that ideological foundation. If anything, it will indeed affirm Marxist 
critiques of the relationship between free market capitalism and law in the form of 
generalised, equally-applicable, certain norms, rather than ad hoc, subject-specific, 
flexible determinations of legality.45 But as the existence and entire purpose of 
competition law is based upon an acceptance of economic liberalism and the potential 
benefits of capitalism, it is methodologically sufficient to focus upon those lawyers, 
economists, and political theorists of a similar orientation, rather than the criticism of 
those who do not share such a starting point. This isn’t just putting liberalism “in” and 
getting the liberal rule of law “out”; as will be seen, it is reaching that conclusion by 
starting with the general liberal assumptions and values which underpin competition 
policy as a field of law. 
III. The Rule of Law Ideal in Liberal Political Theory 
The political theory of liberalism is built upon an inescapable tension between two 
constitutive tenets.46 Their interpretation and unsolvable reconciliation is responsible 
for the countless varieties of liberalism that have been proposed for centuries. The first 
is the paramount importance of individual liberty (freedom, independence, autonomy), 
the ability to pursue one’s wishes without impediment by others.47 This has been a 
recurrent conceptual starting-point throughout the first half of this thesis, coming to the 
surface in both the earlier writing of the Chicago School of economics,48 and the 
metaphysical method of the German Ordoliberals.49 The second is the unavoidable 
requirement for common action by the state, and derives its importance from the first: 
as everybody enjoys liberty and thus invariably represents a threat to the freedom of 
others, it is necessary for the state to guarantee zones of mutual autonomy and resolve 
                                                          
45 See Section IV. 
46 Similarly: Epstein [1998] 9; [2014] 4. 
47 eg Kant [1797] 220; Hayek [1973] 55 (‘a supreme principle which must not be sacrificed’), 59 (its defence 
must be ‘dogmatic and make no concessions to expediency’). 
48 See Chapter II, text accompanying fn 207-210. 
49 See Chapter III, text accompanying fn 43-47, 58-64. 
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normative disagreements. This is freedom through state law: the creation of legal rights 
and obligations that act as boundaries between free individuals, as well as mechanisms 
for adjudication and enforcement.50   
The inescapable tension at the heart of liberal political theory is therefore that whilst 
common action through the state is a necessary guarantor of individual freedom, 
centralised empowerment simultaneously represents a sizeable threat to liberty.51 Such 
a cautious perspective on state power was previously highlighted in early Chicagoan52 
and Ordoliberal scholarship.53 These incidences are representative of a broader liberal 
conviction that recognition of the legitimate use of coercion to ensure mutual freedom 
cannot be conflated with the granting of carte blanche absolute authority. For centuries 
liberal political and legal theory has been considering alternative reconciliations of the 
tense relationship between the foundational commitments to individual freedom and 
restraining the state. A recurrent solution has been through a constitution that 
substantively delineates the limited powers of the state and the inviolable rights of legal 
subjects (property, conscience, expression),54 often accompanied by the institutional 
separation of legislative, executive, and judicial functions to dilute the concentration of 
power.55 Without substantive constitutional conferral and restraint, the freedom of 
                                                          
50 eg Locke [1690] 6 [S7], 29 [S57] (laws to ‘preserve and enlarge Freedom’), 43-44 [S87]-[S88], 63 [S124]-
[S126] (on the desirable civil condition of a ‘known and indifferent Judge’ determining disputes, a ‘Power to 
back and support the Sentence… to give it due Execution’, and ‘establish’d, settled, known law’), 69 [S136] 
(on the security of property under a ‘standing Rule to bound it, by which every one may know, what is his.’), 
109 [S222] (laws ‘as Guards and fences’ to private property); Kant [1793] 290; [1797] 450-460 (see Chapter 
III, text accompanying fn 201-207); Hayek [1944] 60-62 (‘autonomous spheres in which the ends of the 
individual are supreme’), 86 (‘no liberty without law’); [1960] 13, 19-20, 122-123; [1973] 102; [1976] 201-
204; [1979] 496; Leoni [1961] 2-3. For similar claims by Chicagoan economists: Chapter II, fn 213.  
51 eg Locke [1690] 47 [S93] and 69 [S137] (disputing unrestrained sovereignty); Hayek [1979] 462; Epstein 
[1998] 322-323 (the ‘deadly embrace of unlimited state power’); [2003] 51 (‘state power is a necessary evil 
rather than an unqualified blessing.’), 57 (‘strong enough to provide for social order and constrained enough 
not to become a threat to the social order that it supports.’), 260-261; [2011] 191; [2014] 4, 17. 
52 See Chapter II, text accompanying fn 211, 214. 
53 See Chapter III, Section II.B.ii. 
54 Locke [1690] 65 S131 (legislative power substantively constrained by ‘the common good’); Hayek [1960] 
92 (championing ‘things which nobody has power to do’); [1973] 2 (a constitution inaugurating omnipotent 
government serves no purpose); [1979] 347, 456 (constitutional courts ought to rule ‘that nobody at all was 
entitled to take certain kinds of coercive measures.’); Epstein [2003] 57, 261; [2011] 64. For older Chicagoan 
support: Chapter II, text accompanying fn 215-216. For Ordoliberal support: Chapter III, text accompanying 
fn 103. On constitutions as devices for managing political risk and a critique of excessive precaution: 
Vermeule [2014] 1-4.  
55 Montesquieu [1748] 198-199. Similarly: Locke [1690] 63 [S124]-[S126] (though fusing judicial and 
executive powers, with additional federative powers for external relations); Hayek [1973] 2; Epstein [2003] 
260; [2011] 27. 
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individuals is otherwise conditional upon continued majority support which cannot be 
guaranteed.56 
Movements towards realising the formal desiderata of the rule of law, as conceptualised 
in this chapter, offer additional tools for addressing the tension between individual 
freedom and state restraint that goes to the heart of liberalism. It will be argued: A) that 
more comprehensible norms respect the rationality of legal subjects and facilitate the 
freedom to plan one’s life; and B) that aspiring to common action via generalised and 
equally-applied norms further restrains the state, facilitating legal certainty and 
preventing discriminatory treatment of individuals. These formal aspirations are, 
however guaranteed and facilitated by C) a mechanism for incisive review that ensures 
compliance and aims to gradually approximate the two formal principles. In this way, 
the rationality and restraint of the formal rule of law, facilitated by robust review, is of 
considerable value in liberal political thought. 
A) Principle I - Comprehensible Norms: Respecting Rationality 
The first tenet of the proposed conceptualisation of the rule of law concerns the 
importance of comprehensible norms. It ought to be possible for individuals to 
internalise the legal obligations upon them. This ideal is aided by the requirements often 
associated with Fuller’s allegory of hapless King Rex in The Morality of Law: publicity, 
prospectivity, clarity, etc.57 In liberal political theory, approximating this ideal is a means 
to respect the rational autonomy of legal subjects: by avoiding incomprehensible norms 
for delineating legal rights and obligations, the formal rule of law amplifies the 
meaningful exercise of individual freedom. In emphasising this rationality, it also 
facilitates the fair attribution of personal responsibility for violations of norms. 
As noted above, a central tenet of liberalism is that freedom requires common action by 
the state to secure mutual zones of assured autonomy to do as one pleases.58 For 
centuries it has been advocated that it is not just the mere presence of such ‘Guards and 
                                                          
56 Hayek [1944] 74; [1960] 90-93 (on the liberty/democracy tension); [1973] 1 (against unlimited 
majoritarianism); [1979] 346-347 (on British parliamentary sovereignty), 363; Leoni [1961] 7. cf Hayek’s 
support for democracy but need of limiting principles: [1960] 94-95; [1979] 349, 381. 
57 Fuller [1969] 33-39. 
58 See text accompanying fn 50. 
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fences’ vis-à-vis other citizens and coercion by the state that facilitates optimal freedom 
to pursue one’s ends,59 but the formal comprehensibility of such boundaries.  
The connection between normative comprehensibility and the amplification of freedom 
was present at the birth of political liberalism. John Locke viewed the ideal 
conceptualisation of the laws apportioning spheres of freedom to be as a ‘standing Rule 
to live by’ rather than ‘inconstant, uncertain, unknown’ acts.60 Indeed, he went so far as 
to argue that the legal sovereign ought to be bound to act through the form of 
‘establish’d, standing Laws, promulgated and known to the People’.61 The justification 
for mandating law that is clear, stable, and public was noticeably linked to permitting 
the meaningful exercise of liberty. Without comprehensible norms, legal subjects lacked 
‘any measyres set down which may guide and justify their Actions’; such formal 
desiderata for law were thus necessary so that they ‘may know their Duty, and be safe 
and secure within the limits of the Law’.62 Montesquieu similarly claimed that the 
‘political liberty of the subject is a tranquillity of mind’ arising from the knowledge of the 
freedom afforded by clear laws.63 As opposed to the normative chaos of despotic 
governance through princely whim, the law could be ‘perfectly well known’ in more 
moderate states.64 Although an exaggeration, Montesquieu thereby connected the 
comprehensibility of legal norms with the meaningful enjoyment of individual freedom 
under law in the formative period of liberal political philosophy. 
The claim that the aspiration of the formal rule of law towards normative 
comprehensibility facilitates individual liberty is central to two of its most prominent 
accounts in the twentieth century. Repackaged as honouring rational autonomy to plan 
one’s affairs, both Raz and Hayek situate the ability for citizens to internalise legal rights 
and obligations at the core of their respective definitions of the rule of law:65 
“It must be such that they can find out what [the law] is and act on it. This is the basic 
intuition from which the doctrine of the rule of law derives: the law must be capable of 
guiding the behaviour of its subjects.” (Raz) 
                                                          
59 Locke [1690] 109 [S222]. 
60 ibid 13 [S22] (emphasis added). See also: [1690] 44 [S88] (‘standing laws’), 63 [S124] (‘establish’d, settled, 
known law’), 69 [S136] (‘promulgated standing Laws’). 
61 ibid 65 [S131] (emphasis added). 
62 ibid 70 [S137]. 
63 Montesquieu [1748] 198. 
64 ibid 84. 
65 Raz [1977] 214; Hayek [1944] 75-76. 
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“… government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand – 
rules which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the authority will use its 
coercive powers in given circumstances, and to plan one’s individual affairs on the basis 
of this knowledge.” (Hayek) 
To enjoy the freedom to construct paths for action in pursuit of their own ends, it is 
claimed that citizens have to be able ‘to foresee some of the conditions of [their] 
environments and adhere to a plan of action.’66 The formal rule of law was key to 
fostering such prerequisites for the ‘maximal certainty of expectations’.67 The principle 
of comprehensible legal norms, facilitated by endeavouring towards desiderata of 
clarity, prospectivity, publicity, etc, aims to provide the clearest possible articulation of 
rights and obligations ‘between the meum and the tuum’ both horizontally and 
vertically.68 With regard to relations between citizens, formally ‘“good fences make good 
neighbours”’ and freedom is thus increased as individuals can rationally rely upon 
cognisable limits to the acts of others, adjusting their plans accordingly.69 The same is 
true vis-à-vis the state, going to the heart of the unavoidable tension of liberalism 
between freedom and restrained common action. As the tenets facilitating normative 
cognition formally restrict retroactive, unstable, secret, obscure laws, unforeseeable 
exercises of state power are minimised.70 In contrast, the aspiration towards 
comprehensible norms delineating the scope of the state’s powers respects the 
rationality of subjects as they are able to avoid its coercive force and do not have their 
plans thwarted by unforeseeable acts.71 By stabilising the normative framework through 
a clearer delineation of one’s obligations and rights, legal subjects are thereby granted 
the dignified agency to freely plan their daily affairs with expectations that can be relied 
upon.72 Similar analysis of the connection between comprehensibility and liberty can be 
deduced from Rawls’ argument that unclear norms delineating the boundaries of liberty 
leave individual freedom itself indeterminate, thus chilling autonomous conduct through 
fear of unknowing transgression.73 Normative security is therefore eroded when legality 
is determined by recourse to ‘vague formulae’ such as ‘fairness’ and ‘reasonableness’ 
                                                          
66 Hayek [1960] 118. Similarly: Habermas [1996] 143-144 (comprehensible norms stabilise ‘behavioural 
expectations’ and legal certainty permits subjects ‘to calculate the consequences of their own and others’ 
behaviour.’), 201. 
67 Hayek [1973] 103. 
68 ibid 102. 
69 ibid. 
70 Raz [1977] 219,224. This is especially the case for administrative authorities: Summers [1999] 1705. 
71 Hayek [1944] 76 (‘Within the known rules of the game the individual is free to pursue his personal ends 
and desires, certain that the powers of government will not be used deliberately to frustrate his efforts.’), 
79; [1960] 137. 
72 Raz [1977] 220-222. See also: Waldron [1989] 84, 88; Summers [1999] 1705-1706. 
73 Rawls [1999] 208, 210. 
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that necessitate ad hoc, subject-specific evaluations.74 It is owing to this connection 
between comprehensible norms and the exercise of individual freedom that political 
liberalism often seems to suggest that a substantively “bad” norm is to be preferred to 
no clear indication of rights and obligations at all.75 
Respect for rational autonomy through aspiring towards comprehensible norms also 
relates to the complex relationship between free choices and the fair attribution of 
responsibility; acknowledging the rationality of legal subjects makes it possible to ‘assign 
both credit and blame to individuals for their own actions.’76 A common motif of liberal 
writing is that individuals ought not to be penalised for norms that they could not 
foresee as prohibited and thus decide to comply with. As Hayek suggested in The 
Constitution of Liberty, this means of respecting the rationality of legal subjects could be 
considered an extension of the principle that there should be no punishment without a 
law (nulla poena sine lege).77 Even if the law were technically valid, it would be an 
affront to individual autonomy and a violation of the rule of law to be disciplined on the 
basis of an incomprehensible norm.78 John Rawls linked the first formal principle of the 
ideal to absolution of liability:79 
“Unless citizens are able to know what the law is and are given a fair opportunity to take 
its directives into account, penal sanctions should not apply to them. This principle is 
simply the consequence of regarding a legal system as an order of public rules addressed 
to rational persons in order to regulate their cooperation, and of giving the appropriate 
weight to liberty.”   
This may be a politically desirable consequence of aspiring to the formal rule of law but 
it raises difficult questions for judicially-created laws.80 On the one hand, such a means 
of formulating norms may better facilitate the comprehensibility of rights and 
obligations: Dicey,81 Leoni,82 and Law, Legislation, and Liberty-era Hayek83 all argued 
                                                          
74 Hayek [1944] 81. Though note the argument of Section III.C that this can be gradually ameliorated. 
75 eg Scalia [1989] 1179; Tamanaha [2004] 67. 
76 Epstein [2003] 140.  
77 For the more typical interpretation of this concept: Section III.C. 
78 Hayek [1960] 181 (‘Certainly the principle would not be satisfied if the law merely said that whoever 
disobeys the orders of some official will be punished’).  
79 Rawls [1999] 212. See also: 209.  
80 Similarly: Waldron [2008] 8-9, 59-60 (institutional aspects of the rule of law - ie resolving uncertainty 
before courts - is a disruptive process that changes norms and is predicated upon obligations not being as 
clear as the ideal suggests). 
81 Dicey [1915] 115-116, 121 (on the rule of law as the judicial formulation of individual rights rather than 
Continental constitutional codes). For discussion: Leoni [1961] 91; Shklar [1987] 5-6; Craig [1997] 473-474. 
82 Leoni [1961], especially 8-10 (cannot be ‘certain that the legislation in force today will be in force 
tomorrow or even tomorrow morning.’), 81 (the ‘short-run certainty of the law.’), 83-87 (praising the 
stability of Roman law and English common law). 
83 Hayek [1973] 78-81. On this change in his conceptualisation of the rule of law: Tamanaha [2004] 69-70. 
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that the common law afforded stability owing to its gradual evolution in comparison to 
the potentially fleeting existence of statutes and bills of rights.84 Yet this long-term 
stability is conditioned upon courts responding to discrete instances of normative 
incomprehensibility concerning particular parties’ rights and obligations.85 How are the 
unforeseeable consequences of judicial resolution, where one party will be 
disappointed, to be reconciled with absolution for unforeseeable normative 
indiscretions?86 If the principle of comprehensibility is to respect the connection 
between rationality and responsibility, the norm-producing dispute ought to result in no 
punishment.87 
To summarise, the political virtue of the principle that norms be comprehensible to legal 
subjects is that it permits them to meaningfully exercise their rational autonomy and 
freedom to plan their lives. It also facilitates the fair attribution of responsibility. Such a 
formal method for attempting to minimise normative uncertainty is therefore 
considered a valuable endeavour within liberal political theory.88  
B) Principle II - Generalisation and Equal Application: “Belt-and-Braces” Restraint 
The second formal characteristic of the rule of law advocated in this chapter is that 
legality ought to be determined through norms of generalised scope and applied equally 
to all circumstances falling within their ambit. While the first principle was directed 
towards the foundational importance of rational autonomy, this second aspirational 
quality for norms focuses upon restraining the state.  
More specifically, it addresses the tense relationship between freedom and the 
necessity of common coercion at the heart of liberalism by formally preventing ad hoc, 
subject-specific normative acts. Essentially, it celebrates rigid imperfection: in 
committing to laws abstracted from specifics and unwavering in their application, the 
political benefits of rigidity are argued to outweigh the detriments of inflexibility to 
                                                          
84 See: Rosenfeld [2001] 61-62. This is comparable to the constitutional economics literature discussed in 
Section IV, eg Brennan and Buchanan [1985] 10. 
85 Rosenfeld [2001] 60-61 (‘a future oriented act of law-making grounded in the very process of adjudicating 
a present dispute concerning past acts’). 
86 Hayek’s response was that judicial discretion was limited by general principles known by individuals: 
[1960] 183, 186; [1973] 63, 83, 95-96, 110-114. See: Rosenfeld [2001] 61; Tamanaha [2004] 69-70; 
Mestmäcker [2008] 27-28. 
87 Similarly: Fuller [1969] chapter 2 (on strict liability). 
88 Tamanaha [2004] 122. 
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circumstances.89 Having noted the critique offered by Marxist writers and adopted by 
many Critical Legal scholars, it is important to recognise that such imperfection is not 
lightly undertaken by liberals.90 There is plenty of scope to differ in calculating this 
trade-off. It is not inherently more “just” to treat all instances the same, rather than 
recognising particularities of circumstance.91 Indeed, as discussed in Section II, the 
primary criticism of the formal rule of law is that its commitment to generality and 
formal equality prevent steps towards distributive equality and substantive fairness that 
are necessarily purposive, responsive, and circumstance-dependent.92 The restraint of 
the formal rule of law can thus been considered a bulwark to majoritarian and socialist 
ambitions.93 But it also formally hinders many other ends, commonly leading 
administrative authorities to avoid its restraining rigidity, as will be considered in Part II. 
But for many liberal theorists, that is exactly the point. The desirable restraint of the 
formal rule of law ideal is less frequently lauded than limited competence conferral, 
constitutional rights, or the separation of powers.94 Still, that coercion limited to 
generalised norms of equal application constitutes a politically-valuable extra bulwark 
against the state, as opposed to ad hoc, subject-specific determinations, is a recurrent 
motif of liberal political philosophy and scholarship on the formal ideal: Locke’s 
advocacy of ‘a standing Rule to live by, common to every one of that Society’ as opposed 
to the ‘inconstant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary Will of another Man’95 or ‘Extemporary 
Decrees’;96 Dicey’s championing of the English rule of law as the supremacy of the 
ordinary law of the land and its equal application to all, not ‘of arbitrary power’, 
                                                          
89 Hayek [1976] 194; Schauer [1991] 31-33; Epstein [1995] 38-39 (on the diminishing returns of aspiring to 
perfection), 53; Schauer and Zeckhauser [2007]. cf Kaplow [1992] 586-596 (rules can also be complex). 
90 Hayek [1973] 59 (‘The preservation of a free system is so difficult precisely because it requires a constant 
rejection of measures which appear to be required to secure particular results, on no stronger grounds than 
that they conflict with a general rule’). 
91 Schauer [1991] 136-137. 
92 Raz [1977] 228-229 (‘Sacrificing too many social goals on the altar of the rule of law may make the law 
barren and empty.’); Unger [1977] 192-193, 198-199, 204-205. cf Tamanaha [2004] 120-121 (distributive 
goals can also be achieved through general and equally-applicable norms). For some proponents of the rule 
of law, this was the point: Hayek [1973] 134; [1976] 244-248. For similar concerns about rigidity norms, see 
the exceptional treatment of pardoning by: Locke [1690] 81-82 [S159]-[s160]; Montesquieu [1748] 208. 
Perhaps case-by-case exceptionalism is accepted as it benefits the defendant: Tamanaha [2004] 120-121. 
93 Hutchinson and Monahan [1987] 99-100 (a bulwark to the ‘flourishing of a rigorous democracy.’).  
94 See text accompanying fn 54-56. cf Hayek [1979] 436 (unusually affording the restraint of the formal rule 
of law the same credit as the other devices). 
95 Locke [1690] 13 [S22].  
96 ibid 65 [S131]. See also: 48 [S94] (on absolute legal equality), 68-69 [S136]-[S137] (‘Extemporary Arbitrary 
Decrees’, ‘Absolute Arbitrary Power’), 72 [S142] (‘establish’d Laws, not to be varied in particular Cases’). 
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prerogative, or wide discretionary authority on the part of the government’;97 Fuller on 
managerial direction as a ‘set of instructions for accomplishing specific objectives’ versus 
the ‘general declarations’ furnishing ‘a baseline for self-directed action’;98 Raz 
contrasting the restraint of the formal rule of law with the ‘arbitrary power’ to issue 
‘particular legal orders’ at will;99 Unger distinguishing the commands of bureaucratic law 
from the ‘generality in lawmaking and uniformity in application’ of the rule of law 
ideal;100 or in Rawls’ reformulation of the rule of law as promoting the justice of 
‘regularity’ in one’s dealings through the restrained enforcement of impartial norms by 
the administration and courts.101 What unites these varied distinctions is their contrast 
between the form of state action by general and equally-applicable norms as opposed to 
more discriminating normative acts. This is most clear in Hayek’s distinctions between 
the ‘Rule of Law’ and ‘ad hoc action’,102 ‘abstract rules’ and ‘particular commands’,103 or, 
in his later work, ‘nomos’ and ‘thesis’.104 The former ideals meet the rule of law principle 
that norms ought to be general in scope and equally applicable,105 whilst the latter 
represent arbitrariness: ‘‘rule-less’ or determined by particular will rather than 
according to recognized rules.’106  
The virtue common to all of these divisions goes to the core of the freedom/centralised 
coercion tension, and connects this principle of the formal rule of law to the previous: 
individual liberty and the ability to rationally plan is amplified by formally restraining the 
state from determining legality through ad hoc, subject-specific evaluations. Legal 
subjects are free to do as they wish, to pursue their own purposes and ends, without 
incomprehensible bouts of interference.107 The process of generalisation was seen in the 
                                                          
97 Dicey [1915] 120-121. See also: 110 (‘the rule of law is contrasted with every system of government based 
on the exercise by persons in authority of wide, arbitrary, or discretionary powers of constraint’), 114-115 
(‘universal subjugation of all classes to one law’). 
98 Fuller [1969] 209-210. 
99 Raz [1977] 219. 
100 Unger [1977] 53-54. 
101 Rawls [1999] 206-209. 
102 Hayek [1944] 75-76. 
103 Hayek [1960] 131. 
104 Hayek [1973] chapters 5 and 6. 
105 On generality: Hayek [1944] 78 (‘typical situations into which anyone may get’); [1960] 133-134, 182 
(‘referring to yet unknown cases and containing no references to particular persons, places or objects’); 
[1973] 47-48, 82, 116 (‘applicable to an unknown number of future instances). On equal application: Hayek 
[1960] 75, 183; [1973] 116. 
106 Hayek [1979] 438. 
107 Locke [1690] 13 [S22] (preventing arbitrary coercion affords ‘Liberty to follow my own Will in all things 
where the Rules prescribes not’), 29 [S57], 70 [S137] (freedom is threatened if subjected to ‘the exorbitant 
and unlimited decrees of their sudden Thoughts, or unrestrain’d, and till that moment unknown Wills, 
without having any measyres set down which may guide and justify their Action… that both the People may 
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previous chapter to be at the core of Kant’s Doctrine of Right; coercion by the state was 
rightful in the execution of laws capable of universal acceptance, thereby coexisting with 
the mutual freedom of all.108 Habermas similarly links the very concept of law to that of 
generalised norms guaranteeing equal spheres of individual autonomy.109 Such 
abstraction generates end-independent obligations that otherwise afforded the tangible 
freedom to do as one wishes.110 This political virtue of general norms for freedom was 
brought into sharper focus with Hayek’s discussion of nomos as ‘purpose-independent 
rules’.111 Through the process of abstraction beyond specifics,112 norms become merely 
reliable ‘data on which the individual can base his own plans’.113 Autonomy shifts from 
the legal decision-maker to the individual subjected to general and equally applicable 
norms that restrain and rigidify determinations of legality.114 For Hayek, ignorance of the 
formal rule of law’s desirability for permitting individuals to pursue their own ends was a 
result of legal positivism’s willingness to label any old normative order “law”.115 Of 
course, there is still room for ad hoc, subject-specific commands in the legal system, 
though Hayek argued that they are the device of public law: ‘instructions issued by the 
state to its servants concerning the manner in which they are to direct the apparatus of 
government and the means which are at their disposal.’116 The problem was in applying 
the same conceptualisation to legal norms structuring relations between individuals 
and/or the individual’s relation to the state; even if a governmental agent is tasked with 
the means to achieve a particular purpose (eg “competition”), ‘in a free society, these 
means do not include the private citizen’.117  
Although a desirable resultant legal order for subjects wishing to exercise their 
individual autonomy with normative comprehensibility, this freedom is intimately 
connected to formally restricting and rigidifying the power of the state to prohibit or 
                                                                                                                                                               
know their Duty, and be safe and secure within the limits of the Law; and the Rulers too kept within their 
due Bound’); Dicey [1915] 110 (freedom is insecure under discretion); Unger [1977] 69-70. 
108 See Chapter III, text accompanying fn 203-204. 
109 Habermas [1996] 82-83. 
110 Kant [1793] 291; Gregor [1963] 28, 37-38, 46. 
111 Hayek [1973] 82. See also: 107 (like language, general rules are ‘not a means to any purpose, but merely 
a condition for the successful pursuit of most purposes.’). 
112 Hayek [1976] 205. For explicit recognition that he was building upon Kant: 321. 
113 Hayek [1960] 20. See also: [1944] 61-62 (‘follow their own values and preferences rather than somebody 
else’s’), 76; [1960] 132 (‘merely additional information to be taken into account in the decision of the 
actor.’); [1973] 53; [1976] 270. 
114 ibid 131-132 (moving from commands to generalised norms, initiative ‘shifts progressively from the 
issuer of the command or law to the acting person.’), 134-135. 
115 ibid 207-209; [1973] 87-88; [1976] 214, 217 (on legal positivism as the handmaiden of absolute 
authority). 
116 Hayek [1960] 182; [1973] 126-127. Similarly: Unger [1977] 54. 
117 Hayek [1973] 126-127. 
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permit conduct as it deems necessary. For this reason, Hayek thought it unlikely that the 
lawgiver would voluntarily forgo the means of ad hoc normative acts in ‘the needs of the 
moment’.118 Conceptualising determinations of legality on the basis of generalised 
norms of equal application formally prevents what Locke referred to as the ‘Tyranny’ of 
the ‘arbitrary and irregular commands’ that may ‘impoverish, harass, or subdue’ 
individuals based on the ‘Ambition, Revenge, Covetousness, or any other irregular 
Passion’ of those with normative authority.119 It is a formal bulwark against a 
discriminatory ‘reign of status’,120 the ‘ad hoc application of state power against 
individuals or groups singled out for special treatment’.121 The prohibition of 
particularistic normative decision-making specifically forestalls attempts to reduce 
liberty as it must be applied generally to all, across the board, thus increasing the ‘cost 
of oppression’122 by holding friends ‘hostage’ with enemies.123 It also prevents positive 
privileges as a result of lobbying, addressed further below.124 
But even putting to one side such nefarious ends, the commitment to imperfectly 
generalised norms and a lack of flexibility to accurately categorise the “good” as legal 
and the “bad” as illegal in individual instances, thereby affording normative 
comprehensibility to legal subjects, is a formal hindrance to any number of laudable 
policy goals.125 As will be discussed in Chapter VI, one such imperfectly realised end is 
competition enforcement aiming to maximise market efficiency.  
Nevertheless, so valuable to freedom was the quality of generally-applicable and 
equally-enforced norms that both Locke126 and Hayek127 argued that this was not simply 
                                                          
118 ibid 83-84 (Such restraint ‘would require a degree of self-denial not to be expected… Abstract rules are 
not likely to be invented by somebody concerned with obtaining particular results.’). 
119 Locke [1690] 99-100 [S199]-[S201]. See also: Dicey [1915] 111 (‘ruled by law and not by caprice’); Raz 
[1977] 219 (restricting the ‘arbitrary use of power for personal gain, out of vengeance or favouritism’); 
Unger [1977] 70 (inhibits law ‘as a weapon of personal oppression’), 177 (preventing individualised 
punishment or favour); Epstein [1982a] 1720 (if wishing to target certain groups, ‘the clandestine use of 
formally neutral principles is a poor second choice’ to subject-specific normative acts); Rawls [1999] 209 
(against bills of attainder). 
120 Hayek [1960] 135. 
121 Epstein [2011] 20. 
122 Posner [2007] 266. 
123 Epstein [2011] 67. See also: Hayek [1960] 135-136, 184 (equal application makes it improbable ‘that any 
oppressive rules will be adopted.’); Schmidtchen [1984] 67; Summers [1993] 139; Tamanaha [2004] 71; 
Epstein [2011] 25-26 (‘much harder to go after one’s political enemies if it is necessary to also go after one’s 
friends.’). 
124 See Section IV. 
125 See the many commendable goals pursued through the European Commission’s discretion in Chapter V. 
126 Locke [1690] 65 [S131] (the legal sovereign ‘is bound to govern by establish’d standing Laws, 
promulgated and known to the People, and not by Extemporary Decrees’), 68 [S136]. For recognition: Hayek 
[1979] 363. 
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a desirable ideal to be realised, but a binding formal requirement for state action.128 Of 
course, there are practical limits to the restraint that this principle of the rule of law 
imposes. The general scope of norms often falls short of universality, resulting in many 
different categories of legal subject - landlord, employer, dominant undertaking.129 
Nevertheless, so long as the categories are not sham placeholders for individuals or 
small groups, and norms are still applied equally to all in the category, the worst 
excesses of discriminatory, subject-specific determinations are avoided, and this political 
benefit of the formal rule of law may be generally realised.130     
C) Principle III: The Instrumental Virtue of Robust Review 
The formal characteristics of the rule of law that have hitherto been explored as 
valuable desiderata in liberal political theory - comprehensibility, generality of scope and 
equal application - are aspirational ideals. And aspirational ideals they will probably 
remain without a third principle: an independent institutional mechanism by which the 
subjects of normative acts are able to have them closely reviewed, usually entrusted to 
courts.  
Unlike the first and second principles of the rule of law which have clearly been 
foreshadowed and appreciated in previous chapters, the crucial role of the courts for 
realising this ideal has not been a prominent feature of either Chicagoan or Ordoliberal 
scholarship. For the former, the judiciary were primarily the source of the law’s 
economic failings, and actively undermined the rule of law through perpetuating 
determinations of illegality through ad hoc, subject-specific evaluations (eg discretion, 
the unstructured rule of reason standard).131 As will be argued in Part II, such failures to 
prospectively approximate the formal rule of law ideal may also, at times, be attributed 
                                                                                                                                                               
127 Hayek [1979] 445 (a constitutional requirement for laws consisting of ‘universal rules intended to be 
applied in an unknown number of future instances and over the application of which to particular cases it 
had no further power.’) See: Tamanaha [2004] 71. 
128 cf Kant [1793] 296-297 (the legislator should create norms in a self-disciplined manner that could be 
universally accepted by citizens). 
129 Leoni [1961] 68-69 (a distortion of equality before the law); Waldron [1989] 81-82; Tamanaha [2004] 94. 
130 Similarly: Hayek [1960] 183-184. 
131 See Chapter II, Section III. Though note the discussion below of how courts can render standards more 
generalised and comprehensible. 
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to the EU Courts. For the Ordoliberals, courts were almost completely overlooked,132 
though have come into sharper focus for contemporary descendants of their thinking.133  
Nevertheless, entirely denigrating or omitting the role of courts from discussion of the 
concept of the rule of law is a mistake. It will be demonstrated that this third 
institutional aspiration is of key instrumental value to the realisation of the two 
politically-desirable formal principles: i) not only does the rule of law mean little if there 
is no independent method to ensure congruence between legal norms and lived 
experience, but ii) the institutional possibility for review makes the generality and 
comprehensibility of norms more likely to materialise in the face of ad hoc decision-
making, inescapable uncertainty, and the natural administrative desire to expand 
discretion. Essentially, robust review by the courts renders the rule of law ideal of 
normative restraint and rationality-respecting rigidity more achievable.     
i) Congruence between Norms and Reality: Nulla Poena Sine Lege and Judicial 
Independence 
The politically desirable principles of the rule of law advanced so far represent additional 
formal aspirations for constitutionally valid norms of law.134 Nevertheless, it would be 
naïve to exclude from even the most formal of conceptualisations any mechanism for 
independently checking that all normative determinations undertaken actually are legal 
and that there continues to be ‘congruence between official action and declared rule’.135  
This is connected to two mutually-reinforcing ideals of liberal political philosophy: the 
independence of the judiciary and no crime without law (nulla poena sine lege), the 
latter of which Tamanaha has summarised as basic ‘legal liberty’.136 Locke stressed that 
the certainty of property was insecure in despotic societies as there was no independent 
judge ‘who may fairly and indifferently, and with authority decide, and from whence 
relief and redress may be expected of any injury or inconvenience’.137 Montesquieu 
                                                          
132 For a rare discussion: Röpke [1950a] 193 (praising US antitrust judges). 
133 eg Schweitzer [2008] 569-577 (‘Ensuring that the Commission remains closely tied to the substance of 
the competition rules, and ensuring effective judicial review, are essential prerequisites for protecting the 
balance of powers and the rule of law.’); [2013]. 
134 See text accompanying fn 5. 
135 Fuller [1969] 81. Nevertheless, Fuller gave less consideration than other scholars to the role of the courts 
for the rule of law ideal: Loughlin [2010] 335. 
136 Tamanaha [2004] 34-35. 
137 Locke [1690] 45-46 [S91]. See also: 63 [S124]-[S126] (distinguishing between legislative, executive and 
judicial functions), though note the peculiarity of his conceptualisation: fn 55. 
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most famously developed the separation of powers,138 but also advanced the nulla 
poena principle.139 However it was Dicey that included the latter as a fundamental 
requirement of the rule of law. It stood for the virtuous proposition that ‘no man can be 
made to suffer punishment or to pay damages for any conduct not definitely forbidden 
by law.’140 Of course, the requirement that there be some independent mechanism for 
checking that normative acts have some legal basis is a very austere requirement of rule 
by law; this was the criticism levied at the more positivist interpretation of the 
Rechtsstaat, which guaranteed no coercion without law but shed more expansive 
substantive limitations to state coercion.141 But, as Hayek recognised,142 rule by law is a 
necessary precondition for the additional formal desiderata of the rule of law. He 
therefore claimed that strong judicial review of the legality of administrative decision-
making was one of the key developments from Germanic theorising on the 
Rechtsstaat.143 
To this end, a number of theorists include oversight of legal validity by the courts 
amongst the ‘basic institutional conditions that bolster the formal qualities of rule-based 
order, converting it into an operative regime’.144 Jeremy Waldron has stressed not only 
that the institutional mechanism of judicial review of basic legality by the courts is a 
necessary element of the rule of law,145 but also that it should be considered essential to 
the very concepts of law and of a legal system.146 But in justifying the presence of courts 
for the rule of law on this very basic ground, a more significant, residual dynamic can be 
set in motion: progress towards the impossible aspiration.    
                                                          
138 Montesquieu [1748] 198-199. See also: Kant [1797] 456-460 (the ‘irreproachable’ legislator, an 
‘irresistible’ executive, and an ‘irreversible’ judicial authority); Epstein [2011] 27 (on the connection 
between the separation of powers and the rule of law).  
139 ibid 197 (‘no man shall be compelled to do things to which the law does not oblige him, nor forced to 
abstain from things which the law permits.’). 
140 Dicey [1915] lv. See also 110-111. 
141 See Chapter III, text accompanying fn 208-213. 
142 Hayek [1960] 173-174, 181 (‘the most important consequence’ of the rule of law). 
143 ibid (‘all exercise of administrative power… should be made subject to judicial review), 185 (‘The rule of 
law requires that the executive in its coercive action be bound by rules’ which can only be ensured through 
judicial review). See also: Böckenförde [1991] 54-55. 
144 Loughlin [2010] 335. For support: Hayek [1960] 174, 185; Raz [1977] 216-218 (principles 4 to 8 concern 
‘supervising conformity to the rule of law’); Unger [1977] 177; Nonet and Selznick [1978] 54; Summers 
[1993] 129-130, 133; [1999] 1694-1695; Habermas [1996] 173; Rawls [1999] 209-210. 
145 Waldron [2008] 7-8. 
146 ibid 20, 55-57. Similarly: Habermas [1996] 134 (enforcement and adjudication ‘are not just functionally 
necessary supplements to the system of rights but implications already contained in rights’). 
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ii) Facilitating the Formal Rule of Law: A More Achievable Ideal 
The conceptualisation of the rule of law advanced in this chapter is an impossible ideal. 
This is not just because abstract ‘law’ can never rule alone;147 nor as the two formal 
principles may pull in opposite directions if taken to extremes.148 Rather, it reflects the 
fact that the two desirable formal requirements justified and celebrated in liberal 
political theory simply cannot be perfected in real legal systems.149  
With regards to the principle that norms be comprehensible, even if it is conceded that 
this may be met through seeking legal assistance rather than reading law textbooks,150 a 
degree of normative ambiguity is unavoidable: there will always be questions regarding 
the application of norms at their periphery owing to factually novel scenarios, 
technological development, and the inevitable, open-textured vagueness of language.151 
Comprehensive codes perfectly delineating norms without an iota of ambiguity are a 
fantasy.   
So too with the second principle: even if real legislation were not scattered with group-
specific rights and obligations,152 inequality in the application of norms (or ‘enforcement 
discretion’) is a necessary corollary of limited time and finite budgets, rendering the 
choice prosecution of notorious targets all the more appealing. Neither can such 
decision-makers be expected to always think like administrative Immanuel Kants, 
transforming particulars into norms of universal application; legally, it is merely 
sufficient for the specific factual case concluded to meet the goal conferring their power 
to coerce. Ad hoc determinations of rights and obligations by the administration are an 
inescapable reality of contemporary governance.153  
                                                          
147 It will always require human involvement: Raz [1977] 212; Loughlin [2010] 312-313. 
148 Waldron [1989] 82 (‘predictability and capacity to plan… have nothing to do with universality’). Subject-
specific determinations can be clear: Fuller [1969] 207-208; Epstein [2011] 7. Excessively abstracted 
obligations can be incomprehensible: Nonet and Selznick [1978] 83. Similarly in Marxist critique: Picciotto 
[1979] 174. 
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150 See: Waldron [1989] 91; Kaplow [1992] 571-577; Epstein [1998] 67 (normative ignorance is rational as 
more information can be acquired later); Tamanaha [2004] 122. 
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[1999] 6-7 (on unavoidable vagueness in law); Yalnazov [2018] 13-14. cf Epstein [2011] 14-15 (accepting 
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152 See text accompanying fn 129. 
153 As even accepted by a noted libertarian/classical liberal: Epstein [2011] 6-7.  
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But rather than a reason to despair, the impossibility of the ideal recommends closer 
attention to the instrumental value of institutional oversight (principle (iii)) to gradually 
realise the important formal characteristics of norms (principles (i) and (ii)).154 If the 
formal desiderata for laws are seen not as sacred prerequisites for every normative act 
but a systemic aspiration, the courts can be considered an indispensable institution for 
making the formal rule of law more achievable. Rather than a binary quality, aspiring to 
realise the formal rule of law is instead to move along a sliding scale towards normative 
generality and comprehensibility.  
This can be explained through a basic hypothetical scenario. A country passes a 
constitutionally-valid law with only two provisions:155 Article 1 stipulates that citizens 
are prohibited from actions that hinder a vague and contestable societal “good” (eg 
“competition”); Article 2 entrusts investigation and enforcement of Article 1 to an 
administrative authority. Three possible options can be envisaged for how its decisional 
practice could develop: 
(i) The authority immediately translates the vague goal into a 
comprehensive code of generalised normative obligations covering 
every possible eventuality, so that subjects can perfectly comprehend 
acts that are legal and illegal. The subsequent decisions finding 
individual violations perfectly match the code, and are equally applied 
without exception. 
(ii) The authority undertakes individual, ad hoc, subject-specific 
determinations of legality and illegality, giving negative decisions 
whenever it believes that particular acts breach the vague goal of the 
law. It is not immediately clear to subjects where the boundary between 
legality and illegality lies. However, over time, general patterns emerge 
from its decisional practice: individual instances crystallise into broader 
norms frequently enforced when breached, and normative obligations 
become clearer. Eventually, the constellation of cases is as general and 
comprehensible as the code of option (i). 
                                                          
154 Similarly: Rawls [1999] 207.  
155 This law (and Article 3 to follow) is a stylised reimagining of the broad framework constructed by the EU 
Treaties: 1) Articles 101 (‘prevention, restriction or distortion of competition’) and 102 TFEU (‘abuse’ of 
dominance); 2) Article 105 TFEU (enforcement by the European Commission); 3) Article 19 TEU (jurisdiction 
of CJEU to interpret Treaties) and Articles 263 TFEU (judicial review of legality of Commission decisions).     
129 
 
(iii) The authority takes ad hoc negative decisions, prohibiting whatever 
specific actions it believes breach the vague goal of the law. No general 
or comprehensible norms emerge from the pattern of cases: each bears 
no relation to previous decisions or future enforcement. 
Options (i) and (ii) are different institutional paths to realising the formal requirements 
of the rule of law: in the first, generally-applicable and comprehensible norms are 
rationally constructed ex ante; in the second, the same outcome is reached by a gradual, 
evolutionary process of ex post rationalisation.156 The benefits of the formal rule of law 
for legal subjects are realised quicker in the former, but the latter is arguably a more 
accurate reflection of how administrative agencies operate. Of course, the ideal is never 
realised in option (iii).        
Now imagine an addition to the hypothetical law: Article 3 grants courts the power to 
review decisions by the authority pursuant to Article 2 for compliance with the societal 
good of Article 1, alongside sole jurisdiction to interpret the legal meaning of that end. 
The court takes its role seriously: it affords the authority no deference as to the legal 
interpretation of Article 1, nor as to whether specific decisions are in furtherance of that 
societal goal (ie the legal characterisation of facts). How does this institutional 
development change the results?   
In all three options, the court will independently check that the decisions taken - with or 
without comprehensive code/decisional pattern - prohibit actions that it deems to be 
contrary to its own interpretation of the societal good, and permits conduct it considers 
to be compliant. Sometimes it will agree with new, novel decisions, and at other times 
not.157 Essentially, it actively reviews the legality of administrative decision-making.  
However judicial review of administrative decision-making in option (iii) may itself 
transform subject-specific decisions based on unclear normative obligations towards the 
formal rule of law ideal.158 In interpreting the societal good of Article 1 in the context of 
individual decisions, instances of judicial review can generalise norms from specifics and 
elaborate upon legal obligations, permitting wider societal understanding of conduct 
                                                          
156 Corresponding to Hayek’s discussion of constructivism versus evolution. See fn 191. 
157 To mitigate the unforeseeable prohibition it may neutralise the punishment in this individual instance. 
See discussion of the common law at text accompanying fn 84-87. 
158 Or accelerate the organic administrative development of option (ii).  
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that is prohibited by the law. This normative comprehensibility is facilitated as the 
generalised norms restrict and rigidify administrative decision-making in the future. 
Much like the authority’s organic pattern of option (ii), the court’s precedents can 
crystallise into a body of general and comprehensible norms, and thus approximate the 
rule of law ideal. Indeed, it has been claimed that US antitrust law has developed in 
exactly this spontaneous manner from ambiguously-worded origins in the Sherman Act 
to a more ‘precise, principled content’ for legal subjects as a result of the ‘judicial 
craft’.159 
Principles (i) and (ii) of the formal rule of law should be considered an aspirational 
outcome, an unachievable end-state towards which a legal order should attempt to 
progress over time. Whether it is the legislature formulating precise codes, the 
administration translating vague statutory powers into normative guides, or the 
judiciary meeting the possible absence of both in individual cases and responding with 
generalised precedents that restrain future normative determinations, the actual site of 
agency for realising the formal rule of law in practice is largely immaterial; the means to 
the formal end justified by liberal political theory is institutionally ambiguous.160 
Comparisons can be drawn with Martin Shapiro’s early writing on administrative 
decision-making and judicial review by courts as complementary opportunities for 
incremental norm-formulation, both capable of gradually furnishing vague statutory 
goals with more comprehensible obligations.161  
Nevertheless, the residual presence of incisive and independent judicial review by courts 
should be considered a necessary failsafe. As the economic analysis of judicial review 
highlights, decisions by the courts are Janus-faced:162 individual incidents of reactive 
error correction regarding the law, fact, or legal characterisation of facts by 
administrative decisions; but simultaneously a source of prospective norm formulation 
and elaboration, transforming particular decisions into generalised and more 
comprehensible norms going forward by structuring administrative decision-making. 
Courts as curators of the formal quality of legal obligations relates to Hayek’s view of 
                                                          
159 Scalia [1989] 1183. 
160 cf the discussion of judicial norm-creation as a better guarantor of the rule of law in Section III.A. 
161 M Shapiro [1968] 44-45 (both courts and administrative decision-makers fill ‘general statutes’ with 
‘sufficient supplementary and explanatory rules to make them adequate guides’), 91-93 (dual 
‘supplementary law-makers’). 
162 eg Shavell [1995]; Geradin and Petit [2011] 5-6. One-time or infrequent defendants are obviously more 
driven by the former role: Galanter [1974] 100. 
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judges as an institution in a spontaneous order that ‘serves, or tries to maintain and 
improve, a going order’.163 Wherever authorities decide in an ad hoc, particularistic 
manner,164 or there is normative ambiguity,165 judicial review provides the route to 
‘gradual perfection’ by improving the ‘existing system by laying down new rules’ that 
rigidify future determinations of legality.166 In the words of Habermas, normative 
certainty can be approximated through ‘a jurisprudence that works through the legal 
corpus in a rigorous fashion, making it the subject of doctrinal refinement and 
systematization.’167 Recognising this role of the courts for making the formal rule of law 
a more achievable ideal avoids the unfortunate implication that there has to be absolute 
generality and certainty at all times.    
The role of judicial review also relates to the age-old debate between determining 
legality through rules or standards.168 As seen in Chapter II, Posner and Easterbrook 
were displeased with the ad hoc determination of legality through the unstructured rule 
of reason standard for its unpredictable and unforeseeable application. More generally, 
the formal rule of law has frequently been characterised as the rule of rules,169 an ideal 
challenged by the rise of broad standards (eg “reasonable”, “fairness”) for separating 
legal and illegal conduct.170 There are good reasons for doubting whether the idealised 
distinction between “certain” rules and “flexible” standards is theoretically 
watertight.171 But putting that abstract question to one side, it is not logically impossible 
for the use of standards to gradually meet the formal rule of law ideal, despite their 
individually ad hoc and unforeseeable application. The courts may formulate a system of 
general and comprehensible norms that structures the legal analysis undertaken 
through routinely reviewing the legality of specific administrative decisions taken 
pursuant to the standard.172 Or alternatively they may not, perpetuating 
                                                          
163 Hayek [1973] 113. 
164 Hayek [1960] 187 (neutralised by independent judicial review); [1973] 82, 90 (the common law 
transforms individual decisions into generalised norms).  
165 Hayek [1973] 95, 113. See also: Endicott [1999] 13-15. 
166 ibid 96. See also: 113 (‘piecemeal tinkering, or “immanent criticism”, to make the whole more 
consistent’); [1976] 191 (through constantly answering questions where the ‘established system of rules 
gives no definite answer… the whole system evolves and gradually becomes more determinate’). 
167 Habermas [1996] 144. 
168 For overviews of the typical “pros” and “cons” raised in the rules/standards debate: Ehrlich and Posner 
[1974]; Schlag [1985] 384-389; Kaplow [1992]; Sunstein [1995] 959-996; Korobkin [2000] 25-43; Raban 
[2010].   
169 Tamanaha [2004] 96-97; Epstein [2011] 20. 
170 Unger [1977] 193-194, 196-197, 204; Nonet and Selznick [1978] 82-83; Radin [1989] 795-796. 
171 See generally: Schlag [1985]. 
172 On transformations from standards to rules and vice versa: Schlag [1985] 428-429. Similarly: Kaplow 
[1992] 611 (the predictability of standards will be enhanced by precedents transforming them into rules). 
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incomprehensible and particularistic decision-making under vague standards, and 
perhaps actively generating even more unstructured ‘totality of circumstances’ tests.173 
The failure of the US rule of reason to eventually meet the formal rule of law ideal was 
not, therefore, an inevitably. Instead, it highlights a major caveat of the important role 
that the courts serve in moving towards the formal rule of law: it requires not just the 
basic potential for judicial review, but meaningful, incisive deployment of such oversight 
powers.174 
In summary, any conceptualisation of the rule of law that does not include independent 
judicial review as a necessary element overlooks the tangible difference that this 
residual normative “caretaking” role can make to otherwise subject-specific, 
incomprehensible normative determinations by the administration. Instead, it is to 
naively entrust realisation of the formal rule of law to the generosity and self-discipline 
of administrative decision-makers who may, understandably, have incentives to avoid its 
rigidity and restraint to more effectively pursue their ends. 
*** 
The virtue of the rule of law ideal is a common motif of centuries of liberal political 
theory, going to the core of the tension between individual freedom and state 
limitation. The formal principle mandating an endeavour towards normative 
comprehensibility respects the freedom and rationality of legal subjects, permitting 
them to plan their affairs accordingly and attributing responsibility for knowable 
lawbreaking. The aspiration towards general and equally-applicable norms is an 
additional bulwark to state coercion beyond constitutionalism, formally preventing ad 
hoc, subject-specific normative acts that unforeseeably disrupt individual plans and 
permit discrimination between legal subjects. And the institutional mechanism for 
independent review provided by the courts allows for disgruntled recipients of 
administrative decisions to check their legal validity and gradually move the normative 
framework towards these impossible formal ideals, restraining and rigidifying future 
                                                          
173 Scalia [1989] 1180-1182. For a comparable discussion of courts perpetuating standards and normative 
uncertainty in eminent domain and tort law: Epstein [1982b] 354-356. See also Easterbrook’s general 
criticism of ‘laundry lists’: Chapter II, text accompanying fn 199-204. 
174 For an attack on judicial deference to questions of law: Epstein [2011] 7, 153-160. This raises the spectre 
of judicial discretion: see fn 86 for Hayek’s response; Unger [1977] 180-181 (doubting the possibility of ‘a 
truly impartial method of judging’). 
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determinations of legality through formulating generalised, comprehensible norms. The 
rule of law is therefore justified as an aspiration of considerable political virtue. 
But the purpose of the first part of this thesis is to consider the legitimate form for 
determining legality in competition policy - market interventions in pursuit of economic 
goals. Metaphysical concerns for freedom in liberal political theory might be considered 
prima facie off the mark.175 It is therefore fortunate that economics has also reached 
similar conclusions on the desirability of the formal rule of law.     
IV. Convergence: The Formal Rule of Law in New Institutional Economics 
The value of neo-classical microeconomics for exploring the concepts underpinning 
competition policy derives from its abstraction, isolating a few moving parts to 
understand how market forces may produce societally-beneficial results.176 Without 
diminishing the value of this endeavour, it is clear that real-world markets operate 
within a framework of institutions - laws, customs, rights, money - that exogenously 
impact the working of that economic order. Questions of how these framing institutions 
and their variability affect markets are the focus of New Institutional Economics (“NIE”).  
This body of scholarship is notable for providing a parallel set of justifications for 
aspiring towards determining legality through the equal application of generalised 
norms that afford comprehensible obligations and are subject to robust judicial review. 
Albeit by diverging disciplinary routes, liberal political theory and New Institutional 
Economics essentially converge on the value of the formal rule of law ideal. Given its 
economic underpinnings, this is especially significant when considering the appropriate 
form of market interventions in furtherance of competition policy.   
A) New Institutional Economics: An Overview 
Economics has always had an institutionalist strand that has challenged the abstraction 
of microeconomic theory. Chapter I argued that contemporary competition 
microeconomics consists of an uneasy dialectic between the generality of neo-classical 
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176 See Chapter I, text accompanying fn 45-48. 
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price theory and the specificity of industrial organisation scholarship.177 NIE is a sub-
discipline of the latter with a long intellectual lineage. Adam Smith recognised the 
importance of institutional context for markets,178 suggesting that disparate economic 
performance between countries may be related to ‘the nature of its laws and 
institutions’,179 and warning against private efforts to secure governmental privileges 
that artificially distort the interplay between supply and demand.180 The same 
conclusion can be reached on aspects of Karl Menger’s writing, one of the major 
contributors to neo-classical microeconomics.181 An extreme example of the ‘old’ 
institutional school was encountered in the previous chapter: the German Historical 
School.182 But despite the criticisms levied by Eucken, Ordoliberalism itself arguably 
represented an ‘embryonic neo-institutionalist doctrine avant la lettre’.183 This is clear 
from their focus upon the interdependence of the legal and economic order, Böhm’s 
writing on the complementarity of free markets with the private law society,184 and 
Eucken’s advocacy of ‘policy to shape the economic system’.185  
Although the genealogy of NIE involves multiple strands of economic scholarship,186 two 
elements are of particular note. 
The first was Hayek’s later writing on the relationship between organic market forces 
and the normative framework within which they occurred.187 The free economic order – 
“catallaxy” -188 operated spontaneously through a decentralised process of mutual 
adjustment in response to price signals by market actors with little individual 
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knowledge.189 Rather than an equilibrium end-state to be replicated with guaranteed 
beneficial consequences, competition was conceptualised by Hayek as an experimental 
discovery procedure of knowledge acquisition and promulgation that could be more or 
less intense.190 This reflected his abject epistemological distaste for constructivist 
rationalism,191 which he believed downplayed the ‘necessary and irremediable 
ignorance on everyone’s part’ of the knowledge distributed between individuals that 
cannot be located in a single place.192 It was most unavoidable in the economic 
system,193 and justified faith in the decentralised market order for coordinating 
disparate pieces of information, thus overcoming the permanent barrier to 
constructivist central direction.194 But as a spontaneous, reactive, organic system, the 
norms enshrouding market transactions were of critical importance for influencing its 
operation. Markets could scarcely be conceptualised absent the state, necessitating its 
role as curator of the normative framework within which economic forces operated:195 
 ‘This particular function of government is somewhat like that of a maintenance squad of 
a factory, its object being not to produce any particular services or products to be 
consumed by citizens, but rather to see that the mechanism which regulates the 
production of those goods and services is kept in working order.’ 
The second formative impetus for the broader NIE movement since the 1960s was the 
sub-discipline of transaction cost economics.196 This has largely resulted from the 
pioneering work of Oliver Williamson,197 refining the writing of Ronald Coase on the 
importance of costs for economic decision-making.198 Williamson investigated how 
bounded rationality, few players, opportunism, and market uncertainty shaped the 
nature of contractual governance mechanisms between businesses and the ultimate 
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decision of whether to internalise.199 From here it was only a short distance to the 
general reflection that the efficient operation of market forces is dependent upon the 
institutional context within which business decision-making takes place;200 it cannot 
simply be assumed that the law beneficially influences these everyday choices.’201 
Despite inevitable factionalism,202 the multifaceted “New” Institutional Economics 
movement can be reduced into a series of general tenets that offer an interesting 
perspective on the relationship between markets and law.203 The starting position is that 
neo-classical microeconomic price theory abstracts away from the limits of human 
rationality in the face of uncertainty and how institutions develop in responsive to these 
cognitive defects.204 The efficient operation of the price mechanism is constantly beset 
by limits to perfectly rational decision-making and the lack of complete information, on 
future conditions and the behaviour of others.205 Institutions are norms that develop to 
provide predictable regularity in the face of continual market uncertainty;206 “rules of 
the game” within which economic processes take place.207 They may emerge through 
spontaneous experience (eg conventions) or deliberate construction (eg statute law).208 
Their purpose is to facilitate stability by constituting norms that limit the range of 
permissible options open to market actors - prohibiting certain actions, delineating 
rights209 and obligations - thus rendering individual decision-making simpler and the 
conduct of others more foreseeable.210 Business decisions do not need to consider every 
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possible eventuality.211 Institutions thus may make markets more efficient in two 
ways:212 by systemically reducing normative uncertainty to permit actors to more 
effectively respond to the price mechanism;213 or by specifically facilitating efficient 
exchange through reducing transaction costs.214 And as these institutions are constantly 
evolving,215 it is possible to contrast the economic desirability of rival institutional 
frameworks within which market forces operate.216 
B) NIE and the Rule of Law 
The rule of law is rarely well-theorised in NIE literature, often little more than shorthand 
for broad “good-governance” considerations of secure property rights, contractual 
enforceability, and recourse to the courts to guarantee both.217 These criteria are 
frequently linked to higher economic growth,218 fostering a plethora of reductionist rule 
of law “metrics” foisted upon stagnant economies.219 
Nevertheless, it is possible to note two particular instances where NIE and the 
conceptualisation of the rule of law proposed in this chapter meet, justifying the ideal as 
of significant economic merit: i) comprehensible and generalised norms are more 
effective institutions, stabilising rights and obligations to facilitate optimal economic 
ordering; and, more specifically, ii) formally preventing ad hoc normative determinations 
inhibits privately-desired market distortions. Both arguments are pre-empted - and 
perhaps better articulated - in Hayek’s scholarship on the rule of law and free markets.  
Although not recapitulated in this section, the instrumental virtue of independent 
review by the courts for gradually approximating these formal ideals is just as important 
as above, with reactive adjudication and prospective norm-formulation a key institution 
within the decentralised market system. This economic connection is made explicit in 
Hayek’s discussion of courts as institutions within a spontaneous order noted 
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previously,220 and Röpke’s inclusion of the judiciary within the mechanisms ‘creating the 
necessary framework of laws and institutions’ for the free economic order, supervising 
compliance ‘with relentless but just severity.’221 
i) Effective Institutions as Reliable Expectations 
According to NIE, institutions are informational “crutches” upon which market actors 
can rely to facilitate their spontaneous ordering through the price mechanism, of which 
the framework of legal norms constitutes one of the most important elements. But if 
particular laws are to be effective institutions - economising on information, delineating 
rights, obligations, and prohibitions - so that coordination through the price mechanism 
can operate as efficiently as possible, norms ought to be comprehensible to market 
actors (clear, public, prospective, etc).222 NIE is premised upon the limits of human 
rationality and investigates how norms arise to counteract such uncertainty: this is not 
just a question of simply having institutions that shape economic behaviour, but of how 
they can be amplified as market-enshrouding norms through considering their formal 
characteristics.223 The ideal of the rule of law, where businesses can comprehend their 
legal obligations, is functionally equivalent to what Kasper and Streit label the successful 
‘normative impact’ of institutions.224 Given that laws are informational signals 
facilitating the efficient operation of a free market economy, they suggest that the 
desiderata of the formal rule of law ‘relate directly to the fundamentals of institutional 
economics and are essential to the proper functioning of the capitalist system.’225 This 
argument is the economic counterpart to the political argument in favour of the 
comprehensibility of norms fostering ‘good fences’,226 though substitutes “efficient 
market activity” for “meaningful exercises of freedom”. 
The desirability of comprehensible obligations for stabilising normative expectations, 
thereby facilitating the optimal operation of economic forces, is comparable to the 
writing of Böhm on the private law society, reiterated by his student Mestmäcker’s 
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praise for ‘expectations that people can rely on’.227 The same can be deduced from 
Hayek’s reflections on the state’s role in maintaining the framework within which 
markets operate. He argued that the ideal conceptualisation of legal norms ought to be 
in accordance with nomos, the formal rule of law, owing to facilitation of normative 
comprehensibility: the efficiency of mutual adjustment to the price mechanism was 
better realised where ‘there is a known delimitation of the sphere of control of each 
individual’.228 Legal certainty is of economic virtue for stabilising the institutional 
framework surrounding spontaneous economic order, allowing reciprocal coordination 
in response to the price mechanism and collaboration of actors in confidence:229 
‘Where the elements of such an order are intelligent human beings whom we wish to use 
their individual capacities as successfully as possible in the pursuit of their own ends, the 
chief requirement for its establishment is that each know which of the circumstances in 
his environment he can count on.’ 
Indeed, like contemporary attempts to link the ideal to economic growth, Hayek 
asserted that there was ‘probably no single factor which has contributed more to the 
prosperity of the West than the relative certainty of the law’.230 In this way, Hayek 
channelled Max Weber’s argument that capitalist enterprise required ‘an unambiguous 
and clear legal system’ that ‘functions in a calculable way.’231 
But it should also be noted that Hayek’s pre-emptive discussion of effective institutions 
fused principles (i) and (ii) of the rule of law as conceptualised in this chapter: he 
considered generality of legal norms itself to be a necessary requirement for the stability 
of expectations that promoted positive economic outcomes. Whether the legal norms 
framing markets were institutions generated through gradual common law evolution or 
more deliberate normative corrections,232 the economically-desirable stability of market 
conditions was dependent upon them taking the form of generalised norms; ‘isolated 
and subsidiary’ commands by the state, such as ad hoc, subject-specific determinations 
of legality, disrupted the organic coordination of market actors using their dispersed 
knowledge for their own purposes.233 Even if the “corrections” were well-intentioned, 
this particularistic form was incompatible with a decentralised market order.234 It failed 
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to provide scope for ‘individual adaptation and explorative search’ that is the essence of 
competition as a dynamic discovery procedure.235 The administrative restraint of 
formally requiring intervention via general norms engrained much-needed economic 
modesty,236 solely permitting background improvements to the overall framework 
within which market ordering took place.237 This would forestall unpredictable and 
sporadic ‘interfering with – and to that extent impeding – the forces producing the 
spontaneous order,’238 in much the same way as Röpke and Rüstow were seen to 
articulate formally incompatible interventions in the previous chapter.239 Promulgating 
generalised norms was merely oiling the market clock, as opposed to ad hoc 
interventions that shifted the hands; according to Hayek such modesty did not deserve 
the pejorative connotations of the term ‘interference’.240 Therefore in aspiring to 
comprehensible and generalised norms as effective institutions, Hayek argued that the 
formal rule of law was ‘necessary’ for the optimal operation of the free economy.241 
Returning to the more specific suggestion that norms as effective institutions are 
comprehensible (clear, prospective, public, and so on), it is here that articulating the 
virtues of the formal rule of law shades from NIE and its predecessors into “law & 
economics” literature, as well as a classic debate in Anglo-American jurisprudence. What 
connects these disparate discussions is an instrumental rationale: law is better able to 
achieve its goal if norms are cognisable to legal subjects. Chapter II detailed Posner’s 
influential economic analysis of the rule of law ideal:242 law is a means to alter the 
incentives of individuals to guide them away from conduct deemed harmful, and 
comprehensible norms for legal subjects thus better realise the underlying societal 
goals. Like Posner, Böhm similarly suggested that as law was a signalling system 
delineating permissible and impermissible conduct on the market, clear rights and 
obligations represented law at its most ‘extremely effective’ as a means of social 
control.243 Posner’s claim that the formal characteristics of the rule of law are entirely 
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deducible from economic analysis of effective legal norms has become a motif of “law & 
economics” scholarship.244 To take but one example, Hadfield and Weingast’s economic 
analysis of decentralised enforcement finds that this would most effectively deter 
harmful conduct where norms are comprehensible. Their model thereby reaffirms ‘the 
relationship between the attributes of law and the capacity of an individual to be guided 
by rules’ common to “law & economics” literature.245 But both NIE on effective 
institutions and “law & economics” on optimal incentive recalibration are more market-
focused variants of the well-known critique by Raz and Hart of Fuller’s Morality of Law. 
In response to his novel challenge to legal positivism that the formal rule of law 
represented an internal “morality” to law, recognising the rational agency of the legal 
subjects,246 they denied such a metaphysical connection with a widely-accepted 
counterargument:247 in acknowledging human rationality, the formal rule of law 
rendered norms more effective for realising their underlying purposes.248 The ideal was 
akin to the quality of sharpness to a knife; whether innocently chopping or maliciously 
stabbing, a sharper knife more effectively achieves its intended goal.249 Despite a 
trenchant - and perhaps justified -250 defence, Fuller’s work itself routinely accepted that 
normative comprehensibility was ‘essential for the practical efficacy of law’.251 As a 
result, he and his detractors are often bundled together as instrumental advocates of 
the formal rule of law as affording effective ‘incentives to structure behaviour.’252 
To summarise the justification from NIE for the formal rule of law ideal, the aspiration 
towards comprehensibility and the rigidity of normative generalisations is economically 
desirable for producing laws that are effective institutions, a cognisable and stable legal 
framework that more precisely communicates information to businesses to facilitate the 
smooth operation of market processes. 
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ii) Generalised Norms: Resilience against Private Interests 
The central tenet of New Institutional Economics is that the framework of norms 
surrounding and structuring market practices have an impact upon the efficiency and 
performance of spontaneous economic ordering. But in recognising the state’s 
formative role in the economy, this claim makes institutions particularly valuable assets 
for private actors who may wish to influence their content and secure specific 
outcomes.253 Two sub-disciplines of NIE have attempted to explore and remedy this 
potential hindrance to the optimal operation of markets. Once again, NIE reaches 
comparable conclusions to liberal political theory on the considerable desirability of the 
formal rule of law ideal for preventing ad hoc, subject-specific normative acts; an 
effective means to forestall private direction of public institutions is to formally mandate 
market intervention through generalised and equally-applicable norms. 
Hayek’s final volume of Law, Legislation and Liberty is an extended assault upon ‘para-
government’, the assemblage of interests that encircle centralised decisions and intend 
to divert ‘the stream of governmental favour to their members.’254 Much like the 
Ordoliberals before, Hayek’s characterisation of how political representatives come to 
be influenced by organised interests is highly charged.255 Even genuine and well-
intentioned ad hoc intervention would set a dangerous precedent for more malevolent 
economic forces.256 The endeavours of these organised groups are manifold: limiting 
entry or regulating certain trades to restrict their output;257 fixing prices or wages for 
specific industries;258 raising import tariffs on particular products to shield domestic 
businesses;259 designating individual cartels or monopolies for legal protection;260 
discretely disadvantaging successful businesses to shield less efficient rivals;261 and so 
on. All such subject-specific interventions distort the spontaneous order, intending to 
‘bring about a particular result which is different from that which would have been 
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produced if the mechanism had been allowed unaided to follow its inherent 
principles.’262  
Hayek’s criticisms are closely related to public choice theory, a strand of NIE that has 
primarily developed since the 1960s. The concern of public choice theory is the 
principal-agent problem between citizens and state actors: that those entrusted with 
centralised decision-making powers may act opportunistically or against the common 
good owing to the costliness of monitoring.263 As a result, organised private interests 
may come to direct state powers to their own ends.264 Profitable privileges can be 
accrued by successfully bargaining with public actors to lessen competitive forces 
through market interventions (closing market entry, restricting imports, protectively 
regulating).265 This risk is particularly acute where private interests represent a small 
number of focused market actors as the spoils are shared between fewer 
beneficiaries.266 But maintaining the competitiveness of the free market economy is not 
simply about forestalling privately-desired regulation. As the Ordoliberals forewarned,267 
decision-making in furtherance of an active competition policy may be a particularly 
prominent focus for lobbying.268 As a consequence, there is a need to guarantee the 
optimal operation of the free market, preventing anticompetitive regulations and 
defending a robust programme of intervention, by erecting ‘institutional constraints on 
competition for political favours’.269  
If public choice theory describes the phenomenon of private steering of state powers 
over the economy, constitutional economics, an interrelated sub-discipline of NIE, aims 
to provide a solution. Frequently citing David Hume’s connection of constitutional 
checks and balances to the claim that ‘every man ought to be supposed a knave, and to 
have no other end, in all his actions, than private interest’,270 contemporary 
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constitutional economics evaluates binding norms (discrete competences, fundamental 
rights) as pre-commitment mechanisms.271 For example, although we may be perfectly 
content with how a benevolent dictator exercises their omnipotence, it is possible to 
envisage that their successor might be tempted to use such unbounded power for 
oppression. Or a decision-maker is aware that long-term policy success is based upon 
doing X (eg prohibiting cartels), but they also know that possible emergencies could lead 
them to abandon X and do Y (accepting a crisis cartel to manage job losses). In both 
instances, constraints are formulated today to prevent choosing undesirable options in 
the unpredictable future.  
Taken together, public choice theory and constitutional economics advocate tying the 
hands of public actors for ‘when, in the heat of the battle, they are tempted to abandon 
principles’ on an as-needed basis.272 Although various norms could be contemplated to 
limit market-distorting regulation and impressionable competition enforcement, the 
simplest preventative measure is to formally restrain the state from discriminatory 
actions in the market by determining legality through applying generalised norms:273 
‘Both a legislature confined to laying down general rules and a governmental agency 
which can use coercion only to enforce general rules which it cannot change can resists 
such pressure; an omnipotent assembly cannot.’  
The principle that norms ought to be abstract in scope and equally-applicable restraints 
the state from granting ad hoc privileges to powerful private interests, thus shielding the 
continuing operation of the free market order.274 Hayek applied this logic to cartel law, 
cautioning against ‘discretionary surveillance to prevent abuse’ and favouring a general 
prohibition without any exception.275 Of course, this formal restraint against certain 
means of market intervention can be deeply divisive: subject-specific interventions into 
markets may prove to be very popular,276 or, as the Marxist critique suggested, 
necessary for meaningful equality. But it should also be noted that, despite the 
ideological stance of many of the scholars cited above, similar concerns about private 
                                                          
271 See: Brennan and Buchanan [1985] 74-79; Vanberg [1994]; Mantzavinos [2001] 243-244. 
272 Kasper and Streit [1998] 335. 
273 Hayek [1979] 439. See also: [1979] 359 (to limit private influence requires the limitation of governmental 
powers), 463; Brennan and Buchanan [1985] 29. 
274 As argued by: Kasper and Streit [1998] 195, (universal property rights prevent discriminatory treatment), 
316 (citing Ordoliberal support for decision-makers ‘blind to the specific outcomes of rule-guided 
behaviour.’); Mantzavinos [2001] 244-245 (‘formal rules provide a credible limit to the exertion of political 
power by governmental authorities in favour of’ private interests); Vanberg [2014] 211, 218 (on 
Ordoliberalism seeing this as the solution to discriminatory privileges). 
275 Hayek [1979] 423-424 (though without penalties, preferring invalidity and legal unenforceability). 
276 Hayek [1973] 134; Kasper and Streit [1998] 223, 316. 
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steering of public powers has occupied less politically-charged economists,277 and also 
those from the opposite end of the spectrum: indeed, famed US consumer rights 
advocate Ralph Nader was just as perturbed by private interests ‘dominating agency 
decisions’ and compromising ‘independent regulatory judgment’ by securing ‘policies 
which often frustrate, rather than promote, economic competition.’278 That public 
decision-makers will not act in the common good but will respond to exogenous 
influence is a perennial, apolitical worry.  
Whatever angle one approaches the capacity for private interests to steer the state 
towards institutions that hinder the optimal operation of markets, whether through 
protective regulation or targeted antitrust, the rule of law ideal can be considered of 
crucial economic benefit: mandating market intervention through generalised norms of 
equal application formally prevents ad hoc determinations of legality favouring some 
over others. 
*** 
Both liberal political theory and New Institutional Economics reach the same conclusion: 
the rule of law is an ideal of considerable virtue. Similar themes cut across centuries of 
political and economic scholarship: comprehensible rights and obligations permit the 
meaningful exercise of individual freedom and stabilise markets to facilitate more 
efficient reactions to the price mechanism; generalised norms of equal applicability 
rigidify determinations of legality to foster normative certainty, prevent tyrannical 
discrimination against individuals, and forestall market-distorting privileges at the 
behest of private interests; and the courts provide an institutional fall-back for gradually 
approximating these aspirational ideals in the day-to-day existence of the legal order. 
The formal rule of law is therefore not a legalistic, philosophical construct that can be 
dismissed as inappropriate for market interventions in pursuit of economic goals. 
Competition enforcement thus has ample political and economic justifications for 
aspiring to realise the formal rule of law ideal.      
                                                          
277 eg Olson [1982]. 
278 Green and Nader [1973] 876. For an historical overview of convergence in the 1960s on regulatory 
capture: Posner [1997] 955-956.  
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V. Conclusion to Part I: From Justification to Realisation 
Competition law is a fundamentally economic endeavour.279 Its goal is to ensure that 
markets operate “better”, however defined (efficiency maximisation, market freedom?). 
It can best be comprehended with basic concepts derived from neo-classical price 
theory and applied with various techniques of industrial organisation economics. 
Schools of competition thought popularly stand or fall on whether their substantive 
economic orientation is deemed sophisticated or illiterate, as the contemporary 
perception of Ordoliberalism suggests. So too do existing competition law norms, as the 
Chicagoan revolution vividly demonstrated.  
But substantive merits aside, Part I of this thesis has sought to answer an important 
foundational question: to which form should competition policy aspire for determining 
the legality of business conduct on the market in furtherance of, at root, economic 
goals? The preceding chapters have offered a justification for attempting to realise the 
formal rule of law ideal, determining lawfulness via generalised, equally-applicable 
norms, which are comprehensible to businesses (public, prospective, clear, etc) and 
subject to robust judicial oversight. Chapters II and III analysed in detail the formal 
dimensions of Chicagoan and Ordoliberal competition scholarship, often obscured by 
debates as to the merit or demerit of their substantive orientation. It was argued that 
both “rival” schools place a premium upon market intervention through abstracted 
norms that can be internalised by businesses, rather than ad hoc, unstructured, subject-
specific appraisals. This chapter has synthesised and situated their fledgling justifications 
for the formal rule of law within centuries of liberal political and economic scholarship, 
whilst also highlighting the crucial role of close judicial review. The rationality-respecting 
rigidity and centralised restraint of the formal rule of law, facilitated by rigorous judicial 
oversight, has been shown to be an ideal of considerable virtue. The Chicago School 
knew it, the Ordoliberals implied it, and generations of political and economic writing 
have thoroughly theorised it. Rather than an abstract ideal, inappropriate in the context 
of market interventions pursuing economic goods, the arguments justifying movements 
towards the formal rule of law ideal, and thus dissuading subject-specific determinations 
of legality that are incomprehensible to businesses, are therefore of overwhelming 
significance for competition policy. In short, the form of market intervention matters. 
                                                          
279 Following the discussion of NIE, it might be more broadly argued that all law is an economic endeavour.  
147 
 
  Justifying the Rule of Law: Rationality, Restraint, Robust Review 
I: Norms Capable of 
Comprehension 
II: Norms General in Scope 
and Equally Applied 
III: Institution for Reviewing 
Compliance (Courts) 
 
 
Political Virtue:  
meaningful exercise of 
individual freedom, ability to 
plan, fair attribution of 
responsibility for violations 
Economic Virtue: 
effective institutions facilitate 
market processes, overcome 
information limits, reduce 
transaction costs 
 
 
Political Virtue: 
additional limitation upon 
state coercion of individuals, 
freedom to pursue own ends, 
limits discrimination 
Economic Virtue: 
limited disruption to market 
forces, hinders rent-seeking 
that distorts markets and 
influences competition policy 
 
 
Instrumental Virtue: 
ensures congruence between 
legal norms and reality (nulla 
poena sine lege) 
residual institutional 
mechanism for shaping 
particularistic and 
incomprehensible normative 
acts into generalised and 
comprehensible norms 
 
Part II of this thesis shifts from the theoretical justification for aspiring towards the 
formal rule of law ideal in competition policy, to the second research question 
concerning its practical realisation in EU competition law. Is European enforcement a 
picture of respect for rationality and coercive restraint, facilitated by robust review? Or 
is it awash with incomprehensible obligations upon businesses and ad hoc, discretionary 
decision-making, all facilitated by lax judicial oversight? Furthermore, how is this means 
to be reconciled with contemporary advocacy of efficiency-focused enforcement, 
seemingly requiring highly context-, market- and fact-specific analysis to accurately 
determine legality? Having justified the formal rule of law ideal as a politically and 
economically desirable aspiration for competition policy in the abstract, will it be the 
case that in the struggle for effective and “more economic” enforcement, this is shown 
to be ‘correct in theory, but is of no use in practice’?280 
                                                          
280 Kant [1793]. 
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EU Competition Policy and the Rule of Law: 
Realisation? 
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Chapter V: Effective Ends and Discretionary Means: Disregarding the Formal Rule of Law in EU Competition Policy  
I. Introduction: Effective Realisation of Immaterial Ends 
Whether the maximisation of economic efficiency,1 creating a single European market,2 
securing equitable market structures,3 or pursuing any of the other values scattered 
throughout the EU Treaties,4 from the perspective of the formal rule of law it is largely 
immaterial which goal underpins EU competition policy. The ideal imposes no limits to 
the ends animating specific decisions by the European Commission and EU Courts 
pursuant to Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. Instead, it offers an aspirational form for the 
means by which power is exercised to deliver such outcomes. Any of these aims could 
be realised whilst also taking steps towards enforcement in accordance with the ideal of 
generalised, equally-applied, comprehensible norms.  
The problem with regard to approximating the formal rule of law in EU enforcement is 
not necessarily one of impossibility, but likelihood. It was noted in the previous chapter 
that those entrusted with promoting societal goods would probably not voluntarily 
succumb to this form of market intervention. It may seem to an authority more effective 
                                                          
1 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints [2000] [7] (competition ‘enhances consumer welfare and creates an 
efficient allocation of resources’); Guidelines on the Application of Article [101](3) [2004] OJ C101/97 
(“Guidelines on 101(3) [2004]”) [13]; Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying 
Article [102] of the EC Treaty to Abusive Conduct by Dominant Undertakings [2009] C45/02 (“Article 102 
Guidance [2009]”) [5] (ensuring ‘consumers benefit from the efficiency and productivity’), [19] (preventing 
foreclosure ‘having an adverse impact on consumer welfare’). 
2 eg C-56 and 58/64 Etablissements Consten SA & Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v Commission [1966] 
ECLI:EU:C:1966:41 (absolute territorial partitioning); The Distillers Company Ltd (IV/28.282) [1978] OJ L50/16 
(differential pricing for exports). For overviews: Monti [2002]; Ibáñez Colomo [2016]. 
3 As alleged by, eg: James [1976] 251-252; Korah [1978a] 797; [1993] 158; Venit [1987] 20-21; Gyselen 
[1989] 613-615; Turnbull [1996] 96; Kallaugher and Sher [2004] 277; Pera and Auricchio [2005] 160; Lovdahl 
Gormsen [2006] 8; [2007] 329; Auricchio [2007] 374; Pera [2008] 149-150. cf Article 102 Guidance [2009] 
[5]-[6] (‘not simply protecting competitors’, less-efficient firms may ‘leave the market’ owing to the superior 
efficiency of a dominant firm, but note [24] on the importance of a ‘less efficient competitor’); C-209/10 
Post Danmark A/S v Konkurrencerådet [2012] ECLI:EU:2012:172 (“Post Danmark I [2012]”) [21]-[22]; C-
413/14P Intel v Commission [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:632 [133]-[134]. 
4 eg Articles 9 (high level of employment), 11 (environmental protection), 12 (consumer protection) TFEU. 
See generally: Monti [2002]; Jones and Sufrin [2016] 242-247. 
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to realise its ends through subject-specific normative determinations, particularly 
discretion, as opposed to the restraint and rationality-respecting rigidity of applying 
generalised, comprehensible legal norms. The historic and contemporary enforcement 
of EU competition policy is, at times, a demonstration of such formal reluctance. The 
variety of conceivable ends animating decisions are capable of exerting a significant pull 
for the Commission, in particular, to see them realised as effectively as possible and by 
whatever means necessary.5 If their maximal delivery is the sole criterion for evaluating 
the legitimacy of market interventions, and discretionary normative determinations of 
the individually “bad” and “good” are thought to offer the most effective means, it is 
understandable why competition decision-makers would come to neglect alternative, 
more restrained, forms for deciding legality and illegality.   
This chapter will demonstrate that both the Commission and Courts have sometimes 
contributed towards a prevalent focus upon the policy effectiveness of EU competition 
enforcement - the variable ends of intervention - and a disregard for realising the formal 
rule of law - the desirable means of intervention. The first part of this thesis argued that 
aspiring to enforcement in the form of generalised, equally-applicable norms that are 
comprehensible to businesses and subject to rigorous judicial oversight was an ideal of 
considerable political and economic virtue. But this means comes with a cost: it rejects 
discretionary normative acts on a subject-specific basis which may be an effective and 
flexible tool for achieving policy ends. EU competition enforcement has at times failed to 
address this relationship between ends and means, favouring the potency of policy 
delivery through discretionary, incomprehensible market interventions. This chapter 
explores a variety of examples of the legality of business conduct being determined in a 
manner antithetical to the formal rule of law ideal. 
Sections II and III consider the Commission’s pre-modernisation decisional record, 
particularly focusing upon the treatment of joint venture agreements and rebate 
schemes under Articles 101 and 102 respectively. In both instances the Commission 
secured for itself a powerful position of discretionary oversight to effectively realise its 
policy goals. It could rewrite agreements to guarantee their pro-competitive 
implementation and established its ability to scrutinise the competitive merits of a wide 
variety of discounts by dominant firms. But in each example, this was achieved through 
undertaking ad hoc, subject-specific determinations of legality and distorting the law - 
                                                          
5 Discussing the policy effectiveness justification in commitment decisions: Dunne [2014] 434; [2015] 88-89.  
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gaming the Article 101(1)/(3) relationship, ignoring case law that restrained market 
intervention – with the result of fostering substantial normative uncertainty for firms.  
In both instances the EU Courts failed to meet their key residual role envisaged by the 
formal rule of law of rigorously checking administrative discretion, and attempting to 
approximate the rule of law through formulating generalised norms to restrain and 
rigidify legal analysis. With regard to Article 102, the CJEU accommodated and 
legitimated the Commission’s discretion-building decisional record, even where it 
sought to marginalise the case law. In the context of Article 101, there is a live debate 
about whether the EU Courts offer too much deference to the Commission’s legal 
appraisals of factual scenarios. But even where the CJEU took a more proactive role to 
curbing the Commission’s discretion by insisting upon rigorous effects-based analysis, 
there is a risk that this may also fail to foster legal certainty, itself falling short of the 
formal rule of law ideal, if it remains an unstructured inquiry. In essence, the Court might 
have simply substituted one ad hoc, subject-specific means for determining the legality 
of business conduct that failed to offer normative comprehensibility for another. 
Section IV is a detailed analysis of the most egregious post-modernisation example of 
the Commission prioritising the effective realisation of policy ends through discretionary 
enforcement over considerations of the means of market intervention: commitment 
decisions. Without a doubt, this procedure represents the most powerful weapon in the 
Commission’s competition policy arsenal as it can probe any business conduct and 
beneficially restructure entire markets through negotiating ambitious remedial 
packages. Such a means of ad hoc, subject-specific decisions beyond or below the scope 
of pre-existing normative obligations is a form of market intervention that has facilitated 
extensive legal uncertainty. The EU Courts have also failed to structure the 
Commission’s manifest discretion, thereby being implicated in this systemic degradation 
in the formal rule of law. They have actively missed the opportunity to exercise judicial 
control over the scale and type of remedies offered as conditions for on-going legality. 
But somewhat more sympathetically, given that neither investigated firms nor third 
parties are likely to bring commitment decisions before the Courts in the first place, it is 
not immediately obvious how their deployment as a tool of contemporary competition 
enforcement can be restrained. In short, the use of commitment decisions is arguably 
the greatest divergence from realising the formal rule of law in EU competition policy. 
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II. Enforcement of Article 101 TFEU 
A) Pre-Modernisation Commission Decisions: Exercising Discretion via Exemption 
Decisions  
Paragraph 1 of Article 101 TFEU governs collusive acts between independent 
undertakings that prevent, restrict or distort competition by object or effect. Any form 
of coordination which falls foul of this prohibition may in principle benefit from 
exemption if it satisfies the four cumulative requirements of paragraph (3).6 Prior to the 
procedural modernisation of Regulation 1/2003,7 an agreement could only enjoy legality 
pursuant to Article 101(3) if it had been notified in advance, and solely the Commission 
had the discretion under Regulation 17/62 to grant individual exemptions.8 Given the 
context within which this highly centralised regime for the oversight of agreements was 
born, the structure of Regulation 17/62 made a great deal of sense. The vast majority of 
Member States had little experience with competition law, and the potential for 
comparable agreements to be treated differently by national authorities and courts 
could have been a recipe for normative anarchy.9  
From the perspective of the effectiveness of EU competition policy, the Commission’s 
discretion to grant individual exemptions allowed for the close scrutiny of possibility 
problematic business agreements. The flexibility of Article 101(3) also permitted it to 
secure substantial changes to proposed contracts that were intended to ensure that 
competition would not be distorted. This was clearly a potent tool for the Commission 
to realise its ends.  
Nevertheless, this means of competition enforcement through discretionary, subject-
specific normative determinations resulted in widespread uncertainty for businesses. 
Owing to exploitation of the mechanics of Article 101, the legality of every agreement 
was subject to the Commission’s discretion to exempt, and it was not clear what 
remedial changes had to be made to secure its blessing. The end of maximal control 
                                                          
6 (i) improve production/distribution or promote technical/economic progress; (ii) allow consumers a fair 
share of this benefit; (iii) only impose restrictions indispensable to attaining such benefits; (iv) do not 
eliminate a substantial degree of competition. See: Guidelines on 101(3) [2004] [38]-[114]. Restrictions by 
object or effect may in principle receive exemption: T-17/93 Matra Hachette SA v Commission [1994] 
ECLI:EU:T:1994:89 [85]. 
7 Council Regulation 1/2003 on the Implementation of the Rules on Competition laid down in Articles [101] 
and [102] of the Treaty [2003] (“Regulation 1/2003”) OJ L1/1. 
8 Council Regulation 17/62 Implementing Articles [101] and [102] of the Treaty [1962] OJ Spec Ed 87 
(“Regulation 17/62”), Article 4(1) (compulsory notification), Article 9(1) (Commission power to exempt).  
9 Forrester and Norall [1984] 12-13; Wils [1999] 154. 
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over business agreements was secured through a means antithetical to the formal rule 
of law ideal. This is demonstrated by considering the Commission’s pre-modernisation 
treatment of joint venture agreements.  
i) The Effective Ends of Discretion 
Joint venture (“JV”) agreements concern competitors temporarily cooperating on 
research and development, production, marketing, etc. Their competitive consequences 
are unavoidably complex. While they can promote innovation and investment, open 
markets, and generate new products, JV agreements may also facilitate anticompetitive 
collusion through market-sharing, price-fixing, and production quotas.10  
Given their unpredictable impact on markets, defying any ‘simple, universally applicable 
standard’,11 the Commission’s approach was to determine their legality pursuant to 
Article 101 through incisive scrutiny of the ‘the economic circumstances of the individual 
case’.12 This was achieved through the Commission’s discretion to grant Article 101(3) 
exemption decisions, where it could consider the subject-specific competitive merits of 
each JV agreement in question to decide its legality or illegality. Often its decision-
making record revealed substantial economic nuance. Many prima facie restrictive 
clauses in such agreements were accepted as necessary for the pro-competitive 
consequences of the JV to be realised at all. For example in Vacuum Interrupters 
[1977],13 the Commission exempted a JV for the creation of a new product where the 
parents had agreed not to individually develop competing interrupters, as this 
restriction was ‘indispensable’ ex ante for them to cooperate at all and guarantee its 
commercial success.14 As a result, the vast majority of joint venture agreements were 
ultimately found to be lawful through the Commission’s exercise of its discretion to 
grant an Article 101(3) individual exemption.15 In recognising their substantial pro-
competitive efficiencies in the longer term, despite necessary short-term restraints 
between competitors, this was arguably market intervention that successfully sought to 
improve consumer welfare. 
                                                          
10 Caspari [1985] 452-453; Faull [1984] 360. 
11 Caspari [1985] 453. 
12 Vestrynge [1984] 688. 
13 Vacuum Interrupters Ltd (IV/27.442) [1977] OJ L48/32 [23]. 
14 On the ex post bias against ex ante necessary restrictions: Korah [1983] 747; [1986a] 93-95; [1992a] 253; 
[1994a] 212, 274; Horspool and Korah [1992] 385; Van den Bergh [1996] 77. For Commission recognition: 
Guidelines on Vertical Restraints [2000] [100]-[118]; Guidelines on 101(3) [2004] [17]-[19]; Guidelines on 
Vertical Restraints [2010] C130/01 [100]-[109]. For comparable Chicagoan claims on vertical restraints: 
Chapter II, text accompanying fn 91-95. 
15 M Waelbroeck [1987] 716-718. 
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The Commission’s discretion to grant an Article 101(3) exemption decision was also an 
effective tool for competition enforcement as there was scope for determinations of 
legality that considered various non-efficiency goals.16 For example in the early 
Transocean Marine Paint [1967] exemption, intense cross-border collaboration to 
formulate a new paint was clearly influenced by the desire to foster trans-European 
product development to compete worldwide.17 Similarly, the lawfulness of the joint 
venture in Ford/Volkswagen [1993] was swayed by the potential for a new, innovative 
factory to aid regeneration of a disadvantaged area.18 Outside of JV agreements, the 
Commission even exempted a crisis cartel to reduce industrial overcapacity in an orderly 
fashion in Synthetic Fibres [1984],19 and in CECED [2000], permitted the agreement 
between 95 per cent of washing machine manufacturers to abandon production of 
cheaper, more polluting products, thereby promoting more energy-efficient - and 
expensive - machines.20 In this way, the pre-modernisation discretion of Article 101(3) 
exemptions afforded the Commission an opportunity to consider a variety of noble ends 
in determining legality.  
But the effectiveness of the Commission’s oversight was not simply reactive, auditing 
the potential efficiency gains or other benefits of joint ventures; it often aimed to ensure 
that anticompetitive consequences would not materialise through proactively 
renegotiating their terms with coordinating companies. The Commission’s discretion to 
find business collaboration legal through an Article 101(3) exemption decision was 
frequently conditional upon contractual changes, where it essentially rewrote a number 
of proposed JV agreements.21 Examples include the negotiations with the Commission in 
its De Laval-Stork [1977],22 Optical Fibres,23 and UIP [1989] decisions.24 Perhaps the most 
prominent example of the policy effectiveness of the Commission’s discretion to 
conditionally legalise joint ventures were the various Article 101(3) exemptions intended 
                                                          
16 See generally: Monti [2002]; Jones and Sufrin [2016] 242-247. 
17 Transocean Marine Paint Association (IV/223) [1967] JO L163/10. See: Schwarz and Wellman [1972] 204, 
207; Deringer [1974] 104-105. 
18 Ford/Volkswagen (IV/33.814) [1993] OJ L20/14. See: Jones and Sufrin [2016] 245-246 (‘difficult to justify 
on pure efficiency grounds’). 
19 Synthetic Fibres (IV/30.810) [1984] OJ L207/17. See: Bodoff [1984] 52; Hornsby [1987] 89-92; Jones and 
Sufrin [2016] 246. 
20 CECED (IV/36.718) [2000] OJ L187/47. 
21 Korah [1983] 713-714; [1992a] 270; Van Bael [1986] 62. 
22 De Laval-Stork (IV/27.093) [1977] OJ L215/11 (exempted after securing stringent conditions to ensure the 
independent operation of the parties after its expiry). See: Korah [1992a] 269-270. 
23 Optical Fibres (IV/30.320) [1986] OJ L236/30 (exempted after changes to management, the powers of the 
parents, licensing conditions). See: Korah [1992a] 278-279.  
24 UIP (IV/30.566) [1989] OJ L226/25 (exclusive joint selling venture that the Commission redesigned 
through swapping exclusivity for first refusal, redrawing the organisational structure). 
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to liberalise the telecommunications industry before regulatory changes at the end of 
the 1990s, pre-emptively combatting domestic failures to control incumbents.25 When 
national telecoms companies notified their differing international agreements for 
strategic alliances prior to liberalisation,26 the Commission’s exemptions were 
conditional upon commitments by the parent firms to prevent future abuses as 
infrastructure owners.27 This hands-on approach to guaranteeing that competitive 
concerns would not materialise in JV agreements was reflected in its engagement with 
other types of coordination, from the deletion of problematic clauses in selective 
distribution agreements,28 through to more demanding and creative conditions in 
complex commercialisation agreements.29 And as the annual Reports on Competition 
Policy revealed,30 even where the Commission informally closed the notification without 
a formal Article 101(3) exemption decision, it leveraged its discretion to potentially 
reopen formal proceedings to secure changes to business agreements.31  
The pre-modernisation treatment of JV agreements demonstrates how the 
Commission’s power to grant legality to individual agreements through Article 101(3) 
exemption decisions permitted the realisation of its intended competition policy ends 
with utmost effectiveness. It enjoyed a tight grip over JVs to ensure that their various 
clauses would deliver on their purported pro-competitive efficiencies. Decisions like 
Vacuum Interrupters evidence the Commission’s economically-sophisticated 
understanding of the need for certain restrictive clauses to ultimately secure outcomes 
beneficial to consumers, but it could also factor non-efficiency values into its legal 
determinations. Furthermore, if agreements were found to pose serious competitive 
risks, the Commission could negotiate sweeping changes to their operation to guarantee 
efficiency, or, as the telecoms exemptions demonstrate, any other goals it had in the 
                                                          
25 Larouche [2000] 312-313; Cave and Crowther [2005] 489. 
26 Infonet (IV/33.361) [1992] OJ C7/3; Atlas (IV/35.337) [1996] L239/23; Phoenix/Global One (IV/35.617) 
[1996] L239/57; Unisource (IV/35.830) [1997] L318/1; British Interactive Broadcasting/Open (IV/ 36.539) 
[1999] 312/1. See: Larouche [2000]. 
27 eg non-discriminatory network access, information disclosure, no bundling or cross-subsidisation. See: 
Larouche [2000] 187, 239, 262; Cave and Crowther [2005] 486-487. 
28 eg Yves Saint Laurent Parfum (IV/33.242) [1992] OJ L12/24 (deletion of cross-supply and quantitative 
location restrictions). 
29 eg Joint selling of the Commercial Rights of the UEFA Champions League (COMP/C.2-37.398) [2003] OJ 
291/25 (“Champions League [2003]”). 
30 eg Twenty-First Report on Competition Policy 1991 [1992]: 67-68 (Campina, articles of association 
concerning members leaving were rewritten), 73-74 (Amadeus/Sabre, ‘detailed undertakings’ securing non-
discriminatory use of computer reservation systems), 76 (Compagnie des Cristalleries Baccarat, removing 
location and cross-supply restrictions in selective distribution agreements).   
31 Korah [1981] 16; Van Bael [1986] 61-62; D Waelbroeck [1986] 269. 
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field. In short, the Commission’s discretion to permit or prohibit individual agreements 
was a valuable tool for pursuing its competition policy ends. 
ii) The Problematic Means of Discretion 
The Commission’s discretion was an effective means to achieve its ends, but in rejecting 
determinations of legality through applying generalised norms, the obligations 
incumbent upon businesses contemplating JV agreements were incomprehensible and 
unstructured. This uncertainty was exacerbated by the Commission exploiting the 
relationship between Article 101(1) and (3) to subject almost every agreement to its 
discretionary oversight. 
The lawfulness of coordination between firms pursuant to Article 101 was dependent 
upon the Commission’s contract-specific assessment of its merits. As Chapter IV argued, 
where principle (ii) of the formal rule of law - determining legality through generalised 
norms - is not met, the consequence is often injurious to principle (i) - normative 
comprehensibility for legal subjects. In the context of JV agreements, there were no 
generalised norms structuring and restraining the Commission’s ‘virtually unfettered 
discretion whether to grant an exemption’;32 there was no indication, for instance, that 
certain common clauses were deemed legally innocuous. The Commission’s exercise of 
its discretion to grant an Article 101(3) exemption for a joint venture involved ‘a 
complicated, open-ended and somewhat unpredictable process of weighing relative 
economic gains and losses’,33 making it ‘impossible for those who advise firms whose 
business is affected by it’.34 Even the basic question of for how long from the decision 
the exemption would be in force was unforeseeable, seemingly a random number 
selected by the Commission; would it be around fifteen, nine, seven years, or just under 
16 months?35 As the resulting decisions were so subject-specific in their findings of 
legality, it was difficult for businesses to generalise from them to inform their own 
proposals for collaboration.36 This was not impossible: for example, through a number of 
decisions it became clear that the granting of individual exclusive licences tended to be 
                                                          
32 Korah [1994a] 272. 
33 Bodoff [1984] 67.  
34 Korah [1994a] 272.  
35 Optical Fibres [1986] (15), De Laval-Stork [1977] (9), Vacuum Interrupters [1977] (7), Synthetic Fibres 
[1984] (16 months, but a crisis cartel). 
36 Hawk [1972] 256-257 (‘difficult to extrapolate general rules [as] decisions are dependent upon the facts of 
each case’). 
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exempted.37 But this was a pattern, not a guarantee. Until restrained by an authoritative 
norm,38 the Commission retained the discretion to be as consistent or inconsistent as it 
wished, and businesses had no security that such terms would be found legal in their 
own particular instance.  
Furthermore, this normative uncertainty was amplified by the Commission’s discretion 
to include a wide variety of public interest factors in its determinations of legality. For 
example, exempting coordination between firms in Synthetic Fibres [1984] to gradually 
reduce oversupply and manage industrial decline was informed by the noble policy end 
of making it ‘easier to cushion the social effects’ of plant closures.39 But from a pure 
efficiency perspective, this was a crisis cartel, diluting the clarity of reductions in output 
as hard-core restrictions of competition. The same interpretation can be given to the 
CECED [2000] exemption decision, concerning the agreement between firms to stop 
producing cheaper consumer washing machines to promote less pollution but more 
expensive models.40 Admittedly, in both decisions the Commission’s discretion was used 
to absolve companies through incorporating public interest considerations. And as 
reiterated at the outset, the formal rule of law does not limit the ends of exercises of 
centralised power; all goals can be realised in accordance with the ideal, or not. But as 
Bork recognised in his advocacy of consumer welfare as a singular benchmark to 
restraint judges from concluding unlawfulness on the basis of many individually 
commendable ends,41 the rule of law is better approximated by selecting a singular goal 
consistently underpinning market interventions, whatever it may be. As the 
Commission’s decisional practice through Article 101(3) demonstrates, the flexibility to 
determine legality based on any number of inconsistent values in a discretionary, ad hoc 
manner that is not foreseeable in advance intensifies normative uncertainty for market 
actors.    
This legal insecurity was exacerbated by the Commission’s seeking of contract-specific 
changes to secure its discretionary blessing under Article 101(3). Of course, this 
potential for conditional exemption made for effective competition enforcement, how 
much would companies have to offer to secure validity for their proposed agreement? 
                                                          
37 eg Davidson Rubber Co (IV/17.545, 6.964, 26.858, 26.890, 18.673, 17.448) [1972] JO L143/31. 
38 As eventually occurred: Commission Regulation 2349/84 on the Application of Article [101](3) of the 
Treaty to Certain Categories of Patent Licensing Agreements, Article 1. 
39 Synthetic Fibres [1984] [37]. 
40 CECED [2000]. 
41 See Chapter II, Section III.A. 
158 
 
Would it require relatively modest tweaks to agreements, perhaps removing a couple of 
terms the Commission disliked?42 Or more substantial changes to key features of the 
anticipated coordination between businesses?43 Or, as with the far-reaching telecoms 
exemption decisions,44 significant commitments on future conduct that seemingly have 
no connection to the notified agreement?45 When there is such a degree of uncertainty 
as to what will be required to gain the Commission’s discretionary seal of approval, it is 
understandable why pro-competitive coordination comes to be chilled to the ultimate 
detriment of consumers. It simply might not be clear that the benefits of creating a joint 
venture with another firm would be worth the conditions necessary to secure its 
lawfulness from the Commission pursuant to Article 101.   
Discretionary determinations of legality by the Commission that resulted in normative 
uncertainty for businesses could have been a formally problematic but nevertheless 
marginal element of Article 101 enforcement in the pre-modernisation era. The 
requirement for a paragraph (3) exemption decision only came into play if there was a 
finding of a restriction of competition pursuant to paragraph (1). However the 
Commission deliberately amplified the extent of this departure from the restraint of 
applying generalised and comprehensible norms envisaged by the rule of law, thereby 
expanding its discretionary control over agreements. Essentially, it found everything 
presumptively illegal under paragraph (1) unless it chose to grant a paragraph (3) 
exemption decision in the individual instance.46  
Returning to the example of joint venture agreements, Article 101(1) was applied in an 
overbroad manner through recurrent findings of restrictions by object and laconic 
effects analysis, basically applying the prima facie prohibition to any arrangements that 
constrained the parties’ “economic freedom”.47 But all joint ventures - or indeed any 
contractual relations - are inherently intended to restrict freedom through accepting 
mutual obligations.48 Therefore regardless of efficiency or clear consumer benefits, the 
                                                          
42 eg Yves Saint Laurent Parfum at fn 28. 
43 eg Optical Fibres at fn 23 or Champions League at fn 29.  
44 See fn 26-27. 
45 On the conditions being more related to Article 102 than the initial Article 101 notification: Larouche 
[2000] 280; Ibáñez Colomo [2010] 277. 
46 Korah [1983] 712-713; [1990] 1033; [1994a] 272; Forrester and Norall [1984] 12, 22; Venit [1987] 33; 
Hawk [1992] 324-325; [1995] 974, 983; Bright [1996] 536. 
47 Deringer [1965] 604-605; Van Houtte [1982] 498-500; Hawk [1992] 333. 
48 Joliet [1967] 9; Van Houtte [1982] 500; Hawk [1995] 978; Bright [1996] 535. 
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Article 101(1) prohibition applied automatically to ‘any joint venture agreement’.49 This 
resulted in embarrassingly ‘schizophrenic’ decisions.50 The common illustration of this 
dynamic repeatedly criticised by Korah was the (non-JV) exemption decision in Davidson 
Rubber [1972].51 The Commission’s economically-nuanced understanding of the need 
for exclusivity in patent licensing was evident in its Article 101(3) analysis, noting that 
‘no manufacturer would have been prepared to undertake the necessary investment 
without the protection’ of an exclusive licence.’52 But to push the decision into the scope 
of its Article 101(3) discretion to closely scrutinise agreements, consider public interest 
ends, and impose conditions, a few pages earlier pursuant to paragraph (1) analysis, 
committing to exclusivity in the Davidson Rubber licence was considered a restriction of 
competition by object for limiting the commercial freedom to grant the patent to others. 
For joint venture agreements in particular, the blunt deployment of the paragraph (1) 
presumptive prohibition was not only contrary to claims by officials that it would be 
‘flexible and applied in the light of all prevailing economic circumstances’,53 momentarily 
supported by the negative clearance in Odin [1990]54 but reconfirmed in decisions such 
as European Night Services [1994].55 It also often violated the clear case law of the CJEU 
on the need for rigorous effects-based analysis of the restrictive consequences of certain 
types of agreements for finding them in breach of Article 101(1).56 So further to the 
normative uncertainty generated by its entirely discretionary granting of Article 101(3) 
exemptions, as expanded by a deliberately overbroad interpretation of the Article 
101(1) prohibition, the Commission was also ignoring and undermining the legal 
restraints imposed by the CJEU on the requirement for effects-based analysis. This 
disjuncture between the Commission’s decisional practice and the authoritative case 
law on the interpretation of paragraph (1) was therefore another source of legal 
uncertainty for business agreements subject to Article 101. 
                                                          
49 M Waelbroeck [1987] 718 (emphasis added). 
50 Venit [1987] 33-34; [1991] 9. See also: Korah [1975] 183; [1983] 710-711; [1986a] 94; [1990] 1027; 
[1992a] 251-252; [1994a] 269; Claydon [1986] 159; M Waelbroeck [1987] 716-718; Hawk [1988] 70; Venit 
[1991] 9; Wesseling [2000] 25-26, 89. 
51 Korah [1975] 183, 255; [1976] 187; [1983] 710-711; [1986a] 95. 
52 Davidson Rubber Co [1972]. 
53 Faull [1984] 360. See also: Thirteenth Report on Competition Policy 1983 [1984] (outcomes ‘determined in 
each case on the basis of the economic reality of the situation’); Caspari [1985] 454-461. 
54 Elopak/Metal Box-Odin (IV/ 32.009) [1990] OJ L209/15 (cooperation between can and carton-filling 
producers to create a hybrid would not occur individually, so they could not be considered potential 
competitors and the Article 101(1) prohibition did not apply). See: Venit [1991] 6, 26-27; Horspool and 
Korah [1992] 357-358, 360. 
55 European Night Services (IV/34.600) [1994] OJ L259/20. For disappointment: Korah [1994a] 257, 268; 
Bright [1996] 538. 
56 See fn 101.  
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As if this departure from the formal rule of law was not substantial enough, even the 
sole certainty that the legality of proposed agreements was entirely at the Commission’s 
discretion provided little solace. As it was constantly overwhelmed by the thousands of 
notified agreements seeking exemption - a predicament entirely of the Commission’s 
making in its broad-brush approach to Article 101(1) - it was forced to respond primarily 
through informal reassurances that it would not investigate further (“comfort letters”).57 
Given the uncertain legal status of these letters before national courts,58 businesses 
frequently self-applied the paragraph (3) exemption to develop a justification should the 
Commission decide to intervene, or simply ignored EU competition law altogether.59 
This was undoubtedly a counterproductive consequence of the Commission’s desire to 
enjoy maximal control of business coordination.   
In sum, the discretion of Article 101(3) exemption decisions afforded the Commission an 
undeniably effective means to realise its policy goals. It had close oversight of notified 
agreements and could determine their legality on an individual, contract-specific basis, 
often demonstrating a nuanced economic understanding of the ex ante necessity of 
restrictive terms and considering wider public interest goals. Furthermore, it frequently 
secured far-reaching commitments to assuage long-term competitive concerns. But the 
Commission’s pre-modernisation approach to Article 101 was solely driven by a desire 
to pursue its competition policy ends with utmost efficacy, giving no consideration to 
the detrimental consequences of this means of market intervention. Its absolute 
discretion to grant exemption decisions, constituting subject-specific determinations of 
legality, failed to produce generalised, comprehensible norms to inform business 
decision-making. Lawfulness was often conditional, but there was no indication of what 
would actually be required in any instance. And this systemic uncertainty was 
exacerbated by the Commission’s exploitation of the decisional mechanics of Article 
101, reluctance to heed the requirements of the case law, and reliance upon 
unenforceable informalities to remedy an administrative burden of its own making. The 
ends may have been effective, but the means evidence a failure to realise the 
restrained, rationality-respecting ideal of the formal rule of law.  
                                                          
57 For dissatisfaction: Korah [1981]; Kon [1982] 544; Forrester and Norall [1984] 17; Van Bael [1986] 61 
(estimating that 96 per cent of cases closed without a formal decision); Hawk [1992] 324 [1995] 984; Wils 
[1999] 154, 156. 
58 Korah [1981] 22-24, 39; Van Bael [1986] 77. 
59 Forrester and Norall [1984] 16-17, 31-37. 
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B) Judicial Review of Article 101 Decisions  
The conceptualisation of the formal rule of law developed in Chapter IV stressed the 
importance of effective judicial review. This institutional requirement is both reactive 
and prospective. On the one hand, it provides a necessary mechanism for checking that 
administrative decisions are within the legal restrictions upon their authority to act (eg 
compliance with pre-existing law, meeting legal thresholds for characterising factual 
scenarios as prohibited, using powers for their intended purpose).60 On the other hand, 
judicial review also provides the opportunity for the courts to engage in the prospective 
formulation of legal norms. Whether crystallising a series of individualised decisions by 
the authority or of its own creation, courts can generate more generalised and 
comprehensible norms for determining legality, that thereby restrain the decision-
maker’s discretion and provide legal certainty.61 In this regard, courts are a key 
institutional actor in the approximation of the formal rule of law ideal. 
It is questionable whether the response of the EU Courts to the Commission’s pre-
modernisation enforcement of Article 101 effectively met either aspect of this dual role. 
i) Pre-Modernisation Article 101(3) Discretion and Wider Issues of Deferential Review 
With regard to the reactive judicial role of ensuring the legality of decisions and 
reviewing administrative appraisals, the extent to which the Commission’s discretion to 
grant Article 101(3) exemption decisions has been circumscribed by the EU Courts is 
debateable. Since the 1960s the CJEU had seemingly assumed a relaxed standard of 
review as to its legal characterisation of instant facts (ie that the Commission’s 
reasoning met the requirements of the Treaty).62 In the foundational case of Consten 
[1966] it ruled that Article 101(3) ‘necessarily implies complex evaluations on economic 
matters’ and therefore its oversight would be confined to an examination of the 
relevance of facts and the legal consequences deduced from them.63 This judicial 
reluctance to intervene in the Commission’s determining of exemptions has been 
regularly reasserted,64 with the CJEU in Metro I [1977] directly acknowledging the 
                                                          
60 See Chapter IV, Section II.C.i. 
61 See Chapter IV, Section II.C.ii. 
62 Forrester [2009]; Jaeger [2011] 297-298; Kalintiri [2016] 1287-1289. 
63 Consten [1966]. 
64 eg T-7/93 Langnese Iglo GmbH v Commission [1995] ECLI:EU:T:1995:98 [178]. 
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Commission’s ‘discretionary power in this sphere’.65 The classic formulation (or 
‘mantra’)66 of this deferential stance was given by the CJEU in Remia [1985] for when:67  
“the Commission has to appraise complex economic matters. The Court must therefore 
limit its review of such an appraisal to verifying whether the relevant procedural rules 
have been complied with, whether the statement of the reasons for the decision is 
adequate, whether the facts have been accurately stated and whether there has been 
any manifest error of appraisal or a misuse of powers” 
Consten was an example where an Article 101(3) exemption was not granted by the 
Commission. So long as it takes seriously a firm‘s evidence of counterbalancing benefits 
resulting from the restrictive agreement,68 the Courts have often been happy to accept 
such refusals.69 In contrast, Matra Hachette [1994] involved proceedings brought 
against the Commission’s decision in Ford/Volkswagen [1993] to grant exemption to a 
joint venture for a car factory in Portugal. As noted above, the Commission decision was 
influenced, at least, by consequential job creation and investment in a deprived 
region.70 The General Court upheld the exemption decision in its entirety, having 
acknowledged that as ‘complex economic facts are involved, judicial review of the legal 
characterisation of the facts is limited to the possibility of the Commission having 
committed a manifest error of assessment’.71 There are contrasting instances where 
review by the EU Courts of the Commission’s discretion to grant an Article 101(3) 
exemption has been more searching, leading to their overturning.72 Nevertheless, the 
combination of hands-off judicial statements as to the standard of review and the few 
examples of overturned decisions further contributed to the uncertain boundaries of the 
Commission’s discretion to grant exemptions. Given that this procedure was at times 
viewed as a forum for EU competition decision-making by the Commission to internalise 
public interest considerations, judicial abstinence was at least understandable. And 
deciding upon the appropriate standard of review vis-à-vis the legal characterisation of 
facts by an expert, administrative decision-maker is never a simple task.73 But still, 
                                                          
65 C-26/76 Metro-SB-Grossmärkte GmbH v Commission [1977] ECLI:EU:C:1977:167 (“Metro I [1977]”) [50]. 
66 Forrester [2009]. 
67 C-42/84 Remia and Nutricia v Commission [1985] ECLI:EU:C:1985:327 [34].  
68 T-168/01 GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v Commission [2006] ECLI:EU:T:2006:265 [236]. 
69 T-111/08 MasterCard v Commission [2012] ECLI:EU:T:2012:260 [194]-[237]. 
70 Ford/Volkswagen [1993] [36]. See text accompanying fn 18. 
71 Matra Hachette [1994] [104]. 
72 eg T-374, T-375, T-384, and T-388/94 European Night Services [1998] ECLI:EU:T:1998:198; T-185/00, T-
216/00, T-299/00 and T-300/00 Métropole Télévision SA (M6) v Commission [2002] ECLI:EU:T:2002:242. 
73 Especially as it is difficult to separate law, facts, and their legal characterisation: Vesterdorf [2005] 11; Van 
Cleynenbreugel [2012] 528-529; Laguna de Paz [2014] 206. 
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recourse to the EU Courts was an unreliable mechanism for structuring the 
Commission’s ad hoc determinations of legality pursuant to Article 101. 
More problematic has been the consequent spread of judicial deference. Given the 
uncertain scope of what constitutes a “complex” assessment, the breadth of light-touch 
scrutiny by the EU Courts may have come to shield potentially vast swathes of 
Commission decision-making.74 From its origins in Consten [1966] and the specific 
context of granting individual exemptions pursuant to Article 101(3), perhaps reflecting 
the multiplicity of values informing determinations of legality, deference has also been 
extended to cover many facets of Commission analyses concerning both Articles 101(1) 
and 102. For example, the classic statement in Remia [1985] of the relaxed standard of 
review related to the CJEU evaluating the Commission’s finding in the context of Article 
101(1) that a non-compete obligation for ten years was excessive, but a period of four 
years was not.75 In Microsoft [2007], not only did the General Court offer a margin of 
appreciation to the Commission’s economic assessments substantiating the claim of 
abusive conduct prohibited by Article 102,76 but it further extended lighter judicial 
scrutiny to ‘complex technical appraisals’.77 These are matters that go to the core of the 
Commission’s decision-making as to the legality of business practices, leading a number 
of commentators to urge an intensification in the review exercised by the EU Courts.78  
This is not a universally accepted interpretation. Several justifications for judicial 
deference have been offered based upon the robustness of Commission decision-
making,79 comparative economic expertise,80 or the separation of powers.81 Others have 
simply refuted the allegation that scrutiny by the EU Courts is not strong enough 
already,82 preferring to judge its deeds rather than words.83 Cases can be highlighted 
                                                          
74 Cengiz [2011] 141-142; Geradin and Petit [2011] 23; Jaeger [2011] 309; Kalintiri [2016] 1290-1302.   
75 Remia [1985]. 
76 T-201/04 Microsoft v Commission [2007] ECLI:EU:T:2007:289 [87], eg [379] (on whether the 
interoperability information was “indispensable”). 
77 ibid [88]. 
78 eg Siragusa [2009] 4; Forrester [2009]; [2011] 191-197 (on fining review); Slater, Thomas, and Waelbroeck 
[2009] 140; Temple Lang [2010] 238; Gerard [2010]; [2011]; Killick and Berghe [2011] 277; Bronckers and 
Vallery [2012] 294; Nikolic [2012] 586-587; Nazzini [2015b] 506.  
79 Castillo de la Torre [2009] 568-569; Sanchez Graells [2014] 260-263. 
80 Fritzsche [2010] 395, 397. See also: Caffarra and Walker [2010] 159. cf Forrester [2009]; Rose [2009] 8; 
Jaeger [2011] 309-311. 
81 Laguna de Paz [2014].  
82 eg Castillo de la Torre [2009] 565; Pais Antunes [2009] 3; Wils [2010] 28; [2011] 367-368; [2014] 19; 
Jaeger [2011] 300, 313; CMLRev Editorial [2011] 1411; Lenaerts [2013]; Loozen [2014] 106-107; Sanchez 
Graells [2014] 267; Laguna de Paz [2014] 204-206; Prek and Lefèvre [2016] 68. 
83 eg Castillo de la Torre [2009] 566; Wils [2010] 28; [2014] 16; Jaeger [2011] 300; Fritzsche [2010] 380; 
Sanchez Graells [2014] 267; Laguna de Paz [2014] 216; Kalintiri [2016] 1315. For judicial support: C-272/09P 
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that suggest close review of the Commission’s characterisation of the facts as meeting 
legal thresholds for prohibition under Article 101,84 102,85  and merger control.86 More 
adversarial statements by the EU Courts of searching oversight can also be found,87 
often following recitation of the deferential mantra, and perhaps suggesting that there 
is no clear, consistent logic at all as to the intensity of review.88 According to the CJEU at 
least, there is no cause for concern.89 
Regardless of which of the two accounts is accurate, it is clear that with regard to the 
Commission’s discretion to grant an Article 101(3) exemption, as well as many other 
aspects of competition decisions, there is uncertainty as to how exacting scrutiny will be 
by the EU Courts as to its legal characterisations of factual scenarios. When compared 
with the restraining role envisaged as part of the formal rule of law ideal, there has been 
legitimate cause for concern that the judiciary have not set limits to the Commission’s 
subject-specific determinations of legality, thereby perhaps doing little to ameliorate the 
occasional absence of normative certainty for firms.  
ii) The Scope of Article 101(1): From Frying-Pan to Fire 
While there is debate as to whether the EU Courts restrained the Commission’s Article 
101(3) discretion through demanding review of its direct exercise, the CJEU did however 
prospectively formulate norms for determining legality under Article 101(1) to indirectly 
limit its scope. Most commonly,90 this was by insisting that certain types of agreements 
ought to be evaluated through robust analysis of their potential anticompetitive 
effects.91 Although these cases set clear boundaries to the extent of the Commission’s 
discretion under Article 101(1), such a method for determining legality also risks failing 
                                                                                                                                                               
KME Germany AG v Commission [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:810 [109] (the General Court said it would afford 
deference to discretion, but carried out a ‘full and unrestricted review’). For criticism: Nazzini [2012] 995-
997; [2015b] 449; Nagy [2016] 238. 
84 C-89, 104, 114, 116-117, and 125-129/85 Ahlström Osakeyhtiö v Commission [1993] ECLI:EU:C:1993:120.  
85 Microsoft [2007]. See: Wils [2010] 28; [2014] 16; Jaeger [2011] 302. 
86 T-342/99 Airtours v Commission [2002] ECLI:EU:T:2002:146; T-310/01 Schneider Electric v Commission 
[2002] ECLI:EU:T:2002:254; T-5/02 Tetra Laval v Commission [2002] ECLI:EU:T:2002:264. See: Pais Antunes 
[2009]; Cengiz [2011] 142; Geradin and Petit [2011] 24-25; Gerard [2011] 472; Jaeger [2011] 599, 601; 
Ibáñez Colomo [2013] 404-405, 420-422; Laguna de Paz [2014] 217; Kalintiri [2016] 1300-1302, 1308; Prek 
and Lefèvre [2016] 72-74. 
87 eg C-12/03P Tetra Laval BV v Commission [2005] ECLI:EU:C:2005:87 [39]; Microsoft [88]-[89]; KME [2011] 
[102] (the margin of discretion doesn’t prevent ‘an in-depth review of the law and of the facts.’). 
88 Forrester [2009]; Fritzsche [2010] 380; Bronckers and Vallery [2012] 294; Van Cleynenbreugel [2012] 532-
533; [2014] 39-40; Nazzini [2015b] 492; Kalintiri [2016] 1286, 1289.   
89 KME [2011]. See: Sibony [2012] 1993; Bronckers and Vallery [2012] 292; Nazzini [2012] 995-996; [2015b] 
500-505; Van Cleynenbreugel [2014] 41, 44; Nagy [2016] 236. 
90 See the discussion of presumptions of legality in the next chapter. 
91 For praise: M Waelbroeck [1987] 697; Hawk [1988] 70; [1995] 982; Gerber [1994] 117-118, 127-128; 
Bright [1996] 551; Wesseling [1999] 422; [2000] 28, 30, 91, 93; Pera and Auricchio [2005] 177. 
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to approximate the formal rule of law ideal if it is left unstructured. Essentially, the CJEU 
may have substituted one means of market intervention without generalised, 
comprehensible normative obligations for legal subjects under Article 101(3), for 
another pursuant to Article 101(1). 
In the foundational case of Sociéte Technique Minière [1966] the CJEU was asked to rule 
on the legality of exclusive distribution agreements divided along national lines.92 The 
agreement in question prevented distributors deliberately selling into each other’s 
allotted territories (active sales) but did not prevent them from responding to requests 
from customers outside of their territory (passive sales). The CJEU reasoned that such 
partial territorial insulation could be ‘necessary for the penetration of a new area’ to 
guarantee the distributor a return on a novel product.93 As a result, exclusive 
distribution agreements would only breach Article 101(1) and be subject to the 
Commission’s discretion to grant a paragraph (3) exemption if restrictive of competition 
by effect. This required analysis of the specific agreement ‘within the actual context’, 
where the Commission would have to consider, amongst other things, the alternative 
counterfactual level of competition, the particular nature and quantity of products 
covered, the ‘position and importance’ of the specific parties, the severity of the 
exclusivity clauses, whether it was an ‘isolated’ or ‘series’ of agreements, and so on.94 It 
was thus legally prevented from simply assuming a restriction and then exercising its 
discretion to grant a paragraph (3) exception. 
The same narrowing of Article 101(1) was achieved by the CJEU with regard to single 
branding agreements, where distributors agree to stock only the products of a particular 
manufacturer. Although exclusivity may potentially foreclose upstream rivals, it can also 
increase inter-brand competition by focusing distributor attention upon one brand 
without free-riding by others, and is usually in exchange for manufacturer support, 
especially financial.95 In Brasserie de Haecht [1967] the CJEU essentially reiterated its 
approach to exclusive distribution agreements in STM; the prohibition of single branding 
under Article 101(1) was dependent upon an analysis of the agreement’s ‘effects in the 
context in which they occur’, including the ‘cumulative effect’ of similar contracts on the 
                                                          
92 C-56/65 Société Technique Minière v Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH [1966] ECLI:EU:C:1966:38 (“STM [1966]”). 
93 ibid. Praising its economic sophistication: Chard [1980] 407-408; Korah [1994a] 168-169, 269-270. Further 
restricting passive sales is presumed illegal by object: Consten [1966]. 
94 ibid. 
95 Chard [1980] 418-419; Guidelines on Vertical Restraints [2010] [130], [144]. 
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market.96 This means for determining legality was affirmed and elaborated upon in 
Delimitis [1991].97 Recognising the potential pro-competitive efficiency of their 
restrictions for both brewers and retailers, the CJEU found presumptions of 
anticompetitive harm by object inappropriate,98 instead recommending a two-stage 
effects-based analysis to apply the Article 101(1) prohibition: first, evaluating whether 
the totality of agreements had the ‘cumulative effect of denying market access’ to new 
entrants;99 and second, if so, whether the agreements of the producer in question 
contributed to that effect.100  
Through requiring close consideration of their restrictive effects for the application of 
Article 101(1) to certain categories of agreement, the CJEU in STM, Brasserie de Haecht, 
and Delimitis disrupted the Commission’s reliance upon Article 101(3) exemptions to 
engage in discretionary determinations of legality. The ultimate substantive outcome 
might frequently have been the same, regardless of whether the conclusion of 
lawfulness was reached through finding a lack of restrictive effects under paragraph (1) 
or a more nuanced analysis of its pro-competitive efficiencies under (3). But these cases 
limited the potential for searching, contract-specific, often conditional conclusions 
through Article 101(3) exemption decisions, thereby hindering the effectiveness with 
which the Commission could pursue its own ends in competition policy. It is therefore 
unsurprising that it resisted, often simply ignoring these precedents and engaging in 
laconic effects analysis to find the paragraph (1) prohibition met anyway.101 At least for 
single-branding agreements, the Courts eventually required the Commission to comply, 
thereby guaranteeing congruence between the legal requirement of effects analysis and 
its actual application in competition decision-making.102 
But just because the CJEU’s effects-based case law limited the scope of the 
Commission’s Article 101(3) discretion, it did not automatically mean that EU 
competition policy approximated the formal rule of law ideal. The legality of agreements 
was still determined by a means far from aspirations of applying generalised norms that 
                                                          
96 C-23/67 Brasserie de Haecht SA v Wilkin (No 1) [1967] ECLI:EU:C:1967:54. 
97 C-234/89 Delimitis v Henninger Bräu [1991] ECLI:EU:C:1991:91.  
98 ibid [10]-[12]. 
99 ibid [23]. 
100 ibid [24]. 
101 Korah [1981] 35; [1984] 53; [1994b] 171; Veltrop [1994] 563-567, 573; Hawk [1995] 982. 
102 Langese-Iglo GmbH (IV/34.072) [1993] OJ L183/19; Schöller Lebensmittled GmbH & Co KG (IV/31.533 and 
IV/34.072) [1993] OJ 183/1. Reaffirming the requirement for rigorous effects analysis: Langnese [1995]; C-
279/95P Langnese Iglo GmbH v Commission [1998] ECLI:EU:C:1998:447. 
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were comprehensible to businesses. The source of comparable legal uncertainty and 
contract-specific normative acts had simply changed.  
Prima facie, purely effects-based tests for determining legality appear the picture of 
simplicity, as the two-step Delimitis approach for evaluating single branding agreements 
would suggest. But when compared with the formal rule of law ideal, such standards 
mask the sheer complexity of the factual analysis required for deciding lawfulness, 
which businesses cannot simply be expected to prospectively emulate to comprehend 
their legal obligations and formulate their future commercial plans. According to the 
CJEU in Delimitis, whether single branding agreements come within Article 101(1) and 
require individual exemption depends upon, for instance, the number of distributors 
and quantity of products affected, duration, possibility of new entry through acquisition 
of another established brewer, opening their own distributors, the rules governing 
company acquisition, the minimum distribution necessary for profit, market saturation, 
customer loyalty, and other factors.103 Essentially, everything is relevant but nothing is 
especially important. Just as with the Commission’s Article 101(3) discretion it replaced, 
unstructured, purely effects-based analysis is a problematic means for determining the 
legality of individual agreements from the perspective of the formal rule of law.104 In its 
commendable ambition to legally categorise anti-competitive and pro-competitive acts 
with absolute economic accuracy, the Delimitis “test” fails itself to provide any 
generalised norms - or even to list a series of decision-making factors - to structure and 
rigidify legal analysis, which would permit businesses to prospectively comprehend their 
obligations under Article 101. It is the European cousin of the US rule of reason 
standard, heavily criticised by the Chicago School for its unpredictability and 
administrability.105 Purely effects-based evaluations of lawfulness require the 
Commission to determine legality through a factually complex, ad hoc analysis that takes 
a team of economists with information, resources, and expertise months to conduct. 
Undoubtedly, the richest companies could amass a rival team, scrutinising the potential 
competitive consequences of every proposed commercial decision, but what of the 
costs, delay, and likelihood of reasonable disagreement between experts? Furthermore, 
what about companies that are not able to buy a degree of legal certainty for their 
                                                          
103 Paraphrasing: Lasok [1991] 195. See also: M Waelbroeck [1991] 114. 
104 On this as a necessary sacrifice: Holley [1992] 693. 
105 The primary difference is that no pro-competitive efficiencies are to be considered under Article 101(1), 
but addressed under paragraph (3): T-112/99 Métropole Télévision (M6), Suez-Lyonnaise des eaux, France 
Télécom and Télévision française 1 SA (TF1) v Commission [2001] ECLI:EU:T:2001:215 [72]-[77]. 
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envisaged commercial strategy? How are they to know whether their single branding 
agreements are prohibited by Article 101(1), aside from waiting for the Commission to 
tell them so? Additionally, all of these problems assume that the Commission is indeed 
able to reach the economically “correct” outcome. As Easterbrook warned in the 
1980s,106 it would be naïve to overlook the potential for decision-making errors when 
effects-based analysis is entirely unstructured, given the complexity of the analysis and 
potential for a lack of economic consensus. And noting the aforementioned uncertainty 
over the EU Courts’ standard of review, successful error correction cannot be 
guaranteed, especially by bodies with relatively less economic expertise.   
When considered from the perspective of the formal rule of law, the CJEU’s precedents 
in STM and Delimitis indeed took the lawfulness of exclusive distribution and single 
branding agreements out of the frying pan: subject-specific determinations of their 
legality without generalised, comprehensible norms via the Commission’s Article 101(3) 
discretion. But they still risked entering the equally undesirable fire: subject-specific 
determinations of their legality without generalised, comprehensible norms via Article 
101(1) effects-based analysis lacking any decision-making structure. To be clear, 
discretion and effects-based analysis are distinct concepts: the Commission has no 
discretion if it can only prohibit conduct where anticompetitive effects arise; or if the 
Commission has discretion, it can actively choose to prohibit actions based on their 
effect. Yet when deciding the lawfulness of conduct is exclusively a question of its 
specific effects, facts, and circumstances, this is as unstructured, particularistic, 
unpredictable a form of market intervention as discretion, both far from approximating 
the formal rule of law.  
Of course, factually-complex determinations are present in many fields of law,107 raising 
comparable issues of certainty, administrability, and errors. But small concessions to the 
value of normative generalisations can mitigate the worst excesses of purely 
unstructured decision-making without compromising too heavily in terms of economic 
accuracy. As realisation of the formal rule of law is relative, moving along a sliding scale, 
even modest attempts to concretise effects-based standards through more generalised 
factors indicative of competitive concerns improves legal certainty for businesses. The 
issue with these CJEU cases is the prima facie purity of the effects analysis based on the 
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totality of circumstances. As will be discussed in the next chapter, the Commission has 
published a number of documents highlighting important indicators which elaborate 
upon the nature and content of this analysis. Such efforts towards structured effects-
based determinations of legality should be praised; in comparison to the form of market 
intervention seen in STM and Delimitis, they represent an attempt to reconcile the need 
for economically-accurate enforcement with approximating the formal rule of law ideal.      
III. Enforcement of Article 102 TFEU 
A) Commission Decisions: Building Discretion 
Article 102 TFEU does not outlaw the holding of a dominant position on the market.108 
Instead, it simply prohibits an ‘abuse’ of such pre-eminence, conceptualised since the 
1970s as ‘recourse to methods different from those which condition normal 
competition‘,109 or, as commonly referred to in English, not competition “on the 
merits”.110 This distinction can be traced to the Ordoliberal divide between 
“performance” competition, where firms successfully gain market share through better 
products and lower prices than their competitors, and “impediment” competition, 
abusing their dominance to the detriment of rivals.111 Like the Article 101(3) exemption, 
the EU Courts have ruled that it is possible to justify prima facie abuses by 
demonstrating their objective justification or efficiency,112 though this has so far never 
been successful. 
As the standard for determinations of illegality under Article 102, “competition on the 
merits” does not have a deducible essence revealing in itself that certain types of 
conduct undertaken by dominant firms are abusive.113 In the absence of a clear legal 
boundary to the concept, the Commission has assumed the discretion to intervene 
against and prohibit any conduct by a dominant firm it deems for whatever reason to be 
abusive, to not be competition “on the merits”. To this end, a variety of business 
practices have been condemned by the Commission since the early 1970s: the combined 
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sale of two products;114 refusals to continue supplying inputs115 or begin to licence;116 
squeezing the margin of downstream rivals;117 misleading patent offices;118 bringing 
injunctions against a willing licensee of a standard-essential patent;119 and the 
favourable display of the dominant firm’s related businesses on a general search 
engine,120 to name but a few. 
Without doubt, the Commission’s discretion to find that any practice is not competition 
“on the merits” has permitted it to effectively pursue its competition policy ends, 
however constituted. But once again, the Commission’s attempt to secure for itself the 
broadest possible flexibility to find conduct abusive under Article 102 as and when it 
sees fit has been at the expense of realising the formal rule of law. As the example of its 
pre-modernisation decisional record on rebates illustrates, there were seemingly no 
limits to the Commission’s discretion to intervene on an ad hoc basis. The consequence 
of this means for determining the legality of market conduct was considerable 
normative uncertainty for dominant firms. But what makes the policing of rebates a 
particularly egregious example of the Commission prioritising effective enforcement at 
all costs is how it actively sought to marginalise the restraining influence of generalised 
legal norms formulated by the CJEU upon its discretion to intervene. In essence, the 
Commission deliberately tried to avoid the rigidity of determining legality in the manner 
envisaged by the formal rule of law.  
i) The Effective Ends of Discretion 
From the perspective of the formal rule of law, the Commission’s commonly alleged bias 
against efficient and fierce competition by big businesses, as supposedly manifest in its 
approach to rebates,121 is irrelevant. Whatever the ends of its enforcement activity, it is 
clear that the Commission was able to effectively realise them. From its first 
engagement in the mid-1970s to controversial decisions at the dawn of its substantive 
modernisation of Article 102, the Commission has secured for itself the discretion to 
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scrutinise and ultimately find illegal almost any rebate schemes, however specifically 
constituted.  
The Commission’s initial focus was discounts conditional upon exclusivity or near-
exclusivity in Hoffmann [1976].122 If any of the manifold schemes operated by dominant 
firms are to raise competitive concerns, these loyalty or fidelity rebates are arguably it. 
Granting discounts for satisfying all or most of a company’s individual product demand, 
regardless of the actual volume purchased, can be a strong incentive to deal exclusively 
with a supplier to the possible exclusion of other firms.123 For the first time in Hoffmann 
the Commission deemed such rebates for near-exclusivity by the vitamin producer to be 
violations of Article 102. Indeed, this form of discounting was found automatically 
abusive as ‘by its nature [it] hampers the freedom of choice’ of purchasers.124  
The Commission soon expanded the scope of its Article 102 oversight of rebates to also 
potentially outlaw discounts offered by a dominant firm for satisfying individually-set 
targets. In Michelin I [1981] and BA [2000], it prohibited pre-agreed rebates on all 
purchases granted to repairers and travel agents respectively for meeting annual sales 
thresholds.125 Although frequently depicted by economists as a manifestation of 
legitimate and ‘natural competitive rivalry’,126 a presumption of competitive harm was 
prioritised by the Commission over consideration of their actual market 
consequences.127 This was despite the fact that in the latter decision, BA’s rivals had 
actually increased their market share.128 In finding it legally acceptable to ground 
presumptions of illegality upon a practice’s mere capability of anticompetitive 
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consequences,129 the EU Courts endorsed a low threshold for the Commission to reverse 
the burden of proof onto defendant companies to substantiate a justification.130  
The final panel in the triptych establishing the Commission’s discretion to outlaw a wide 
range of rebate schemes was Michelin II [2002], where Article 102 was applied to 
discounts for meeting standardised targets.131 These provided discounts equally applied 
to buyers of all sizes for annual volume purchases, where passing each threshold 
secured a discount on every product acquired. In this instance, the Commission found 
such rebates abusive.132 
Through this series of decisions over a 25 year period, the Commission gradually 
expanded its discretion to condemn a variety of rebate schemes as abusive under Article 
102, from exclusivity, through individualised targets, to standardised volume discounts. 
This broad legal control of almost all forms of rebates was undoubtedly effective for the 
Commission to achieve its ends. If its goal was to protect the existence of smaller 
companies and the maintenance of a more equitable market structure, the ability to 
readily find many discounts illegal under Article 102 was clearly of utmost efficacy. But 
even if a more efficiency-focused approach were to be pursued instead, the 
Commission’s decisional record was of great utility. Economic theory does not entirely 
rule-out that the various rebate systems investigated cannot be harmful to consumer 
welfare, but instead reaches differing conclusions as to the likelihood of anticompetitive 
outcomes in each case. This is what has motivated calls for an end to imperfect 
presumptions133 and for legality to be determined through effects-based analysis.134 
Having established that many types of rebate scheme may come within the scope of the 
Article 102 prohibition, the Commission’s discretion to find individual instances illegal, 
however specifically constituted, could be deployed to effectively pursue the end of only 
prohibiting the exclusion of as-efficient rivals. 
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ii) The Problematic Means of Discretion 
The efficacy of the Commission’s oversight of a variety of rebate schemes pursuant to 
Article 102 was constructed through a means of market intervention that was 
detrimental to normative certainty for businesses. More specifically, this broad-ranging 
discretion resulted from the Commission conquering and expanding the gap left by the 
CJEU’s ruling in Hoffmann [1979].  
In the landmark Hoffmann judgment, the Court accepted the Commission’s conclusion 
that fidelity rebates – ‘discounts conditional on the customer’s obtaining all or most if its 
requirements’ from a dominant undertaking – were not competition “on the merits” 
and amounted to an abuse. It was content to endorse the Commission’s finding of 
legality in this instance as it found that exclusivity discounts  were ‘designed’ to restrict 
the free choice of purchasers, denying other producers access to the market, and  
applying ‘dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions’.135 Putting aside the economic 
sophistication of this presumption, the CJEU formulated a general, comprehensible legal 
obligation: fidelity rebates for near-exclusive purchasing are illegal. In contrast, it also 
established a norm of presumptive legality for ‘quantity rebates exclusively linked with 
the volume of purchases’ offered equally to all buyers.136 
As a means for determining the lawfulness of discounts, from the perspective of the 
formal rule of law the two norms established by the CJEU have a great deal to commend 
them; they are general, relatively clear obligations applicable to all dominant firms that 
are capable of informing business decision-making. But it is the same formal 
characteristics that make these problematic from the view of a competition authority 
wishing to realise its ends as effectively as possible: they restrain and rigidify the 
Commission’s discretion in individual instances to decide that quantity rebates are 
illegal, or (more unlikely) that exclusivity rebates are permissible under Article 102. They 
also said nothing as to the space left between, upon which the CJEU presumably 
reached no conclusion as to their permissibility. 
To guarantee the effective realisation of its competition ends under Article 102, the 
Commission responded by systematically distorting both generalised, comprehensible 
norms in its pre-modernisation decisions on rebates. It was thereby able to cement its 
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far-reaching discretion to determine legality on an ad hoc basis against potentially any 
form of discount by a dominant firm.  
This was principally achieved by unpredictably expanding the CJEU’s condemnation of 
exclusivity rebates through analogising and the (economically-sound) insistence that all 
discounts could have anticompetitive consequences. Essentially, the Commission’s 
decisions aimed to colonise the gap between exclusivity and quantity discounts through 
finding that everything could be “loyalty-inducing”, a discretionary conclusion based on 
a holistic, unstructured analysis of all the circumstances, rather than applying clear, 
generalised norms for determining legality. For instance, it jumped from the Hoffmann 
prohibition of near-exclusivity loyalty rebates to individually-determined target rebates 
in Michelin I by asserting that ‘the bonuses must be regarded as a variant of loyalty 
rebates’ on the facts.137 Although this was not at all obvious on the basis of the 
Hoffmann precedent, the Commission concluded with little substantiation that such 
discounts were not competition “on the merits” and were abusive.138 Individualised 
target schemes therefore came within the scope of its enforcement of Article 102.  
The same can be said of the finding in Michelin II that standardised volume rebates 
granted annually to all buyers on the same terms were prohibited. Here the 
Commission’s decision diverged from the plain reading of the CJEU’s precedents 
suggesting that such discounts were legal: Hoffmann had explicitly indicated this, and 
Michelin I stressed that the individualised nature of targets was what could be loyalty-
inducing.139 Prior to Michelin II, businesses may legitimately believe that standardised 
volume rebates fell outside of the Article 102 prohibition. Yet the Commission evaded 
the restraint of the law and broke the expectations of businesses by nevertheless finding 
them abusive, through what can only be considered conclusory logic rather than legal 
reasoning: Hoffmann conceptualised abuses as competition not “on the merits”,140 
which meant that dominant companies could not strengthen or abuse their position,141 
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and ‘this is exactly what has occurred in the case in point’ as Michelin’s action ‘was not 
based on the methods which condition normal competition.’142  
As for the clear Hoffmann presumption of legality for quantity rebates itself, aside from 
breaching it in Michelin II, the Commission maximised its discretion by conceptualising it 
as a very narrow exception to legal condemnation that is difficult to prove. First, it 
secured its broad discretion through finding quantity rebates the only variety classifiable 
as competition “on the merits”: ‘no discount should be granted unless directly linked to 
a genuine reduction in the manufacturer’s costs.’143 And second, it made quantity 
rebates a defence that is almost impossible to meet. As decisions such as Michelin II and 
Portuguese Airports demonstrate, the Commission found volume discounts loyalty-
inducing and then shifted the burden of proof onto defendants to demonstrate that they 
were actually pure quantity rebates, with a very difficult evidential threshold to establish 
legality: that the rebate amount reflected a ‘fair marginal or linear return on the 
additional purchase’, thus allowing the firm to realise savings through economies of 
scale.144 This is particularly challenging for the provision of services: Portugal could not 
show cost-based savings to justify purely quantitative discounts for greater frequencies 
of airport landings a month, so the Commission found them abusive.145 In this way, the 
presumption of legality for quantity rebates established by the CJEU was narrowed to 
the point of extinction. 
The Commission’s pre-modernisation policing of rebates pursuant to Article 102 was 
undoubtedly rigorous. Whether its end was to protect small competitors or only prohibit 
the exclusion of as-efficient rivals, the expansion of the Commission’s discretion to 
scrutinise any discount system through 25 years of decisional practice did, for better or 
worse, allow its policy goals to be realised with utmost effectiveness. But these potent 
ends were achieved through freeing itself from the restraint and rationality of 
generalised, comprehensible norms approximating the rule of law ideal. In building its 
unstructured discretion to find various schemes illegal, businesses evidently had little 
indication of what could be found illegal. The initial prohibition of loyalty rebates was 
expanded to cover everything as they could have “loyalty-inducing” effects on the basis 
of holistic, conduct-specific analysis. Even where it looked as if there was a safe harbour 
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for quantity rebates, the Commission broke this expectation and the Hoffmann 
precedent anyway. With Michelin II completing the Commission’s discretion-building 
decisions, at the dawn of the substantive modernisation of Article 102 it could find 
pretty much any rebates abusive.  
From the perspective of dominant firms, there were no generalised, comprehensible 
norms meaningfully restraining the Commission’s legal oversight of this common 
business practice.146 The illegality of “loyalty-inducing” rebates was an unforeseeable 
discretionary determination by the Commission that could prohibit any discount system 
as it saw fit,147 and the legality of quantity rebates was almost impossible for businesses 
to prove.148 The only certainty that businesses enjoyed was knowing that exclusivity 
rebates were illegal, which offered little solace. The best advice to dominant firms 
wishing to avoid Commission condemnation pursuant to Article 102 was simply not to 
offer any discounts for purchasers.149 Given that rebates are an ordinary part of fierce 
competition, and dominant firms will often compete with non-dominant firms not 
subject to the law of Article 102, normative uncertainty recommending abstinence from 
often efficient conduct is not a satisfactory outcome for competition enforcement. 
B) Judicial Review: Who Interprets the Law of Article 102? 
It was argued with regard to judicial oversight of Article 101 that the CJEU was, at times, 
a hindrance to the Commission’s discretion to grant Article 101(3) exemption decisions. 
Although the form of market intervention substituted risked falling far from the formal 
rule of law ideal – ad hoc, contract-specific determinations of legality without any 
generalised, comprehensible norms to inform businesses - the CJEU’s insistence upon 
(albeit unstructured) effects-based analysis set legal boundaries to the automatic 
imposition of the Article 101(1) prohibition, ultimately restraining the Commission’s 
discretionary oversight for certain categories of agreement. Despite a perhaps 
deferential standard of judicial review afforded to the Commission’s Article 101(3) 
decisions, the CJEU’s prospective formulation of the law on Article 101(1) generated a 
degree of institutional antagonism in the pre-modernisation era. The Court was at least 
attempting to constrain the Commission’s discretion. 
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The same cannot (always)150 be said of the EU Court’s scrutiny of Commission decisions 
pursuant to Article 102. The subject of rebates provides an illustrative example of the 
Courts failing to prospectively formulate and defend general norms for determining 
legality, which would have restrained the Commission’s discretion and offered certainty 
to dominant firms. Ultimately, the EU Courts did not meet their role envisaged as part of 
the formal rule of law, of structuring ad hoc decisions, clarifying legal obligations 
deduced from Article 102, and setting boundaries to the Commission’s individual 
findings of illegality. 
Following the leadership of the CJEU in Hoffmann where it formulated two general, clear 
norms of legality and illegality, the subsequent relationship between the Commission 
and Courts on rebates was relatively more deferential. Rather than defending the 
Hoffmann presumptions and rigidifying the Commission’s means of finding everything 
possibly “loyalty-inducing” through conduct-specific analysis, the Courts legally 
legitimated its discretion to deem any rebates abusive on an ad hoc basis. In contrast to 
judicial deference on the decision-maker’s legal characterisation of instant facts as 
meeting thresholds for prohibition, the CJEU may have afforded deference to the 
Commission’s interpretation of the law itself. 
In Michelin I [1983] the CJEU was asked to rule upon the Commission’s stretching of 
abusive exclusivity rebates in Hoffmann to individualised target schemes. It accepted 
that these discounts fell between the stools of illegal loyalty and legal quantity 
rebates.151 But it was nevertheless content to endorse the Commission’s finding of them 
as abusive under Article 102 in this specific instance,152 given the annual reference 
period, high market shares, a lack of transparency, and so on.153 But in simply recounting 
the many factors that had gone into the Commission’s holistic justification for a finding 
of illegality in this instance, the CJEU neglected to offer generalised norms for 
determining the legality of individualised target regimes that could inform businesses 
and limit the Commission’s ability to intervene. Essentially, the Court endorsed the 
Commission’s unstructured discretion to deem individualised target schemes illegal as 
and when it saw fit. 
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The same can be said of the General Court in Michelin II [2003], where it once again 
accepted the Commission’s drive to maximise its discretionary oversight of discounts.154 
It endorsed the notion that ‘any loyalty-inducing rebate system’ of a dominant firm was 
illegal.155 This does not amount to a general and comprehensible threshold for 
determining the legality of rebates. It is a conclusion reached on an ad hoc basis through 
‘consider[ing] all the circumstances’ specific to the individual discount scheme.156 Given 
the particularities of the standardised target scheme in question, the Court was happy 
to accept that the Commission had demonstrated loyalty-inducing characteristics in this 
instance.157 Again, the General Court failed to approximate the formal rule of law by 
providing no limits or structure to the Commission’s discretion to find any rebate 
scheme illegal. It once more legitimated the determination of legality through ad hoc, 
subject-specific market interventions.  
But Michelin II was also a particularly egregious instance of judicial deference as to the 
law because the General Court did not defend the only apparent restraint to the 
Commission’s discretionary enforcement: that quantity rebates were legal. The sole 
normative certainty that dominant firms had in this field was removed by the Court 
accepting that standardised volume rebates could nevertheless be “loyalty-inducing” in 
individual instances, when the entirety of circumstances were evaluated.158 
Furthermore, it endorsed the Commission’s marginalisation of the legality of quantity 
rebates by accepting the difficult evidential burden to rebut the presumption of an 
abuse. Repeating that their permissibility was related to considerations of lower costs 
on bulk-dealing,159 the General Court agreed with the need for businesses to 
demonstrate the passing-on of ‘actual cost savings’; mere references to economies of 
scale were ‘too general’ and ‘insufficient’.160 This was a reaffirmation of the CJEU’s 
problematic claims in Portugal v Commission [2001] on standardised volume rebates at 
airports.161 As it ruled that notionally volume-based quantity rebates could also amount 
to abusive discrimination if the higher bands with large savings were routinely met by 
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only a few firms,162 it accepted the shifting of the burden of proof onto defendants; the 
Commission could presume that even quantity rebates were abusive, unless firms met 
the nigh-on impossible threshold for demonstrating their status as pure quantity 
discounts.  
Judicial review of the Commission’s decisional practice on rebates accepted its 
discretion building, shifting the nature of market intervention away from the formal rule 
of law. Every extension of the Commission’s ad hoc ability to find various discounts 
illegal was met with approval, even if it distorted the CJEU’s own case law that 
businesses had relied upon. On individualised and standardised target rebates, the 
Courts failed to structure the Commission’s holistic determinations of illegality for 
“loyalty-inducing” discounts with any generalised norms for firms to comprehend the 
lawfulness of their own rebates. Post-Hoffmann, the Courts declined opportunities to 
approximate the restraint and rationality-respecting rigidity of the formal rule of law 
ideal in this area of EU competition enforcement.  
This example of a reserved reaction by the EU Courts to the development of the means 
for determining the legality of conduct pursuant to Article 102 raises a wider question: 
which institution actually deduces the normative obligations of EU competition law from 
the Treaty? According to the Article 19(3) TEU this is solely a task for the EU judiciary. 
The Courts are to ensure that the Commission’s decisions are in accordance with the 
law, without providing for deference as to what “the law” means.163 It would be 
unrealistic to suggest that Commission decision-making at the enforcement coalface 
should never attempt to expand the boundaries to capture new types of business 
conduct that could legitimately be considered abusive under Article 102; there is clearly 
a welcome degree of dialogue between administrative action and judicial interpretation 
of the law deduced from the Treaties. As noted above, the varieties of conduct that have 
been categorised as abusive by the Commission and accepted by the EU Courts has 
grown exponentially since the 1970s. In terms of the ends of enforcing Article 102, 
whether efficiency-or equity-based, the maximal jurisdiction to intervene allows for 
their effective pursuit as and when required.  
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But as the EU Courts have routinely rubber-stamped new abuses as falling within the 
dominant undertaking’s “special responsibility”, can it really be maintained that judges 
alone deduce the requirements of the law; authoritatively deciding what is permitted 
and prohibited, and the means for determining their legality?164 There are no limits to 
the types of conduct that can be found contrary to “normal” competition “on the 
merits”.165 This phenomenon of adding new types of conduct to the “special 
responsibility” of dominant firms continues in earnest in the post-modernisation era of 
Article 102, both directly166 and indirectly,167 and will perhaps be reaffirmed in the 
forthcoming review of the Google Search prohibition decision.168 Of course, it may well 
be the case that the EU Courts have been correct to accept every extension of the scope 
of Article 102, albeit fostering legal uncertainty for businesses. But as discussed in the 
previous chapter, there is a tension between normative comprehensibility and individual 
responsibility on the one hand, central to the formal rule of law, and incremental, 
organic norm-formulation on the other.169 At the very least, unforeseeable violations of 
the law should be met with no punishment (nulla poena sine lege). Rather than the EU 
Courts upholding this tenet of the rule of law, it has, in fact, been the Commission 
commendably exercising punitive self-restraint for novel determinations of an abuse.170 
Yet this has not been wholesale, as illustrated by the imposition of a €2 billion fine in 
Google Search for an entirely unprecedented violation of Article 102.171 
What is more problematic is where there has seemed to be a generalised, 
comprehensible norm limiting the Commission’s ability to find illegality which the Courts 
have subsequently declined to uphold. One example of such deference to formulating 
the legal obligations deducible from Article 102 was discussed above: Michelin II on 
standardised volume rebates contradicting Hoffmann on quantity rebates. Another 
instance was Tetra Pak II [1994] where the clear wording of the Treaty itself was diluted, 
freeing the Commission from its apparent restraint. Article 102(d) explicitly lists as an 
                                                          
164 Art and Ibáñez Colomo [2010]; Gerard [2011] 470-471; Ibáñez Colomo [2013] 411-412. cf Wils [2011] 
364-384. 
165 C-6/72 Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Company Inc v Commission [1973] 
ECLI:EU:C:1973:22  (“Continental Can [1973]”) [26]. 
166 eg C-457/10P AstraZeneca AB and AstraZeneca plc v Commission [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:770 (misuse of 
regulatory procedures). 
167 eg C-170/13 Huawei Technologies Co Ltd v ZTE Corp and ZTE Deutschland GmbH [2015] 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:477 (injunctions against standard-essential patents). 
168 T-612/17 Google and Alphabet v Commission [pending]. See: [2017] OJ C369/37. 
169 See Chapter IV, text accompanying fn 76-87. 
170 Motorola [2014] (owing to the novelty of finding injunctions for standard-essential patents abusive). For 
praise: Whish [2014] 604. 
171 Google Search [2017]. 
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exemplary abuse the concluding of contracts with ‘supplementary obligations’ which 
have ‘no connection’ according to ‘commercial usage’. One would presume that if it did 
reflect ordinary ‘commercial usage’, it would not amount to an abuse. Yet when Tetra 
Pak argued as much in response to the Commission condemning its tied sale of carton-
filling machines and cartons, the CJEU found that this generalised limit to market 
intervention didn’t actually matter: Article 102 was ‘not exhaustive’ and therefore even 
where tying did accord with ordinary business practice, ‘such sales may still constitute 
an abuse’.172 
But restraining the Commission’s unpredictable discretion to find conduct abusive does 
not just concern the Courts merely scrutinising what can be deemed illegal. Judicial 
leadership in formulating the norms of EU competition law also goes to how 
determinations of illegality pursuant to Article 102 are made; whether the Commission’s 
decision-making is structured by generalised rules, presumptions, or multi-stage tests 
that are comprehensible to businesses, or is simply an ad hoc, context-specific 
discretionary appraisal. The rebates cases discussed above, where the Courts endorsed 
individualised findings of “loyalty-inducing” discounts on the particular facts of the case, 
represent the unstructured latter. The Courts’ record in this regard is mixed, coming 
down to the type of abuse in question. Sometimes it has formulated generalised 
presumptions of illegality that tightly constrain and rigidify the Commission’s discretion 
to condemn conduct as abusive, thus affording dominant companies a reasonable 
degree of certainty as to their legal obligations.173 In other instances, EU Courts have 
assisted the Commission in loosening the normative restraint of demanding structured 
tests for finding conduct illegal, thereby expanding its discretion to intervene 
unpredictably against conduct as it sees necessary.174 
Overall, the EU Court’s adherence to the role envisaged as part of the formal rule of law 
ideal is debateable under Article 102. It has set no boundaries to the Commission finding 
new abuses of a dominant position and has, at times, neglected to promulgate norms 
that would structure its discretion. Although the next chapter will discuss more decisive 
instances of leadership by the CJEU to shape EU competition law into generalised and 
comprehensible norms, it is nevertheless clear at this stage that judicial endeavours to 
                                                          
172 C-333/94P Tetra Pak International SA v Commission [1995] ECLI:EU:C:1996:436 [37]. 
173 See Chapter VI, Sections III.C.i, and D.ii. 
174 See the discussion of Microsoft [2007] in Chapter VI, Section III.D.ii. 
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restrain Commission decision-making and foster legal certainty for businesses have 
sometimes been lacking. 
IV. Commitment Decisions in the Post-Modernisation Era: More Effective Ends, Same Problematic Means, 
By the end of the 1990s, the Commission had realised that its gaming of the procedural 
idiosyncrasies of Regulation 17/62 had become counterproductive. As Section II 
demonstrated, it had deliberately adopted an unnecessarily broad approach to 
interpreting Article 101(1), thereby ensuring maximal oversight to effectively realise its 
policy ends through the discretionary granting of paragraph (3) exemption decisions. 
The eventual problem was one of too much oversight; the quantity of agreements 
notified had become unmanageable for the Commission to meaningfully scrutinise. As a 
result, the compulsory notification and centralised exemption regime for Article 101 
eventually came to an end with Article 5 of Regulation 1/2003, permitting national 
courts and enforcement bodies to apply Article 101(1) and (3) together for the first time. 
But the procedural modernisation was both an instance of change and continuity.175 
Despite the decentralisation of Article 101(3), Regulation 1/2003 affords the 
Commission the discretion to pursue its competition policy ends as it sees fit in 
individual instances through negotiating directly with businesses. But this post-
modernisation discretion to intervene in markets is even more effective: it can also be 
used for Article 102 investigations;176 as there is no formal finding of illegality, 
rudimentary analysis177 and fewer defence rights178 are permissible; the remedial 
packages can be ratcheted-up via invariably negative responses to their compulsory 
                                                          
175 Some imply that commitment decisions are an innovation: Georgiev [2007] 973; Botteman and Patsa 
[2013] 349. For more accurate accounts: Van Bael [1986]; D Waelbroeck [1986]; Bourgeois [1993]; Furse 
[2004] 5; Sousa Ferro [2005] 459; Cook [2006] 210; Wils [2006] 347-348; [2015] 10-12; Marquis [2008] xxxi-
xxxii; Schweitzer [2008] 548; Martinez Lage and Allendesalazar [2008] 583-584; Forrester [2008] 639-630; 
Jenny [2015] 703-705. See Section II.A.i on conditional exemption decisions and comfort letters. 
176 Although without a legal basis, companies regularly agreed an “undertaking” to suspend the 
Commission’s Article 102 investigation, eg: IBM, ‘Averting the Danger of an Abuse of Dominant Position: The 
IBM Case’ [1984] 17(7/8) Bulletin of the European Communities 7 (see: Hughes [1985] 189-195; Van Bael 
[1986] 70-75); Twenty-Seventh Report on Competition Policy 1997 (Brussels 1998) mentions La Poste/SWIFT 
(26), IRI/Nielsen (144-148), and Digital (26-27); Marathon, Commission press releases IP/01/1641,  
IP/03/547, IP/03/1129, and IP/04/573 (see: Temple Lang [2003] 356; Cave and Crowther [2005] 487). 
177 ‘Report on the Functioning of Regulation 1/2003’ [2009] Commission Staff Working Paper SEC(2009) 574 
(“Staff Working Paper [2009]”) 33. 
178 ‘To Commit or not to Commit?: Deciding Between Prohibition and Commitments’ [2014] Competition 
Policy Brief (“To Commit? [2014]”). The procedural safeguards conceded are not addressed in this thesis. 
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market testing;179 enforcement of non-compliance is more robust than before;180 and all 
of this without the cumbersome notification regime of old. Such is the absolute 
discretion afforded to the Commission by the Article 9 commitment decision 
procedure.181  
In comparison to the conclusion of formal Article 7 prohibition decisions,182 since their 
introduction in 2004 commitment decisions have become the Commission’s main 
enforcement tool for investigating non-cartel cases.183 There are clearly substantial 
incentives (or pressures) for businesses to prefer this procedure: time, publicity, 
consensual remedial solutions, ever-increasing fines, general risk aversion, and many 
other factors.184 As for the Commission, it has sometimes attributed its frequent 
recourse to Article 9 to the concession of defence rights, allowing it to swiftly secure 
competitive conditions upon the investigated market and to quickly bring potentially 
problematic conduct to an end.185 This is particularly appealing and appropriate, it has 
claimed, in technology markets.186 At other times the Commission has suggested that 
the relative mildness of the conduct investigated through commitments, as expected by 
Regulation 1/2003,187 justifies their use and simultaneously conserves resources to 
pursue the most heinous behaviour - especially cartels - via Article 7 prohibition.188 
                                                          
179 Regulation 1/2003, Article 27(4). On the risk of the Commission using negative responses to leverage 
greater remedies: Forrester [2008] 65; Rab, Monnoyeur, and Sukhtankar [2010] 176; Wagner-Von Papp 
[2012] 948; Botteman and Patsa [2013] 361; Gerard [2013] 13-15; Wathelet [2015] 553-554. 
180 Regulation 1/2003, Article 23(2)(c). See: Microsoft (Tying) (AT.39530) [2013]. Criticising fines without 
finding illegality: Aleixo [2013] 479; Dunne [2014] 418. Previously exemption decisions could be revoked, 
but breaching comfort letters and Article 102 undertakings required the initiation of formal proceedings.  
181 Regulation 1/2003, Article 9. 
182 ibid Article 7. 
183 For statistics: Wils [2015] 3-4; Ibáñez Colomo and Kalintiri [2018] 53. For Commission acknowledgement: 
‘Ten Years of Antitrust Enforcement under Regulation 1/2003: Achievements and Future Perspectives’ 
[2014] Commission Staff Working Document SWD(2014) 230/2 (“Staff Working Document [2014]”) 55-56. 
184 On incentives: Cook [2006] 219-221; Wils [2006] 350-352; Cooke [2008] 267; Ratliff [2008] 306-307; 
Schweitzer [2008] 559, 571; [2012b] 3; Forrester [2008] 645-646; Rab, Monnoyeur, and Sukhtankar [2010] 
182; Piergiovanni [2010] 8; Cengiz [2011] 136; Talus [2011] 1588; Lugard and Möllmann [2013]; Marsden 
[2013]; Gerard [2013] 6,8; Moullet [2013] 91; Botteman and Patsa [2013] 362; Dunne [2014] 437; Lianos 
[2014] 24; Jenny [2015] 760. 
185 ‘Report on the Functioning of Regulation 1/2003’ [2009] COM(2009) 206 (“Commission Report [2009]”) 
5; ‘Ten Years of Antitrust Enforcement under Regulation 1/2003: Achievements and Future Perspectives’ 
[2014] COM(2014) 453 (“Commission Report [2014]”) 7; To Commit? [2014]; Almunia [1/10/2013] 
(Commitments ‘solve competition concerns more quickly and concretely, with an immediate impact on the 
market’); [27/10/2013] (‘main advantage’ is speed and immediate impact). 
186 eg Almunia [21/5/2012]; [27/10/2013]; Commission Report [2014] 7. 
187 Regulation 1/2003, recital 13 (‘Commitment decisions are not appropriate in cases where the 
Commission intends to impose a fine’).  
188 Staff Working Paper [2009] 33. 
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Despite these claims, their use in practice casts doubt on explaining the rise of 
commitment decisions by their speed,189 high-tech focus,190 or legal innocuousness.191 
The alternative justification offered for the prominence of Article 9 commitment 
decisions is that they are perhaps the most powerful tool conceivable for the European 
Commission to realise its competition policy goals with absolute effectiveness. They 
constitute the unrestrained, unpredictable enforcement of competition policy through 
sheer discretion. It will be demonstrated that through commitment decisions it is 
possible to A) secure changes to any conduct, even if beyond or below the pre-existing 
scope of EU competition law, and B) negotiate any remedial package with businesses, 
regardless of its connection to the initial competitive concern. Essentially, the 
Commission can successfully sanction conduct and redraw markets according to its 
idealised vision for their perfect operation with maximum efficacy. Once again however, 
C) such effective policy realisation through ad hoc discretionary enforcement is achieved 
at the expense of approximating the formal rule of law ideal. Commitment decisions 
substantially diminish normative comprehensibility for businesses. In sidestepping the 
restraint and rigidity of the Court’s case law, the certainty afforded by every 
authoritative norm of EU competition law is systemically depleted. Like the conditional 
exemptions of old, legality is also dependent upon unforeseeably offering whatever 
remedial package is necessary to please the Commission. And, D) again, the EU Courts 
are implicated, though their culpability is less clear. Essentially, the Commission’s 
absolute discretion in commitment decisions prioritises the short-term gains of 
enforcing competition policy with efficacy in individual instances at the expense of  long-
term movements towards realising the formal rule of law ideal.   
A) Effective Ends I: Competition Enforcement without Competition Law 
As the above discussions of judicial review implied, there are several distinct ingredients 
that go into making a competition decision. The first is the law, the normative 
                                                          
189 Various calculations suggest that on average commitment decisions have not been significantly faster: 
Lugard and Möllmann [2013]; Mariniello [2014] 4. For acknowledgement: Staff Working Paper [2009] 34. 
190 Lugard and Möllmann [2013]; Mariniello [2014] 5 (only 24% of commitments since 2004, compared with 
61% of prohibition decisions); Jenny [2015] 732-733. 
191 Schweitzer [2008] 549; [2012b] 6; Lugard and Möllmann [2013]; Jenny [2015] 724-725, 736-737. eg Coca-
Cola (COMP/A.39.116/B2) [2005] (concerning rebates ordinarily treated severely in prohibition decisions); E-
Books (AT.39847) [2012/2013] (investigating conduct akin to a hub-and-spoke cartel); Container Shipping 
(AT.39850) [2016] (comparable to information exchanges on future prices commonly considered a 
restriction of Article 101 by object). cf Telekomunikacja Polska (COMP/39.525) [2011] (Commission explicitly 
ruled-out a commitment decision owing to the severity of the case). 
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obligations determining the legality of conduct by firms, as authoritatively deduced by 
the CJEU from Articles 101 and 102. The second input is the articulation of facts, the 
matrix of events established by the Commission to have taken place. The third bridges 
the gap between the first and second: the legal characterisation of the factual 
circumstances as satisfying the norms determining legality or illegality. For example, the 
reasons leading to a conclusion that certain statements do amount to an illegal plan to 
exclude a rival through pricing below average total cost, or that a particular selective 
distribution agreement can be considered legal as its requirements are qualitative.192 
The effectiveness with which commitment decisions permit the Commission to 
successfully pursue its policy objectives primarily concerns the first and third 
ingredients. Article 9 affords the Commission a discretion to investigate conduct and 
secure changes without being subject to the restraint of EU competition law as deduced 
by the CJEU. It can enforce competition policy i) beyond the law, through pursuing novel 
theories of harm, and (ii) below the law, without necessarily meeting high judicially-
determined thresholds for finding certain forms of conduct illegal. Commitment 
decisions facilitate market interventions on an ad hoc basis against specific companies as 
and when the Commission deems necessary, regardless of the legal originality or 
strength of its concerns. This is undoubtedly an effective means to achieve its aims, 
unshackled from the rigidity and restraint of replicating pre-existing violations of the law 
or having to rigorously justify that high hurdles for illegality have been met in instant 
cases. To this end, the Commission’s discretion in commitment decisions has achieved a 
great deal of good. Nevertheless, it represents a form of competition enforcement 
without competition law.  
i) Market Interventions Beyond the Law   
Through commitment decisions the Commission has the discretion to target any 
business conduct, regardless of whether it has been previously found illegal pursuant to 
Articles 101 or 102.193 With Article 9, it can secure effective changes to subject-specific 
behaviour as and when it sees fit. Numerous examples could be given of enforcement 
activity beyond the scope of the pre-existing law deduced by the CJEU.   
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One such instance is patent ambush. In Rambus [2009] the Commission suggested that 
dishonesty in standard-setting procedures could be an abuse contrary to Article 102.194 
The patent holder was argued to have ‘engaged in intentional deceptive conduct’ in 
keeping secret the inclusion of its intellectual property within the internationally-agreed 
standard for DRAM chips,195 aiming to charge considerable royalties to locked-in 
producers. The goal pursued by the Commission through its intervention in Rambus of 
ensuring confidence in international standard-setting processes is commendable.196 It 
nevertheless bears no relation to pre-existing EU competition law.197 
Although there has yet to be an authoritative ruling on their legality, the Commission 
has also been able to secure remedies in response to the contractual use of most 
favoured nation (“MFN”) clauses through the Article 9 process. In E-Books [2012/2013] it 
raised concerns about five publishers separately negotiating agency contracts with 
Apple that all included various MFNs.198 The specific breach of Article 101 alleged was 
that the publishers had jointly converted the sale of e-books from a wholesale model to 
an agency model through introducing similar MFN clauses. The Commission suspected 
that their intention was to raise retail prices above those hitherto offered by Amazon, 
which had used its wholesale relationship to offer substantial discounts on e-books, 
thereby undercutting physical sales directly by the publishers. The facts of E-Books were 
shuffled around in the more recent Article 102 commitment decision of Amazon [2017] 
concerning its own imposition of MFNs on publishers.199 In both instances, the 
Commission’s investigations into MFNs were motivated by a desire to combat the 
artificial raising of prices to the detriment of consumers, a bread-and-butter concern of 
competition enforcement. Indeed, Amazon is one of the most robustly articulated 
commitment decisions to date, with the possible anticompetitive effects of various 
MFNs covered in great detail. The Commission’s effective realisation of consumer 
welfare in these instances through Article 9 was in no way prejudiced by the lack of 
clear, analogous precedents.   
Although ultimately ending in failure, the Commission’s initial recourse to Article 9 for 
investigating potentially abusive preferential treatment of related services in Google 
                                                          
194 Rambus (COMP/38.636) [2009]. 
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197 Lianos [2014] 24; Dunne [2015] 110. 
198 E-Books [2012/2013]. 
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Search nevertheless demonstrates the potential effectiveness of discretionary market 
intervention through commitments. The theory of harm proposed by the Commission 
from the very beginning - displaying related vertical search results (eg shopping, 
restaurants) more favourably than those of competitors in response to generic website 
searches -200 was always clearly driven by a desire to forestall potential market 
foreclosure consequences in the specific instance. So too were the increasingly 
demanding remedial packages negotiated over numerous years on the ground of 
‘preferential’ or ‘favourable treatment of Google’s own services’.201 At no point did the 
Commission feel the need to indicate how the investigated practice related to the legal 
norms deduced by the EU Courts from Article 102;202 intervention was apparently to be 
legitimated by the resultant positive outcome of more competitive online search 
markets. This ends-driven approach to enforcement has been replicated in the feast of 
economic analysis and famine of legal precedent that is the formal Google Search 
prohibition decision itself.203 That the same outcome was almost achieved through an 
Article 9 commitment decision - novel theory of harm, ambitious remedies, and all - is a 
testament to the effectiveness with which this procedure can be utilised by the 
Commission to alter business conduct and pursue its ends as considered desirable, even 
if ‘significantly stretch[ing] the boundaries’ of the law.204       
As a final example of the efficacy of enforcement through commitment decisions to 
improve competition beyond pre-existing legal obligations, the Commission has 
frequently targeted capacity hoarding and strategic underinvestment in the energy 
sector.205 These investigations focus upon owners of infrastructure bottlenecks such as 
transmission networks, pipes, or terminals for import. The allegation of capacity 
hoarding concerns a vertically-integrated bottleneck owner reserving for its 
upstream/downstream business a substantial portion of the infrastructure’s 
transmission volume for a long period.206 The Commission’s interventions range from 
hoarding via explicit contracts, to vagueness as to the capacity available,207 poor 
                                                          
200 eg ‘Commission probes allegations of antitrust violations by Google’ [30/11/2010] IP/10/1624. 
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congestion management,208 or simply failures to make it easier for third parties to gain 
access.209 Sometimes the more subtle forms of hoarding have blended into suspicions of 
strategic underinvestment, where the bottleneck operator neglects to expand capacity 
to hinder upstream/downstream market entry. Gaz de France [2009], for example, 
concerned two import capacity terminals. For one, the Commission criticised GdF for 
never taking seriously external offers to co-finance expansion; for the other, it censured 
a failure to invest in additional capacity that the Commission deemed ‘sufficiently 
profitable’.210 These commitment decisions have permitted the Commission to 
effectively address its belief that vertically-integrated infrastructures necessarily have 
distorted incentives against capacity expansion to protect their upstream or 
downstream profits. Via Article 9 it has been possible to secure ‘investment obligations’ 
with the aim of fostering more competition through increased market entry.211 It is 
possible to disagree with the end pursued by the Commission through these 
interventions, especially given the highly unpredictable impact upon business incentives 
to invest and innovate.212 Yet it is undeniable that the discretion afforded by Article 9 
commitment decisions has facilitated the highly effective realisation of its competition 
goals in this sector, despite the specific conduct investigated bearing little relation to 
pre-existing legal obligations.213 
In short, commitment decisions have proven to be a powerful tool of competition 
enforcement for whenever the Commission has reason to believe that harm is being 
caused to markets, but where there has been no previous finding of illegality for the 
alleged theory of harm. Freed from the scope of the pre-existing law of Article 101 and 
102, its discretionary market interventions can be directed towards realising its policy 
views on improving specific markets, however conceptualised, and addressing conduct 
by particular firms as and when it deems necessary.   
                                                          
208 RWE [2009] [27]. 
209 ibid. 
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ii) Market Interventions Below the Law  
The effectiveness of the commitment decision procedure for realising competition policy 
ends with utmost efficacy does not stop at permitting Commission enforcement beyond 
the pre-existing scope of the law. Article 9 only requires the identification of a ‘possible’ 
infringement of EU competition law, rather than the demonstration of an ‘actual’ 
violation.214 The Commission therefore has discretion not just as to the statement of 
facts,215 but also as to its legal characterisation that the instant facts meet criteria for 
prohibition. As a result, it can intervene against conduct possibly below authoritative 
thresholds deduced by the EU Courts for a formal finding of illegality. Although the 
Commission is (unsurprisingly) adamant that it does not use this discretion to close weak 
cases,216 its reasons for investigating conduct caught by pre-existing legal precedents are 
often less substantial than in a formal prohibition decision.217 Albeit a blunt metric, 
comparing the average number of paragraphs signals the possibility of a more sparse 
justificatory logic.218 In terms of more qualitative analysis, a number of commitment 
decisions can be interpreted as evidencing the Commission’s discretion to secure 
changes to business conduct without necessarily passing exacting legal thresholds. As 
with Article 9 enforcement beyond the law, these examples of enforcement possibly 
below the law reinforce the effectiveness of commitment decisions for the Commission 
to realise its various goals in competition enforcement, often securing admirable ends.  
The first concerns establishing a position of collective dominance for the purposes of 
Article 102. The substantive test for prohibition under the original EU Merger Regulation 
did not textually afford the possibility to prohibit a concentration on the basis of 
concerns for non-collusive oligopoly consequences. Although this seems to have 
motivated the Commission’s prohibition in Airtours,219 the legislative gap led it to 
conclude that the merger would create a sustainable position of collective 
dominance.220 In a period of major embarrassment for the Commission,221 the General 
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215 See fn 177. 
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Court re-instated the demanding test for establishing collective dominance,222 and 
found that that its legal characterisation of the proposed merger fell short.223 The high 
hurdles to substantiating collective dominance for the purposes of Article 102 and 
merger control restrained the Commission’s ability to effectively intervene in oligopoly 
markets. The utility of the discretion afforded by commitment decisions in this regard 
was demonstrated by German Electricity Wholesale Market [2008].224 E.ON was alleged 
to have engaged in the serious practice of capacity withdrawal, but the requirement of 
dominance under Article 102 was dubious given its low market share. Instead, the 
Commission claimed that this could amount to an individual abuse225 of collective 
dominance with other energy companies. The flexibility of the commitment decision 
procedure is revealed in how easily the Commission was able justify this characterisation 
in a few hundred words without actual reference to the stringent norms of EU 
competition law. This was plainly an effective means to remedy a gravely 
anticompetitive action in the individual instance for the good of consumers, without 
being held back by robustly substantiating the difficult Airtours criteria. 
Excessive pricing investigations are another example of commitment decisions providing 
discretion as to the legal characterisation of facts. The early United Brands [1978] case 
established the test for high pricing as abusive under Article 102 in bearing ‘no 
reasonable relation to the economic value of the product supplied’, either in comparison 
to competitive price benchmarks or in itself.226 This threshold for formal prohibition is 
rather hazy and has hampered successful condemnation of excessive pricing by the 
Commission for decades.227 However such difficulties forestalling market intervention 
have been evaded through the evaluative latitude of commitment decisions. For 
example in Standard and Poor’s [2011] the Commission felt confident in tersely 
concluding that prices ‘significantly exceed the costs incurred’ so as to potentially 
amount to an abuse of dominance, despite the usual legal vulnerability of such claims.228 
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Following the recent reengagement of the CJEU with the law on excessive pricing,229 the 
commitment decision in Gazprom [2018] is slightly more rigorous, adopting competitive 
price benchmarks for gas in Germany and the Netherlands as a gauge for alleged abuses 
in Central and Eastern Europe, and noting average differences of 22-44 per cent 
(reduced to 9-24 per cent on another metric).230 Still, the conclusion that these 
variations meet that the United Brands definition of excessive pricing is reached in fewer 
than two pages.231 Very high prices are an exercise of market power of clear consumer 
detriment, and the Commission’s determination to effectively prevent customer 
exploitation is therefore an understandable end of competition policy.232 Article 9 
affords the discretion to do so as it thinks necessary, with greater ease than at any time 
before Regulation 1/2003.  
A third and final example of the Commission’s latitude as to the legal characterisation of 
facts in commitment decisions, thereby effectively pursuing its policy goals, concerns 
the law on refusals to deal with companies requiring access to physical property. As will 
be discussed in the next chapter, it is not easy to meet the legal test for characterising 
such refusals as abusive. In Bronner [1998] the CJEU found that illegality required a 
demonstration that the facility in question was indispensable to operate on the market, 
lacking actual or potential substitutes; ‘less advantageous’ alternatives would not 
suffice.233 While explicit and constructive refusals have been found illegal through 
formal Article 7 prohibition decisions since Bronner, they invariably involve long and 
detailed appraisals that the legal test (as reformulated by the Commission)234 is met.235 
This blockage to effective market intervention has been minimalised by recourse to the 
discretion of commitment decisions, where the Commission admits to regularly finding 
constructive refusals to grant access to energy infrastructure.236 Notwithstanding 
academic scepticism that such facilities are actually indispensable or objectively 
necessary to operate,237 it has nevertheless characterised infrastructure as potentially 
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meeting the high justificatory threshold for Article 102 intervention with comparably 
scant reasoning, at times bordering on assertion.238 Along with the novel theories of 
harm in the previous section and remedies in the next, the Commission’s discretion to 
readily justify market intervention without rigorous legal appraisal of the instant facts in 
commitment decisions have permitted it to effectively pursue its goals for competitive 
energy markets.     
In summary, Article 9 has proven to be a powerful tool for the Commission to realise its 
varied policy ends with utmost efficacy. In facilitating market interventions beyond the 
scope of the law or, where demanding legal thresholds exist, below judicially-
determined strictures, it has the discretion to target a wide variety of market conduct 
that may be much more difficult through the formal prohibition decision procedure. This 
is competition enforcement without competition law, and it is undoubtedly very 
effective for realising the Commission’s often commendable ends. 
B) Effective Ends II: The Remedial Potential of Commitment Decisions 
The ability to persuade companies to merely cease market conduct where the 
Commission has competitive concerns, even if beyond or below pre-existing legal 
prohibition, would in itself be a useful enforcement tool. But the effectiveness with 
which the Commission can reach its competition ends through Article 9 goes far beyond 
such remedial restraint. It has the discretion to finalise a commitment decision as a 
result of companies offering all manner of business changes. Article 9 has been a site of 
extensive experimentation in competition remedies,239 leading some to suggest that the 
outcome-based potency of this procedure has been the key impetus for its 
prevalence.240 The appeal to an administrative authority is not surprising. Through 
commitment decisions the Commission essentially has the discretion to effectively 
redraw targeted markets according to its idealised vision,241 whether informed by 
efficiency, equity, European integration, or anything else.   
Although free to impose behavioural or structural solutions in prohibition decisions, the 
text of Article 7 only permits remedies that are ‘proportionate to the infringement 
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committed’ and necessary to bring it ‘effectively to an end’.242 Fines are the ‘baseline’ 
remedy beyond cease-and-desist,243 even when recidivism is a key concern.244 The 
Commission has never imposed a structural remedy through Article 7.245 Such restraint 
has therefore rarely led to judicial engagement with the subject.246 The exception was 
the General Court’s annulment of the monitoring trustee remedy in Microsoft [2007] 
owing to illegal delegation and disproportionality,247 where it stressed that the 
Commission ‘does not have unlimited discretion when formulating remedies’ under the 
predecessor procedure to Article 7.248   
In contrast, the actual text of Article 9 states that the Commission has the discretion to 
accept any remedies that ‘meet the concerns’ it has expressed, thereby rendering 
divestiture more likely.249 Early remedial extensions beyond the strictures of Article 7 
were relatively modest. Although the Coca-Cola [2005] commitment decision expressed 
competitive worries under Article 102 about contractual practices with distributors in 
only four countries, the remedial package covered all EU member states where it was 
dominant.250 Similarly in comparing Premier League [2006] with the almost identical 
Article 7 decision in Champions League [2003] on joint-selling of football broadcasting 
rights, the commitment decision included a bonus remedial obligation to prevent a 
single buyer from acquiring all of the packages.251  
Yet it has since become clear that the potential outcomes of Article 9 are a very effective 
tool for the Commission to pursue its policy ends through creative remedies. For 
instance, an apparent desire to assist smaller competitors vis-à-vis tech giants through 
pro-active commitments can be seen in Microsoft (Tying) [2009]. The theory of harm 
from its infamous investigation into the pre-installation bundling of Windows Media 
Player with the Windows operating system was replicated in a commitment decision on 
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Internet Explorer.252 Rather than simply requiring the two products to be de-coupled, 
the Commission secured from Microsoft a pledge to offer a consumer ballot screen 
presenting a selection of browsers from which to choose, thereby giving rivals an 
unprecedented visibility on the market.253 The same promising of extensive remedies to 
assist smaller rivals was sought in the abandoned Google Search commitment 
negotiations. Over four years the Commission and Google’s rivals attempted to redraw 
how the search engine displayed the related shopping suggestions of itself and other 
services, scrutinising package after package to get the ‘icing on the cake’ and finally the 
‘cherry on top’.254 Commissioner Almunia himself considered the final set to be ‘far-
reaching’ concessions to ‘restore a level playing-field’ in online search.255 Although 
ultimately failing to convince his successor, the extent of the radical remedies to which 
Google was willing to commit still demonstrates the effectiveness with which the 
Commission can pursue its competition goals through the flexible outcomes permissible 
via Article 9. 
Without a doubt, the most vivid examples of the Commission’s discretion as to the 
remedies accepted to finalise commitment decisions concern the energy sector. This has 
been an area of activity where the Commission has a very particular vision it wishes to 
replicate as effectively as possible. Since the 1990s, it has spearheaded various EU 
legislative packages endeavouring to liberalise domestic markets, foster entry to 
challenge vertically-integrated former-incumbents, and introduce a single, borderless 
European energy market.256 Its 2007 sector report still found a number of 
inadequacies,257 though its insistence that the appropriate solution was regulation 
rather than competition enforcement was short-lived.258 Commitment decisions have 
given the Commission ample remedial discretion to effectively restructure energy 
markets in creative and radical ways. The potential examples of the remedial latitude 
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afforded by Article 9 are too numerous to all be considered in detail, so priority is given 
to the most dramatic.  
In Swedish Interconnectors [2010] the electricity transmission system operator had 
managed internal bottlenecks at peak times by restricting export to Denmark, thus 
discriminatorily raising prices for Danish customers.259 Plainly animated by the goal of 
market integration,260 the Commission fundamentally reorganised the Swedish 
electricity system through the remedial package negotiated.261 Despite the existence of 
less drastic solutions,262 and regulatory ambivalence as to the chosen option for 
congestion management,263 the Commission had the discretion to realise its ideal 
outcome. It similarly reconstructed the Bulgarian energy market in BEH Electricity 
[2015].264 Article 9 was utilised to negotiate the offering of electricity on a newly created 
power exchange for five years before its transfer to the Bulgarian Ministry of Finance, 
amongst other things, to thereby realise its commendable ends of anonymous sales, 
greater liquidity, improved transparency, and cross-border integration with utmost 
efficacy.  
The effectiveness of Article 9 and the breadth of the Commission’s remedial discretion is 
also evidenced by decisions where the outcomes bear little relation to the conduct 
initially considered problematic.265 In German Electricity Wholesale Market [2008], 
allegations of production withdrawal to raise prices for downstream providers were 
closed with the unrelated divestiture of generation capacity to a potential buyer, clearly 
intended to force new market entry.266 In CEZ [2013] the Commission was concerned 
with long-term capacity booking into the transmission network by the former electricity 
monopolist potentially reducing entry and expansion by rivals.267 But despite this 
specific impetus, and contrary to remedies in earlier analogous investigations,268 CEZ 
also agreed to divest generation capacity. And in the recent Gazprom [2018] decision, 
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allegations of excessive pricing offered the opportunity for the wholesale 
reconceptualisation of Central and Eastern European energy flows through remedial 
negotiations.269 
So powerful are commitment decisions as a tool for competition enforcement that the 
Commission even has the discretion to secure remedial ends that have been explicitly 
rejected as mandatory in regulation, essentially side-stepping obstructive intermediates 
to its ends - Member States in the legislative process.270 In German Electricity Balancing 
Market [2008],271 RWE Gas [2009],272 and ENI [2010],273 various bottleneck 
infrastructures (transmission networks, import pipelines) were divested by vertically-
integrated energy companies who might have used this control to the advantage of their 
related upstream or downstream businesses. These outcomes reflected the 
Commission’s belief that the only suitable remedy to address the risk of ‘distorted 
incentives’274 was ownership unbundling; operation by an independent firm driven by a 
singular commercial incentive to manage the bottleneck efficiently, invest in capacity 
expansion, and invite market entry,275 without any ‘inherent conflict of interest’.276 In 
comparison to merger control where divestiture is relatively common, this represents an 
unusually far-reaching outcome.277 The remedial discretion of commitment decisions is 
particularly highlighted by the fact that the Commission’s stated preference for 
compulsory ownership unbundling through regulation278 was not accepted by Member 
States in the Third Energy Package, which left open a variety of options.279 Through 
competition enforcement via Article 9, it nevertheless achieved the same result via one-
to-one negotiation with owners.280 Utilisation of commitment decisions to evade 
regulatory decisions clearly raises concerns for the legitimacy of EU legislative 
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procedures and the separation of powers.281 Still, these qualms further highlight the 
power of commitment decisions for the Commission to realise its policy goals with 
extreme effectiveness.  
In sum, given the remedial discretion of commitment decisions, the attraction of Article 
9 for conducting and concluding competition investigations is surely irresistible to an 
administrative decision-maker. Critics are correct to equate this manner of enforcement 
with regulation;282 the Commission can, in theory, reach any outcome, including those 
that lead to divestiture, redraw Member State markets, force entry, aid competitors, 
and so on, even where they appear unrelated to the initial competitive concern.283 
When combined with the discretion to investigate market conduct beyond and beneath 
the law, useful even if simply resulting in cessation, the Commission arguably has the 
most powerful tool conceivable for pursuing its various policy ends with utmost efficacy. 
The competitive outcomes have in many instances, done a great deal of good for 
European consumers. The question is whether the unbridled realisation of these ends 
justifies a means antithetical to the formal rule of law ideal.      
C) Problematic Means: Systemic Detriment to the Rule of Law 
The Commission’s continual recourse to the discretion of Article 9 commitment 
decisions represents the maximal prioritisation of delivering its ends in an individual 
investigation above the broader detrimental consequences of this means of market 
intervention, which eschews administrative restraint and rationally-comprehensible 
norms. It is beyond doubt that commitment decisions are potent tools for achieving 
competitive “goods”, however defined, through the ability to intervene against any 
conduct as and when necessary, and to secure any remedy that is thought desirable for 
the market to work optimally. But this effectiveness for realising competition goals 
comes with a disregard for realising the formal rule of law.284  
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The Commission’s unbounded discretion to intervene against and secure changes to any 
business conduct systematically undermines the normative comprehensibility of EU 
competition policy for firms. As it is able to mount a serious investigation beyond the 
pre-existing scope of the law with novel theories of harm, or below high thresholds for 
findings of illegality through superficial legal characterisation of the facts, businesses 
have no reasonably guaranteed zone of legality. In both instances, the authoritative 
legal norms deduced by the EU Courts from Articles 101 and 102 fail to prospectively 
demarcate the boundary between permission and prohibition as they have no 
restraining influence upon the Commission’s discretion to pursue an Article 9 
commitment decision. This is not simply an issue of concentric normative circles, with 
the scope of conduct caught by the Commission’s commitment decisions being 
somewhat broader at the edge than the Courts’ jurisprudence. All business behaviour 
beyond or below the pre-existing ambit of EU competition law can potentially be 
questioned and lead to remedial change. With market intervention through unbounded 
discretionary enforcement, official recommendations that companies will be fine if they 
simply ‘stay on the right side of the law at all times’ ring hollow.285 Firms can act within 
the confines of authoritative competition law and still be the subject of informal 
enforcement. The Commission’s calculation of the benefits of adopting individual 
commitment decisions - pursuit of its ends with utmost effectiveness as it deems 
necessary - fails to take into account the costs of market interventions that undermine 
systemic aspirations towards normative comprehensibility for all other firms.286  
Perhaps this picture of normative anarchy from the perspective of the formal rule of law 
is too stark. Although with a largely negative intent, a number of commentators have 
speculated that commitment decisions might over time come to themselves gradually 
provide guidance, crystallising into a rival ‘shadow jurisprudence’.287 Cognition of what is 
prohibited and permissible, might still be enjoyed by market actors but they just have to 
look at how the Commission has exercised its discretion through commitment decisions, 
rather than the law.288 This was indeed a possible institutional route towards realising 
the rule of law considered in Chapter IV, where the decisional practice of an 
administrative authority incrementally approximated the desirable form of generalised, 
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comprehensible norms of legality.289 This more optimistic interpretation of commitment 
decisions seems to be the Commission’s reading of its record under Article 9. For 
example, its 2009 Staff Working Paper praised the ability for commitments to ‘serve as a 
model for addressing similar situations’, highlighting its investigations into long term 
energy contracts and joint-selling of broadcasting rights as providing ‘sufficient 
orientation to operators’ to adapt their business practices.290 
Nevertheless, there are two reasons to be sceptical that commitment decisions could 
gradually crystallise into a series of comprehensible competition norms for firms, further 
demonstrating the extent to which the discretion characterising the Article 9 decisional 
procedure leaves EU competition policy far from approximating the formal rule of law. 
The first cause for caution relates to the nature of the EU legal order as laid out in the 
Treaties. No matter how many commitment decisions the Commission concludes, or 
how consistently it treats like investigations alike in the future, the unavoidable truth of 
the EU’s legal architecture is that they can never be treated as authoritative 
determinations of the norms of competition law. Although the Commission has specific 
competence to investigate suspected violations of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU,291 it is the 
sole preserve of the CJEU to authoritatively interpret those provisions and deduce the 
obligations incumbent upon businesses.292 Despite their frequency and substantial 
remedial packages, without the CJEU’s seal of approval normative determinations within 
commitment decisions are necessarily more precarious points of reference against 
which to orientate business decision-making. The Commission’s discretion to intervene 
in markets as and when it sees fit against potentially anticompetitive behaviour may 
temporary settle the individual investigation, but simply cannot guide other businesses 
as to the legality of the practice overall.293  
When it comes to enforcement beyond the law, inconsistency between the silence of 
the determinative law and discretionary enforcement against unprecedented practices 
means that the latter exist within a normative void, their legality never authoritatively 
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settled.294 At the same time the jurisprudence of the Courts, the only valid statements of 
the obligations upon market actors, becomes stale and outmoded, failing to evolve 
alongside constantly innovating business practices.295 If, for instance, “patent ambush” 
is a live competitive concern as the formulation of international standards containing IP 
rights becomes more important to industry,296 the authoritative norms of EU 
competition law contain a gap that matters to markets, yet cannot be decisively 
addressed by Article 9 decisions. Even if the Commission prefers to advance novel 
theories of harm through its unbounded discretion in commitment decisions rather than 
a formal prohibition, the issue may still come before the EU Courts via an Article 267 
preliminary reference from national disputes.297 However such referrals arise in a 
necessarily sporadic and unforeseeable manner that fails to guarantee a steady stream 
of opportunities for judicial engagement with legal questions perhaps most in need of 
clarification.298  
With regard to commitment decisions investigating conduct below the law, the 
Commission’s discretion is de facto undermining the normative assurance of deliberately 
high de jure thresholds for intervention. It may have used particular legal doctrines in 
Article 9 decisions where it would struggle to successfully characterise instant cases as 
meeting their tests through formal prohibition.299 But that difficulty was arguably the 
Courts’ intention: high legal boundaries were set to restrain the Commission’s ability to 
reach certain conclusions, thereby reflecting the controversy of, for instance, bringing 
individually non-dominant firms within the ambit of the Article 102 “special 
responsibility” via findings of collective dominance,300 or threatening investment 
incentives through readily granting compulsory access in refusal to deal cases.301 
Although not ruling-out findings of illegality, businesses could previously take solace in 
their limitation to truly exceptional circumstances. EU competition law provided 
certainty in setting limits to the Commission’s decision-making. Yet the unbounded 
discretion afforded by commitment decisions has allowed the Commission to sidestep 
these restraints, thereby undermining their reassuring normative clarity by transforming 
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once rare legal findings to now rather routine elements of informal competition policy 
enforcement.  
In this way, the parallel yet inconsistent existence of authoritative, judicially-determined 
norms and unauthoritative commitment decisions, permitting discretion to intervene 
beyond and below the law, has degraded the restrained normative comprehensibility 
afforded by the former, without providing any additional clarity to the demarcation of 
illegality through the latter.  
The second reason for scepticism that the Commission’s use of commitments could 
eventually form an enlightening body of guiding decisions goes to the connection 
between the first and second formal principles of the rule of law articulated in Chapter 
IV.302 The comprehensibility of the obligations upon subjects often results from 
determinations of legality in accordance with norms of generalised-scope and equal-
application. If there are no prospective, general norms but discretionary findings of 
competitive concerns through ad hoc, narrow, subject-specific decisions that need not 
be consistently applied, others have little capacity to comprehend the obligations upon 
them. Article 9 commitment decisions represent the latter means for enforcing EU 
competition policy.  
Considering the examples of enforcement beyond the law, it often appears that the 
Commission uses the discretion of commitment decisions to create exceptional findings 
of possible illegality at the firm- or industry-specific level. Not only does this raise 
questions of equal treatment before the law. Such normative pointillism also renders 
the extrapolation of generalised obligations to guide other market actors difficult.303 
What, for example, are other businesses to read into the Commission’s distaste for: 
patent holders acting deceptively in standardisation processes to then ambush 
producers for excessive royalties;304 competitors all including MFN clauses in their 
agency agreements with the intent of forcing a wholesaler to switch model and thus not 
undercut prices for products not subject to the agreement;305 owners of infrastructure 
bottlenecks reserving substantial access and protecting their upstream/downstream 
business by failing to invest in capacity expansion or accepting offers/inviting responses 
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from competitors to co-finance such;306 or of non-indispensable but still very important 
services directing users to their own related search services more favourably than those 
of competitors?307 Compare these decisions to the generalised presumptions of illegality 
for resale price maintenance and pricing below average variable cost,308 or the slightly 
more complex though nonetheless comprehensible requirements for abusive refusal to 
grant access to physical property.309 The normative clarity of the latter derives from 
their restraining and structuring of Commission decision-making to reasonably 
generalised norms for determining legality, applicable to all. How much greater would 
the uncertainty of EU competition policy have been without such universal norms for 
when the law would be violated?310 But the difficulty of generalising context-dependent 
theories of harm in many commitment decisions may well be the intention, a further 
element of their effectiveness: as universal application of some of the novel findings of 
possible illegality could be inefficient and highly burdensome (“strategic 
underinvestment”?),311 the potential for unequal, subject- or industry-specific normative 
acts through the unbound discretion of commitment decisions amplifies their appeal for 
the Commission to realise its ends. Nevertheless, market intervention through subject-
specific appraisals of legality is a means deleterious to realising the normative clarity 
envisaged by the formal rule of law ideal. 
The same ad hoc, discretionary form of intervention through Article 9 forestalls the 
comprehensibility of those commitment decisions enforcing competition policy below 
the law. Where generalised norms of legality and illegality already exist, the Commission 
uses the discretion of Article 9 to create individual exemptions falling short of the 
authoritative thresholds for intervention. This has been particularly noticeable in the 
energy sector, where it was demonstrated that the Commission has systematically 
undermined high thresholds for market intervention in specific instances. For example 
with the doctrine of collective dominance, it can avoid the restraining influence of the 
stringent and generalised normative hurdles established in Airtours, thus reaching the 
same conclusion regardless in the individual case of German Electricity through a series 
of assertions and banal reflections on the structural characteristics of the particular 
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market.312 The Commission has been more open about using its Article 9 discretion to 
create individual exemptions to the generalised, reasonably comprehensible Bronner 
test for abusive refusals of access that restricts its enforcement activity in formal 
decisions. Rather than novel theories of harm, it has characterised capacity hoarding 
and strategic underinvestment as ‘sector specific’ manifestations of constructive refusals 
to supply,313 though without having to rigorously meet the high thresholds of the legal 
test. Are these dilutions of Bronner only applicable in the energy sector? Other 
industries with bottlenecks? Or, as seems a simpler assumption, as and when the 
Commission sees fit in an Article 9 decision? Its own justification itself stresses that 
Article 9 is a vehicle for avoiding the restraint of generalised, exacting tests for reaching 
certain legal conclusions, thereby undermining the normative clarity of the law. In short, 
the Commission has the discretion to engage in exceptional, subject- or industry-specific 
enforcement activity via commitment decisions that is deliberately discriminatory. 
The lack of clarity as to the divide between legality and illegality that results from the 
Commission’s absolute discretion in commitment decisions is also related to the radical 
remedies negotiated. The conceptualisation of the rule of law offered in the previous 
chapter did not mention the outcome of normative determinations of illegality, focusing 
instead upon whether this was through applying generalised norms or ad hoc, subject-
specific decisions, and their resultant consequences for normative comprehensibility. 
The concern was for the predictability of a finding of illegality, not the foreseeability of 
the resultant punishment. But as with the conditional granting of Article 101(3) 
exemption decisions considered above, commitment decisions blur the neat conceptual 
divide between legality and punishment; unlike the punitive fines attached to a formal 
Article 7 prohibition decisions, the remedial packages negotiated in Article 9 
commitment decisions are better considered conditions of legality. And as has seen, the 
Commission has the discretion to require all manner of far-reaching changes for it to 
close the investigation. Unsurprisingly, it has always maintained that these remedial 
packages are offered by businesses of their own volition.314 There are good reasons to 
question this self-portrayal of the Commission neutrally encouraging commitments from 
                                                          
312 See text accompanying fn 219-225. 
313 Staff Working Document [2014] 32. 
314 ‘Commitments decisions – frequently asked questions’ [8/3/2013] MEMO/13/189; Almunia [8/3/2013] 
(the ‘cooperative attitude’ makes them a ‘favourite option among companies’); Staff Working Paper [2009] 
33. It has particularly stressed that it does not negotiate or bargain remedies, but considers those 
independently offered: To Commit? [2014]. 
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companies, eschewing messy negotiations and not applying pressure to settle.315 But 
regardless of which side of the investigation is suggesting the remedies, it remains the 
case that there is no way of knowing in advance what changes will satiate the 
Commission’s concerns.  
To secure no further investigations under EU competition policy going forward, 
companies have agreed to conditions that are not just severe (eg divestiture), but also 
against the wishes of their national government (eg ownership unbundling of German 
energy networks) or tenuously connected to the competitive concerns the Commission 
initially raised.316 But sometimes the Commission’s use of its Article 9 remedial 
discretion has been rather restrained, for instance in E-Books and Amazon merely 
requiring the deletion of the MFN terms it thought problematic.317 As an exercise of 
unbounded discretion, it is unclear whether the Commission expects such moderate 
changes or something more radical. As CEZ [2013] also demonstrates, even where 
commitment decisions on similar grounds have resulted in one form of outcome (the 
sale of reserved capacity),318 the Commission still has the discretion to inconsistently 
acquire something else to close its investigation (generation divestiture).319  
The unpredictability of what will have to be offered is further amplified by the ad hoc, 
subject- or industry-specific nature of commitment decision negotiations. If the 
Commission opens proceedings against a company that is not the owner of the world’s 
largest computer operating system for the suspected bundling of software, what can it 
learn from Microsoft pleasing the Commission with a creative consumer ballot 
screen?320 What normative clarity can be derived from geographical discrimination 
being remedied by splitting the Swedish electricity market into two bidding zones for 
any business that is not a national transmission system operator?321 Very little. Yet these 
have been the conditions for the Commission to accept that on-going market practices 
are legal from the perspective of EU competition policy enforcement. Such uncertainty 
                                                          
315 The extent of Commission creativity is difficult to gauge given the confidentiality of discussions. However 
the General Court implied in Alrosa that the Commission told firms what it expected them to offer: Cengiz 
[2011] 150; Jenny [2015] 760. See also: Aleixo [2013] 476 (the choice screen in Microsoft (Tying) was 
proposed by the Commission after rejecting Microsoft’s remedy of decoupling). 
316 See text accompanying fn 265-269. 
317 E-Books [2012/2013]; Amazon [2017]. 
318 Gaz de France [2009]; E.ON Gas [2010]. 
319 CEZ [2013]. 
320 Microsoft (Tying) [2009]. 
321 Swedish Interconnectors [2010]. 
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as to what must be done by firms for their behaviour to be deemed lawful represents a 
manner of enforcement far from the formal rule of law ideal. 
When viewed in this light, the hope or fear of commitment decisions crystallising into a 
“shadow jurisprudence”, guiding businesses to a greater extent than the authoritative 
law deduced from Articles 101 and 102 by the CJEU, is not likely. The Commission’s 
discretion is not structured by any generalised norms for comprehending when it will 
intervene or what concessions will be necessary for it to close the investigation. The ad 
hoc, subject-specific, inconsistent collection of commitment decisions constitutes a rag-
bag of legal novelties, shallow characterisations falling short of the requirements of the 
law, and particularistic remedial packages that are unable to meaningfully inform 
market decision-making.  
The Commission’s discretion to investigate any conduct and secure any remedy has 
permitted the enforcement of its policy ends with maximum efficacy, often with 
substantial benefits for European consumers. But as a means of market intervention, 
this is highly problematic. In freeing competition policy from the restraining influence of 
the authoritative, generalised norms of law for determining the permission and 
prohibition of business conduct, there is little normative certainty. As an exercise of 
pure administrative discretion, commitment decisions represent a form of EU 
competition enforcement seriously failing to approximate the principles and resultant 
virtues of the formal rule of law ideal.    
D) Judicial Review: A Missed Opportunity? 
It is thoroughly unsurprising that an administrative authority would endeavour to realise 
as effectively as possible the various policies it believes to be in the general interest. The 
same is true of the Commission’s discretion to intervene in markets as and when it 
pleases through the Article 9 commitment decision procedure. Mere suggestions that it 
ought to exercise such power with ‘impeccable judgment’322 are unrealistic. This 
explains the importance of judicial review for gradually approximating the formal rule of 
law ideal. It can be an institutional fail-safe, a residual mechanism for reactively ensuring 
that administrative decision-making stays within the confines of the law, and for 
                                                          
322 Marquis [2008] lxxiv. See also: Wils [2008] 348 (‘strict and effective internal procedures and controls 
ensuring that weak cases are not opened’); Wagner-Von Papp [2012] 931. 
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prospectively formulating norms for determining legality that structure discretion, thus 
affording normative certainty to legal subjects. 
Judicial review of commitment decisions has not satisfied this role, but it may not be an 
oversight entirely of the Courts’ making. Although the CJEU missed an opportunity to 
provide some boundaries to the use of commitment decisions, it is unlikely that they will 
appear before the Courts in any event. 
Whenever judicial review is raised in the context of commitment decisions, the Alrosa 
saga invariably comes to mind, culminating in what has been labelled the ‘Worst 
Decision of the EU Court of Justice’ ever.324 The Courts were essentially called upon to 
either terminate or legitimate the extreme remedial discretion seen in Article 9 
commitment decisions, by answering whether they should be held to the same 
proportionality requirement of Article 7 prohibition decisions.325 The concept of 
proportionality – that suitable penalties and remedies ought to be the least onerous 
possible – is a general principle of EU law.326 The alleged disproportionality of remedies 
has often been the perspective from which the compliance of commitment decisions 
with the rule of law has been questioned.327 As noted above, in Microsoft [2007] the 
General Court annulled the establishment of a monitoring trustee partly on this 
ground,328 and stressed that the Commission ‘does not have unlimited discretion when 
formulating remedies’ under the predecessor procedure to Article 7.329 
When asked in Alrosa to rule on whether the same limitation applied for Article 9 
commitment decisions, the General Court answered in the affirmative, finding that the 
Commission could only secure the least onerous outcome that met its competitive 
concerns.330 Celebrations that the Commission was forced to ‘respect the rule of law’ 
and that ‘quasi-regulatory solutions’ via commitment decisions had been brought to an 
end were short-lived.331 The CJEU overturned the ruling on appeal and rubber-stamped 
                                                          
324 Jenny [2015].  
325 For overviews: Kellerbauer [2011]; Messina and Ho [2011]; Jenny [2015] 737-761. 
326 C-331/88 ex parte Fedesa [1990] ECLI:EU:C:1990:391 [13]. See also: Article 5(4) and Protocol 2 TEU. 
327 eg Wils [2006] 351-352; Cook [2006] 212-213; Schweitzer [2008] 559; Cengiz [2011] 135; Schweitzer 
[2012b] 3; Hjelmeng [2013] 1009, 1012; Moullet [2013] 86, 89.  
328 Microsoft [2007] [1251]-[1279]. 
329 ibid [1276]. 
330 T-170/06 Alrosa v Commission [2007] ECLI:EU:T:2007:220 [92]-[111]. 
331 Siragusa and Guerri [2008] 202. See also: Schweitzer [2008] 568-569; Forrester [2008] 651. cf Cengiz 
[2011] 149-150. 
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the Commission’s discretion pursuant to Article 9 to secure any outcome,332 so long as it 
only accepted the least onerous of the proposed remedial packages that it considered to 
be satisfactory.333 The Commission’s analysis of the proportionality of remedies in 
commitment decisions immediately became noticeably more scant.334  
As a striking example of judicial deference, Alrosa has understandably been the subject 
of widespread condemnation.335 The CJEU declined the opportunity to set at least some 
boundaries to the Commission’s discretion manifest in commitment decisions. The sheer 
breadth of remedies that may be required for the Commission to deem market conduct 
immune from further scrutiny makes it difficult to know what is necessary. By using the 
concept of proportionality to narrow the scope of the possible and the Commission’s 
remedial discretion, the CJEU could have provided a greater degree of certainty for 
companies considering which remedies to offer. Furthermore, by actually establishing a 
direct link between the potential infringement investigated and the outcomes of 
commitment decisions, the CJEU could have prevented those instances where the 
Commission’s discretion has permitted it to secure remedies seemingly disconnected 
from its competitive concerns. Such examples are so disproportionate as to perhaps 
even raise the spectre of a possible challenge on the ground of misuse of powers. 
Instead, the CJEU chose not to take the only opportunity it has hitherto had to shift the 
use of commitment decisions towards the formal rule of law ideal. 
But having noted the failure in Alrosa to set boundaries to the discretion of Article 9 
decisions, it is worth questioning whether adopting the General Court’s more searching 
oversight would really have made much of a difference. As the last section argued, the 
problems with commitment decisions go beyond the unpredictability with which the 
Commission exercises its remedial discretion. That legality is conditional upon 
unknowable concessions is only one element in a phenomenon with complex 
implications for normative comprehensibility; remedial proportionality would not have 
touched upon the undesirable consequences of enforcement against business conduct 
beyond and below the scope of the pre-existing norms of EU competition law. Put 
                                                          
332 C-441/07P Commission v Alrosa [2010] ECLI:EU:C:2010:377. 
333 The rational course of action for investigated firms is to adopt ‘salami tactics’ to cover the ‘entire 
spectrum of adequate remedies’: Wagner-Von Papp [2012] 937-938. Similarly: Messina and Ho [2011] 747. 
334 Wagner-Von Papp [2012] 942-943. 
335 Cengiz [2011] 129, 150-151; Wagner-Von Papp [2012] 937, 967-968; Botteman and Patsa [2013] 369; 
Jenny [2015] 702. cf Messina and Ho [2011] 750. Supporting a system of compulsory judicial authorisation: 
Ratliff [2008] 314; Wagner-Von Papp [2012] 967; Massarotto [2015] 499. 
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differently, commitment decisions predicated upon novel theories of harm but where 
the Commission’s remedial discretion is exercised in a more restrained fashion, such as 
E-Books or Amazon, still foster legal uncertainty but owing to issues unrelated to their 
outcomes. 
But the main reason to be somewhat more forgiving of the CJEU failing to exert a 
restraining influence upon the Commission’s discretionary use of commitment decisions 
is practical. The very nature of enforcement through Article 9 leaves any opportunity for 
review by courts highly unlikely. Regardless of the intensity of judicial scrutiny, it is not 
obvious how much control the EU Courts could actually apply, setting limits to the use of 
commitment decisions and affording greater clarity to businesses. Having made the 
strategic decision to agree a remedial package with the Commission, it makes little sense 
for the investigated undertaking to launch judicial review proceedings of it.336 And given 
the Commission’s enforcement beyond and below the law to effectively sanction firms, 
often with substantial remedies, it is also improbable that third parties would frequently 
launch a challenge to privately-negotiated commitments either. This is a very different 
scenario to pre-modernisation exemption decisions, where the suspicion of 
administrative leniency acted as a red rag to disgruntled competitors and trading 
partners to bring legal proceedings.337 Although not impossible,338 businesses close to a 
firm subjected to a commitment decision would probably feel overjoyed with their use 
by the Commission rather than litigious.  
The unlikelihood of judicial review reinforces that the Commission’s discretionary 
enforcement of EU competition policy through commitment decisions is absolute. The 
authoritative norms deduced by the Courts for determining legality exert no restraining 
influence upon their subject-matter. Following Alrosa, neither do the Courts rigorously 
scrutinise the proportionality of their remedies. And given the rarity of commitment 
decisions being subject to judicial review at all, it seems highly implausible that this 
problematic form of market intervention will change any time soon.  
It is not obvious how such a major departure from the formal rule of law ideal can be 
solved. One possibility is for the Commission to not use commitment decisions for novel 
                                                          
336 Wagner-Von Papp [2012] 968. 
337 eg Metro I [1977]. 
338 A third-party challenge was brought by Hynix against Rambus [2009] as to the royalty rate agreed, 
though withdrawn after signing a patent agreement: Botteman and Patsa [2013] 359-360. 
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theories of harm, or, as with standard-essential patents in Motorola and Samsung 
[2014], to bring concurrent Article 7 and 9 proceedings. There would be at least one 
fully-reasoned decision for businesses to internalise and which may eventually be 
authoritatively considered by the EU Courts through subsequent review of its legality.339 
But short of a legislative reformulation of Regulation 1/2003, there is no means to 
currently compel the Commission to do so.  
Another possibility would be for the EU Courts to intensify the review of Article 7 
prohibition decisions. It has commonly been noted that the discretion in commitment 
decisions is most effectively restrained not by Courts but by investigated firms, who can 
always question its enforcement activity by forcing it into a formal prohibition 
decision.340 Why this does not happen more frequently, and whether multinational 
business empires really succumb to the worst excesses of the Commission’s discretion - 
novel abuses, superficial substantiation, extreme outcomes - to enjoy a quieter life and 
save a few Euros, is open to debate.341 The perception, at least, that the EU Courts 
afford deference to the Commission’s complex appraisals in prohibition decisions, and 
perhaps the legal norms themselves, has already been noted. Maybe even the most 
powerful firms prefer the ‘known sacrifice’ of Article 9 to the perceived difficulty of 
overturning the inevitable Article 7 prohibition decision before the Courts.342 
Admittedly, substantiating such an explanation for the prevalence of commitment 
decisions would require a great deal of deeper research. But it is at least conceivable as 
a possibility that the perception of lax judicial review by the EU Courts of formal 
infringement decisions has failed to provide businesses with a meaningful alternative to 
humouring the Commission in commitment decisions.343 Putting to one side the Alrosa 
saga, the EU Courts can be forgiven for a practical lack of opportunities to restraint this 
discretion through direct review of commitments. Still, they may be indirectly implicated 
in this systemic degradation of normative comprehensibility in EU competition policy 
through failures elsewhere to meet the role envisaged by the formal rule of law ideal.  
                                                          
339 Whish [2014].  
340 Sousa Ferro [2005] 459; Cook [2006] 222; Wils [2006] 352; Svetiev [2014] 484; Wathelet [2015] 553. cf 
Ratliff [2008] 311; Dunne [2014] 437 (the substantial incentives might sway commitments on borderline or 
even legal conduct). 
341 Similarly: Wagner-Von Papp [2012] 944-948. 
342 Forrester [2008] 647; Ibáñez Colomo [2013] 406; Jenny [2015] 721-722 (‘not offering such commitments 
is necessarily a losing strategy’). 
343 Gerard [2011]; Jenny [2015] 722-723. 
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V. Conclusion 
The history and contemporary nature of competition enforcement demonstrates that 
the Commission has often been able to achieve its policy goals very effectively. Like 
many administrative decision-makers, it has frequently pushed the boundaries of the 
possible, securing for itself the widest discretion to scrutinise the competitive 
consequences of a broad array of market practices, while sometimes acquiring radical 
remedial outcomes. Regardless of whether one condones the various aims pursued from 
time to time through EU competition enforcement, it is difficult to seriously question the 
sincerity of the Commission’s endeavours towards them; its close oversight of 
potentially problematic joint venture agreements, rebate schemes, and the variety of 
practices scrutinised through Article 9 commitment decisions, have all been genuinely 
motivated by a desire to make markets work “better” and to secure significant 
consumer “benefits”. 
Nevertheless, this chapter has argued that the efficacy with which these ends are 
realised in EU competition policy through the exercise of administrative discretion has 
been at the expense of normative comprehensibility for businesses. It represents a 
means of market intervention that disregards the political and economic desirability of 
the formal rule of law ideal. The Commission has at times aimed to avoid the restraint 
and rigidity of determining legality through the application of generalised norms that 
afford legal certainty to firms. It has skewed substantive legal concepts (eg restrictions 
under 101(1), loyalty and quantity rebates) and preferred particular decision-making 
procedures (eg Article 101(3) exemptions, commitment decisions) to expand the 
potential for discretionary market interventions in an ad hoc, subject-specific manner as 
and when it sees fit. Furthermore, the examples considered in this chapter cast doubt on 
whether the EU Courts have met their role envisaged by the formal rule of law ideal. 
Judicial review has not always produced rigorous scrutiny of Commission decisions. Nor 
are they guaranteed instances of the Courts prospectively formulating generalised 
norms for determining legality to restrain the Commission’s discretion and afford some 
certainty to businesses. Indeed, the case law on rebates under Article 102 suggested a 
deferential approach to developing the law itself, instead affording legal legitimation to 
the Commission’s discretion-building decisional practice. But even in the example 
offered of the CJEU holding the Commission’s method of market intervention to account 
- agreements necessitating effects-based analysis under Article 101(1) - the Court still 
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failed to approximate the formal rule of law, instead supplanting one unstructured 
means of determining legality through particularistic, incomprehensible analysis for 
another. 
In short, EU competition enforcement has sometimes prioritised the effective, perfected 
pursuit of its policy ends through unstructured market interventions, while disregarding 
the negative consequences of this means of market intervention in terms of normative 
certainty. Put differently, approximating the formal rule of law ideal of generalised, 
comprehensible norms for determining legality would require a means of market 
intervention less effective at securing the ends of competition policy. The rule of law 
champions policy imperfection. Of course, an absolute, formally-unbridled authority 
could perfectly deliver society’s ends (efficiency, equity, integration, etc), as the 
Commission’s discretion in commitment decisions may well demonstrate. But given the 
political and economic detriments of ad hoc determinations and widespread legal 
uncertainty, the formal rule of law is an ideal content to settle for prima facie less, but 
ultimately more: the optimal combination of effective ends and desirable means in the 
inevitable trade-off between the two. This has not been the case for the enforcement 
activity considered in this chapter.  
Nevertheless, there are examples of such a rival logic operating within EU competition 
policy. Whether deliberate or serendipitous, numerous aspects of EU market 
intervention can be interpreted as reasonable attempts to imperfectly synthesise 
effective, economically-sophisticated, and efficiency-focused ends, with a means 
aspiring towards the formal rule of law ideal of applying more generalised norms that 
are comprehensible to businesses.           
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Chapter VI: Ex Ante Optimisation of Efficiency and the Rule of Law: Celebrating Imperfection in EU Competition Policy  
I. Introduction 
In merely recommending the desirable means of market intervention, the formal rule of 
law can come to be disregarded by ad hoc, subject-specific, incomprehensible normative 
determinations in the very effective pursuit of any conceivable end. The previous 
chapter demonstrated as much. Whether driven by economic freedom, market 
integration, environmental protection, energy policy, or any other outcome, the 
Commission has sometimes pursued noble ends through problematic means, 
circumventing the restraint that generalised, comprehensible norms for determining 
legality provide. This departure from the formal rule of law is compounded if courts fail 
to incisively review administrative decision-making or prospectively formulate norms 
that structure discretion. 
The same is true of market interventions to maximise efficiency, where the basic goal is 
to permit practices that result in efficiency and prohibit conduct that results in 
inefficiency. This end of competition enforcement has a particularly tense relationship 
with the means of determining legality through applying generalised norms. Perfectly 
categorising the efficient as “legal” and the inefficient as “illegal” with absolute accuracy 
can only be achieved by ad hoc, conduct-specific analysis of the consequences of the 
instant business practice on the specific market. This is the core tenet of contemporary 
competition microeconomics: the particular context of conduct is critical to 
understanding its efficiency, so nothing can ever be deemed inherently pro- or 
anticompetitive.1 As a result, determining legality with any degree of abstraction from 
the investigated case is to necessarily realise the end of efficiency maximisation 
imperfectly; the efficient will be prohibited and the inefficient will be permitted. And 
                                                          
1 See Chapter I, Section III.C. 
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that is exactly the means advocated by the formal rule of law to provide normative 
clarity to legal subjects.  
The choice is stark: either market interventions attempt to perfectly maximise efficiency 
via a means formally indistinguishable from the exercise of absolute discretion; or they 
aspire to determinations of legality through the application of imperfectly generalised 
norms affording legal certainty to businesses.    
Although commentators have commonly advocated the former, the purpose of this 
chapter is to demonstrate and celebrate instances where EU competition law has 
chosen the latter, the imperfect realisation of efficiency maximisation. The restraint of 
determining legality through generalisations of varying degrees (rules, presumptions, 
multi-stage tests) for certain types of conduct has afforded a greater deal of normative 
certainty for businesses than the fetishisation of pure, unstructured effects-based 
analysis. Such modesty is not to abandon the end of efficiency or engage in anti-
economic “formalism”. It simply envisages a different relationship between law and 
economics in competition policy; one of optimisation, endeavouring towards the 
maximal combined reconciliation of economically accurate ends - permitting the 
efficient, prohibiting the inefficient - and a means that seeks to approximate the formal 
rule of law ideal. The absolute realisation of one will often be highly injurious to the 
other. But rather than a black or white, all or nothing view of this inevitable trade-off 
between means and ends, intermediate positions are available; economic learning can 
be incorporated ex ante into the design of generalised tests for determining legality that 
also afford normative comprehensibility to market actors. The characterisation of the 
individually efficient as legal and the inefficient as illegal will necessarily be imperfectly 
accurate, but the task is to minimise these errors without abandoning aspirations 
towards generalised and clear legal obligations. If the desiderata of efficiency-focused 
EU competition enforcement and the formal rule of law are to be pursued 
simultaneously, the best that can be hoped for is such imperfection.  
Section II will briefly recount the history of “perfectionism” and “optimisation” in EU 
competition scholarship. Although the former has been dominant since the 1960s, often 
advocating the wholesale adoption of the CJEU’s unstructured effects-based method for 
determining legality, the logic of optimisation has come to prominence under the 
banner of a “Neo”-Chicago approach. Despite the prefix, this attempt to incorporate 
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economic wisdom into the ex ante design of generalised norms that are comprehensible 
to businesses, thereby approximating the formal rule of law ideal, is indistinguishable 
from the “old” Chicago School approach, and can also be extrapolated from 
Ordoliberalism, as was considered in Part I.  
In contrast to the disregard for the desirability of the formal rule of law evidenced 
previously, the bulk of this chapter will analyse various aspects of EU competition policy 
that can be interpreted as commendable efforts to optimise efficiency-focused ends and 
legal certainty through positing norms of varying degrees of generality. Section III will 
consider: the diverse forms for determining legality proposed in the Commission’s soft 
law documents; the presumptions of legality formulated by the CJEU that restrain the 
Commission’s ability to intervene; presumptions of illegality pursuant to Article 101 and 
102, focusing particularly upon the form-based institutional clash in AKZO and the 
CJEU’s important ruling in Cartes Bancaire; and finally more intermediary, discriminating 
means to determine lawfulness through cumulative stages of legal analysis, as 
represented by the “new” block exemption regulations and the varying tests for finding 
refusals to deal an abuse of dominant position. 
Each aspect of EU competition policy considered in this chapter has been subjected to 
fierce critique. In eschewing ad hoc, subject-specific analysis in favour of normative 
generalisations of various degrees, they are unavoidably and inherently imperfect in 
categorising the efficient as legal and the inefficient as illegal. But such imperfection is 
what commends rather than condemns these elements of EU competition law. They 
grapple head-on with the ends/means trade-off, incorporating efficiency considerations 
into the ex ante design of generalised norms for determining legality that structure 
decision-making to thereby afford normative comprehensibility to market actors. 
Although not always constituting the optimal reconciliation between effective ends and 
clear means, in contrast to the unstructured, unpredictable forms of market 
intervention detailed in the previous chapter, they represent a more compromising 
relationship between efficiency-focused enforcement and the formal rule of law in EU 
competition policy.   
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II. Efficiency “Perfectionism” and “Optimisation” in EU Competition Scholarship 
Although the desirability of a “more economic” approach has been a recurrent motif of 
criticism directed at EU competition law for decades, it not obvious what this actually 
entails. While there seems to be a general consensus that efficiency ought to be the 
exclusive goal of market interventions, there are multiple ways in which such an end can 
be incorporated into determining the legality of market conduct. Rather than a singular 
“more economic” approach, it is more accurate to speak of a variety of “more 
economic” approaches.2 The result of such an oversight in EU competition scholarship 
has been  advocacy of one particular conceptualisation fundamentally incompatible with 
the formal rule of law ideal: efficiency perfectionism. But abandoning aspirations 
towards the desiderata of determining legality via generalised norms that are 
comprehensible to businesses need not necessarily result from advocating a “more 
economic” form of EU competition enforcement. The logic of optimisation recommends 
itself as an admirable attempt to imperfectly reconcile legitimate means and effective 
ends. Although a minority perspective in the history of EU competition commentary, its 
more recent resurgence belies deeper conceptual roots. 
A) Efficiency Perfectionism: Effective Ends and Problematic Means Redux 
The logic of efficiency perfectionism is as follows: to prohibit inefficient and permit 
efficient market conduct with absolute accuracy on the basis of sophisticated economic 
research, it is necessary to determine legality through ad hoc, particularistic, conduct- 
and market-specific analysis of its efficiency consequences; the restraint and rigidity of 
market intervention via applying generalised normative obligations necessarily detracts 
from such perfect separation between competitively “good” and “bad”, and therefore 
should be sacrificed in the pursuit of the end of efficiency maximisation on markets with 
maximum efficacy. 
As discussed in the Introduction,3 it is possible to interpret the writing of a number of 
scholars as advancing such an argument. René Joliet’s 1967 The Rule of Reason in 
Antitrust Law favoured EU adoption of the US rule of reason,4 which he interpreted as 
legal prohibition on the basis of ‘factual analysis, on a case-by-case basis, in the light of 
                                                          
2 For rare recognition of this in the EU “modernisation” process: Witt [2016]. 
3 See text accompanying fn 4-15. 
4 For discussion of the rule of reason: Chapter II, Section III. 
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economic investigation’.5 Its virtue lay in the accuracy of the flexible standard, able to 
perfectly discriminate between efficient and inefficient business conduct in particular 
instances for deciding illegality.6 In contrast, he denounced the Commission’s preference 
for ‘general and abstract rules’ over ‘economic investigation’ and ‘proceeding on a case-
by-case basis’,7 attributable to a Germanic fascination with legal predictability.8 Joliet 
considered such a ‘lack of flexibility’ and overreliance upon simple presumptions of 
harm to be the original ‘major defect’ of EU competition law.9 And although he 
recognised the inescapable tension between perfectly prohibiting inefficient conduct 
and a means injurious to normative comprehensibility10 - that ad hoc determinations of 
legality were a ‘burdensome task’ and businesses appreciated ‘clear-cut rules of thumb’ 
- Joliet deemed ‘a certain amount of uncertainty’ simply unavoidable in competition 
policy.11 His preference was for a means of enforcement that constituted ‘an economic 
investigation into each factual situation’, thus deciding lawfulness through ‘the 
collection of economic data’ on the specific consequences of the act.12  
This baton of admiration for ad hoc, particularistic determinations of legality that can 
accurately sift efficient from inefficient, and distaste for imperfectly generalised, 
simplistic norms in EU competition law, has been passed between many scholars since 
the 1960s: Korah’s rallying against ‘formalist reasoning’ as opposed to close analysis of 
the particular effects of market conduct on competition;13 Kon’s critique of the ‘rather 
mechanical and rigid’ reliance on presumptive prohibitions, thereby overlooking the ‘live 
economic significance of an agreement’ specifically in question;14 constant references to 
the ability of the US rule of reason standard to discern individual efficiency 
consequences and calls for its European transplantation;15 and Hawk’s influential 
condemnation of EU law on vertical restraints as categorisation and ‘conclusory 
                                                          
5 Joliet [1967] 184. 
6 ibid 6-7, 63, 113-114 (‘to ascertain when a restraint of trade has actually produced, or is intended to 
produce, an excessive anticompetitive effect on the market.’). 
7 ibid 9, 66. 
8 ibid 76. 
9 ibid 10, 64-66 (limiting rigid and mechanical presumptions to price-fixing and boycotts). 
10 ibid 8. 
11 ibid 10. See also: 43, 63 (presumptions ease adjudication by making the law ‘simpler and more certain’). 
12 ibid 170-171. See also: Salzman [1979] 54; Vestrynge [1984] 680. 
13 Korah [1993] 148. See also: Horspool and Korah [1992] 385. 
14 Kon [1982] 554. 
15 Van Bael [1980] 45; [1983] 75; Schechter [1982] 13; W Collins [1983] 516-520; Hawk and Victor [1985] 
626; Jeanrenaud [1986] 36; Hawk [1988] 53; Frazer [1990] 618. 
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reasoning’, rather than determining legality through rigorous ‘economic analysis of a 
particular agreement or practice, i.e. its competitive harms and benefits’.16  
In their defence, many of these scholars were reacting to the Commission’s overbroad 
reading of Article 101(1) to thereby maximise the scope for its discretionary granting of 
exemption decisions. Still, recourse to ad hoc normative determinations was not the 
only way in which to limit the scope of paragraph (1).17 Furthermore, this perspective 
has continued to be popular during the period of procedural modernisation through 
Regulation 1/2003 decentralising the application of Article 101(3), and subsequent 
Commission endeavours to substantively modernise via soft law documents. With 
regard to Article 101, Siragusa argued in the discussions on the future of enforcement 
that the legality of competitive restrictions must be determined through a ‘sui generis 
“rule of reason approach”’.18 Competition decision-makers should attribute liability only 
by considering the counterfactual and balancing positive/negative efficiency 
consequences.19 Save for a single rule prohibiting naked cartels as restrictions by 
object,20 all other generalised, simplistic presumptions - including those of legality -21 
were necessarily imperfect and inaccurate tools for distinguishing between instances 
with efficient and inefficient market consequences, and should therefore be scrapped.22 
During the Article 102 modernisation process, a group of economists essentially 
advocated the same ad hoc, subject-specific method for determining the legality of 
conduct by dominant firms: an ‘economics-based approach will naturally lend itself to a 
“rule of reason” approach’,23 defined as ‘a careful examination of how competition 
works in each particular market in order to evaluate how specific company strategies 
affect consumer welfare’.24 Any concessions to normative certainty through accepting 
comprehensible, generalised presumptions of legality or illegality, running ‘counter to 
the economics of the cases’, were considered the imposition of ‘an uncomfortable 
                                                          
16 Hawk [1995] 984-986 (emphasis added). 
17 See Section III.B on presumptions of legality. 
18 Siragusa [1997] 547-548. 
19 ibid 548-549. 
20 ibid 548. 
21 Presumptions of legality and block exemption regulations are discussed in Section III.B and D.i. 
22 Siragusa [1997] 550. 
23 EAGCP [2005] 3. 
24 ibid 1 (emphasis added). 
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“straight jacket”’, hindering the perfect sifting between conduct permitted as efficient 
and prohibited as inefficient.25 
Given this perspective, it is unsurprising that the CJEU’s rulings on finding restrictions by 
unstructured effects analysis in STM [1966], Brasserie de Haecht [1967], and Delimitis 
[1991]26 are often championed by these commentators as the gold-standard for 
determining legality, not just pursuant to Article 101,27 but also as the appropriate 
means for characterising conduct as abusive under Article 102.28 The last chapter 
detailed how these cases ruled that the illegality of certain types of agreement was to be 
evaluated through a rigorous, thorough, and far-reaching consideration of their nature, 
actual market context, and envisaged competitive consequences.29 Without doubt, 
market intervention via ad hoc, particularistic normative determinations concerning 
individual agreements represents the most effective means to realise the end of 
perfectly prohibiting the inefficient and permitting the efficient.30 The “more economic” 
sophistication of the law is reflected ex post in its potential for accurate sifting between 
the competitively “good” and “bad” in each instance. If the legitimacy of competition 
enforcement is only appraised on the basis of the desired end of maximising consumer 
welfare, pure effects-based analysis clearly scores highly in terms of its effectiveness for 
realising this end. 
But efficiency perfectionism’s preferred means to determine legality also represents a 
form of market intervention simply incapable of offering normative comprehensibility to 
businesses, falling far short of the rule of law ideal.31 Admittedly, in these cases the CJEU 
forced the Commission to abandon its discretion to grant Article 101(3) exemptions. It 
has no active choice as to whether conduct is presumed legal or illegal pursuant to 
Article 101(1) if the deeper effects analysis reveals that there has or has not been a 
restriction of competition. Nevertheless, the two means of market intervention are 
formally indistinguishable: both discretionary enforcement and entirely unstructured 
                                                          
25 ibid 16. See also: CLFA82RG [2005] 182-183. 
26 C-56/65 Société Technique Minière v Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH [1966] ECLI:EU:C:1966:38 (“STM [1966]”); 
C-23/67 Brasserie de Haecht SA v Wilkin (No 1) [1967] ECLI:EU:C:1967:54; C-234/89 Delimitis v Henninger 
Bräu [1991] ECLI:EU:C:1991:91. 
27 eg Joliet [1967] 12, 166, 170-171, 186; M Waelbroeck [1991] 115; Korah [1994b] 171 (though see text 
accompanying fn 38-43). 
28 eg Sher [2004] 245; Sinclair [2004]; CLFA82RG [2005] 180-182; EAGCP [2005] 1-3; Bishop and Marsden 
[2006] 1-4. 
29 See Chapter V, text accompanying fn 92-100. 
30 If the potential for decision-making errors is overlooked. 
31 See Chapter V, text accompanying fn 103-105. 
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effects-based analysis represent ad hoc, subject- and context-specific forms for 
determining legality, which in circumventing the rigid restraint of generalised norms fail 
to offer legal certainty to businesses. As suggested in the previous chapter, the 
normative comprehensibility of EU competition enforcement thus jumps out of the 
frying pan and into the fire.  
This situation is not a necessary corollary of a “more economic” approach to EU 
competition policy, driven solely by the end of maximising efficiency. A more 
satisfactory reconciliation with the desirable means of the formal rule of law is possible, 
albeit necessitating contentment with the imperfect realisation of this singular outcome 
animating market intervention.      
B) Efficiency Optimisation: Imperfect Ends and More Comprehensible Means 
An efficiency optimisation approach recognise head-on the inherent, unavoidable 
tension between the end of accurately condemning conduct resulting in inefficiency or 
permitting that occasioning efficiency, and the valuable means of aspiring to determine 
legality through generalised, equally-applicable norms that afford legal certainty to 
businesses. But rather than prioritising the perfection of the former and disregarding the 
latter, the logic is to seek the optimal reconciliation of imperfect ends with 
approximating the means of the formal rule of law. This is achieved through the ex-ante 
incorporation of economic sophistication into the design of generalised norms (rules, 
presumptions, structured multi-stage analyses) for determining legality.  
To give a stylised illustration, the pursuit of efficiency perfectionism with absolute, 100 
per cent enforcement accuracy through purely ad hoc determinations of legality for 
resale price maintenance (manufacturers fixing the retail price) in individual instances is 
to abandon the desideratum of legal certainty. Alternatively, a universal per se rule of 
illegality for resale price maintenance may only be accurate in prohibiting inefficient 
conduct in, say, half of the individual instances included within its scope, but scores very 
highly in terms of normative comprehensibility. This might be considered too much of a 
sacrifice of the end of efficiency-focused enforcement to the formal rule of law. As a 
result, the rule of per se illegality could be swapped for a presumption with distinct 
exceptions, or a more discerning three-stage test based upon the economic consensus 
as to factors rendering inefficiency more likely; normative generality and 
comprehensibility would be slightly diminished to secure a more accurate, 
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discriminating prohibition of inefficient conduct in 80 per cent of instances. The end of 
efficiency-maximising competition policy is still realised imperfectly, as is the formal rule 
of law ideal. But the logic of optimisation is to strive for the greatest possible 
combination of means and ends through using economic wisdom to propose more and 
less discerning forms - rules, presumptions, structured tests - for determining legality as 
effectively as possible whilst also approximating the ideal of norms comprehensible to 
businesses. 
Efficiency optimisation has generally been a minority position in EU competition 
scholarship. Some commentators have explicitly addressed the trade-off between 
accurately realising the efficiency-maximising end of market intervention and the means 
characterised by the formal rule of law,
The test was ‘not an easy one for national courts to apply’ and it was 
32 thus exploring intermediate tests founded 
upon economic research into the indicators of likely efficient and inefficient 
consequences.33 Defending the desirability of imperfect intervention through applying 
generalised but comprehensible norms has, over the decades, crystallised into a series 
of recurrent themes: that businesses are ‘irritated’ by an unclear divide between legality 
and illegality, chilling efficient conduct beneficial to consumers;34 that steps towards 
realising the formal rule of law ideal represent a welcome restraint upon a competition 
authority’s discretion to intervene in an unpredictably ad hoc and particularistic fashion, 
while easing administrative burdens;35 that the US Courts have struggled with the rule of 
reason standard and have developed simpler norms;36 and that Member State courts 
may be ill-suited to hyper-factual analyses for determining legality.37 Given her long-
term advocacy of effects-based determinations of legality,38 Valentine Korah’s frosty 
response to the unstructured analysis posited by the CJEU in Delimitis is especially 
notable. 
                                                          
32 Vestrynge [1984] 689-690; Venit [1987] 42; Faull [1997] 503; Jenny [1998] 193; Bishop [2000] 55-63; 
Boscheck [2000] 7-8; Hawk and Denaeijer [2000] 130, 136; Nicolaides [2000] 10-11; Bruzzone and Boccaccio 
[2009] 466-467. 
33 Fox [1982] 162 (on ATP); Claydon [1986] 192 (on joint ventures); Faull [1997] 506 (on experience-based 
presumptions of harm; Nicolaides [2000] 10-11, 23; [2005] 134-135, 142-144; Bruzzone and Boccaccio 
[2009] 467. 
34 Osterweil [1976] 77, 103; Caspari [1987] 356; Whish and Sufrin [1987] 37; Schaub [2000] 252-253; 
Nicolaides [2000] 9; Röller [2005] 21. 
35 Alexander [1973] 85; Osterweil [1976] 77; Hawk [1980] 41-42; [1995] 975; Whish and Sufrin [1987] 7-8; 
Black [1997] 149, 151-152. 
36 Gyselen [1984] 653; Schröter [1987] 655; Whish and Sufrin [1987] 7-8; Hawk [1988] 65-69, 73; [1995] 979; 
Hawk and Denaeijer [2000] 134-137; Van Gerven [2003] 416, 437-438.  
37 Steindorff [1984] 642-644; Whish and Sufrin [1987] 37; Bishop [2000] 55, 61-62; Nicolaides [2005] 144 (on 
Article 101(3) as a series of presumptive filters to unify national decision-making). 
38 cf Korah [1986a] 85 (acknowledging US courts’ difficulty with rule of reason). 
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problematic that ‘everything seems to be relevant’ for determining legality.40 Perhaps 
this was a return to earlier form. Her first EU competition law treatise in 1975 had also 
critiqued Brasserie de Haecht41 as highly complex and difficult to administer,42 while 
basing legality upon an evaluation of ‘the actual, probable, or intended effects of the 
agreement’ was of substantial detriment to normative comprehensibility for 
businesses.43 
As referenced in the Introduction,44 the logic of efficiency optimisation and endeavours 
towards ‘economics-based rules of law’45 have become much more prominent in EU 
competition scholarship since the millennium. The approach was effectively summarised 
in a 2005 piece by John Vickers, then Director General of the UK OFT:46 
“To say that the law … should develop a stronger economic foundation is not to say that 
rules of law should be replaced by discretionary decision making based on whatever is 
thought to be desirable in economic terms case by case. There must be rules of law in 
this area of competition policy, not least for reasons of predictability and accountability. 
So the issue is not rules versus discretion, but how well the rules are grounded in 
economics... To be effective, however, economics must contribute in a way that 
competition agencies, and ultimately the courts, find practicable in deciding cases.”        
In recent years efficiency optimisation has come to be styled as the “Neo”-Chicago 
approach.47 David Evans, Jorge Padilla, and a rotating cast of co-authors have advocated 
incorporating economic consensus positions on likely efficiencies into legal norms that 
may also approximate the formal characteristics of the rule of law ideal. The “Neo”-
Chicagoans attribute the rise of efficiency perfectionism and its determinations of 
legality through ad hoc, particularistic analysis to the evolution of competition 
microeconomics since the 1980s: the Post-Chicago School’s absorption of various 
methods and tools from an array of sub-disciplines (eg game theory, econometrics, 
behavioural economics) stressing the importance of context for determining whether 
actual business practices have a positive or negative market impact.48 In highlighting the 
hypothetically possible over the reasonably likely to justify market intervention via 
                                                          
40 Korah [1992b] 171-173.  
41 Brasserie de Haecht [1967]. 
42 Korah [1975] 232. 
43 ibid 255. 
44 See text accompanying fn 20. 
45 Motta [2009] 595. 
46 Vickers [2005] F260. Favourably cited by: Röller [2005] 21; Motta [2009] 596. Note that this thesis does 
not consider unstructured effects-based analysis to be an exercise in administrative discretion but agrees 
that the formal case-by-case means for determining legality are nevertheless indistinguishable. 
47 Evans and Padilla [2005] 74-75. 
48 See Chapter I, Section III.C, and Chapter II, text accompanying fn 158-164.  
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individualised decision-making that could theoretically achieve absolute economic 
accuracy, the practical reality of perfectionism is often one of substantial decisional 
error by agencies and courts,49 as well as normative uncertainty for legal subjects.50 
Their preferred approach is to bring the valuable insights of economics into EU 
competition law ex ante at the stage of normative design,51 indicating the appropriate 
prior beliefs – on the likelihood of efficiencies, inefficiencies, administrative and error 
costs in implementation – to find the optimal generalised form (eg per se rules, 
presumptions, structured tests)52 for market intervention against particular business 
practices, each approximating the end of accurate efficiency-maximisation and 
normative certainty to a varying degree.53 The result is a system of more and less 
‘differentiated’ norms for determining legality.54 
Although a prominent contemporary example of the logic of efficiency optimisation in 
EU competition scholarship, there is nothing “neo” about “Neo”-Chicago; it represents a 
method of economically-informed market intervention indistinguishable from the 
original Chicago School itself.55 This is why the frequent implication that the Chicagoans 
offer inspiration for ad hoc, particularistic determinations of legality in Europe, 
reminiscent of the rule of reason standard in US antitrust, are wide of the mark.56 When 
closely analysing the writing of Bork, Posner, and Easterbrook, it was clear that their 
approach was to combine a foundational commitment to efficiency as the sole end of 
antitrust, but a means of intervention that aspired towards generalised and equally-
applied norms where the boundaries between legality and illegality were 
comprehensible to businesses.57 Easterbrook especially highlighted the trade-off 
                                                          
49 Evans and Padilla [2005] 74, 79-80. See also: Evans, Padilla, and Polo [2002] 511; Evans, Padilla, and 
Salinger [2003] 560, 567-568; Ahlborn, Evans, and Padilla [2004] 330, 337 (Although the best legal test 
‘perfectly ferrets out anticompetitive ties from procompetitive ones’, decision-makers ‘are only human and 
make errors.’); Evans [2005] 95-96. Similarly: Maier-Rigaud [2006] 99-100 (economics ‘has focused on case-
by-case analysis’ rather than principles informing ‘competition rules designed to be as general as possible‘). 
50 Evans [2005] 93. On the importance of normative certainty: Evans and Grave [2005] 136; Evans and 
Padilla [2005] 74. 
51 Evans and Padilla [2005] 80 (on using economics to design administrable norms that minimise uncertainty 
and maximise efficiency); Evans and Grave [2005] 136.   
52 Referenced throughout their writing, eg: Ahlborn, Evans, and Padilla [2004] 337; Evans [2005] 94. 
53 Evans and Padilla [2005] 85; Evans [2005] 95-96. Similarly: Röller [2005] 11 (Not a question of ‘“more” or 
“less” economics’ but how ‘economic analysis is used’); Christiansen and Kerber [2006]; Maier-Rigaud 
[2006] 99-100 (economics should investigate ‘what effects are likely to be produced under what 
circumstances’); Bruzzone and Boccaccio [2009] 484; Katsoulacos and Ulph [2009]; Motta [2009] 595-596 
(using economics ‘to provide simple and easy-to-administer rules.’). 
54 Christiansen and Kerber [2006] 240-241. 
55 As also argued by: Kobayashi and Muris [2012] 147, 155; Wright [2012] 250-251. 
56 See citations in Chapter II, fn 10 and 105. cf recognition of their preference for clear and administrable 
presumptions: Hawk [1995] 979; Boscheck [2000] 28; Hawk and Denaeijer [2000] 134-137. 
57 See Chapter II, Section III. 
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between economically-perfect enforcement and the formal rule of law ideal, proposing 
intermediate positions that aimed to optimise both desirable characteristics of 
competition policy. The analysis of the “Neo”-Chicagoans is arguably more rigorous in 
articulating the method for reconciling means and ends. But their conceptualisation of 
the most appropriate relationship between law and economics in competition policy, 
and the idealised form of market intervention, is nevertheless almost identical. 
But just as the prefix “Neo” is contestable, so too is the “Chicago” element. It was 
argued in Chapter III that the Ordoliberal approach to competition law has often been 
mischaracterised. Rather than anti-efficiency structuralists, driven by the pursuit of 
“economic freedom”, the substance of Ordoliberal policy was more ambiguous, 
frequently indicative of efficiency as the goal of competition, and more generally to be 
guided by current economic wisdom. At the same time, it was extrapolated from links 
between Ordoliberalism and the Kantian-Rechtsstaat tradition that they would expect 
market intervention by the independent monopoly office to entail the enforcement of 
general and comprehensible norms. In combining these two elements, it is reasonable 
to argue that Ordoliberal competition policy also advocated optimisation of means and 
ends: the incorporation of economic research into the ex ante design of generalised 
rules, presumptions, or structured tests that clearly and comprehensibly delineate 
legality and illegality.58 
In short, the virtue of the optimisation approach to competition policy is that it grapples 
head-on with the tension between the end - the accurate categorisation of in/efficient 
conduct as il/legal - and means of enforcement - the formal rule of law ideal, where 
generality is connected to normative comprehensibility. Unlike the dominant 
perfectionist strand, it attempts to imperfectly realise both desiderata to the greatest 
possible extent through ex ante normative design, selecting the most appropriate level 
of generalisation (rule, presumption, structured test) to foster legal certainty without 
inflicting excessive harm to efficient business practices.   
                                                          
58 Argued by: Möschel [1989] 153-154; Herrera Anchustegui [2015] 164-165. 
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III. Optimising Ends and Means in EU Competition Law 
If the various forms for determining the legality of business practices were sorted from 
most to least “generalised” – or least to most “discriminating” – it might go as follows:59 
− Per Se legality/illegality 
− Presumptive legality/illegality with clear and specific exceptions 
− Presumptive legality/illegality with the possibility of a generalised justification60 
− Multi-stage test of legality/illegality with clear and specific stages 
− Multi-stage test of legality/illegality with broader, more context-specific stages 
− Ad hoc, context-specific evaluation of legality/illegality with indicative factors 
− Unstructured ad hoc, context-specific evaluation of legality/illegality (eg STM, 
Delimitis) 
Albeit highly stylised, this order captures the variable trade-off between the effective 
pursuit of ends and the restraining, rigidifying form of the rule of law. As one moves 
down the list, the means for determining legality becomes more flexible, better able to 
accurately categorise the efficiency consequences of individual instances of market 
conduct as warranting permission or prohibiton. The last form of market intervention, 
unstructured, context-specific evaluation, is the only one capable of perfectly 
categorising the actually efficient/inefficient as legal/illegal; all other approaches are 
necessarily imperfect in constituting varying degrees of generalisation, representing 
divergent levels of rigidified decision-making. However as one moves towards the top, 
the means better approximate the formal rule of law ideal, as ever more imperfect 
economic accuracy that affords greater normative clarity to businesses. The 
optimisation approach is one that seeks to use the economic consensus to find the 
appropriate generalised form for determining legality that produces the greatest 
combination of accurate efficiency maximisation and approximation of normative 
comprehensibility. 
The following sections will demonstrate that a number of aspects of EU competition law 
can be interpreted as reflecting this logic of optimisation, determining legality in a 
manner that overall reflects a sophisticated understanding of the efficiency 
consequences whilst also endeavouring as far as possible to constitute general, 
                                                          
59 Of course, this list represents a rather artificial separation of forms that frequently blend into each other 
in practice. For similar “Neo”-Chicagoan forms: text accompanying fn 52 
60 eg Article 101(3) or ‘objective justification’ under Article 102.  
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comprehensible norms. It can be argued A) that the Commission’s soft law 
modernisation documents themselves suggest a commitment to blending a variety of 
forms for determining the legality of specific types of market conduct, ranging from 
more to less efficiency-differentiating, more to less compliant with the formal rule of 
law. On specific instances of optimisation in action, the subsequent discussion will 
essentially move down the list of forms from least to most discriminating, considering: 
B) the CJEU’s case law establishing rules of per se legality outside the scope of Article 
101(1); C) the use of presumptions of illegality in Article 101 and 102, and whether the 
recognition of more narrow, specific exemptions would better optimise efficiency-
maximisation and legal predictability; and finally, D) more complex, discriminating multi-
stage tests for legality, as evidenced by the block exemption regulation and the test for 
abusive refusals to deal. Whether each individual instance represents the optimal 
reconciliation of means and ends is open to discussion. Nevertheless, the examples 
analysed can be taken as at least reasonable attempts within EU competition policy to 
maximise market efficiency whilst approximating the desiderata of the formal rule of 
law.    
A) Mixing Forms of Market Intervention: The Commission’s Soft Law Guidelines 
The previous chapter argued that the Commission’s understandable desire to pursue its 
ends with utmost effectiveness, unbridled by the normative restraint and rigid 
predictability reflected in the formal rule of law ideal, continues into the post-
modernisation era. Article 9 commitment decisions afford the Commission a discretion 
to flexibly and unforeseeably change any market conduct it dislikes. They represent an 
extreme example of a perfectionist approach to enforcement, regardless of which policy 
ends it ultimately chooses to realise through market interventions. 
The logic of commitment decisions contrasts with the approach reflected in the 
Commission’s attempts at substantive modernisation through the promulgation of soft 
law guidance and the “new” style of block exemption regulations.61 Whether a 
deliberate rationalising exercise by the Commission, a mirror of the diverse case law of 
the EU Courts, or (more likely) a mixture of both, the documents distributed since 2000 
can be interpreted as constituting a blend of more and less generalised forms for 
determining the legality of various types of business conduct.62 Each proposed facet of 
                                                          
61 For discussion of block exemptions, see Section III.D.i. 
62 Similarly: Bruzzone and Boccaccio [2009] 484. 
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EU market intervention may be taken as an attempt to individually calibrate the optimal 
realisation of its underpinning ends with a means aspiring towards the normative 
comprehensibility of the formal rule of law ideal. Commissioner Kroes suggested as 
much in her characterisation of the substantive modernisation of Article 102 as an 
endeavour for ‘economically sound but also practically workable’ enforcement.63 This 
would require implicating sophisticated economic research in the:64   
“search for sensible “rules” that would allow us to reach preliminary conclusions about 
when conduct may be exclusionary, and at the same time allow companies to know 
when they are on safe ground. Such an approach would have the advantage of being 
based on solid economic thinking while at the same time would give clear indications to 
companies and maintain workable enforcement rules.” 
This comes very close to the logic of optimisation, incorporating economic consensus 
positions ex ante into the design of generalised and thus clear norms for determining 
legality. 
Certainly the soft law documents include various gestures that indicate a perfectionist 
agenda. The Guidelines on Vertical Restraints [2000] for Article 101 promised to decide 
the legality of agreements ‘based on the effects on the market’,65 and the Article 102 
Guidance [2009] similarly committed the Commission to analysing conduct by taking 
into ‘account the specific facts and circumstances of each case’.66 The guidelines 
incorporate lengthy and individually indecisive lists of abstract factors that the 
Commission may consider in reaching ad hoc, context-specific decisions on lawfulness.67 
These statements were greeted by some as a positive sign that absolute accuracy in 
separating the efficient from inefficient was possible, as legality would be determined by 
‘an individual and sound assessment of the (likely) effects’,68 perhaps even amounting to 
a ‘full-blown rule of reason analysis’ in EU competition law.69 Indeed, they do at times 
seem to mimic the method of unstructured effects-based analysis proposed by the CJEU 
in the likes of STM and Delimitis, where legal certainty is sacrificed to perfectly-realised 
ends.   
                                                          
63 Kroes [2005] 391. 
64 ibid. 
65 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints [2000] OJ C291/1 [7]. cf [2010] OJ C130/01 (omitting the reference to ‘an 
economic approach which is based on the effects on the market’). 
66 Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article [102] of the EC Treaty to Abusive 
Conduct by Dominant Undertakings [2009] OJ C45/02 (“Article 102 Guidance [2009]”) [8]. 
67 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints [2000] [111]-[127]; [2010] [96]-[127]; Article 102 Guidance [2009] [19]-
[21]. 
68 Bourgeois and Bocken [2005] 113.  
69 Van Gerven [2003] 436-437. 
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But it should be clear from even a cursory glance of the various soft law documents that 
this means of market intervention is not exclusively proposed by the Commission. On 
the contrary, they cover the entire spectrum of forms of normative generality and 
administrative restraint for determining the legality of various types of business 
conduct. In each instance the realisation of accurate efficiency maximisation is traded-
off with the formal rule of law ideal to different degrees.  
For example, the Commission continues to adopt certain presumptions of illegality. 
There are still restrictions of Article 101(1) by object, where it is unnecessary ‘to 
demonstrate any actual effects on the market’.70 The same is true of presumptive 
abuses of Article 102,71 justified as they can ‘only raise obstacles to competition’ and 
generate no efficiencies so that ‘anti-competitive effect may be inferred.’72 Specific 
examples of presumptions include those against absolute territorial protection,73 resale 
price maintenance,74 and pricing below average variable cost.75 The desirability of prima 
facie findings of illegality will be considered in greater detail below.76 But with each 
presumption, the enforcement of EU competition policy is predictably restrained, for 
better or worse. 
At the same time, more discriminating but less comprehensible thresholds for illegality 
are adopted for certain types of conduct, striking the balance between the accuracy of 
prohibiting anticompetitive conduct and the desiderata of the formal rule of law in a 
different way. For instance a refusal to supply will be prohibited as abusive where it 
relates to something objectively necessary to compete, is likely to lead to the 
elimination of effective competition, and will probably result in consumer harm.77 This is 
an amalgamation of the various, multi-stage legal tests formulated by the CJEU for 
finding refusals to deal abusive under Article 102. As will be discussed below, the 
thresholds for determining illegality themselves reflect the economic hesitancy to 
                                                          
70 Guidelines on the Application of Article [101](3) [2004] OJ C101/97 (“Guidelines on 101(3) [2004]”) [21], 
[23]. See also: Guidelines on Vertical Restraints [2000] [7] (omitted in [2010]); Guidelines on the Applicability 
of Article [101] of the EC Treaty to Horizontal Cooperation Agreements [2001] OJ C3/02 [18]; [2011] OJ 
C11/1  [24]-[25]. 
71 Pera [2008] 156 (‘a mixture of structural and efficiency analyses’); Akman [2009b] 78 (‘forms of conduct 
which justify intervention without an assessment of effects of conduct.’). 
72 Article 102 Guidance [2009] [22]. 
73 Guidelines on 101(3) [2004] [23]. 
74 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints [2000]/[2010] [223]. 
75 Article 102 Guidance [2009] [44]. 
76 See Section III.C. 
77 Article 102 Guidance [2009] [81]. 
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readily compel free-riding on investments, reassuring businesses through a substantively 
high standard and a formally comprehensible, restrictive test.78     
Finally, there are types of conduct where determinations of legality are closer to the ad 
hoc analysis advanced by the CJEU in its case law on Article 101(1) restrictions by effect, 
where context and individual efficiency consequences upon the market are key. These 
instances of possible market intervention place less emphasis upon realising the 
desirable characteristics of the formal rule of law. For example, the Commission’s 
approach to rebates of various kinds in the Article 102 Guidance [2009] lists a substantial 
number of factors to be considered in the particular market.79 The flexibility with which 
it can find individual schemes abusive mirrors its close oversight of “loyalty-inducing” 
discounts from the pre-modernisation era through holistic analysis of its elements 
(albeit with a clearer focus upon their efficiency consequences).80 But in the Guidance, 
the Commission has still attempted to provide at least a degree of normative 
comprehensibility for businesses by indicating a number of informal, generalised 
presumptions that will structure its legal analysis in the individual instance: retroactive 
rebates tend to be more damaging than prospective;81 discounts set at prices below 
average avoidable cost are ‘as a general rule’ abusive as they are capable of foreclosing 
as efficient competitors;82 standardised volume thresholds are less problematic than 
individualised.83 Of course, none of these are dispositive, guaranteeing that a conclusion 
of abuse will or will not be reached. Nevertheless, the commendable intention is to 
simplify and structure the Commission’s analysis of their legality, for the benefit of 
businesses and its own resources. Even these small efforts to marginally approximate 
the formal rule of law ideal are a considerable improvement over the entirely 
unstructured effects-based analysis offered by the CJEU in STM and Delimitis.84  
It is obvious why the Commission’s substantive modernisation through such soft law 
documents was a disappointment to advocates of efficiency perfectionism in EU 
competition policy.85 The guidelines do not wholeheartedly embrace ad hoc, 
particularistic, context- and conduct-specific analysis to determine legality, to perfectly 
                                                          
78 See Section III.D.ii. 
79 Article 102 Guidance [2009] [20], [37]-[46]. 
80 See Chapter V, Section III.A. 
81 Article 102 Guidance [2009] [40]. 
82 ibid [44]. 
83 ibid [45]. 
84 See Chapter V Section II.B.ii. 
85 eg Boscheck [2000] 40-41; Pera [2008] 156; Akman [2009b] 78; Ridyard [2009]. 
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discriminate between individually inefficient and efficient market conduct. There are 
undoubtedly elements suggestive of such a form of market intervention. But pursuing 
the end of efficiency maximisation with perfect accuracy across the board is not the 
intention of these guidelines, which are replete with generalised and comprehensible 
(or, more negatively, rigid) rules, presumptions, structured multi-stage tests, and 
indicative factors for findings of illegality. These are necessarily imperfect means for 
sifting the “bad” from the “good”, and can therefore be interpreted as reflecting the 
logic of efficiency optimisation: incorporating economic research on the likelihood and 
indicators of pro- or anticompetitive consequences into the ex ante design of norms for 
determining legality, simultaneously aiming to realise the effective pursuit of efficiency 
maximisation with a means attempting to approximate the formal rule of law ideal.  
It is possible to question whether the particular reconciliation of ends and means for 
each type of conduct is actually optimal, as will be considered in the following sections. 
But the effort to even give emphasis to the appropriate means for determining legality is 
significant. It is not just in sharp contrast with the contemporaneous nature of 
enforcement through the absolute discretion of Article 9 commitment decisions. It also 
marks a real break with the Commission’s pre-modernisation endeavours to avoid the 
restraint and rationality-respecting rigidity of the formal rule of law ideal at all costs.86 
The understandable preference for maximising the potential for flexible interventions as 
and when it deemed necessary, thereby pursuing its policy ends with utmost 
effectiveness, was detailed in the previous chapter. So what has changed for the 
approximation of the formal rule of law to seemingly feature so prominently in its 
documents aiming to modernise the substance of EU competition enforcement? One 
possible explanation could be procedural modernisation, the decentralisation of Article 
101(3) as part of Regulation 1/2003. In the absence of compulsory notification, 
statements of the Commission’s decision-making logic and intentions are a useful 
complement to formal decisions for businesses wishing to understand the general 
contours of their normative obligations,87 even if they do not constitute binding 
interpretations of the law.88 Their promulgation may also be an attempt to at least 
influence national authorities and courts towards uniform decision-making. After 
                                                          
86 cf Section III.B, where the Commission was the initiator of presumed legality for certain selective 
distribution agreements. 
87 von der Groeben [1965] 920; Ferry [1979] 12, 14; Forrester and Norall [1984] 15; Hofmann [2006] 169. 
88 eg C-23/14 Post Danmark A/S v Konkurrencerådet [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:651 (“Post Danmark II [2015]”) 
[52]. On their “soft” or “hard” nature: Hofmann [2006] 162-165. On case law inconsistency (eg margin 
squeeze): Petit [2009] 500. 
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decades of avoiding the restraint and rigid regularity of determining legality through the 
application of generalised norms, as envisaged by the formal rule of law, it would be 
somewhat ironic if the Commission wished to achieve a comparable result vis-à-vis other 
decision-makers, by publishing a series of reasonably comprehensible enforcement 
norms to secure consistent and predictable enforcement of competition policy 
throughout the Union. 
B) Presumptions of Legality under Article 101 
Examples from the previous chapter did not depict the EU Courts in the most flattering 
light from the perspective of the formal rule of law. There is a live debate about whether 
judicial scrutiny of legal characterisations of facts is too superficial, and it could be 
argued that the Courts have occasionally failed to prospectively develop generalised 
norms for determining legality, setting boundaries to the Commission’s power to 
intervene and affording legal certainty to businesses. Yet even when the Courts did take 
leadership over the substance of the law of Article 101(1) to restrain the Commission’s 
discretion to exempt agreements, insisting upon robust, effects-based analysis, this itself 
neglected to approximate the rule of law ideal. Instead, cases such as STM and Delimitis 
substituted one instance of determining legality through unstructured, particularistic, 
unpredictable analysis for another.     
But this was not the only method by which the CJEU recognised the positive efficiencies 
of particular agreements and clauses to limit the scope of Article 101(1). In an important 
line of cases from the late 1970s to the 1990s, the Courts incorporated sophisticated 
understandings of efficiency consequences on competitive restrictions ex ante into the 
design of generalised presumptions of legality that closely approximate the formal rule 
of law ideal. This method of market intervention reflects the logic of optimisation: 
economic literature suggests that particular prima facie restrictions – common 
contractual clauses or certain types of agreement - are necessary for generally pro-
competitive outcomes, and therefore to promote normative comprehensibility they 
ought to be prospectively excluded from the scope of the Article 101(1) prohibition. The 
CJEU essentially married sophisticated first-principles on the high likelihood of efficient 
outcomes with simple but imperfect presumptions of legality. This represents a very 
different means for determining the legality of collusion from unstructured analysis of 
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its specific consequences on the market,89 illustrating the logic and benefits of an 
optimisation approach to EU competition policy. 
In Metro I [1977] the CJEU endorsed the Commission’s uncharacteristic stance in the 
1970s towards selective distribution agreements (“SDAs”) based on qualitative 
admission criteria. Rather than over-expansive norms under Article 101(1) and ad hoc, 
subject-specific exemption pursuant to (3) that typically constituted pre-modernisation 
enforcement,90 the Commission actually tended to find SDAs for luxury or technical 
products outside of Article 101(1) altogether.91 It did so for an SDA permitting only 
specialist electronics dealers on stringent but ‘general qualitative criteria’ in SABA 
[1976].92 As an excluded supermarket retailer, Metro challenged this relaxed stance.93 
The CJEU agreed with the Commission in finding that SDAs should not fall under Article 
101(1) so long as the nature of the product necessitated selectivity, the criteria adopted 
were qualitative, objective, non-discriminatively applied, and were no more demanding 
than necessary for the product in question.94 The Court’s reasoning mimicked the largely 
positive tenor of economic literature on non-price inter-brand competition, using 
qualitative criteria to guarantee a level of sales support through restricting intra-brand 
competition, and to ensure that the brand’s reputation is not undermined by 
discounters.95  
Nungesser [1982] involved a French seed developer providing an exclusive licence to a 
German firm containing a commitment to not licence for any other firm in Germany, nor 
to itself export and compete there (an open exclusive licence).
should not be considered ‘in itself incompatible 
with Article [101](1)’, despite necessarily limiting the licensor’s freedom.
96 Although the CJEU 
prohibited the prevention of all other parallel trade of the seed into Germany (a closed 
exclusive licence) as a restriction by object, contrary to the Commission it ruled that the 
bare grant of an open exclusive licence, 
98 Again, the 
CJEU’s logic was sound from the perspective of efficiency-focused competition 
                                                          
89 Hawk [1988] 70 (not ‘an inquiry into actual anti-competitive effects of a challenged agreement’ but 
distinct ‘per se rule[s] of legality’). 
90 See Chapter V, Section II.A. 
91 For analysis of the 1970s selective distribution cases: Forrester [1978] 19-20; Salzman [1979] 60-63. 
92 SABA (IV/847) [1976] OJ L28/19, [27]-[28]. Other clauses (eg supply targets, turnover and stock 
requirements) were Article 101(1) restrictions but exempted under Article 101(3). 
93 C-26/76 Metro-SB-Grossmärkte GmbH v Commission (No 1) [1977] ECLI:EU:C:1977:167 (“Metro I [1977]”). 
94 ibid [20]. 
95 ibid [21]. See: Chard [1980] 413-414; [1982] 91-95; Goebel [1987] 610. 
96 C-258/78 Nungesser v Commission [1982] ECLI:EU:C:1982:211. 
98 ibid [58]. 
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enforcement: were a licensor legally prohibited from committing to not compete against 
the licensee or to grant it to anybody else in the territory, the licensee may be ‘deterred 
from accepting the risk of cultivating and marketing that product’, thus recognising the 
trade-off between intra- and inter-brand competition to promote the ‘dissemination of 
new technology’.99  
It reached a comparable outcome four months later in Coditel II [1982] involving the 
exclusive right to exploitation, performance, and copyright along territorial lines.100 
Coditel (a collection of Belgian cable television broadcasters) argued that these 
agreements were void after they had violated the Belgian copyright of a film by relaying 
a German broadcast to their subscribers. The ability to sue under the licence for showing 
foreign broadcasts in Germany was akin to preventing passive sales.101 But on reference 
to the CJEU, the Court ruled that absolute territorial protection in exclusive copyright 
licensing agreements was ‘not, as such, subject to the prohibitions contained in’ Article 
101(1).102  
Finally, the ruling in Pronuptia [1986] immunised common restrictions found in 
franchising agreements from the scope of Article 101(1) prohibition:103 those protecting 
the communication of know-how from the risk of benefitting competitors;104 and clauses 
necessary to protect the identity and reputation of the franchised network.105 The 
economic pedigree of Pronuptia is clear from the CJEU’s discussion of the overwhelming 
benefits to consumers of such terms, thereby facilitating the rapid expansion of brands 
faster than vertical integration, and for franchisees to make a quick profit without 
substantial investment.106 
                                                          
99 ibid [57]. For praise: Schechter [1982] 17; Korah [1983] 754; [1994a] 214; M Waelbroeck [1987] 712-713. 
100 C-262/81 Coditel SA and Others v Ciné Vog Films SA and Others (No 2) [1982] ECLI:EU:C:1982:334 
(“Coditel II [1982]”). See: Korah [1983] 753. 
101 See Section III.C.ii on absolute territorial protection as a restriction by object. 
102 Coditel II [1982] [20]. 
103 C-161/84 Pronuptia de Paris GmbH v Pronuptia de Paris Irmgard Schillgallis [1986] ECLI:EU:C:1986:41 
[15]. See: Goebel [1986] 692; Venit [1986] 217; Korah [1988] 146; de Cockborne [1988] 13-3-13-5; Rosenthal 
[1990] 328).   
104 eg preventing the opening of a similar shop during or immediately after the agreement; not selling the 
shop without the franchisor’s consent if it will risk their know-how. 
105 eg requiring the use of the franchisor’s business methods and know-how; stipulating the location and 
decoration of the shop to guarantee uniformity; only selling the franchisor’s products or those it approves. 
106 Pronuptia [1986] [15]. For praise: Goebel [1986] 691, 693; Venit [1986] 216; Korah [1994a] 183-184. It 
drew the line at excluding territorial divisions and resale price maintenance, though left open their possible 
exemption: [23]-[24]. 
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All four CJEU judgments reflect a sophisticated economic understanding of how certain 
restrictive clauses (Metro I, Pronuptia) or types of agreements (Nungesser, Coditel II) are 
indispensable for the pro-competitive outcomes to be realised. As a result, the Court 
ruled that they ought to be presumed beyond the Article 101(1) prohibition. Along with 
its judgments on the need to scrutinise certain categories of agreement by their effects, 
these cases demonstrate the Court’s role in the pre-modernisation era as the primary 
guardian of an efficiency-driven approach, limiting the reach of Article 101(1) and 
therefore also the Commission’s discretionary decision-making pursuant to Article 
101(3).  
But despite this similarity as to their substantive outcome, the means of market 
intervention in this line of cases is fundamentally different to the unstructured, ad hoc 
determinations of legality seen in the judicial authorities on restrictions by effect.107 A 
number of commentators at the time did not notice this, mistakenly interpreting the 
above rulings as the advent of a European rule of reason.108 Indeed, one response to 
Nungesser erroneously depicted the CJEU as undertaking a ‘balancing approach’ through 
weighing a host of ‘factors which the Court took into consideration’.109 But it did not, 
thus generating rather contradictory analyses praising the supposed adoption of 
contract-specific determinations of legality, but then criticising the CJEU’s failure to 
actually engage in ‘evaluating the competitive effects of an agreement.’110 Instead, these 
cases can be interpreted as attempts to optimise an economically-sophisticated 
substance with the formal rule of law ideal; each case takes efficiency-focused first 
principles on the benefits and risks of certain types of agreement and common 
restrictions, before translating them into generalised, relatively comprehensible 
presumptions for determining legality.  
Clearly these norms for limiting the reach of Article 101(1) are imperfect, both in legally 
categorising the actual efficiencies of individual agreements and approximating the 
formal rule of law ideal. For example, the Coditel conditions attached to the exclusion of 
copyright agreements absolutely partitioning territories from prohibition are rather 
                                                          
107 Recognised by: Whish and Sufrin [1987] 23-28. See also: Salzman [1979] 60; Van Houtte [1982] 502-503; 
Schechter [1982] 17; Korah [1986a] 101; [1986b] 103; M Waelbroeck [1987] 211, 219; de Cockborne [1988] 
13-3-13-5. 
108 Siragusa [1982] 115, 119, 138-139; Goebel [1986] 691-692; [1987] 610-611; Jeanrenaud [1986] 37; Venit 
[1987] 217, 230; Holley [1992] 691.  
109 Siragusa [1982] 119. Similarly: Jeanrenaud [1986] 37; Venit [1987] 230. 
110 Jeanrenaud [1986] 37. Similarly: Goebel [1986] 693-694. 
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vague and could be formulated with greater clarity.111 As for the Metro criteria 
concerning SDAs, there has been uncertainty over which products warrant selectivity,112 
and in deciding whether their requirements are actually objective, simple, and non-
discriminatorily applied.113 There is also the economically problematic distinction 
between qualitative and quantitative, the latter usually found to breach Article 101(1) 
and thus require exemption.114 But these defects are a consequence of the impossibility 
of perfectly realising both the formal rule of law and complete economic accuracy in 
legally characterising inefficient and efficient practices. The normative certainty of the 
ancillary restraints cases is a direct result of restricting the Commission’s ability to reach 
a contrary conclusion, even if individually warranted on efficiency grounds. If the tests 
developed by the CJEU do not optimise the two in their current form, other generalised 
means for determining legality ought to be devised, avoiding the tempting form of ad 
hoc, unpredictable decision-making. 
For efficiency perfectionists, the concessions to rigid normative comprehensibility 
through the adoption of restraining, generalised presumptions of legality in this line of 
cases will always be problematic. Although their economically-sound and efficiency-
focused first principles were welcomed, the method of carving-out exceptions from the 
Article 101(1) prohibition for categories of agreements and common restrictive clauses 
was frequently dismissed as swapping over- for under-expansive normative 
imperfection: enforcement characterised by ‘anaemic economic analysis’,115 where 
specific consideration ‘of both pro-competitive and anti-competitive effects have been 
seriously inadequate’,116 and representing ‘an unfortunate example of lawyers’ 
tendency to develop rules and sub-rules.’117 It is true that the form of market 
intervention seen in Metro, Nungesser, Coditel, and Pronuptia is incapable of reflecting 
the actual efficiency consequences of specific agreements in their market context, and 
will necessarily be under or over-inclusive. But that’s the point: this line of judgments by 
the CJEU is to be celebrated specifically because ‘there is little economic analysis – just 
                                                          
111 Coditel II [1982] [19] (still prohibiting agreements creating ‘artificial’ barriers that are ‘unjustifiable in 
terms of the needs of the cinematographic industry’, including fees exceeding ‘a fair return on investment’, 
or of a ‘disproportionate’ duration). See: Korah [1990] 1024. 
112 Korah [1994a] 175 on C-243/83 SA Binon & Cie v SA Agence et Messageries de la Presse [1985] 
ECLI:EU:C:1985:284. 
113 Chard [1982] 85, 100. 
114 Salzman [1979] 62; Chard [1982] 96-97; Goebel [1987] 619-620; Korah [1988] 144; [1994a] 176; Pathak 
[1989] 268; Forrester [1994] 473-474. 
115 Hawk [1995] 975-976. 
116 Chard [1982] 89. 
117 Korah [1988] 146 (discussing selective distribution). 
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assertions of principle’.118 As only a small collection of supporters have realised,119 this 
means of enforcement involves the ex ante reconciliation of sophisticated 
understandings of the efficiencies resulting from various restrictive agreements with the 
formal desiderata of the rule of law. Both are realised imperfectly, but unlike the 
unstructured effects cases under Article 101(1), the CJEU’s rulings resulted in 
generalised norms for determining legality to restrain the Commission’s decision-making 
and thus offer a degree of normative certainty for market actors. 
C) Presumptions of Illegality 
Shifting from one end of the legality spectrum to the other, both Article 101 and 102 
utilise general presumptions of anticompetitive harm for specific types of business 
conduct, regardless of the actual efficiency consequences of individual instances falling 
within their scope. Article 101(1) has the category of restrictions by object presumed 
illegal ‘by their very nature’,120 and Article 102 has been interpreted as allowing for 
comparable condemnation for conduct that ‘must be regarded as abusive’.121  
Understandably, determinations of legality through the application of generalised norms 
have frequently been criticised by efficiency perfectionists as an anti-economic form of 
market intervention, ripe for reformulation towards ad hoc evaluation of the specific 
consequences of the investigated conduct.  
But viewed from the perspective of optimisation, there is no reason to believe that 
rather blunt presumptions of anticompetitive harm cannot be reconciled with an 
efficiency-focused, “more economic” approach to EU competition law. Generalised 
presumptions can optimally synthesise efficiency considerations and continue to play a 
valuable role in affording normative comprehensibility to businesses as envisaged by the 
formal rule of law, but only so long as they condemn appropriate types of conduct, as 
informed by economics. It will be argued that i) the treatment of predatory pricing 
pursuant to Article 102 is a good example of the logic of optimisation recommending a 
presumption of anticompetitive harm, and ii) following the recent case law of the CJEU, 
                                                          
118 Korah [1994a] 267-268. 
119 eg Whish and Sufrin [1987] 23-29 ; González Díaz [1995] 330 (The absence of ‘full-blown market analysis’ 
offers business certainty). 
120 C-209/07 Competition Authority v Beef Industry Development Society Ltd and Barry Brothers (Carrigmore) 
Meats Ltd [2008] ECLI:EU:C:2008:643 (“BIDS [2008]”) [17]. 
121 C-62/86 AKZO Chemie BV v Commission [1991] ECLI:EU:C:1991:286 [71]. 
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there is reason to believe that it intends to interpret restrictions by object under Article 
101 in a comparable manner. 
i) Article 102: The Example of Predatory Pricing 
In substantiating a claim that a dominant undertaking has engaged in an abuse, Article 
102 does not contain a de jure conceptual distinction between conduct presumptively 
illegal in and of itself, or as a result of more detailed analysis of its overall competitive 
consequences on the market. Nevertheless, a de facto distinction between the two 
forms of market intervention is discernible in practice, with different types of conduct 
categorised onto either side.122 For example, while a margin squeeze requires a 
demonstration of the ‘anti-competitive effect on the market’ for prohibition,123 
exclusivity rebates were, until recently, considered ‘by their very nature capable of 
foreclosing competitors’ and thus abusive without examining ‘the circumstances of the 
case’.124 As a result of this means for determining legality, the law deduced from Article 
102 has been criticised by those seeking the perfect maximisation of efficiency for its 
deployment of overbroad presumptions of anticompetitive illegality for certain types of 
market conduct, regardless of their actual impact.125 Such imperfect categorisation of 
inefficient and efficient conduct by dominant firms is often said to chill pro-competitive 
practices by dominant firms to the ultimate detriment of consumers.126 It is therefore 
routinely argued that the legality of conduct by dominant firms ought instead to be 
determined through ad hoc analysis of the actual efficiency consequences of specific 
practices in their market context, akin to the unstructured effects analysis articulated by 
the Courts for Article 101(1).127 
On the contrary, the logic of optimisation suggests that presumptions of abuse can be 
appropriate tools for prohibiting conduct as abusive pursuant to Article 102, effectively 
reconciling the goal of condemning inefficient conduct with the formal rule of law. The 
CJEU’s ruling in AKZO [1991] provides a good illustration. Much like the form-based 
distinction between STM/Delimitis and the presumptions of legality in the previous 
                                                          
122 Sinclair [2004]; Eilmansberger [2005]. 
123 C-295/12P Telefónica SA and Telefónica de España SAU v Commission [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2062 [124]. 
124 T-286/09 Intel v Commission [2014] ECLI:EU:T:2014:574 [85]-[87]. cf C-413/14P Intel v Commission [2017] 
ECLI:EU:C:2017:632. 
125 Pathak [1989] 262 (‘Gross generalisations’ ignore efficiencies); Pera and Auricchio [2005] 177; Bishop and 
Marsden [2006] 2; Auricchio [2007] 374; Pera [2008] 150 (overlooking exclusionary effects ‘in the specific 
context’).  
126 CLFA82RG [2005] 182-183; EAGCP [2005] 2-3; Bishop and Marsden [2006] 1-2. 
127 Sinclair [2004]; CLFA82RG [2005] 180-181; EAGCP [2005] 1-3; Bishop and Marsden [2006] 1-4. 
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section, AKZO is an example from Article 102 of two diverging means of market 
intervention. But rather than a contrast between parallel lines of CJEU case law, AKZO 
was a direct clash between the Commission and the Court over the appropriate form for 
determining the legality of low prices.128 Once again the CJEU’s reasoning can be 
interpreted as evidencing the logic of optimisation in its approach to the promulgation 
of generalised norms, incorporating the economic consensus ex ante into a 
comprehensible and administrable presumption of illegality. 
AKZO concerned a large peroxide manufacturer threatening and executing a policy of 
aggressively low prices to intimidate and exclude a smaller rival. The successful policing 
of predatory pricing includes pitfalls aplenty as low prices are, of course, a desired result 
of aggressive competition and can be difficult to distinguish from conduct meant to 
exclude competitors with shallower pockets.129 Both the Commission and CJEU agreed 
that AKZO had engaged in abusive conduct contrary to Article 102, but their respective 
methods proposed for determining illegal predation varied. 
On the one hand, the Commission continued its pre-modernisation endeavours to 
secure for itself maximal discretion to prohibit business conduct without generalised 
normative boundaries, as and when it saw fit. It suggested a broad and seemingly 
unrestrained threshold for finding a dominant firm’s conduct abusive: it would intervene 
to prohibit ‘[a]ny unfair commercial practices… intended to eliminate, discipline or deter 
smaller competitors’.130 Albeit unrelated to resultant efficiencies or effects-based 
analysis, such a means for determining legality constitutes a highly particularistic, ad hoc 
test, essentially coming down to the Commission’s appraisal of a firm’s perceived 
intentions in the individual instance.131 It found this requirement met and concluded 
that AKZO had violated Article 102.   
The CJEU also found that AKZO had engaged in predatory pricing on the basis of its clear 
intent, but proposed a different means for determining legality. Prices would be 
presumed to be abusive predation violating Article 102 either: where they fell below the 
average cost of producing an additional unit (average variable cost, “AVC”) as ‘each sale 
generates a loss’, according to the Court explicable only as a means of excluding 
                                                          
128 ECS/AKZO (IV/30.698) [1985] OJ L374/1; AKZO [1991]. 
129 Sharpe [1987] 54-55. 
130 ECS/AKZO [1985] [74].  
131 ibid [80], [87]. See: Sharpe [1987] 74-75. 
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rivals;132 or where they fell below average total cost (“ATC”, AVC plus average fixed costs 
of production) and were part of ‘a plan for eliminating a competitor’.133 The CJEU agreed 
with the Commission that AKZO met this second threshold for illegality. 
Both the Commission and CJEU’s routes to a finding of abuse share difficulties. The 
common reliance upon intention focuses more upon the subjective perception of 
fairness rather than efficiency,134 and it risks overlooking that a great deal of beneficial 
competition is driven by a desire to eliminate rival firms.135 The cost-based thresholds 
for intervention could also be higher, requiring evidence of a risk of recoupment of 
losses after the targeted firm has been excluded. Following Chicagoan reasoning,136 this 
would place greater faith in market self-correction as, in the absence of substantial 
barriers to entry, new firms might enter in response to the dominant firm raising prices 
to compensate earlier losses.137 
But putting these issues to one side, the proposed methods of market intervention to 
determine illegality were of fundamentally different forms. The Commission’s decision 
preferred ad hoc, subject-specific analysis of intentions for finding abusive predation. 
Although the CJEU maintained a degree of culpability for anticompetitive intent, it 
conceptualised market intervention to police low pricing primarily through generalised 
cost-based presumptions of anticompetitive harm that are reasonably comprehensible 
to businesses. Indeed, it was the restraint and rigidifying clarity of the presumption for 
prices below AVC as abusive which led the Commission to explicitly reject cost-based 
tests for legality in its decision.138 Its justification was, in essence, a desire to maintain 
the flexibility to determine illegality on a case-by-case basis: the ‘mechanical application’ 
of cost-based presumptions would restrict the Commission’s ability to ‘cover all cases of 
unfair conduct designed to exclude or damage a competitor,’139 or, less charitably, to 
intervene against particular businesses as it deemed appropriate. It is this administrative 
                                                          
132 AKZO [1991] [71]. 
133 ibid [72]. 
134 Sharpe [1987] 74; Merkin [1987] 211-212. 
135 Merkin [1987] 211; M Waelbroeck [1991] 119; Levy [1992] 426; Mastromanolis [1998] 215, 222; 
O’Donoghue [2003] 414. 
136 See Chapter II, Section II.B.i. 
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restraint resulting from the application of generalised norms which affords normative 
clarity to businesses and thus approximates the rule of law ideal.  
Of course, the CJEU’s cost-based approach is imperfect, both as to the end of accurately 
maximising efficiency and the fostering of legal certainty. Cost-based tests are not 
necessarily easily ascertained, whether by businesses at the time of the allegedly 
anticompetitive behaviour or by the Commission ex post.140 But in comparison to rival 
methodologies for determining predation, it may arguably be the most ‘useable’ of a 
defective bunch, and is ‘something that European regulators and courts seem capable of 
applying, if not always with great sophistication.’141 Once again, realising these 
characteristics of the formal rule of law is traded-off against the possibility of perfectly 
categorising efficient and inefficient low pricing. In certain circumstances, it is rational 
and efficient to price below AVC to promote a new product, clear stock, or to avoid 
expensive cessation of production during periods of downturn.142  
But these limited exceptions ought not to lead to the conclusion that the CJEU’s 
generalised presumption in AKZO [1991] is an ‘exceedingly worrying’ rule of thumb,143 or 
to the perfectionist perspective that predation under Article 102 ought therefore to be 
determined through recourse to ‘a close assessment of its effects on competition’.144 
The presumption of illegality for pricing below AVC represents a reasonable attempt at 
optimising ends and a means for determining legality that is generally clear for 
businesses. In terms of economic first-principles, the CJEU’s generalised presumption of 
abuse reflects the consensus position that pricing below AVC accurately prohibits 
anticompetitive, efficiency-reducing behaviour in the vast majority of cases, albeit not 
every instance.145 The automatic recourse to determining legality for low prices through 
particularistic analysis of the business, conduct, and market in question as a means to 
achieve a perfect legal categorisation between “good” and “bad” may simply not be 
worth the hassle. Catching the few pro-competitive instances that slip through the net 
                                                          
140 Sharpe [1987] 66-67; Guy [1987] 88-89; Merkin [1987] 214; Levy [1992] 427; Korah [1993] 177-178. 
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into illegality via this ad hoc form of competition enforcement might be outweighed by 
the dilution of normative comprehensibility for businesses.146  
If, however, remedying the imperfect overreach of the presumption of illegality below 
AVC is still thought desirable, there are intermediate means. For example, a series of 
clear and narrow exceptions on stock clearance or short-term promotions could be 
formulated as distinct justifications to be recognised in the exculpatory analysis of the 
defendant offering an objective justification. Such a tweak to the form for determining 
legality or illegality of predatory pricing would arguably be closer to the optimal 
reconciliation of ends and means, improving both the accurate prohibition of market 
inefficiency and the normative comprehensibility of a relatively simple presumption of 
illegality with discrete exceptions. 
In summary, the law on predatory pricing pursuant to Article 102 reflects the struggle 
between contrasting forms of market intervention to enforce EU competition policy: the 
Commission and some commentators advocating particularistic determinations of 
legality on the basis of intention or efficiency consequences; and the CJEU 
demonstrating the logic of attempting to optimise the end of accurately prohibiting 
conduct resulting in inefficiency, with a means that is comprehensible to legal subjects. 
This approach is necessarily imperfect, but unlike the recommendations of the former, it 
offers the restraint of a generalised presumption of illegality to thereby afford 
normative certainty to dominant undertakings. 
ii) Article 101: Restrictions by Object and Hardcore Restrictions 
The use of generalised presumptions pursuant to Article 101(1) has been a contentious 
issue in EU competition enforcement ever since their first judicial articulation in 1966. In 
STM [1966] the CJEU ruled that the legality of a restriction on active sales by distributors 
into other national territories in an exclusive distribution agreement was to be 
determined by considering its particular restrictive effect within the market context. 
However three weeks later in Consten [1966], an exclusive distribution agreement also 
prohibited its members from passive sales requested by customers in other national 
territories.147 This contractual guarantee of absolute territorial protection (“ATP”, 
preventing active and passive sales) was categorised by the CJEU as a restriction by 
                                                          
146 Similarly: Sharpe [1987] 68. 
147 C-56 and 58/64 Etablissements Consten SA & Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v Commission [1966] 
ECLI:EU:C:1966:41. 
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object under Article 101(1), and therefore presumed illegal without the need to 
investigate ‘further considerations, whether of economic data’ or ‘possible favourable 
effects of the agreements in other respects’. 
Rather than the unstructured, subject-, market- and context-specific decision-making 
constituting a finding of restriction by effect, restrictions by object determine the 
illegality of conduct through the application of generalised, simple presumptions against 
types of agreement that are deemed ‘by their very nature’ to harm competition.148 Over 
the decades various categories of collusive acts have been added to the ‘object box’:149 
‘obvious restrictions’ such as price-fixing or market-sharing;150 exchanges of sensitive 
commercial information as to future market conduct;151 paying rivals to delay the 
release of competing products;152 resale price maintenance;153 internet sales bans,154 
and many others. Functionally and formally equivalent are the hardcore, “black-listed” 
clauses found in block exemption regulations. For example, the Vertical Block Exemption 
Regulation cannot be used to find an agreement legal if it contains any of the hardcore 
restrictions noted in Article 4,155 and the Commission’s view is that on individual analysis 
they are ‘presumed to fall within Article 101(1)’.156 Although restrictions by object and 
hardcore restrictions pursuant to the block exemption can in principle be exempted via 
paragraph (3)157 - and frequently were by the Commission in its pre-modernisation 
decisional practice -158 the Commission recognises in its post-modernisation and post-
decentralisation guidelines that this is ‘unlikely’.159 Albeit not de jure the case, the reality 
is therefore more commonly than not one of per se condemnation.     
                                                          
148 BIDS [2008] [17].   
149 Whish and Bailey [2018] 131. 
150 T-374, T-375, T-384, and T-388/94 European Night Services [1998] ECLI:EU:T:1998:198 [136]. 
151 C-8/08 T-Mobile Netherlands BV [2009] ECLI:EU:C:2009:343. 
152 T-472/13 Lundbeck A/S v Commission [2016] ECLI:EU:T:2016:449. 
153 Pronuptia [1986] [23]. 
154 C-439/09 Pierre Fabre Dermo-Cosmétique SAS v Président de l’Autorité de la Concurrence [2011] 
ECLI:EU:C:2011:649 [47]. 
155 Commission Regulation 330/2010 on the Application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union to Categories of Vertical Agreements and Concerted Practices [2010] OJ L102/1 
(“Vertical Block Exemption Regulation [2010]” or “VBER” [2010]’) Article 4 (resale price maintenance, 
absolute territorial protection (save for a number of exceptions), restricting active or passive sales by 
approved members of a SDA, restricting SDA cross-supply, or preventing suppliers selling components as 
spare parts). 
156 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints [2010] [47]. 
157 T-17/93 Matra Hachette SA v Commission [1994] ECLI:EU:T:1994:89 [85]. 
158 See Chapter V, Section II.A. 
159 Guidelines on 101(3) [2004] [46].  
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Every single generalised presumption of illegality pursuant to Article 101(1) is 
necessarily and unavoidably imperfect as a means to realise the end of only prohibiting 
conduct resulting in inefficiency and permitting anything else.  
For example, although the presumptive prohibition of ATP in Consten - or other means 
to the same end -160 was clearly driven by the political end of preventing the partitioning 
of the EU market, it could be reinterpreted and defended on the basis of efficiency. 
Maintaining cross-border trade may stimulate greater price competition, market entry, 
and the realisation of productive economies of scale to the potential benefit of 
consumers.161 However in certain circumstances, prohibiting ATP does not always 
maximise efficiency. As the CJEU noted in STM,162 territorial exclusivity (restricting intra-
brand competition) may ex ante incentivise distributors to undertake risky investments 
with a better chance of return, thereby promoting the introduction of new products 
(inter-brand competition) and avoiding the “free-rider” problem.163 ATP in exclusive 
distribution contracts simply applies the same economic logic to an even higher level of 
territorial insulation.  
The imperfect illegality of individually efficient market conduct is also a possibility with 
the categorisation of resale price maintenance (“RPM”, the fixing of minimum prices 
with retailers) as a hardcore restriction by object.164 Generally, RPM can lead to losses in 
welfare through limiting price competition between distributors and possibly facilitating 
producer or retailer cartels, while its industry-wide adoption may allow for non-collusive 
price increases.165 But as with ATP, RPM can also be another means to ensure that 
distributors provide additional services to customers and prevent free-riding on their 
investments by other sellers, thereby restricting intra-brand price competition to foster 
                                                          
160 eg differential pricing for exports: The Distillers Company Ltd (IV/28.282) [1978] OJ L50/16. See: Korah 
[1978b]; Chard [1980]; Baden-Fuller [1981]; Van Bael [1980]. C-501, 513, 515, and 519/06P GlaxoSmithKline 
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161 Korah [1978a] 768-769; Guidelines on 101(3) [2004] [13]. 
162 STM [1966] (‘necessary for the penetration of a new area’). 
163 For discussion of the “free-rider” problem and the trade-off between intra-brand and inter-brand 
competition that may result from territorial partitioning: Deringer [1965] 608-610; Joliet [1967] 145; Chard 
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165 Kneepkens [2007] 664; Peeperkorn [2008] 206-208. 
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inter-brand, non-price competition that is beneficial to consumers.166 On the basis of 
this potential for positive efficiencies, the US Supreme Court in Leegin [2007] overturned 
the per se prohibition of RPM set down in Dr Miles [1911] and now determines their 
legality through ad hoc, agreement-specific analysis of the restriction’s competitive 
impact under the “rule of reason” standard.167  
Efficiency perfectionists have understandably been highly critical of the overbroad scope 
of these generalised presumptions of illegality pursuant to Article 101(1).168 In the 1960s 
Joliet condemned the absence of ‘any sophisticated market analysis’ in Consten,169 and 
the preference for ‘mechanical’ generalisations that overlooked possible pro-
competitive efficiencies resulting from specific agreements.170 EU competition policy has 
been similarly accused of ignoring the ‘powerful efficiency arguments’ for permitting 
RPM to be found in economics.171 The recommendation has invariably been to 
determine illegality through a thorough, ad hoc consideration of the likely context-
specific efficiency consequences in each individual instance.   
But from the perspective of optimisation, the category of hardcore restrictions by object 
can be a highly valuable means of market intervention, but only if the economic 
consensus on the conduct presumed unlawful indicates a high likelihood of inefficiency. 
It is clear that generalised, simple presumptions for determining legality closely 
approximate the formal rule of law. As Advocate General Kokkot noted in T-Mobile, the 
simplicity, rigidity, and restraint of a presumption fosters normative comprehensibility, 
as well as conserving administrative resources.172 But in doing so, this desirable means is 
particularly at risk of diminishing the economic accuracy of competition policy, 
potentially condemning conduct that is, in the actual instance, efficient. Essentially, from 
an optimisation perspective, the appropriateness of considering particular clauses as 
presumptively illegal comes down to whether EU competition law actually sticks to its 
decades-long justification for their adoption: that the prohibited clauses really can be 
‘regarded, by their very nature, as being injurious to the proper functioning of normal 
                                                          
166 Van den Bergh [1996] 77; Kneepkens [2007] 664; Vickers [2007] 9, 11-12. cf Peeperkorn [2008] 205-212.  
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170 ibid 11, 150 (failing to consider ‘market conditions to see whether competition has been affected’). 
171 Van den Bergh [1996] 77. Similarly: Kneepkens [2007] 664; Vickers [2007] 11. 
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competition’.173 This seems to be the logic espoused by the CJEU in Cartes Bancaires 
[2014]. 
As was discussed in the previous chapter, the pre-modernisation distinction between 
restrictions by object or effect was of little practical difference. The Commission almost 
always found some form of competitive restraint, whether through over-ready findings 
of anticompetitive object or by ignoring the rigor of effects analysis mandated by the 
CJEU.174 However in the post-modernisation era where national decision-makers can 
apply the full range of Article 101, the scope of the object box is of live significance. In T-
Mobile [2009] the CJEU’s unclear formulation of restrictions by object as practices 
merely ‘capable’ or having the ‘potential’ to cause a negative competitive impact for a 
presumption of illegality afforded little guidance;175 was this meant to suggest that 
possibly anything can be presumed illegal by object, or simply that the individual 
practices prohibited did not have to lead to inefficiency in every instance for the 
presumption to still stand?  
The ruling in Cartes Bancaires [2014] is a welcome clarification that demonstrates an 
optimisation approach to presumptions of harm pursuant to Article 101(1). In brief, 
practices should only be categorised as hardcore restrictions by object - a generalised 
means of determining legality that is simple, administrable, and comprehensible - if 
there is considerable economic evidence that they are highly likely to lead to 
anticompetitive consequences in most instances. The CJEU stressed that this was a 
category of presumptions limited to those practices that ‘reveal a sufficient degree of 
harm to competition’, as otherwise it would afford the Commission a shortcut to finding 
breaches of Article 101.176 The key criterion for categorisation as a restriction by object 
was that of economic ‘[e]xperience’, demonstrating that the practice ‘may be 
considered so likely to have negative effects’ that it was ‘redundant… to prove that they 
have actual effects on the market.’177 It was on this basis that in the subsequent case of 
                                                          
173 BIDS [2008] [17]. 
174 See Chapter V, Section II.A. 
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Maxima Latvija [2015], the CJEU refused to recognise another generalised presumption 
of illegality, despite accepting a negative competitive effect in the instant case.178 
The example offered by the CJEU as an illustration of its proposed approach to 
presumptive breaches of Article 101(1) was naked price-fixing. This type of market 
conduct perfectly captures the logic of optimisation in action. The Court reasoned that 
the benefits of closely approximating the normative comprehensibility of the formal rule 
of law through a generalised presumption of illegality are justified because the 
economic evidence on the likelihood of negative efficiency consequences is so strong, 
counterbalancing the highly unlikely occurrence of individually pro-competitive 
outcomes from naked price-fixing.179 This is essentially the same logic as Bork’s defence 
of the per se rule in US antirust. As discussed in Chapter II, although it cannot be claimed 
with absolute certainty that price-fixing will never be efficient, Bork argued that the 
overwhelming economic consensus on the vast majority of instances having no 
redeeming features heavily outweighed the costs of normative uncertainty, error, and 
administration brought about by more discriminating, case-specific scrutiny to save the 
(hypothetical) minority of pro-competitive instances from prohibition.180  
This is a method for determining legality that incorporates efficiency considerations ex 
ante into the design of generalised norms, rigidifying competition decision-making to 
afford legal certainty to businesses. To be sure, it may well be the case that the 
treatment of certain types of conduct as restrictions by object - absolute territorial 
protection, resale price maintenance - does not represent an optimal reconciliation. But 
this should not automatically result in evaluating their legality according to Article 101(1) 
through individualised, unstructured efficiency analysis (effects-based evaluations, the 
rule of reason standard) that is thoroughly unpredictable.181 If the particular instances of 
pro-competitive outcomes can be isolated into clear, narrow exceptions to the 
presumptive prohibition (eg the launch of a new product requiring distributor 
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investment to justify ATP or RPM),182 the combination of accurately permitting efficient 
conduct and normative comprehensibility may be even closer to optimal.       
In summary, the generalised presumptions of illegality pursuant to Article 101(1) are 
capable of reconciling a means approximating the formal rule of law and economically-
sophisticated EU competition policy, so long as they only prohibit conduct that is highly 
likely to result in efficiency. The Cartes Bancaires ruling is a strong signal that the CJEU 
also views restrictions by object from this perspective of optimisation. 
D) More Discriminating Determinations of Legality: Multi-Stage Tests 
A great deal of routine business conduct falls between the extremes of positive or 
negative efficiency consequences in the vast majority of instances which would justify 
presumptions of legality or illegality. Understandably it is here that the temptation is 
strongest to abandon hopes of approximating the formal rule of law, and instead 
succumb to determining legality via ad hoc, case- and conduct-specific unstructured 
analyses of their individual efficiency consequences. 
On the contrary, it is for these types of conduct that insights from economic research 
are most valuable in attempting to construct more discriminating multi-stage tests, 
which are nevertheless comprehensible to businesses and simple to administer. This 
section will consider two very different examples that share in common the form of 
determining the legality of market conduct via structured legal analysis constituting a 
number of cumulative steps: i) the legality of agreements pursuant to Article 101 which 
meet the stipulations of the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation; and ii) the EU Courts’ 
requirements for concluding that a refusal to supply is an abuse of dominance in 
violation of Article 102. Once again, both of these multi-stage tests are imperfect means 
for categorising in/efficient agreements or refusals as il/legal with complete accuracy, as 
each step may include normative generalisation to differing degrees. But this 
imperfection is what recommends them over the uncritical recourse to unpredictable ad 
hoc, effects-based analysis; they represent reasonable attempts to incorporate 
economic consensus positions ex ante into determinations of legality that aspire to the 
characteristics of the formal rule of law, thereby aiming to optimise effective ends with 
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more comprehensible means. Essentially, they are formally comparable to Easterbrook’s 
multi-stage filters for structuring the US rule of reason standard.183       
i) Article 101 Legality: “New” Block Exemption Regulations 
Since 1965 the Commission has been empowered to exempt categories of agreement en 
masse from the application of Article 101 via regulations, a tool frequently deployed to 
ease the administrative burden for both itself and businesses occasioned by the pre-
modernisation regime of compulsory notification.184  
Whether judged by their means or ends, the “old” block exemptions were highly 
problematic tools of EU competition enforcement. While firms appreciated the certainty 
afforded by regulations stipulating ‘an area of absolute legal protection’,185 this came at 
a substantial cost to the overall maximisation of market efficiency. Their degree of 
prescriptiveness for securing legality often restricted the ability for firms to effectively 
innovate with contractual arrangements.186 The long lists of prohibited (“black”) and 
acceptable (“white”) clauses had an air of regulatory dirigisme,187 with the latter 
practically adopted as standard-form contractual templates by industry.188 But even 
their approximation of the desiderata of generality, and thus normative 
comprehensibility, was deficient. Aside from routinely vague drafting and byzantine 
complexity rendering their scope of application contestable,189 some were also unduly 
narrow190 or inconsistent in their treatment of similar practices,191 thus distorting 
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business behaviour towards potentially inefficient methods.192 Essentially, the old 
exemptions achieved the rare dual distinction of being both economically and legally 
deficient. 
Despite the deluge of criticism levied at block exemptions over the decades, the 
Commission has maintained them as a means to determine the legality of agreements in 
the post-modernisation era. However a “new” approach to them was heralded with the 
introduction of the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation (“VBER”) in 1999.193 At a general 
level, the adoption of an overall regulation for vertical contracts was meant to overcome 
the normative incomprehensibility of the old collection of narrow and inconsistent 
regulations.194 Confusing jurisdictional questions have been marginalised195 and certain 
agreements – particularly selective distribution – no longer fall between the cracks.196 
The economic logic underpinning the VBER also represents a ‘radical change’ from the 
past: ‘less formalistic, less prescriptive, more economics-based’.197 In particular, this 
shift in approach is represented by the abandonment of long “white lists” of acceptable 
clauses to dispel their popular perception as compulsory codes for legality.198  
Albeit more complex than the presumptions of legality or illegality considered above, 
the VBER can be interpreted as a more intermediate approach to reconciling the 
accurate permissibility of efficient agreements and the desiderata of determining 
legality through generalised and comprehensible norms. The legality bestowed by the 
VBER, as updated in 2010, now depends upon a four stage analysis of the agreement: 
first, the individual market shares of the parties involved must be below 30 per cent;199 
second, the agreement cannot include the hard-core restrictions listed in Article 4; third, 
the terms outlined in Article 5 must be severed;200 and fourth, exemption may be 
withdrawn under Article 6 if the agreement contributes to a network of parallel 
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relationships covering more than 50 per cent of the market. At every step, the 
discernible commitment to reconcile considerations of overall efficiency maximisation 
with approaching the formal rule of law has been critiqued by those desiring the perfect 
legal categorisation of individually “bad” and “good” agreements. 
The market cap set at 30% is the most important innovation of the VBER, and was meant 
to be a sign of the Commission’s commitment to economically-sophisticated first-
principles. Nevertheless, determining legality through this ‘rough instrument’201 has 
been dismissed for not capturing with absolute accuracy the actual contestability of the 
market, or pressure faced by even the largest, most successful firms.202 By bluntly 
accepting the legality of vertical agreements purely on this generalised basis, the VBER 
has routinely been trivialised as constituting a series of ‘mere screens’203 or as a 
‘glorified’ extension of the de minimis doctrine for vertical agreements.204 The same 
allegations could be levied at the reverse presumption found in Article 6, where parallel 
networks of agreements covering over half of the market may be found by the 
Commission to fall outside the exemption regime.205 But from the perspective of 
optimisation, this is exactly the reason to celebrate the use of market share 
presumptions: they constitute relatively clear thresholds based upon the logic that 
anticompetitive concerns with vertical agreements are highly unlikely for firms of such 
small market size,206 or are more likely where a dense web of such relationships exist. 
Admittedly, the case could be made to raise the thresholds higher,207 and despite the 
simplicity of their exposition, calculating actual market shares is no easy task, previously 
exacerbated by the EU’s imperfect methodology for defining relevant markets.208 
Nevertheless, there is really no other workable indicator of market power on offer209 
save for ad hoc, contract-specific effects analysis, which would defeat the point of a 
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simple and clear self-applied exemption regime. The use of necessarily imperfect market 
shares can therefore be interpreted as a reasonable economic and legal compromise.210  
The same defence can be made of the Article 4 presumptions of illegality for hardcore 
restrictions. Again, as imperfect generalisations ‘every single entry… could be 
substantiated or challenged’ as pro-competitive in certain instances.211 But as was 
argued above,212 if determined in an economically nuanced manner, these almost 
automatic findings of illegality can optimally reconcile reasonably accurate 
condemnation of anticompetitive practices with a form for determining legality that 
affords normative certainty to businesses. 
The recourse to four cumulative, presumption-laden steps in the VBER for finding that 
certain agreements are lawful will always represent a problematic means of market 
intervention for those seeking the perfect legal categorisation of practices into efficient 
and inefficient. Block exemptions clearly do not adopt the form of ad hoc, particularistic 
decision-making, relying instead upon the ex ante incorporation of economic thinking 
into necessarily imperfect indicators of a lack of competitive concerns. It is unsurprising 
that Joliet condemned the first block exemption for permitting agreements on 
generalised criteria ‘without examining specifically their market effect’213 and for being 
‘purely designed to avoid [the] case-by-case method.’214 Korah similarly dismissed their 
avoidance of particularistic market intervention, preferring ‘rules of general application 
to a variety of situations, thereby necessarily preventing market analysis and ‘special 
circumstances’ in the individual case.’215 Even their “new” style is said to reveal the 
Commission’s ‘stubborn unwillingness’ to embrace enforcement ‘consistent with 
economic theory’ and consider contract-specific efficiency consequences.216  
But the VBER is more an instrument of efficiency optimisation than perfectionism, and is 
much the better for it. Claims that each of the four stages to a presumption of legality 
are ‘arbitrary’,217 or constitute ‘‘simple’ rules which seem easy to apply’218 are not a 
criticism, but a reflection of their commendable imperfection. The multi-stage legal 
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analysis required for an agreement to be protected under the VBER adopts a ‘principled, 
economics-based approach’ that avoids recourse to an ex post ‘“more realistic 
assessment”’ through incorporating economic theory into a sophisticated and 
reasonably comprehensible generalised normative framework for typically pro-
competitive agreements.219 Contracts in breach of the blacklisted clauses might be 
rational and efficient in particular instances. Firms with a market share above 30% may 
be subject to substantial competitive constraint and therefore lack market power. 
Alternatively, firms falling within the threshold could still produce agreements that lead 
to harmful inefficiency on the market. And a network of parallel contracts covering more 
than half the market might not prevent market entry. Each of the steps of the VBER for 
determining contractual legality is imperfect. But if the received economic consensus 
suggests these possibilities are rarer than the opposite presumption, they represent safe 
generalisations that attempt to reasonably optimise the accurate categorisation of 
efficient agreements as legal and normative certainty for businesses, much more so than 
the automatic assumption that ad hoc, particularistic market intervention must be the 
solution.220   
Rather than ‘an outdated instrument’ in the post-modernisation era,221 the deployment 
of “new” block exemption regulations can be considered an exercise in the logic of 
optimising the efficiency-maximising end of permitting largely innocuous agreements 
and a means aspiring towards the formal rule of law. To be sure, the VBER’s four-stage 
test for affording legality to vertical agreements is less comprehensible and more 
discriminating than a single presumption, and vice versa for the alternative of 
unstructured, individualised analysis of the specific agreement in question. But the 
chosen means for determining the legality of vertical agreements can be seen to result 
from the same method of optimisation. The VBER incorporates economic consensus 
positions on the likelihood - though not inevitability - of efficiency or inefficiency ex ante 
into a series of simple, generalised steps to thereby afford a degree of legal certainty to 
businesses. 
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ii) Article 102 Illegality: Refusals to Deal 
Like the four-stage analysis of the VBER under Article 101, the law on refusals to deal 
pursuant to Article 102 can also be interpreted as a more intermediate, discriminating 
means for determining illegality, lying below the simpler presumptions on the above list 
of forms. It nevertheless avoids the normative anarchy of absolute ad hoc, refusal-
specific analysis through resorting to a series of comprehensible cumulative steps.     
Attempting to reconcile the accurate legal categorisation of individually efficient and 
inefficient refusals with the formal desiderata of the rule of law for this particular type 
of market conduct is far from a simple task. Compelling business dealing has complex 
efficiency consequences. In the short term, legally mandating access may guarantee the 
existence of competition on the downstream market and facilitate further entry, or if 
concerning intellectual property (“IP”), compulsory licencing could allow for the 
development of a new product or other innovations. The problem is striking the 
appropriate balance with long-term business incentives. If the law is thought to 
frequently permit free-riding upon investments made by others, this could have a 
chilling-effect upon the impulse to invest in the first place. This mixed picture suggests 
that finding refusals to deal ought to be rare, but not necessarily impossible. 
In the cases of Magill and Bronner the CJEU formulated multi-stage tests for determining 
the legality of refusals to deal. Both instances can be interpreted as reflecting the logic 
of optimisation, effectively incorporating ex ante their varied economic implications into 
the design of reasonably comprehensible cumulative steps to assuage business concerns 
about free-riding on their investments.222 
In Magill the Commission and CJEU both found it abusive under Article 102 for Northern 
Irish TV broadcasters to refuse to licence their schedules to a publisher wishing to 
produce a single listings magazine. This elicited a resoundingly negative response from 
many commentators, for some representing a ‘significant diminution’ of IP protection to 
the detriment of innovation,223 and a wholly disproportionate solution to the consumer 
inconvenience of buying three magazines.224 On the contrary, both the substantive 
standard and form of intervention posited by the CJEU clearly demonstrated a 
                                                          
222 For “Neo”-Chicagoan support: Evans and Padilla [2005] 87-88; Evans [2005] 94. 
223 M Waelbroeck [1991] 136-137. Similarly: Myrick [1992] 303; Subiotto [1992] 237-238; Crowther [1995] 
524-525. 
224 Myrick [1992] 303. 
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commitment to restraining the Commission to only compelling licensing ‘in exceptional 
circumstances.’225 To reassure businesses that their intellectual property was generally 
safe, it formulated a four-stage test for concluding that there had been an abuse of 
dominance. A breach of Article 102 would only be found where: there is no substitute to 
the ‘indispensable’ IP held by the dominant firm;226 such a refusal prevented the 
‘appearance of a new product’;227 it had the consequence of ‘excluding competition on 
that market’;228 and it could not be objectively justified.229 This represents a reasonable 
internalisation of the complex efficiency consequences of refusals to licences into a 
narrow, structured, comprehensible test for exceptionally finding illegality where 
inefficiency to the detriment of consumers is most likely to materialise; essentially, the 
blocking of a new product. It is both the substantively high standard for a finding of 
abuse under Article 102 and the formal restraint of the four-part test that suggests to 
businesses that their investment in innovation and development of IP will not 
unnecessarily be undermined by over-eager and unpredictable compulsory licensing 
under EU competition law. 
The same desirable combination of economically-informed restraint and clarity on 
exceptional intervention can be seen with the means for determining legality as regards 
refusing access to physical property in Bronner [1998].230 Protesting that postal delivery 
of a small newspaper was too burdensome, Bronner claimed that Mediaprint had 
abused its dominance by refusing to deliver their newspaper through its own 
sophisticated national system that could not feasibly be replicated. Advocate General 
Jacobs’ response closely considered the investment/competition trade-off and reflected 
the consensus of economic anxiety that frequent compulsion of access through Article 
102 could severely undermine incentives to invest in the first place.231 Like Magill, the 
CJEU laid out another four-part test for finding refusals to physical abusive where: it 
would  eliminate all competition on the part of the requesting party; access was 
‘indispensable to carrying on the person’s business’; there were no actual or potential 
                                                          
225 C-241-242/91P RTE & ITP v Commission [1995] ECLI:EU:C:1995:98 (“Magill [1995]”) [50]. See: Crowther 
[1995] 527; Forrester [2003] 509-510, 517, 519 (exceptionalism based on the unusual breadth of national 
copyright protection). 
226 ibid [53]. 
227 ibid [54]. 
228 ibid [56]. 
229 ibid [55]. 
230 C-7/97 Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co KG v Mediaprint [1998] ECLI:EU:C:1998:569 (“Bronner [1998]”). 
231 ibid (AG Jacobs [56]-[58]). 
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substitutes; and the refusal could not be objectively justified.232 Again, this multi-stage 
test for abusive refusals to grant access can be interpreted as reflecting the logic of 
optimisation. The CJEU made a reasonable attempt to reconcile efficiency 
considerations recommending a high substantive threshold for exceptional intervention, 
with a means for determining legality through a series of comprehensible, relatively 
narrow generalised steps.233 Of course, the stage of objective justification is a more fluid 
aspect of the legal analysis that is open to interpretation. In contrast, the generalised 
requirement of indispensability is a particularly satisfying optimisation of both the 
economic wariness on mandatory access and the desire for normative 
comprehensibility.   
Given the strictures of the legal tests developed by the CJEU in Magill and Bronner, it is 
possible that refusals to deal falling short of a finding of abuse do cause detriment to 
consumers in individual circumstances. But the logic of optimisation is one of combining 
the economic consensus (ie compulsory dealing has long-term negative investment 
consequences) with a means for determining legality that involves a series of 
generalisations which render the scope of legal prohibition comprehensible to 
businesses. It does not automatically assume that ad hoc analysis of the efficiency 
consequences of a distinct refusal ought to be determinative of its legality pursuant to 
Article 102.  
It is therefore regrettable that in Microsoft the Commission, supported by the General 
Court, expanded the narrow generalisations constituting the Magill test for compulsory 
licencing by diluting the clarity of each of the four stages of legal analysis to find an 
abuse in the instant case.234 The exacting requirements initially posited by the CJEU 
were qualified and blurred to afford the Commission more opportunities to intervene 
against specific refusals, recalibrating the Magill trade-off away from more generalised 
and comprehensible steps, towards a more individually-discriminating and 
unpredictable form of analysis. For instance, rather than excluding competition on the 
market, the woollier requirement of eliminating ‘any effective competition’ was 
adopted, thereby permitting the Commission to still find an abuse where a number of 
                                                          
232 ibid [41]. 
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fringe operators continued.235 The existence of these small competitors also raised 
questions as to whether the inter-operability information requested was strictly 
indispensable, as reverse-engineering was an available option, albeit difficult.236 The 
step of preventing a new product from arising was also found to be satisfied where a 
refusal hindered follow-on ‘technical development’, essentially allowing the Commission 
to condemn businesses that limited any incremental additions short of simply replicating 
the initial product.237 All of this led one commentator to mock the Commission’s initial 
decision as espousing the ‘doctrine of convenient facilities’.238  
Although the four-stages of legal analysis for finding a breach of Article 102 remain 
intact from Magill, each element is slightly broader and less comprehensible than 
previously, permitting a greater degree of particularistic analysis by the Commission of 
the market consequences occasioned by the refusal in question. Microsoft could be 
considered a retrograde step in the treatment of refusals to licence under Article 102, 
shifting away from the previously admirable economic nuance and legal certainty of the 
Magill and Oscar Bronner tests to thereby secure more “effective” enforcement. But in 
terms of welfare consequences and the rule of law ideal, it constitutes a lose-lose 
outcome as investments are chilled, both by the greater likelihood of compulsory 
licensing than hitherto and by a shift towards a woollier, more unforeseeable scope for 
Commission intervention. 
Be that as it may, the test for determining the legality of refusing to licence IP pursuant 
to Article 102 can still be interpreted as demonstrating the logic of optimisation. 
Although the combination of efficiency-focused ends and rule-of-law-compliant means 
may be further away from the optimum following Microsoft, especially given the 
dilution of the latter half of the sum, the test still occupies an intermediate position 
between absolute rules of legality/illegally and completely unstructured analysis of its 
specific competitive consequences. The result is a form of market intervention now 
closer to the second pole, broadening and blurring each stage of Magill, but the decision 
and ruling of the General Court continues to provide a series of cumulative, generalised 
criteria for evaluating the legality of refusals. When compared with the means of market 
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intervention advocated by efficiency perfectionists, the Microsoft test still offers 
something cognisable to IP owners, albeit to a lesser extent than previously. It also 
evidences how loosening the restraint imposed upon the Commission through 
generalised norms may facilitate more effective, efficiency-discriminating enforcement, 
but at the cost of normative comprehensibility for businesses.     
IV. Conclusion: Less is More 
The previous chapter was an exploration of how the realisation of ends in EU 
competition enforcement was often achieved by the Commission avoiding - and the EU 
Courts failing to formulate - generalised norms for determining legality that rigidified 
decision-making. Undoubtedly this means of market intervention was effective and led 
to outcomes ultimately beneficial to consumers. Nevertheless, determining the 
lawfulness of business conduct through ad hoc, subject-specific decisions, whether 
specifically dressed in the garb of Commission discretion or the indistinguishable form of 
completely unstructured effects-based analysis, is to abandon legal certainty for market 
actors. The examples considered in the previous chapter painted a bleak picture on the 
realisation of the formal rule of law in EU competition policy. 
The argument of this chapter has been that less can be more in competition 
enforcement. A variety of areas of market intervention have been discussed, where the 
acceptance of less effective ends through a variety of generalised, less-discriminating 
tests for determining legality can foster more certainty for businesses. As concerns the 
specific goal of market interventions to promote efficiency, the logic of optimising the 
means and ends of competition policy has been explored and advocated: the ex ante 
incorporation of economic consensus positions on the likelihood of positive or negative 
efficiency consequences into the design of necessarily imperfect generalisations (rules, 
presumptions, multi-stage tests) that therefore aim to provide normative 
comprehensibility, thus approximating the formal rule of law ideal. Despite the 
contemporary “Neo” label, this is the same approach to reconciling law and economics 
in competition enforcement as proposed by the original Chicago School in Chapter II, 
and possibly the Ordoliberals too in Chapter III.  
Many aspects of EU competition law can be reinterpreted as attempts at the 
optimisation of effective ends and generalised, comprehensible means in action. These 
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range from presumptions of legality developed by the CJEU for certain categories of 
prima facie restrictive agreements and clauses, through to presumptions of illegality 
under Article 101 (restrictions by object, the hardcore clauses of the VBER) and 102 
(pricing below average variable cost), and intermediate, more discriminating multi-stage 
tests (block exemption regulations, findings of abusive refusals to deal). Unlike purely ad 
hoc, unstructured effects-based analysis, these aspects of EU competition law 
imperfectly distinguish between the individually efficient and inefficient. But it is such 
modesty as to the realisation of ends that permits steps towards approximating the 
formal rule of law ideal, sometimes to a substantial degree. This is not to suggest that 
the examples considered necessarily represent the optimum reconciliation; clearer 
exceptions to certain restrictions by object and the dilution of the straightforward Magill 
steps were considered. But rather than a reason to simply abandon aspirations towards 
realising both economic nuance and the rule of law, the challenge of formulating the 
optimal means for determining legality should be considered an on-going task for 
competition lawyers and economists alike.  
When compared with the ends-focused nature of enforcement discussed in the previous 
chapter, or the common alternative proposal of perfect efficiency maximisation through 
ad hoc, conduct-specific, unstructured normative determinations, the examples 
considered in Section III are indicative of a very different approach to market 
intervention. There is a welcome rigidity and restraint to the generalised norms posited 
for analysing the legality of conduct. Attempts have been made by the Commission and 
Courts to render the ambit of legal prohibition relatively clear for businesses. And 
particularly when considering the Article 101 presumptions of legality and the AKZO 
dispute, this has often resulted from the CJEU directly rejecting conduct-specific means 
for deciding lawfulness, instead assuming leadership over the prospective development 
of the law towards norms that structure and restrain legal analysis. In settling for varying 
degrees of economic imperfection, these examples represent the closest 
approximations of the formal rule of law ideal to be found in EU competition policy. 
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Conclusion  
This thesis began with two research questions. 
The first was theoretical: to which form for determining the legality of business conduct 
should the fundamentally economic endeavour of competition policy aspire? It was 
derived from the shallow theoretical roots of scholarship exploring questions of 
appropriate form in EU competition law: where one group advocated unstructured, 
case-by-case analysis without any consideration of its formal implications or less 
absolute alternatives; and others defended “the rule of law”, “certainty”, or “judicial 
review” on the basis of an assumed relevance, with little justification of their meaning or 
place in this specific, economically-animated field.  
The response to this question advanced in Part I was that aspiring to realise the formal 
rule of law ideal - of determining legality through the application of generalised, equally-
applied, and comprehensible norms, overseen by courts – was of considerable virtue in 
competition enforcement. In eschewing ad hoc, unstructured, unpredictable 
determinations of legality in a case-by-case manner, this formal aspiration comes at a 
cost to the effectiveness with which the ends of market intervention are pursued. 
Nevertheless, by combining fledgling justifications found in the writing of the Chicago 
School and German Ordoliberalism with centuries of legal, political, and economic 
theory, it was shown that the positive implications of realising the formal rule of law 
cannot easily be discounted in competition enforcement. These include political 
desiderata, amongst them facilitating the meaningful exercise of freedom, the ability to 
plan one’s affairs, the legitimate attribution of responsibility, and an additional 
safeguard against discriminatory treatment. Perhaps more important, there are also 
economic goods from legal norms as effective institutions which facilitate market 
processes, overcoming informational limits and reducing transaction costs, whilst 
further formally restricting centralised decision-makers from overly disruptive 
interventions, especially at the behest of private rent-seeking. Additionally, as decision-
makers may be tempted to prioritise the effective pursuit of ends over the desirability of 
merely applying restrained and regularised norms of legality and illegality, the 
opportunity for judicial review is a key mechanism for these valuable outcomes to be 
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approximated over time. Courts can reactively ensure congruence between law and 
enforcement, and prospectively structure future decision-making with more generalised 
legal norms, affording greater certainty to businesses. 
Armed with a justification for aspiring towards this form of market intervention, the 
second research question turned to the reality of enforcement: do the substantive 
norms, enforcement practices, and institutions of EU competition law realise the formal 
rule of law? Part II offered a mixed response. Several illustrations were evaluated of the 
Commission attempting to avoid the rigidity and restraint of generalised, certain 
competition law norms to maximise the scope for discretionary determinations of 
legality, perhaps legitimated by deferential judicial oversight. Albeit a very effective 
means for pursuing its various policy goals, such flexible, unstructured discretion to 
engage in case-by-case analysis was achieved at the expense of certainty for businesses. 
But in contrast, many aspects of EU competition enforcement can be reinterpreted as 
attempts to reconcile economically-sophisticated ends with approximating the desirable 
means represented by the formal rule of law ideal. At times, the Commission and Courts 
have incorporated nuanced consensus positions on the likelihood and signals of 
in/efficiency ex ante into the design of norms that aspire towards generalisability and 
comprehensibility. In their abstraction from the actual market consequences of the 
individual practice, the resultant presumptions, structured tests, or indicative factors are 
necessarily imperfect for delivering the end of always accurately condemning the 
economically “bad” and permitting the “good”. But such imperfection in EU competition 
policy is to be celebrated. It is the modest restraint and foreseeable rigidity of 
determining legality through more structured means beyond ad hoc, conduct-specific 
evaluations of business practices, which allows for the political and economic virtues of 
the formal rule of law to be realised. 
Having addressed both research questions, a number of recommendations can be briefly 
offered for EU competition law scholarship going forward. 
First, the economic underpinnings of competition policy should not automatically render 
concerns about the appropriate legal form, and in particular the formal rule of law, 
irrelevant. The form of market intervention matters, not just for age-old reasons found 
in political liberalism, but as explored by certain institutionalist aspects of recent 
economic scholarship. Microeconomic price theory and the tools of industrial 
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organisation economics are legitimately the foundations of contemporary competition 
policy, but they are not exhaustive of thinking which can enlighten contentious aspects 
of European enforcement.   
Second, incorporating theoretical considerations of the appropriate legal form into 
contemporary discussions would enrich an otherwise rather superficial debate. 
Advocates of the rule of law in competition scholarship cannot simply reference the 
concept and expect it to heeded, but should make its political and economic value 
clearer. Conversely, critics of generalised norms and legal certainty ought to address 
head-on why this body of supportive literature is misguided. More crucially, those who 
indirectly and often unintentionally challenge the rule of law ideal through, for instance, 
proposing unstructured, conduct-specific determinations of legality, should more keenly 
consider the political and economic implications of their formal recommendations. The 
quality of scholarly analysis is lessened by assertions that concepts – eg the rule of law, 
subject-specific determinations - are necessarily “good” or “bad” in competition policy.  
Third, dynamics between legal institutions have a crucial impact upon the resultant 
substance and form of law. This was emphasised in the role envisaged for courts in the 
conceptualisation of the rule of law offered in Part I, and evidenced at numerous points 
in Part II. Courts can prospectively structure discretion through presumptions or multi-
stage tests, or defer when faced with attempts to stretch administrative boundaries. 
Enforcement authorities can utilise certain procedural tools (eg informal settlements) 
which essentially insulate their decision-making from effective judicial oversight and the 
restraint of pre-existing legal norms. They can also introduce certainty into their own 
decision-making when courts settle upon unstructured, case-by-case analysis (eg 
effects-based enquiries versus the Commission’s guidelines). These dynamics deserve 
closer conceptual and practical attention.   
Fourth, the perennial debate on how to render EU competition law “more economic” 
must recognise that this is not an obvious, self-evident goal. There are numerous ways 
in which it can be conceptualised and realised. Wholesale adoption of unstructured, 
conduct-specific analysis of actual market consequences to determine legality is not the 
only form by which an exclusive focus upon the goal of efficiency can be introduced into 
the law. Ex ante incorporation of economic wisdom into the design of norms aspiring to 
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realise the formal rule of law ideal offers an alternative. The positive and negative 
implications of competing “more economic” approaches should be acknowledged. 
Fifth and finally, an optimisation approach to formulating competition law, aspiring to 
realise accurate efficiency outcomes through generalised and comprehensible norms, 
still depends upon empirical economic research, but merely questions how its insights 
are utilised. Rather than stressing the importance of context, enquiries into economic 
generalisations – the likelihood of efficient and inefficient outcomes, specific instances 
of competitive concerns – should inform where particular business practices sit on the 
sliding scale between the forms of almost absolute rules and case-by-case analysis. Can 
economics provide, for instance, specific exceptions to presumptions of illegality based 
on their likely positive consequences (eg time-limited absolute territorial protection and 
pricing below AVC for new products)? As the Chicagoans explored, should effects-based 
analysis become a last resort, following a structured series of filters?  
Discovering the optimal combination of economically-accurate ends and a means that 
aspires to realise the rule of law for determining the legality of each particular type of 
conduct will require the joint, interdisciplinary effort of both competition economists 
and lawyers. Considerations of legal form, normative design, and the rule of law have 
been shown to be of political and economic significance in the pursuit of competition 
policy. As stated at the beginning, academic intrigue in this societal endeavour derives 
from its location at the intersection between law and economics. There it should 
remain. 
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